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
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
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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

VOLUME XXXVI, 1877.

NULLIUS ADDICTUS JURARE IN VERBA MAGISTRI.



NEW HAVEN:
PUBLISHED BY W. L. KINGSLEY.

PRINTED BY TUTTLE, MOREHOUSE, AND TAYLOR.

1877.

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXXXVIII.

JANUARY, 1877.

ARTICLE I.—CHINESE IMMIGRATION AND POLITICAL
ECONOMY.

THERE are indications that we are on the eve of a movement not altogether unlike the anti-slavery agitation. This time, however, the color under discussion is not black, but yellow. Books and pamphlets, letters and leading articles, begin to appear, the scattered snowflakes that come before the overwhelming storm. Reports from the Pacific coast, at first vague but recently more distinct, make it plain that there at least the agitation is no insignificant matter. A delegation of Californians has already visited Washington to influence Congress; an immense meeting has been held in San Francisco, attended by tens of thousands of citizens, the governor, several ex-governors and members of Congress; and finally a committee of the State Senate appointed to take evidence on the general effect of the presence of the Chinese in America, has made its report, copies of which have been widely circulated at the East. Whatever else may be said of this document, it shows one thing plainly enough: that there are passions aroused that will not be quieted by being disregarded. Already our astute party-leaders have scented political capital from afar, and the platforms of this year are a little varied by the appearance of a

Chinese plank. And really the questions involved are so grave that there is little danger that they will attract too much attention.

As in the anti-slavery times, the first step will be to arouse the feelings of those who are not directly concerned. California is even more remote than the Southern States, and it will be hard at first to awaken a genuine public interest in matters thousands of miles away. Only by constant and vivid representation are we aroused to the reality of the feelings of those who are far from us. The deplorable condition of the Heathen has always been a cause of distress to the Christian mind; but the uncomfortable sense of personal responsibility slumbers until some returned missionary moves the purse-strings with the recital of what he has actually witnessed. Perhaps in the fullness of time we shall have novels after the fashion of Uncle Tom's Cabin, with Chinese heroes and heroines, and San Francisco "Hoodlums" instead of Legrees. We shall hear comparisons of white horses with bay in place of black, as an argument for the equality of races, and perhaps again the scornful question will be asked as a crushing blow to all opposing reasons:—"Would you let your sister marry a Chinaman?" Yet in the case of Negro slavery, back of all the feelings of wrath at tales of cruelty, and affected contempt at such tales, there was a great underlying sense of right, that revolted against the idea that beings so much like ourselves should be forced to submit to the treatment of convicts; in the case of the Chinese, although the same principle is involved, it assumes the modified form of an enquiry whether all men have a right to settle in our boundaries. Once there was a stern determination that no more Negroes should be forced to come to America; now we must decide whether the Chinese shall be forced to stay away.

Unquestionably it is the feelings of men that will decide in the matter; yet the problem is by no means so simple as that of slavery, and perhaps stands even more in need of thoroughly statesmanlike treatment. The proposition, "Slavery is wrong," passed for self-evident; the proposition, "All men have a right to emigrate to America," does not so directly appeal to the conscience. The majority of mankind are indifferent to what does not affect either themselves or their friends; and

even those who desire to act justly require a certain amount of time to grasp the meaning of the terms of a question before their inward mentor begins to prick them on. In the case of such a problem as we have before us, the strangeness and vastness of the conditions and the remoteness of the scene, cause a pardonable hesitation about deciding at once. We need to consider all the bearings of the presence of a Chinese element in our complex nationality before we resolve either to admit or to exclude it. Not the least prominent of the considerations suggested are those derived from Political Economy, and we now proceed to give a brief statement of some of the more important of these suggestions.

The science of Political Economy has from various causes been developed in its economical rather than political aspect. The questions discussed relate to wealth, its production, distribution, and exchange, more than to the conditions of the growth and strength of nations in other respects than commercial prosperity. The causes most favorable to an immediate increase of wealth in a people may not be those that promote national stability. England is to-day the wealthiest of nations, wealthier because her population has long been engaged in peaceful production, but Prussia, it has been suggested, might perhaps turn the wealth of England to her own account, because she has followed a policy that, although economically speaking wasteful, politically may be economical. We may then depend upon the precepts of this science in considering the economic results of Chinese immigration, but for the political effects we shall have no such trusty guidance.

The factors in the production of wealth are land, labor, and capital, according to the nature and proportion of which elements is a country rich or poor. Under the term *land* are embraced all the natural materials and conditions of production; under the term *capital* are included the artificial materials, the results of previous production; while *labor* signifies the human element regarded mainly as a natural force. If we disregard land, we find that when labor is scarce and capital abundant, wages, or the reward of labor, tend to increase. If capital is scarce and labor abundant, then wages are less. In a new country, however, where land is as yet unlimited in supply,

there may be a rich reward for both capital and labor, both profits and wages may be large. In an old country where all land is under ownership, we find that the production of the land cannot be increased beyond a certain point, except by the expenditure of proportionally greater amounts of labor and capital; that is, for twice the outgo we cannot get twice the return. On the other hand, population, or labor, is restrained by no natural law except that of starvation. Hence, if things took their unimpeded course there would be continually more mouths and proportionally less bread to fill them. This is the celebrated law of Malthus, a doctrine that has been "to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness;" a law that is only less remorseless than that of natural selection because it can be suspended by human volition.

Applying these principles to the case in hand, we find that the state of California has a population of about 600,000, of which the Chinese form nearly one fifth, the number having been put as high as 150,000, but reduced by the report of the Senate's committee to perhaps 115,000. There is abundant complaint that the land is in possession of monopolists who demand for its use exorbitant rents, but we must regard the supply as practically unlimited. The supply of capital is of course not great, yet it has increased with remarkable speed. The supply of labor was deficient before the advent of the Chinese. It is only in a general way that the results of their coming can be stated, for the abundance of land renders it impossible to do more than reason hypothetically.

California being a new country both profits and wages are naturally large; capital increases rapidly and labor increases with greater or less speed, but for a long time the rate of profits as well as wages remained high, as the conditions of production would lead us to expect. Suddenly a disturbing force appeared; the supply of labor was abnormally increased by the importation of Chinese. The immediate result could not but be to diminish the rate of wages—unless this had been expected the Chinese would not have been wanted. The effect was felt by laborers in all departments where the Chinese could compete, and indirectly in all others, for a certain amount of labor would be, so to speak, forced upward by the intruding

layer. Either all labor must receive lessened wages, or some labor be unemployed. We should expect that production would be greatly stimulated, capital would rapidly increase and wages would soon tend to rise. The price of food would naturally be raised under the influence of the increased demand, but owing to the fact that wheat is largely exported from California, the price would not be affected so violently as it otherwise would be. The higher price would lead to the cultivation of more land, thus drawing off a certain amount of labor and again wages would tend to rise. Without question the aggregate wealth of the community would be greatly augmented. In brief then, after the disturbance caused by the suddenness of the increased supply of labor had ceased, the results would approximately be—a great increase in the wealth of capitalists and land-owners, diminished wages in the hands of those who were laborers before the coming of the Chinese, cheapened products for the community at large, except perhaps in the case of food, and increased development of the country. Possibly if the supply of labor were not further increased wages might finally return to perhaps the point where they were before.

But is there any reason why the supply of labor should not increase? If the Chinese can emigrate at all, there seems to be no assignable limit to the number. If a laborer can earn in China but fifteen or twenty cents, while he can earn in this country a dollar, Chinese labor will tend to come to this country. China having a population of three or four hundred million could easily spare a fraction of one per cent., which fraction might however be greater than unity in California. China may be likened to an immense reservoir of labor, California to a partial vacuum, and communication once opened between them, the current of labor once started, equilibrium will only be reached when the rate of wages is reduced so low in California that the inducements to emigrate are counterbalanced by the annoyances and difficulties. The supply of labor in China is so large that the loss of a million would hardly affect the rate of wages there, even if the natural increase of population did not soon supply the deficiency. The advent of a million Chinese in California, however, would be attended by very noticeable results. All capital would be employed to its

fullest extent, securing immense profits from the abundance of labor, but wages would in apparent violation of economic laws remain low. The effect would be precisely that of an excessive multiplication of the laboring class, a case under Malthus' law, except so far as the abundance of land acted in modification. Labor would not receive in cheapened products a compensation for lessened wages, for the increasing population would retard the fall of prices; neither would wages rise, for that tendency would be checked by an increased importation of Chinese.

The employers of labor would thus be masters of the situation. Any attempt on the part of the laboring classes to secure higher wages would be hopeless. The condition of affairs would resemble that in the southern states before the rebellion. The capitalists would be irresistible masters, the Chinese almost their slaves, and American laborers would have to content themselves with the position of the "poor whites." The condition of Italy under the empire, when the peasantry were extinguished by the unlimited importation of slaves, would furnish singularly apt and instructive material for a historical parallel. American laborers could not hope to compete with Chinese except by reducing their standard of living. Granting that a Chinaman is only one half so efficient as an American, an assumption that would probably be true only for the severest kind of labor, the American would be unable to live in the comfort to which he is now accustomed. The food and shelter that the Irishman gives to his pig would suffice for the wants of a Chinese laborer; and while this is so the Chinaman can compel the Irishman to descend to the level of his pig. Economists generally maintain that the increased production arising from lessened wages, restores ultimately to the laborer, in cheaper subsistence, what he loses in wages. But we should bear in mind, what is often overlooked, that the benefit is not immediate, while the suffering from reduced wages follows at once. It is of little practical importance to the laborer that his present loss will tend to his future gain, provided he starves in the interval. No doubt the English peasants that burned the newly invented threshing machines were foolish in the judgment of the economist, who reflected that these machines would make the bread of the laborer cheaper; but the immediate effect

was ruin to themselves. The price of bread is a matter of indifference to those who have no money at all. To philosophize when one is in security is not hard; as Gibbon remarks, to follow Stoicism with Seneca's purse is to enjoy at once the advantages of fortune and philosophy. But to one who asks for bread, the offer of a stone, even though it be that of the philosopher, is not satisfactory. If the supply of Chinese labor were to cease now, the American workman might soon find his condition no worse than it was before the immigration began. To be sure the Chinese have already monopolized certain occupations in San Francisco, but the temporary suffering of those who were driven from these trades, might be atoned for by other considerations. But if Chinese immigration is to continue at the rate of seven or eight or ten thousand a month, no human power can prevent the social degradation of American labor. Strikes would only bring an increase of the evil against which they were directed; hostile demonstrations would only incline the public to sympathize with the Chinese. Less fortunate than Sampson, the laborer would find that he had overwhelmed himself while his enemies had escaped. He would be granted only the miserable choice between living like a Chinaman and not living at all.

It would be carrying speculation too far to follow the economical effects on the remainder of the country of such an immigration to the Pacific coast. Of course cheap labor would attract capital, and manufacturers at the East would find themselves obliged to reduce wages or abandon business. Certain articles are already produced by Chinese labor at rates that threaten to drive competitors even out of the Eastern market. Immense quantities of salmon, for instance, are preserved and already exported to a considerable extent. The star of commercial empire may take its way westward, and the manufacturing population of the East may come to look back with regret at the times they now find so hard.

On the whole, then, the economical results of Chinese immigration would be a great increase of wealth, confined principally to those who already possess it, the capitalists, and a temporary, and probably permanent reduction of the rate of wages of American labor. At present, it is true, the Chinese

do not remain in this country perhaps more than five or six years, so that this danger is still remote; but there are indications that they may be disposed to make a longer stay. Doubtless too the bad treatment they have received, and are likely to receive, will operate as a check on further immigration, as the Chinese companies in San Francisco have already given orders to discourage applicants at Hong Kong. The worship of ancestors requiring the return of all dead bodies to China will operate strongly as a discouragement to permanent emigration, until some one, like the pious Æneas, hits on the happy plan of carrying with him his father and his household gods. The danger and expense of the passage, ignorance of our language, and a thousand other causes will all tend to retard the results above described. Time is the best prophet.

Some political aspects of the question remain to be considered. In case the Chinese should choose to make their permanent abode in our country, there is nothing to prevent them from being naturalized. They have the right under the Burlingame treaty to whatever privileges are accorded "to the most favored nation." As they already constitute one-fifth of the population of California, and are almost entirely adult males, they nearly equal in numbers the legal voters in that State. A slight addition would put them in the majority, and if they chose to combine, as they naturally would, the government of the State would, under our democratical system, fall into their hands. Adopting our principle of compulsory State-education they would be justified in teaching their own views of science, religion and morals. They would have the same right to compel American scholars to listen to the institutes of Confucius, that a Yankee majority has to compel Irish children to listen to the Protestant Bible. They would have as much right to displace all American office-holders as a republican majority has to displace all servants of the State that hold with another party. The consequences of such an inversion of races could not fail to be serious. The Chinese would have the advantage of law on their side; all they have to do is to open their eyes to the advantages of naturalization, to import a few more of their brethren, and they become the legal majority. Opposition to their rule must therefore be in violation of the fundamental

principles of our government; the choice would lie between submission and revolution. Californians are not subdued rebels, and the disgraceful history of South Carolina since the war, would not be repeated on the Pacific coast among a people the most independent in the world, and far removed from the central authority. United States marshals and troops may be able to enforce Negro supremacy in the South; they would find in the far West a more difficult field for their labors.

Hitherto in the history of the world, the possession of the earth has been decided by force. Stronger races have destroyed or expelled the weaker; *vae victis* has been the rule of invaders. "Let them take who have the power, and let them keep who can," may be regarded as the principle that has practically regulated the ownership of the soil. Natural selection knows nothing of the doctrine that all men are created equal. Formerly, as Cicero observed, although he put a wrong explanation on the phenomenon, the word for "enemy" was the same with that for "stranger;" and "outlandish" still means to us something repulsive. We are witnessing for the first time the experiment of the peaceful mingling of men of different races in one republic. Views may differ as to the success of the experiment hitherto; but no one is so rash as to maintain that the result is not a matter for anxiety. It was a severe strain on our institutions to admit the Negroes to the suffrage, and the most ardent believer in democracy might well be disposed to wait for a few years before extending the same privilege to the Chinese. "Government of the people, for the people, by the people," means one thing when the people are mainly of English blood, but it may have quite a different signification in the case of France or Spain. In spite of the declaration of independence, it is well to remember that self-government is not a characteristic of all races. In short, it is wise to reflect that we are trying a gigantic experiment in nation-building, on an entirely new principle. By our theory of equal rights, we have removed one of the conditions unfavorable to the survival of weaker races. If the Chinese were to be left to their natural enemies, the lower class of laborers, the problem would be quickly solved. They would be exterminated in the literal sense of the word. For a more powerful race to admit an

inferior one to its boundaries on terms of equality is as marvellous an inversion of natural laws, as an eastward emigration is in the history of mankind.

Self-interest as a motive may be condemned in the individual. He will be a zealous and consistent intuitionist, indeed, who will insist that his principle applies also to States. Can it be said to be the duty of a people to sacrifice itself to the good of the world at large? A life-boat is designed for saving men from drowning, but if it is loaded beyond its capacity it will sink. Our ship of State may suffer a similar experience. Nothing in the history of Political Economy has excited more serious discussion than the elevation of the laboring classes; to a nation of freemen, the possible degradation of a large number of citizens, a degradation proverbially hard to overcome, would be an appalling danger. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that a number of millions of Chinese come to our shores, are we ready to accept all the possible consequences? Is the declaration of equal rights a venerable platitude, a "glittering generality," or shall it be logically applied? Do we feel so firmly convinced that the Chinese are created our equals, that we should surrender to them the control of our government in case they become the majority? Or if this supposition seem too absurd, let us imagine the question asked where the absurdity no longer exists, by a citizen of California.

It is not here maintained that the Chinese are about to overrun the United States. It is not even asserted that they will outnumber the American population on the Pacific slope. The elements of the problem are as yet too uncertain to admit of any positive statement. But a possible danger there certainly is, and where the questions involved are so momentous, it is perhaps not too soon to begin their discussion.

ARTICLE II.—AS TO ROGER WILLIAMS.

As to Roger Williams, and His "Banishment" from the Massachusetts Plantation; with a Few Further Words concerning the Baptists, the Quakers, and Religious Liberty; A Monograph.
By HENRY MARTYN DEXTER, D.D., Member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, &c., &c. Boston. Congregational Society.

AS TO ROGER WILLIAMS not much remains to be said, since the publication of Dr. Dexter's monograph. We are somewhat late in our notice of this work; but we may express our judgment the more confidently for having taken time to think about it. Our judgment is that whatever questions may be raised, here and there, touching the author's interpretation of some subordinate and incidental facts, his vindication of the Massachusetts authorities in their dealings with Roger Williams is complete. Concede to that "fiery Welchman" all that is claimed for him as the apostle of what he called "soul liberty"—admit that the Massachusetts fathers had no just conception of the distinction between church and State, and that they never doubted their right or their duty to suppress by power whatever opinion might seem to them dangerous—the fact remains (and Dr. Dexter has set it in a clear light), that Roger Williams, with all his genius, and all the picturesqueness of his figure in history, was not, at the time when he lived in Massachusetts, the right man in the right place. Erratic, enthusiastic, heady, fascinating in his gift of eloquence, magnetic in his influence on kindred minds, he was just the man with whom it was impossible to get on except by absolute submission to his whims; and his whims, in the then perilous condition of that colony, were hardly less dangerous than the caprices of a child playing with fire. The case was this:

A certain corporation, named "the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay," was the chartered proprietor of the territory in which it was beginning to plant a religious colony. The Company was formed, and the colony was to be established

in the interest of certain religious convictions. Whether the convictions were correct or erroneous, liberal or narrow, neither here nor there; the doctrine of "soul liberty" is the religious convictions, as such, are to be respected. Were not the religious convictions of "the Governor and Company" sacred a thing as the religious convictions of Roger Williams. By their charter from the English crown, and by the equity common sense, the founders of Massachusetts had a right to admit whom they would into their partnership, and to shut out any who seemed likely to be troublesome members—the same right that a missionary society has to determine who shall, and who shall not, partake in its management at home or in its work at its missionary stations. They had a right to determine who should inhabit their territory, and under what conditions—the same right which a "total" colony by the name of Greeley or by any other name, whether in Colorado or in New Jersey, has to make some pledge of total abstinence a condition of the tenure of town lots. Outside of Massachusetts there was room enough for all who could not accept the principles on which that colony was to be established. If Roger Williams could not accept those principles, there was room for him elsewhere, and not very far away—as was afterwards demonstrated by experiment.

Williams knew full well that the enemies of Massachusetts were numerous, and were ever on the look-out for matter of accusation against it. He knew that the Governor and Company had been careful to disavow all the extreme opinions professed by Separatists, and had proclaimed their intention to maintain fellowship with "their brethren in and of the Church of England." He knew what accusations against the colony had been current among its enemies, and were even preferred in a petition to the King in Council: that it intended rebellion, was casting off its allegiance, was separating wholly from the church and laws of England; and that its ministers and people were continually railing against the State, and the ecclesiastical dignitaries of the mother country. He knew what danger there was that the charter on which all the legal rights of the colony depended, and without which no title to real estate the colony was valid, might be revoked by an unscrupulous

king or nullified by sycophant judges. He knew that every wild opinion, political or religious, and every fantastic practice that might be tolerated in the colony, would help the enemies that were plotting to bring over a royal governor, and with him not the Prayer-book only but the ecclesiastical courts, and all that machinery of oppression from which he himself in common with the Pilgrims of Plymouth, and the Puritans of Massachusetts had fled across the ocean. Knowing all this, how did he behave himself?

He arrives at Boston in February, 1631, hardly six months after the beginning of the settlement there, and was received with welcome as "a godly minister." He begins by condemning the Boston church for its too great liberality, inasmuch as it had not in his views sufficiently "separated" from the Church of England, or, more explicitly, "because they would not make a public declaration of their repentance for having communion with the churches of England while they lived there." Next we find him at Salem, a year later, where the church, charmed with his gifts, was ready to make him one of its official ministers. He has broached the opinion "that the magistrate may not punish the breach of the Sabbath, nor any other offense, as a breach of the first table," or in other words as an offense against God. The opinion, as we now understand it, is a sound one; but, there and then, it was novel and startling, and if not suppressed, was quite as likely as any other radical doctrine to bring reproach upon the colony, and to strengthen the hands of those who were plotting to bring New England into the enjoyment of such liberty and liberality as might be had under the lordship of William Laud. Was the alarming novelty suppressed? Was the man who had propounded it called to account before any other tribunal than that of public opinion? All that appears is that some of the leading men, at the most not more than six—being convened at Boston on public business, and hearing that the church in Salem—a very conspicuous church—was likely to make that erratic dogmatizer its official teacher, united in addressing to another leading man, Capt. Endicott of Salem, a letter of advice and caution. Thereupon, it seems, the church, "for the present, forebore proceeding;" and next we find Mr. Williams among the Separatists in

the old colony. Surely the Pilgrims had sufficiently professed their repentance for whatever communion they, in the time before their separation, had held with the parish churches in England.

In the church at Plymouth, Mr. Williams, being "a godly minister," is received as he was at Boston. He preaches, unofficially, in "the exercise of prophesying;" and his preaching stimulates thought and discussion. Here he comes out with a new crotchet. In the English language of the seventeenth century, the word "Goodman" has very nearly the same meaning (or the same no-meaning) with "Mr." in our nineteenth century English; and "Goodwife" or "Goody" is the feminine form of the familiar title. But in the burning and shining light wherewith Plymouth is illuminated by Roger Williams, the momentous truth appears that if, conforming to the fashion of this world, we address John Doe as Goodman Doe, and Richard Roe as Goodman Roe, we thereby testify that the said John Doe and Richard Roe are "good," in the highest and theological sense, and have been divinely regenerated. Pastors Ralph Smith and Brother Roger Williams insist vehemently on the discovery, until "by their indiscreet urging of this whimsey the place begins to be disquieted." It happens that Governor Winthrop of the new and Puritan colony, and Pastor Wilson of the Boston church, with others, come to Plymouth on a friendly visit. On the Lord's day, the brethren from Boston partake with the Plymouth church in the sacramental communion. We have a glimpse of what was the Sunday afternoon service in that church. After prayer and psalm (doubtless), "Mr. Roger Williams, according to their custom, propounds a question," and "the wiser people" in the church have so arranged the procedure, that he propounds the question by which the place has been disquieted: Is it lawful to call an unregenerate man by the name of "Goodman such an one?" Pastor Smith speaks briefly to the question. Then Mr. Williams prophesies, and is followed by Governor Bradford, by Elder Brewster, and by "some two or three more of the congregation." Then "the elder," Brewster, the venerable president of the assembly, invites "the Governor of Massachusetts and Mr. Wilson to speak," not to exhort at random, but to speak "■

the question," "which they did." All this was "the exercise of prophesying." Cotton Mather tells us (and his testimony may pass for what it is worth), "That speech of Mr. Winthrop's put a lasting stop to the little, idle, whimsical conceits, then beginning to grow obstreperous."

As if the aforesaid whimsey were not strange enough, the author of it, after another year or two in the same church, "*begins*" (as we learn from Governor Bradford,) "to fall into some strange opinions, and from opinion to practice, which causes some controversy between the church and him, and in the end some discontent on his part by occasion whereof he leaves them something abruptly." He returns to Salem in 1638, and becomes informally an assistant to the pastor there. He "exercises his gifts, but is in no office." It seems that he has brought with him the strange opinions which were the occasion of controversy at Plymouth, and of discontent on his part because he was "seeking to impose them on others." Of course he is no less opinionated, and no less desirous of making others adopt his convictions in the place to which he has now returned after a three years' absence. So important in his view are those opinions, that he has written a "treatise" in support of them; and the treatise, though not printed (for as yet there is no printing in New England), has become, as of course it could not but become, a matter to be talked about and discussed. At the request of Governor Winthrop, the "treatise" is submitted to the consideration of the magistrates at Boston. Thus we learn, definitely, what the strange opinions are which have produced disquiet at Plymouth, and are now propagated at Salem. What are they? It appears that Mr. Williams denies the authority assumed by the late King, James I, and the reigning King, Charles I, in giving the successive patents and charters under which the colonization of this great wilderness has been begun and thus far carried on. The charter of Massachusetts was granted in the exercise of usurped authority, and has no real validity. "He chargeth King James to have told a solemn public lie, because in his patent he blessed God that he was the first Christian prince that had discovered this land." "He chargeth him [King James] with blasphemy for calling Europe Christendom or the Christian world." "He personally applies to"

the present King certain passages from the Apocalypse, representing him as in alliance with the kings of the earth against God Almighty, as giving "power and strength to the beast," and as committing fornication with the great Roman harlot. He "concludes" that all who claim anything under the charter "lie under a sin of unjust usurpation upon other's possessions." Shall it be published in England—shall it be told to the king, and to Laud—shall it be reported in the Privy Council, that such opinions are not only held in Massachusetts, but are propagated without "censure" from the authorities of the colony? What shall the court do? Here is a conspicuous and influential man at work "to weaken the confidence of the freemen of the Company in the charter in which all their legal rights as a plantation are bound up;" and, at the same time, strengthening the hands of those malignant enemies who are plotting to destroy the colony by depriving it of its charter. We cannot wonder that the magistrates, after taking advice, give order that he "be convented at the next court to be censured." An unofficial letter is addressed by the Governor to Endicott, giving him information of what has been done by the court, adding some arguments in refutation of the errors, and requesting him to deal with Mr. Williams in the hope of his coming right. Endicott replies kindly, and Williams himself, writes to the Governor, and, more formally, to the Governor and Council. On this occasion certainly, we may commend his modesty and his discretion. He tells why the treatise was written, professes that he has no intention of becoming an agitator, "withal offering his book or any part of it to be burnt." At the next court, he appears, "and gives satisfaction of his intention and loyalty." All seems hopeful. The court (Governor and Council) "weighing his letter, and farther considering the offensive passages" in his book, "find the matters not to be so evil as at first they seemed." On the whole it is "agreed that upon his retractation, &c., or taking an oath of allegiance to the king, &c., it shall be passed over."

Six weeks later, the lively and irrepressible Roger becomes again conspicuous. This time his crotchet is comparatively harmless. At the Thursday lecture in Boston, "a question is propounded about veils." The question is founded, doubtless,

on 1 Cor. xi. Mr. Cotton gives his judgment "that where, by the custom of the place, veils are not a sign of the women's subjection, they are not commanded by the Apostle." But Captain Endicott, an admiring hearer of Mr. Williams, is of the opposite opinion, and "maintains it by the general arguments brought by the Apostle." The debate proceeds with increasing earnestness till the Governor, perceiving that little good is likely to come of it, interposes, and it is broken off. Mr. Williams has taught the women of Salem that in religious assemblies they must always be veiled. They remain under the bondage till Mr. Cotton, passing a Sunday at Salem, and preaching on that subject in the morning, turns the fashion, and they are free. In the afternoon of that memorable day, they appear at church without their veils. All this is significant as illustrating the character and tendency of the ministry in Salem. Wherever Roger Williams preaches to admiring hearers, there one whimsical opinion after another—all more or less mischievous—will surely be vented and will have eager partisans; at one time it will be held impious to address an unregenerate man in the terms of ordinary civility; at another it will be considered unscriptural, and inconsistent with the profession of godliness, for maid or matron to appear in church without such envelopment as modest women wore at Corinth in the year of our Lord 60; and who can tell how soon the whimsey of the hour may be something far more formidable?

We go forward from March to November, and behold! a new trouble at Salem. Capt. Endicott, himself a magistrate and otherwise one of the most conspicuous men in the colony, is just the man to catch from Mr. Williams any fantastic scruple, and to proceed fearlessly from fantastic opinion to corresponding practice. The cross in the English flag is a symbol of superstition; and the flag, while that cross remains, is one of the rags of Popery. Awakened to this fact, and repenting of the idolatry which he has committed in the days of his ignorance, Capt. Endicott bravely mutilates the flag; and the red cross ceases to float over the trained band in Salem. The colony awakes to alarm and controversy. On the part of judicious and prudent men who do not regard the flag as a thing to be worshipped, or the act of marching under it as an act of

worship, there is a reasonable fear that in the perilous condition of the colony as related to the king, the act of "‘defacing the king’s colors,’ will be taken as an act of treason or of like high nature." On the other hand, men whose consciences are sensitive to the scruple must needs disregard all considerations of prudence and cast out the idol, "not fearing the wrath of the king." For some months—though a letter has been written to England, by the magistrates, disowning the act, and cautiously expressing an intention to punish the offenders—the agitation continues. At last, brave Endicott is publicly censured by the General Court, and made incapable of any office for a year. Gradually that question passes out of sight.

Meanwhile another difficulty has come up, in which Mr. Williams is more conspicuously involved. Complaint is made to the assembled magistrates that, in violation of his promise, he is "teaching publicly against the king’s patent and our great sin in claiming right thereby to this country;" and also that he "usually terms the churches of England anti-Christian." Accordingly he is summoned to appear at the next court, March 3–13, 1635. But the record of that next court shows no trace of anything done in the matter. The reason seems to be that Mr. Cotton with the concurrence of other elders and brethren, has entreated the magistrates "to forbear all civil prosecution" till the case shall have been dealt with "in a church way;" their charitable confidence being "that his violent course did rather spring from scruple of conscience (though carried with an inordinate zeal) than from a seditious principle."

But whatever may be done "in a church way" or any other way, the great subject of these proceedings goes on in his own Roger-Williams way. Only one month later (May 30–June 9) the court is constrained to "send for Mr. Williams." There is a new difficulty between him and the government. "He is teaching publicly that a magistrate ought not to tender an oath to an unregenerate man, for that thereby we have communion with a wicked man in the worship of God, and cause him to take the name of God in vain." In the existing condition of affairs there is that which makes such teachings very significant. If we remember that this colony of the Bay has been

planted by Puritans for Puritans; that the Governor and Company have a right to determine what sort of people they will have to inhabit their territory—the same right that the proprietor of a farm has to determine whom he will entertain as a tenant or a transient guest; that the few inchoate plantations of the colony may be swamped, and the whole enterprise wrecked, by the incoming of uninvited and undesired strangers—outlaws, fugitives from justice, moon-struck enthusiasts, enemies of the churches and the state, conspirators against all the ends for which the enterprise has been begun—we understand why it has been ordered that every man above the age of twenty years who is or proposes to be a resident within the jurisdiction for six months or more, shall bind himself by an oath to obey the laws, to promote the peace and welfare of the body politic, and to reveal all plots and conspiracies against it that come to his knowledge. This is called “the Resident’s Oath.” It is of course opposed by the malignants who invade the colony for the purpose of subverting it; and the great agitator has come to their aid. Therefore the court has sent for him. “He is heard before all the ministers,” and in their opinion and that of the court, though not in his own, is “very clearly confuted.” Even his admiring friend, Capt. Endicott, who had accepted this crotchet as heartily as he accepted the crotchet about the flag, is convinced by the refutation, and “gives place to the truth.” So the matter rests. At present, certainly, there seems to be no interference with Mr. Williams’s “soul liberty”—no punishment for holding or for holding forth his fantastic opinion, save the punishment implied in a public refutation.

But inasmuch as Mr. Williams, though “clearly confuted” is not convinced, but is like that schoolmaster of the Deserted Village (never yet heard of) who,

“Though vanquished oft could argue still,”

it is proposed to try again what can be done “in a church way.” The churches, not having the light which has dawned upon some modern Congregationalists, and seeing no way in which they can deal with the obnoxious minister save by dealing with the church in which he is a member, are preparing to

remonstrate by their letters with that church for its acceptance of his teaching. Just at this juncture, the Salem church hurls a sort of defiance at its sisters, by formally electing and ordaining to the office of teacher the minister whose erratic notions are so offensive, and who till now has simply "exercised his gifts" without being in office. Consequently, at the court in July, Mr. Williams, having been summoned to appear, is present. Certain "dangerous opinions," for which he has been "under question before the magistracy and churches," are recited, and are adjudged by all, magistrates and ministers " (for the ministers have been invited to give their advice) "to be erroneous and very dangerous; and the calling of him to office, at that time, is judged a great contempt of authority."

The affair has become very serious, and on each side there is something of indignation against the other. "Salem men" (we know not who or how many) have preferred a petition to this General Court, claiming that a certain tract of land "in Marblehead neck" belongs to their town, and asking that their claim be conceded. Nothing can be more evident than that there is an adverse claim, and that, in the existing relations between Salem and the rest of the colony, it will be difficult to decide the question impartially. Reasonably enough (so far as we can see) the decision is postponed "till, &c.," which phrase from Winthrop's History may be understood to mean "till there shall be a better state of feeling."

At this stage of the growing controversy, Mr. Williams initiates a new movement. He seems to think that a disputed boundary between Salem and Marblehead may be adjusted by church authority overruling the civil government. Accordingly he proposes that the ecclesiastical censure of admonition shall be inflicted on the members of the General Court for what they have done, or have not done, about the land in Marblehead neck. He obtains the consent of his church to "letters of admonition [and seemingly of objurgation] written and sent in their name to the churches at Boston, Charlestown, Newtown," and elsewhere, demanding that they shall deal with the magistrates and deputies belonging to them respectively for the "heinous sin" of not yet adjusting the disputed boundary between Marblehead and Salem to the satisfaction of "Salem

men." In other words he attempts to use church discipline for the decision of a question about the ownership of real estate. He, ruling the church at Salem and swaying it by his caprices is to be "a judge and divider over" the young commonwealth. But the churches, or their elders, instead of yielding to Mr. Williams and his church, take occasion from those letters of admonition "to deal with him and the church in a church way." Some of the churches "write to the church of Salem to present before them the offensive spirit and way of their officer both in judgment and practice." These proceedings in the way of admonition and counter-admonition are not without effect at Salem. At last it begins to be felt there that Mr. Williams has erred in some things, and "divers of them that joined with him in those letters"—"acknowledge their error and give satisfaction." He finds that the majority of his own church is no longer with him in this last movement. What next?

On the Lord's day, Aug. 16-26, 1635, the church at Salem, being assembled for worship under the presidency of its Ruling Elder, receives a written communication from its Teaching Elder who is detained at home by some temporary illness. The letter from Mr. Williams is "delivered and read in the public church assembly;" and the scope of it is "to give them notice that if the church of Salem will not separate not only from the churches of old England but the churches of New England too, he will separate from them." He does not merely resign his office, he announces his withdrawal from the church, and will have henceforth no communion with it in sacrament or in prayer, unless it will follow him in his renunciation of all communion with the surrounding churches. "The more prudent and sober part of the church, being amazed at his way, cannot yield to him;" and indeed "the whole church is grieved," and it may well be. It finds itself excommunicated by its own minister because it has declined to excommunicate all other churches at his bidding. He means what he says. The Sabbaths come and go, but he comes no more into that assembly. He holds a private meeting in his own house with as many as will stand on his platform of "rigid Separation." He will have no communion whatever, in worship, with any-

body who worships in that church. He refuses even to pray with his own wife, or to give thanks with her at their family table, till she too withdraws from the church which he has denounced as "anti-Christian."

A General Court is held (Sep. 2-12,) while the excitement caused by these proceedings is blazing; but though the attempt of the Salem church to coerce the civil government by ecclesiastical power is noticed, not without grave resentment, no mention seems to be made of Mr. Williams as responsible for that attempt. Inasmuch as he has withdrawn from all the churches of the colony, why may there not be a hope that, in his disgust, he will withdraw from the colony itself? But at an adjourned session, five weeks later, to which all the ministers in the Bay have been invited, "Mr. Williams, the teacher at Salem," has been summoned and is present. The matter charged against him is in the two letters which have so disturbed the tranquility of the commonwealth; "that to the churches, complaining of the magistrates for injustice, extreme oppression, etc.,—and the other to his own church, to persuade them to renounce communion with all the churches in the Bay, as full of anti-christian pollution, etc. He justifies both these letters, and maintains all his opinions, and being offered further conference or disputation, and a month's respite, he chooses to dispute presently. So Mr. Hooker"—soon to become the famous Thomas Hooker of Hartford—"is appointed to dispute with him, but cannot reduce him from any of his errors."* An

* "One single glimpse of this debate is afforded us by Mr. Cotton, writing not very long after. He says that Mr. Williams complained, now in open court, that he was wronged by a slanderous report up and down the country, as if he did hold it to be unlawful for a father to call upon his child to eat his meat. Our reverend brother Mr. Hooker (the pastor of the church where the court was then kept) being moved to speak a word to it, 'Why,' saith he, 'you will say as much again (if you stand to your own principles) or be forced to say nothing.' When Mr. Williams was confident he should never say it, Mr. Hooker replied, 'If it be unlawful to call an unregenerate person to take an oath, or to pray, as being actions of God's worship, then it is unlawful for your unregenerate child to pray for a blessing upon his own meat. If it be unlawful for him to pray for a blessing upon his meat, it is unlawful for him to eat it, for it is sanctified by prayer, and without prayer unsanctified, 1 Tim. iv, 4, 5. If it be unlawful for him to eat it, it is unlawful for you to call upon him to eat it, for it is unlawful for you to call upon him to sin.' Here Mr. Williams thought better to hold his peace than give

adjournment is had, and the next day "the court sentences him to depart out of our jurisdiction within six weeks, all the ministers save one approving the sentence, and his own church having him under question also for the same cause."

We must not rehearse in detail the sequel of the story;—how, instead of a strict enforcement of the sentence, he was permitted in consideration of his health to remain in Salem through the winter, under an injunction "not to go about to draw others to his opinions;"—how, as soon as he was well enough, he renewed his work of agitation;—how the court of magistrates, finding their authority defied and their clemency (or what they thought was clemency) abused, attempted to put him on shipboard, that he might try what liberty there was for such agitation in England; how he escaped out of their hands, and went beyond their jurisdiction into the land of Narragansett, where he builded a city and devoutly named it Providence; how, notwithstanding the contempt with which Puritan statesmen in the other colonies regarded his experiment in the science of government, or as they thought no-government, the relations between him and them were always friendly;—how he grew wiser and gentler, though hardly less crotchety, as he grew older;—how he kept company with the wild men of the woods, winning their confidence and love;—how his old age was honored;—how he died and was buried, leaving a name not unworthy of grateful and perpetual remembrance wherever there is perfect liberty for men to think, to speak their thoughts, and to worship in spirit and in truth. It is enough that our learned friend, Dr. Dexter, has given us a vision of the irrepressible conflict between Roger Williams and the Puritanism of Massachusetts Bay.

an answer." Dexter, p. 57. Alas! for the quibble about "unregenerate doings"—a quibble that has puzzled the heads and hardened the hearts of thousands! Too often a "chop-logic" theology, misled by false philosophy, has put the light of life into a dark lantern, and has entangled the preaching of the gospel in perplexities which no ordinary hearer can unravel.

ARTICLE III.—THE INWARD AND THE OUTWARD.

THE ordinary view of the Inward and the Outward sets each against the other in the contrast of a perpetual antithesis. Though while each has its partisans, no one can support both; he that maintains one of them thereby excludes the other; whichever is declared true, the other is by implication declared false. Here is the root of wide-branching, multitudinous controversy; and to the end of time there is no hope of settlement; for in reality each one is as true—and as false—as the other. The view which this paper will endeavor to present offers terms of an honorable peace in the alliance of the contending parties, for it declares that the Inward and the Outward are correlative and that the being of each lies wholly in the mutual relation. Each is what it is only by reason of the other, and the truth of either is to be found in the fact of both. Apart from each other they are abstractions and untrue, for the actual is the indivisible concrete of them both. Looked at from the inward the actual is an *Essence* which *must appear*; and looked at from the outward, it is a *Phenomenon* which is the appearance of an *Essence*. There is an Inward which makes itself outward and there is an Outward which is only the inward *as outward*. With this brief general statement of our principle, let us follow it into the three special spheres of Nature, Morals and Art.

I. NATURE. A fundamental question for human science is—what is the real—what is ultimate, essential reality? The first answer was that of Physics: Nature, the materiality which is to perception. Nay, retorted Metaphysics, it is the Supernatural, the ideality which is to thought. Each insisted on his own answer; neither would hear to the other's. The one would exclude ideality altogether, for that it held to be distinctly the unreal. The other was equally determined to exclude materiality, being equally clear that *that* was the unreal. The dispute was waxing warm when Philosophy entered and after listening awhile took advantage of a pause to interrupt: My

friends, you are both right, or rather you are both wrong. Reality, that which truly is, cannot be Matter, for matter is that which is and is not. It fleeth as a shadow and never continueth in one stay. It is perishable; indeed to perish is its very nature. Nor is reality purely ideal, for that is in the air, a mere possible; a maybe which as yet is not. Give over quarreling, join hands, and learn the truth. Reality is not materiality alone, or ideality alone, but both together. That which is, is the indivisible, homogeneous concrete of ideal and material. The Inward *and* the outward, because the inward *of* the Outward, and the outward *of* the Inward. You are standing on opposite sides of the gold and silver shield, and, stoutly maintaining your exclusive views, tilt against each other on a mistaken issue in which both are right and yet neither. But they would not listen, and shrugging their shoulders each went his several way. Philosophy looked after them saying to herself: Well, it is but a question of time. Truth is truth whether we know it or not; whether we admit or deny it, we cannot alter it. Take your separate roads; wherever you think they are leading, you will find they bring you together, as workmen in a tunnel who begin to bore the rock from opposite sides, and see nothing of each other till the work of each is completed, and then they meet in the middle and shake hands, standing for the first time in full light with a view from end to end. And Philosophy walked away to her own higher speculations.

Time is verifying this prophecy. The work of physical and of metaphysical science, each on its own line, has already advanced far enough to bring them nearer together than they were at first, and so we have spoken of the doctrines of abstract materialism and abstract idealism in the past tense. The latter, as a doctrine involving the denial of reality to matter, disappeared with Berkeley, or is maintained only by a few Rip Van Winkles of Berkeleyism who have slept through a century of progressive thought. Idealism, which we may characterize for convenience as abstract in Berkeley, transcendental in Kant, subjective in Fichte, objective in Schelling, and absolute in Hegel, has arrived by these stages at the concrete position stated above, where Matter is embraced within the actual as the externality of the ideal, subsidiary, yet essential

to it. Here thought is seen to be the inward being of Nature. "Nature," the old *natura rerum*—the nature of *things*, rather means the nature of thought. Thus it has worked clear through from its starting point and to-day stands ready to join hands with materialism when it shall break through from its side to meet it. Materialism for its part has abandoned its exclusive form, in which it denied reality to the ideal. It is true that this abandonment is largely unconscious. It is a substantial abandonment, but not one declared or admitted. Physics has turned Metaphysics out of the front door and does not perceive that she has reentered by the back door. She still rejects all terms and phrases of Metaphysics, not perceiving that while she is banishing the word idealism she is admitting the thing. In short Physics herself is becoming metaphysical. At present her whole quest is for the ideal, but since she is seeking it within Nature and not without, she continues to repudiate idealism. For she has passed the encyclopedic stage of mere gathering of facts, and begun to generalize. She has advanced, that is, from perception to thought. She is no longer satisfied with classifying salts, and stones, and sea-weed, and mushrooms and monkeys according to their appearance; she inquires what they are. Her concern now is no longer with mere phenomena but with their principles, forces, and laws,—that is, with entities unsensuous, immaterial, hyperphysical; in a word, ideal. These are not found in "experience," but in reason; they are not perceived, but conceived. She reproaches Metaphysics with being mere intellectuality, mere subjective brain-spinning, but the fact is the farther she herself advances the more purely intellectual becomes the matter of her study. She seeks the principles of Matter and finds that these are none other than the principles of Mind, and this might serve at least to hint that mind is not a subject merely but the substance of all that is. But a nod is as good as a wink to a blind horse. The leaders of Science cling to their material basis even while they make various novel admissions as they feel it turning over with them. One says that the facts of existence may be described indifferently in terms of materialism or in terms of idealism; another says he is no materialist, and believes that system to involve grave philosophical error; another declares that matter

contains the promise and potency of life and spirit, but adds that the idea of matter must be more profound and comprehensive than the current mechanical conception; another says that the analysis of matter leads to the immaterial and non-extended as the elements of which matter is composed, and adds the further statement that "nature in itself is mind." Thus materialism has come to see that ideality pervades the material universe as water is held in a sponge and it alters its old conception of matter accordingly. That is no longer mechanical but dynamic; no longer inert and dead, but charged with forces and instinct with life. The new position is that matter embraces ideality, that matter itself is ideal. Nature is everywhere sleeping spirit, and in the animal and man it awakes to movement and thought; *matter itself awakes* and there is an end of the dualism of matter and mind.

Well, some one may say, it would seem that idealists ought to be satisfied, unless they wish to maintain a logomachy. For they too would do away with the dualism of matter and mind. Physics agrees with them that the whole question is homogeneous and demands one method; that there is one science only, name it as one pleases, the science of that which is. Physics is really only opposed to abstract idealism, to the idealism which ignores nature and which modern idealists have given up. It may deny the *supernatural*, or ideality taken apart from the material universe and unconnected with it, but it will admit the *intra-natural*, and that modern idealists ought to accept as the truer term. Softly, good friends: Once more, what is the Actual? Is it the concrete of thought and matter so constituted that the first is the inward, the essence, and the second the outward, the phenomenon; or is it matter alone, matter however embracing, containing thought and evolving it as the highest mode or quality of its own being? Here a new issue has arisen. To take a particular instance that may make it plainer, is it vitality, an immaterial force, that organizes matter, or is it matter that develops life, that of itself becomes alive, so that vitality is a term as unscientific as "aquosity" would be? Scientists and philosophers agree in giving both the material and the ideal a necessary place in the actual; so far good; but which is original and which derivative? This question is sometimes treated

as unimportant, but in reality it is very far from being so. At bottom it is the same old question unresolved that presents itself again; is it thought or thing that is? Does mind constitute matter, or matter constitute mind? We are told that we may speak of existence indifferently in terms of matter or terms of spirit, but this question is not disposed of by admission of idealistic terminology; it is not a question of words but of the meaning that lies under them. What is your intellectual point of view; which way do you face; to put a technical question, what do you understand by matter? Is it the outward representative of ideality, existing only by virtue of thought or is it essential, universal being, possessing ideality as property? There is a gulf between the opposite answers to this question, and no agreement is possible between science and philosophy until it is plain that they agree here at the starting point, for philosophy has found out that it is nothing unless it is absolute idealism.

Consider the theory of Evolution, and the importance of the point of view we take of the relation between the ideal and the material; it becomes manifest. Which is logically anterior; which is that which involves and therefore evolves the other? Now there is no question that with men of science matter is the beginning; matter, with its capability of life and thought, is the one and the only. The theory of the Origin of Species assumes that organic life constantly encroaches upon the means of subsistence, whence ensues a "struggle for existence." In this the plant and the animal may be helped by slight individual differences which make it easier for it to gain its food or to protect itself from enemies. Such individuals are more likely to survive and to propagate, and so perpetuate and develop their own peculiarities. These variations, being in the line of advantage to the animal, or plant, (it must be said that the theory seems to the latter more loosely) it will be seen that the variation and multiplication is also progressive development. There is a movement at once to a greater number and to a higher quality of organic forms. This constant tendency, or law, is called Natural Selection or the Survival of the Fittest. That Nature selects her breeders, and Evolution is on a grand scale the same process as that which produces the race horse

the prize cow. Following it back, we see the higher and later species deriving from lower and earlier ones until we conclude to "at most three or four primitive species," and finally to "a single primordial form" as the ultimate origin of existing species; and in this stream of evolution it is easy to trace the descent of man from his immediate ancestors, the higher *Quadrumanus*. Such is the position of the modern idealistic materialism, and we notice the break between it and the old fashioned materialism, which has led one of its advocates to the declaration referred to: I am no materialist; I believe that system to involve grave philosophical error. The old materialist knew matter and matter only; that was enough for him, and so he knew nothing of *progression* which is an ideal principle, but only recognized *succession* which is a material fact. For him it was simply a world of contingent phenomena, varying according to contingent conditions; he had no thought of discovering an ordered scale of ascending series. Still, the modern materialist is true to his principle; he only takes it in a wider comprehensiveness. For him, life, thought, self-consciousness are stages of material progress, modes of material development. Matter itself takes on metamorphosis as it ascends to higher qualifications and finer forms of being. The chain of evolution which leads link by link from the crystal to the man is wholly in and of matter, inheres in matter and spins itself out of matter.

It is here that we join issue with him. We must protest against the obliteration of essential distinctions; we must protest against being told that "nature in itself is mind." Evolution we grant. The splendid locomotive which flashes across the continent with the Fast Mail at the rate of eighty miles an hour is a marked development from the rude machine of Stephenson. A complete collection of locomotive models, arranged in historic sequence would show the evolution of locomotives, and how each class and kind arose out of the preceding one by slight modification and improvement, but the evolution pertains to the art of engine-building; it falls wholly within the brains of the builders; it will not be claimed that any one species of locomotive has evolved another. "Nonsense," cries the evolutionist, "locomotives don't breed."

Well, what if monkeys do? This is not a question of like producing like, but of like producing difference. The gradual improvement in monkeys leads to higher varieties leads, if you will, to the new species, man, but this is not the work of the individual monkeys. From the individual monkey you can no more extract a different and higher variety than from that variety you can extract the human child. It would be as easy to extract the modern locomotive from the engine of Stephenson, and from the modern locomotive the telegraphic machine. The variation and improvement are the work of something that lies outside of the monkeys, and that is the power that works in the law of evolution. What and where is that power? In nature as nature, in matter as matter? Mr. Darwin has given us a mass of most interesting details on the variation of plants and animals under domestication. Now, the production of fancy stock, of French pears and roses, of numberless breeds of pigeons shows—what? The Evolutionist says: Under man's care, improvement is so rapid that new varieties originate in a very short time; and this shows the origin of species to have been this same derivation of higher from lower, only a more gradual one. That is Nature does just what man does, only she takes more time to do it. This is to shut his eyes to the obvious analogy. Doubtless what man does is done in Nature, but is it done by Nature? In domestication the new variety does not rise *naturally* out of the lower, any more than does the superior class of locomotive, but the progression is owing to the action of man. Not nature, but he, working in nature, builds the new organic form. Analogy, then, would indicate that the origin of species in nature is not by way of natural derivation of higher from lower, but is due to the action of designing mind which lives in nature or in which nature lives, but which in either case is something distinct from nature. We believe then in Evolution, but it is Evolution from the idealistic point of view. Systematic unity, coördinated progress, that is demanded by the very constitution of reason, but by the very constitution of nature it can never be found in nature. We conceive this organically connected system, but we do not perceive it. In reason and truth there is such a system, but in nature and fact

there is not. Nature is pure heterogeneity, the aggregate of individualities. She has neither species nor genera. No one ever saw the genus Dog or the species Mastiff. Still less can evolution in its movement of transition be seen in nature. No Darwinist can come upon Nature unawares and catch her with an individual half in and half out. The origin of species by derivation, by natural production of higher by lower—however it is “sought to be made clearer by relegation to the obscurity of a distant past” remains a myth. Nature in herself has no motive soul of progress, of development; she has no system, no ascent, no evolution. The metamorphosis, the chain of ascending series, the evolution, all this is the affair of thought which is not born of nature, but dwells with her to originate and guide a progress she knows nothing of. Evolution is the ideal necessity of advance which is involved in the ideal necessity to be. It *inheres* in thought, but only *accrues* to nature.

It shows, however, how far materialism has come to meet idealism, how far the study of the outer has forced consideration of the inward, to find that Mr. Darwin's famous book deals solely with a metaphysical problem, viz., the relations of Identity and Difference. the former of which is approached in the ascent to higher genera and the latter in the descent to lower species. And his unconsciousness of what he is really about, and his consequent blind wandering, show the disadvantage they must labor under who insist on looking only upon the outward to discover the principles and laws of the inward. The study of metaphysics would save naturalists a world of trouble, and it would teach the evolutionists not only that their problem in its universality has received solution, but also that their own special treatment of it has been anticipated and criticized by anticipation. In Kant's *Transcendental Dialectic* he proves the existence of “three laws in the mind, imposed by it on the objects of sense, and received by it with and from these objects, as if they (these laws) were part and parcel of these objects themselves, and not a reflection, a color, fallen on them from the faculties to which these objects presented themselves.” This is what is meant by transcendental; that is transcendental which in reality is a contribution to objects from the mind, but which appears to belong to the objects themselves. The three

laws in question are characterized thus: "Reason therefore prepares for understanding its field, I. by a principle of the Homogeneity of the Variety of individuals under higher genera; II.—through a principle of the Variety of the Homogeneity of the individuals under lower species; and III.—in order to complete the systematic unity—a law of the Affinity of all notions, which law dictates a continuous transition from every single species to every other through gradual increase of diversity. We may name them the principles of the Homogeneity, of the Variety and of the Continuity of Forms." Here then we have the rationale of Darwinism. Laws, not in objects, but projected upon them from the mind, have been taken as belonging to such objects, and supposed capable of yielding empirical results. That is, the theorists have supposed principles to be Constitutive which are only Regulative, and that to be Objective which is only Transcendental. Thus Darwinism as matter of science is at once perfectly certain, and utterly impossible. To this anticipation of Darwinism by Kant, I may add the following by Hegel, written many years before Mr. Darwin's book: "Nature is to be regarded as a system of grades, of which the one rises necessarily out of the other, and is the proximate truth of the one from which it results; but not so that the one were *naturally* generated out of the other, but only in the inner Idea which constitutes the ground of Nature. Metamorphosis accrues only to the Notion as such. The notion, however, is in Nature partly only inner, partly existent as living individual; to this individual alone, then, is *existent* metamorphosis confined. It has been an inept conception of earlier Nature-philosophy, to regard the progression and transition of one natural form into a higher, as an outwardly actual production, which, however, to be made clearer must be relegated into the obscurity of the past. To Nature externality is precisely proper—to let the Differences fall asunder, and present themselves as neutral existences; while the dialectic Notion which guides forward the stages is the Inner of the same. Thought must deny itself such nebulous and sensuous conceptions as, for example, the so-called *origin* of plants and animals from water, and then the origin of the more highly developed organizations from the lower, and so on."

The question of the Origin of Species leads to a larger one, the question of origin in general; what here is the answer of Materialism? The problem is to explain the Beginning. Here is the actual world, the manifold variety of phenomena. Science is not content with it just so; as an affair of thought, Science seeks to explain it. Explanation, Mr. Spencer has shown us, is reduction to unity. The quest of Science then is for the constant in this variable, the substantial under this phenomenal, for the first principle into which the vast universe contracts and coils itself up, from which it extricates itself and issues forth; in a word, for the First Cause. Religion is ready with her answer, God. Science objects to this assertion that it is only an assertion. What is sought is a natural fact, and a supernatural hypothesis will not serve. God is a mere name to cover the unknown principle, the unknown power, and naming it leaves us as far as ever from understanding it. Once the unknown powers of Nature were all deities; now that they are scientifically understood, the deification is laid aside. Well, we grant that a God who is merely a *Deus e machina* will not solve the problem; we will listen to Science. But we rub our ears, doubting we have heard correctly when Science gives the explanation in—Atomism. Let us remember the conditions of the problem. The requisites of a first principle are two: that it be absolutely first and underivative, and that it have the power to develop out of itself the manifold. We are told then that Electricity, opacifying from a nebulous condition, becomes or produces a primitive atom: that this atom multiplies, develops, rises till it takes life, and in the end becomes self-conscious life in man. "A single germ-cell," it is said, "might have been thrown into space from which all we see might have developed itself." Indeed, and *how*? Given the single germ-cell, how does it change itself, develop, take new form? To this question "how?" we get no answer; yet there is the whole problem for science. They have run all back into a single identity; that is easy, but how extricate the differences from that identity? It is easy to assume a principle and assert its all-producing power, only do not pretend that such assumption and assertion are science. A germ-cell *might have been* thrown into space, and *might have* developed the universe, but Science

means explanation, not hazy fancies and might-have-beens. In fact we are no better off with the material atom than with the *Deus e machina* of religion. Religion may retort the objection to hypotheses and the insistence upon facts. Let Science explain the atom as the *principium*. Let her show this first one effecting transition to the manifold. Let us see a primitive atom which is only electricity, and let us see this atom develop into another which is different, and that another one which takes life and so on to self-consciousness. Let us have explanatory demonstration, and not mere talk. But suppose we grant the atom the causal power of development, suppose we grant the matter has evolved its own variety, that it has made organization, and organization thought—grant, that is, all on this side of the material beginning, how is it with the other side, how is it with the other requisite of the *principium*, that it be absolutely first? “A germ-cell might have been thrown into space.” Whence then is space? The primitive atom is already in space and time and surrounded by “conditions” of development. But so situated it is not primitive, it is not a *principium*. Back of the atom lie space and time which are necessarily antecedent conditions of matter’s existence. The god of the materialist has had a god before him who made space and time and “conditions.” However, having granted the power of development, it would be rather niggardly now to refuse primitiveness to the atom, so being in this yielding mood we will grant that a first principle may presuppose time and space and conditions. Surely then we have simplified cosmogony enough to ask, Of what size is this atom? It is a question perhaps to give our interlocutor pause, but rallying he will reply, Why any size; for all size is relative, and any size indifferent to infinite space. But observe, any size is quite literally no size. If quantity is indifferent to the atom, it is a pure nullity to it. With the atom as the beginning any *positive* quantum becomes impossible; positiveness is lost in a boundless relativity; and no one can see why there ever should have been any such thing as quantity at all, no one can tell for the life of him what quantity is. Once more, dropping the question of quantity, or assuming a quantitative atom out by itself in the middle of time and space, let us ask, What sort of a thing is it? We are

told that it is something—not nothing; well, *what* is it? describe it, define it. Here our materialist is absolutely silent. It is impossible for a thing to be anything in particular, to have any definiteness or individual character, except in so far as it is distinguishable from other things. Only through its properties, that is, its relations to other things, has a thing any determinate being of its own. Quality as well as Quantity lives wholly in relation, and quality as well as quantity is a nullity to the solitary atom, which is equally destitute of one and the other. Thus all actuality fades out of the atom, and it remains the mere empty abstract conception of Particularity as the Being of the Eleatics was the abstract conception of Universality.*

This doctrine of Atomism, if a new one in Physics, is an old one in Metaphysics. The fact is that Physics having unconsciously become metaphysical and taken a few steps on the metaphysical road, calls on the nineteenth century with some flourish of trumpets (see Tyndall's Belfast Address) to return to the world-theory of Democritus. But what does such return necessarily involve? To return to any point in past history is to find oneself in a movement, a progress, a development. If we return to Democritus we cannot remain with him. Thought did not stop with Democritus and the material particular, but went on from thence to Anaxagoras and designing power or abstract reason, thence to the Sophists and subjective reason, and thence to Socrates and objective or universal reason, before it found the ultimate explanation and true principle. And this found, it was easy for Aristotle to estimate the position of Democritus and measure the limitations of his principle. Its radical defect, he points out, is to assume the indivisibility of the corporeal. Quantity is the concrete of continuity and dis-

* It may of course be said that no Atomist ever spoke of a single primitive atom, but of an infinitude of atoms, but it should be seen that this makes no sort of difference. Number here simply adds itself to the conception, singleness, and does not change it. The atom is the same thing whether said once or repeated forever; when we consider one, we consider all, and if each equals zero, all equal zero.

Again some of the modern evolutionists say nothing of atoms but speak only of a primordial form, but this too is a distinction without essential difference, for form demands substance, and to substitute the latter for the former is only to go back to the logical prius and state their case correctly.

cretion, and in this lies the solution of all antinomies of Zen or others which arise from isolating these abstract *moments*. But when regarded as discrete—in the moment of discretion—matter is infinitely divisible and there is no such thing as an ultimate, indivisible unit; the atom is a mere subjective conception and an untruth.

The first principle, the absolute explanation, which Science is somewhat unintelligently seeking, that is the true scientific quest, but it is an equal mistake to seek it in matter or in thought, if those are to be the terms of an antithesis, if the relation between the notional and the sensible is to be regarded as extrinsic and not intrinsic to their several being. In that way the principle will not be found, for it is not an inward, nor yet an outward, because it is both. A material beginning, an external principium, is forever impossible, not only because matter, being necessarily in space and time, finds these foreign to itself and so must presuppose them and leave them unexplained—not only because of this fact, but rather because of the general truth exemplified in this fact. The material is the aggregate of particulars. Now the particular does not contain but is contained in, the universal. At the same time it is a necessary content; without it the universal would be empty nothing. That is to say, the being of the particular resides not in itself, but in the universal, and the existence (out-being) of the universal resides not in itself but in the particular. Hence universal and particular are both abstractions; both are part of that whole which is the actual. Now in looking for the beginning we are looking for a principle which can evolve the actual, but to do this it must already involve the actual; what is to become explicit must be already implicit. Hence the principle can be neither a universal nor a particular; neither the pure being of the Eleatics and Spinoza, nor the material atom of Democritus and modern science. The first of these is abstract identity, and the second is abstract difference, and an abstract difference nothing else than the same abstract identity. But identity does not involve difference, and so cannot evolve it; the secret of these is their inseparability. As the actual is not an abstract but a concrete, so the beginning is in a concrete, not in an abstract. It is true, the first and one of the

universe is the *summum genus*, the "primordial form;" this is identity; but if it is really to be the *summum genus* of the actually varied universe, it must have been the primitive difference quite as much as the primitive identity; that is, the *summum genus* was never only genus, but must have always been the *summa differentia* as well.

We have found then in thought the constituents of a true *principium*. It must be the unity of *genus* and *differentia*, the unity of universal and particular, that is, it must be the indivisible concrete of both, the Singular. Where is this principle? Not in nature, not in the particular; where then? The question has been answered a little back: "we have thus found in thought the constituents of a true *principium*;" where is it, why there—in thought. But it has just been said that it was not to be found in thought, that it was no more an inward than an outward. Well, it is not found in abstract thought; that gives only the pure being of the Eleatics. Abstract thought is a universal, or thought is the abstract universal, and we have just seen generally that a universal is always an abstract and never an actual. What is, is the concrete individual or the singular. What is, is not thought, but the thinker. The principle is not found in thought, but in *our* thought, in our thinking, in self-consciousness, for here, and here alone, is at last what we seek, a dualism which is unity: an identity (the subject) which evolves difference (the object) and then conjoins it in concrete unity (personality). But we are speaking of the first principle of the universe, the principle of the actual all, the actual absolute. Do you mean the Absolute is in my thought; am I the Absolute? I did not speak of your thought, but of our thought; not of the complex of the groundless fancies and fluctuating feelings of the mere individual, but of the very substance of humanity—fundamental, universal human nature. But not to insist on the difference between the empirical Ego and the universal Ego, let me hasten to say that I do not mean subjective idealism in any form. We have not within us the potentiality of the outward all. The Absolute is not in our thought; but we are in the thought of the Absolute. And so in this, our relativity, the Absolute to which we relate is mirrored to us. In our self-consciousness

we find the Absolute *reflected*. In the form of our being we find the form of absolute being. We learn that absolute being is an infinite self. We learn the great cosmical fact, the first of all truths, the personality of God. "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."*

Thus it is that in finding the principle of the universe we find at the same time our own relation to it. We see God in the mirror of the soul because of the essential oneness of all spiritual being, and in this kindred sense He no longer looms in the infinite distance, cold and vague, an *Être Suprême* of Deism, but we see Him near us, the Living God, the Father whom we know, and whom to know is our eternal life. For self-consciousness is only completed within us in the religious consciousness—in our grasp of the prime fact of our being, our unity with the Divine. And in that consciousness the human spirit may echo those words spoken in it and for it by the Christ: "I and my Father are one, but my Father is greater than I." If then we find that the ultimate truth of our being resides in its unity with a life higher than its own, *à fortiori* we find that it does not reside in its unity with a life lower than its own. If spirit is not less than divine, humanity is more than animal. In the true knowledge of ourselves our life is easily rescued from the blind contingency or the blind necessity of matter and force. For we too hold of the concrete, the absolute; we have not existence only but being also; not finitude alone but infinitude as well. Our being stands not only in the outwardness and "other-ness" of nature like the brutes, but in the inwardness of self-conscious thought. We are not only from and of matter, the particular; we are of and from spirit, the singular. We are not the slow result of a material evolution, we are children of the Highest, and in our spirituality,

* And here it will be seen that a material beginning is impossible for this further reason, that beginning in itself is a pure ideality. The beginning is not in time—however the discrete of that pure quantity be isolated so as to view it in its infinite divisibility, ages on ages, æons on æons—for in that way you precisely cannot find it. The beginning is not an occurrence, but a thought, and *the* thought the *principium*, the absolute, God. What is first? Why, the principle, and that is, the actual; what is, is the first that is.

which is the eternal transcendence of matter, we see ourselves the very image of the Divine.

II. MORALS.—Coming now to the inner world of morals from the outer world of nature, we shall find the constitutive principle *here* to be the same that we have found it *there*—the concrete unity of inward and outward. But there is this difference between the first aspects of each case: As nature is to reflection an outer, the difficulty in its consideration is to see the true place and import of the inward, or that all necessarily *goes in* into an inward; on the other hand, as morality is to reflection an inner, the difficulty here is to see the true place and import of the outward, or that all must necessarily *come out* in an outward. The contemplation of nature remains an affair of thought, but the consideration of morals leads to principles of action; hence the opposite difficulty in the way of finding the common principle—the unity of inward and outward—which is regulative alike of action and of thought. For the theoretical constructive of the universe is for most men a matter of the understanding; that is, of a faculty which sees things in relation, and consequently in duality, and hence the difficulty *there* is to see the *unity* of inward and outward, or ideal and material. On the other hand, personal action, in its spring and motive, is for most men an affair of personal feeling or conviction—conscience or moral sense—that is, of a faculty simple and single in its working, and hence the difficulty *here* is to see clearly the *distinction* between inward and outward, or ethical and moral.

A word to explain the sense in which for convenience sake I shall employ these terms. The Germans, who have noted the distinction I speak of between what appears to be absolute and what relative in morals, have invented terms to express it. With them *Moralität* names the morality of conscience; *Sittlichkeit* the morality of custom. We English have not clearly perceived this distinction, and our language has no terms for its statement. The meaning of Ethics from the Greek and of *Morals* from the Latin is radically the same, or nearly the same. Both signify good manners, the habits and behaviour sanctioned by social approval; both, that is, are synonyms for

Sittlichkeit. I propose, therefore, throughout this paper, to use the terms ethics to signify *Moralität*, or inward morality, in distinction from morals, or outward morality. No one can find object to my appropriating this word to a special purpose which it was not designed if I offer to return it to common usage in good condition when I am done with it. At common law one going a journey in urgent haste was allowed to press into service any horse found loose in the field, provided, his journey done, he sent it back uninjured to the owner; and presumably as much license may be taken with language, which is common property, as with horses, which are private property. If justification is required, however, some degree of it may be found in the fact that there is at least a shade of difference between ethics and morals. The former is not so wholly a matter of outside deportment, but has a touch of reference to the inward; it glances from conduct to character. But however arbitrary the distinction in terms, a real distinction in thought will come apparent if we descend from generalities and compare the opposite views of the ethicist and the moralist.

The run of men are moralists; their life is in harmony with that of the community; they breathe the common atmosphere and are nourished on the common food of settled use and wont. Social standing is all important to them; social standards are the rule of their action and of their judgments on the actions of others. They bow to convention, to propriety, and *ça va sans dire* has the force of a legal injunction. In their eyes the rules of etiquette are by divine right; weddings must be ordered after certain fixed precedents; the guest of honor can dine on the right of the hostess; and one cannot withdraw from polite circles without leaving his P. P. C. if he wishes to remain in Fashion too is an authority not to be disregarded; no one wears his clothes merely to please himself, nor alter their fashion save in accordance with those equable general changes which preserve a constant general uniformity. Thus in the view of the moralist *vox populi* is *vox Dei*; the law, the standard of usage of society is what should regulate individual conduct. In every case that presents itself he refers his contemplated action to established use and wont, tries it by the standard of settled social opinion, and acts or refrains from acting as he finds it consistent or inconsistent therewith.

To this the ethicist replies. In all ordinary matters of slighter moment your rule may answer, but will it bear the strain of a sudden critical conjuncture? In considering a possible course of action which arises from exceptional circumstances, from complex conditions whose origin in the past was beyond his foresight or control—a course of action which involves perhaps the dearest interests of his life, a man will scarcely rest satisfied with the general rules of conduct laid down by society. He will feel that the occasion throws him upon himself, upon his personal independence and personal responsibility. He will recognize the enormous power of social opinion over the individual; he may consent to bow to it, rather than be ostracised as a rebel and a recusant, even while he inwardly refuses acquiescence in its justice; or he may resolve to brave it and submit his unlicensed action to that higher law of absolute right which he finds in his own reason and conscience, and which he believes to be the law of God.

And, pursues the ethicist, for this falling back upon one's own soul, for taking stand with the *inward*, personal conviction, as against the *outward*, social standards rooted in tradition,—for this, justification is not wanting. Men can only touch each other on the surface; the relations they mutually hold are external to the inmost personality of each, which dwells in itself and with itself alone. Hence all that men ask is that what they see be right; they are satisfied if a man acts morally. The moral or social rule is of necessity solely a rule for conduct. Conduct is all that the world can know or judge, and therefore all that it can regulate. But there is a higher than conduct, and that is character, and of that conduct is not the adequate measure. The inward intent and motive, the spirit of the deed and not the deed itself is the thing of consequence, is that in which lies the whole ethical question. This is what men can never know, but it is all that God cares for. We find that the main stress of Christ's ethical teaching fell on this, that he carried the question from the outward to the inward. He asked not for deeds but for disposition; not how much good have you *done*, but how good *are* you. This, that the test of fitness for heaven is not a quantitative but a qualitative one, was the distinctively Christian truth maintained by

Christ against the Pharisees and by Paul against the Judaizers, and it asserts the supremacy of ethical principle over moral rule. For man meets God in an internal relation, a sphere of intercourse that lies far within that outdoor region of behavior which forms the sphere of the social world. Hence what we are to God—or simply what we are—is something different from what we are in men's eyes; not because moral judgments are likely to be mistaken, but because they are certain to be inadequate, since they deal with what is external and superficial, not with what is internal and essential to the soul's being. The inward spirit, the motive and aim may transfigure and transform a given deed so as to sanctify in God's sight what men blindly denounce. Man looketh upon the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh upon the heart. He sees that rectitude of conduct often veils rottenness of character, and that immorality often disguises without destroying inward allegiance to the good. For Him, then, conduct is nothing except in so far as it is the expression of inward quality of soul, for *that* is all. Thus Christ looked on the most respected classes of Jewish society—and so far as behavior goes, deservedly respected—and pronounced them whited sepulchres; he looked on the vilest of the people—and so far as behavior goes, deservedly reprobate—and astonished the respectable and well-behaved by the declaration: I say unto you, the publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of heaven before you.

By this time our ethicist has waxed warm, and he will be apt to go on to turn the distinction between ethics and morals into a complete separation of the two. The fact is, he will say, "morality" is purely an affair of social order. Its commands and prohibitions are necessary to the smooth working of the social machine as it exists, and they will be esteemed worthy of obedience in proportion as the present constitution of society recommends itself as worthy of support and preservation. But in any case, from the considerations just adduced, the moral standards of society have no absolute sanction and no ethical value. Now it is matter of just complaint against society that it does not remain on its own proper ground, but encroaches on the ethical sphere and assumes ethical authority. It is not content to say, it is expedient for the general good that such

and such should be the rules of conduct, but it ventures to affirm that its rules are intrinsically obligatory. It has imported an ethical element into morals, and this is what confuses the whole matter. To take an instance. We are ready to grant the necessity of the marriage ceremony in relation to social order, and the necessity of the strict enforcement of all that tends to make the conjugal union indissoluble. The allowance of transitory and capricious relations between the sexes would be the return not merely from civilization to barbarism, but from humanity to animalism. Society is based upon the family. That is the natural sphere of the support and nurture of children, nor is any substitute for it devisable. The well-being of a people is in proportion to the effect upon their life of the training they receive from the domestic affections, of the influences that radiate from the home. But all this belongs to social order, not to ethical principle; it concerns the consequences of marriage, not the essence of the union; it deals with the relations of married people to society, not with their relation to each other. Society, however, does not recognize any limitation upon its jurisdiction. It claims to govern the ethical inward as well as the social outward. Marriage without the ceremony is not only banned with social outlawry, but condemned as ethically sinful. And here society exceeds its authority. Marriage, as any lawyer will tell us, consists in mutual consent; the outward ceremony, civil or religious, is merely the ratification, the formal expression of what already exists. Love pure and devoted is the essence of all true union of man and woman. This makes the union sacred, this hallows the mutual life, this is true marriage, this, according to the much abused phrase, is marriage in the sight of heaven. In the marriage without love, the *marriage de convenance*, the ceremony only sanctions what is unethical, only consecrates a desecration. The ceremony is only declarative of that which makes a valid union; it only declares a union which therefore must exist before such declaration. The ceremony, therefore, does not make the union ethically valid, as society pretends, but only socially respectable.

We can fancy the moralist properly shocked and indignant at these dangerous sentiments, and we can easily divine what

he will say in reply. He will bring up his half truth against the half truth of his opponent, and the dispute will go on indefinitely. Where the inward is arrayed against the outward either side may "draw the game" but neither can win. The end of controversy is only reached with the whole truth, and that is the concrete unity of inward and outward. Either apart from the other—that is, either in the abstract, is untrue. The truth of ethics and of morals, of individual conscience and of social custom, lies wholly in the mutual relation which binds them together in one. Hence while it is not to be denied that ethical principle is what is essential for human action and the social rule what is derivative, it does not follow that the two are to be cut apart and the social view and habit evacuated of all ethical value. It rather follows that the outward must be ethical because the inward is; since the outward is only the outward *of the inward*. This principle throws a light on the onesidedness of the ethicist's position.

Looking only at the difference between conduct and character, he sets them in an antithesis in which their organic connection is lost sight of. Conduct, he says, is nothing except in so far as it expresses or realizes the inward spirit of character. Very true, but that exception is rather the rule; it covers some ninety-nine per cent. of the true bearing and significance of conduct. The deed is after all the deed of the doer; it is in general the realization of his thought, purpose, motive; not the contradiction of that. That conduct does not always tell its own motive, does not invariably manifest the character, but leaves room for mistaken inference is no ground for pronouncing ethically worthless all social judgments passed on conduct. If, in general, conduct is a true index and revelation of character, the world has a right to say, show us your faith by your works; it has a right to demand that conduct shall correspond to character and a right to believe that it does. Nor is the view taken of Christ's teaching wholly a fair one. It presents only the negative side of that teaching which appears as a depreciation of the ethical value of conduct. But such depreciation is no where sanctioned by Christ. He left conduct where it was in ethical importance and simply put character above it as of greater importance. He did not make less of conduct

because he made more of character. He taught that conduct was not enough, not that it was indifferent; that something more than rectitude of deed was required, not that that could be dispensed with. In a word, He put the ethical standard higher than the rule of conduct, and so inclusive of it, while the view of the impassioned ethicist which seems to exalt that standard above the moral rule, being exclusive of it, in reality falls below it. Except your righteousness exceeds the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees—how then if we do not even attain Pharisaic righteousness? A great reaction from the moral to the ethical standpoint took place in the Reformation. The morality of outward deed had become hollow and lifeless, and so as men found that conduct *alone* was worthless, they hastily inferred that it was altogether worthless; as if because building materials serve no purpose as a house, one should fancy a house might be built without them. So all went in into intense inwardness. Men were to follow the inward light, the higher law, the sublime inspirations and aspirations of the spirit of holiness. But such a rarified atmosphere was found too strong for human lungs. The abstract positive collapsed into a negative; sanctity turned out to be only Antinomianism; and a comparison of the Anabaptists of Münster with the Roman Court shows that character without conduct, or ethics without morals, is a principle that leads to no better results than its converse. The fact is that the whole teaching of the New Testament on the subject of conduct gathers into a strong urging of its importance, and under two aspects: first, in that it acts out character, realizes it, stamps in actuality the latent potency of thought or wish; and secondly, in that it reacts on character, forms and fixes it, since it is from what men have done that they become what they are. Hence there is constant insistence upon doing. If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them; why call ye me Lord, and do not the things which I say? Dutiful behavior is the one narrow way that leads to life; moral conduct is our education into the ethic freedom of the divine nature. Consequently although the world can judge and regulate no more than conduct, that is enough to give its action an ethical bearing and value. To foster sound habits that shall brace and fortify the weak and

wayward; to enforce general moral laws on the willful
verse, is not only to maintain the fabric of social o:
also to exercise a potent educational influence on in
character. The whole scope of social law is only re
this insight, that restraint is training. The little
hedges and fences about individual freedom, the c
natural impulse that so abound in refined society, th
discipline and a culture; and the man brought up all
in the habits of good society will have a quickness o
tion and a delicacy of feeling as to what is intrinsic
coming" unknown to the rustic or the provincial.

The chief error of the ethicist, however, is this: v
identifies "morality" with social expediency, he assu
this eliminates from it the "ethical" element. This is
the question. Such an assumption rests on the not
human society has no absolute existence, but that its
tions are simply the wise arrangement of men and t
of experience. At this point the question turns on the
between society and the individual. Now it is capabl
monstration that as the relation between character and
between ethics and morals, is not extrinsic but intrinsic
is the relation between individuals and society. Societ
an aggregate of individuals whose existence was ever
to it or independent of it; it is that universal in whic
men have their being as men. Not in our individua
in our independent self-hood, resides our manhood, bu
in our organic relation to the organic whole. That re
the common cement of the single structure apart from
men not only fall helplessly asunder, a mere pile of
but their personal humanity itself wells away from th
the substance escapes from a jelly fish taken from his
element—till they collapse into the animal. Hence t
the individual in opposition to society, and to assi
antithesis between ethics which relate to the one and
which relate to the other, is a misapprehension and per
of the facts of the case. Social standards, rules, c
habits are not factitious or conventional; they are the c
embodiment of the inward necessity, of the absolut
which is fundamental in the nature of man. Use and w

the standard of individual action, not because of any arbitrary decree of a majority, but because use and wont only *are* use and wont because they are also the true ethic.

It is the claim of the ethicist that conscience shall be the supreme arbiter of the individual's action. For him

"Self-contradiction is the only wrong,
For, by the laws of Spirit, in the right
Is every individual's character,
That acts in strict consistence with itself."

This is entirely true if the *self*, with which consistence is the right, and contradiction the wrong, be the objective self; and certainly this high utterance of self-exaltation seems to have been inspired by at least a glimpse of the truth—the objectivity of self. But it is only a glimpse, and after all self-hood remains subjective to the ethicist's conception, and in this sense the declaration is false; it is indeed the very root of falsehood. In fact the ethicist here is only echoing the well-known cry Place for private judgment! The truth of the cry is a question of accent. Private judgment! subjective reason! exclaim a large number with sufficient noise, but the whole stress of their voice falls on "private" and "subjective;" judgment and reason are hardly heard; about them there is evidently little thought or care. It is the private man, the individual subject, in and for whom they are interested. But let the emphasis fall evenly, and the truth appears. Private, subjective,—that is what is peculiar to me, what is mine and not yours; but judgment, reason,—is that what is peculiar to me, what is mine and not yours? The watchword of the ethicist really states objectivity as well as subjectivity. *Private* judgment is self-will; private *judgment* is free-will. The subject is not my true self; the object is my true self. The rights of the object are paramount over the rights of the subject, or to put it more truly, the rights of the object *are* the true rights of the subject. Social morals are the deposit of objective reason realized through time in the practical life of mankind, and the sole right of private judgment, of the individual, is to share intelligently in this common heritage, to be present with insight and assent, so as to find his true self, his true freedom, in the social law, and not an alien authority constraining him.

In this view of "morals" the point taken in illustration wears another aspect. Granting that mutual affection is the essence of true marriage, as regards the parties to it, it does not follow that even for them the form is unessential or can be dispensed with. If form in general is not an independent something, but the form *of essence*—essence's *own* form—if it lies in the very nature of the inward that it be also outward, then it is plain that the marriage ceremony has its *raison d'être* not only in grounds of external utility, but in that it completes and fulfills, realizes and substantiates the ethical inward of marriage by supplying its own necessary outwardness. And this truth of reason is confirmed by the facts of experience. No sexual union based on ethic sentiment alone, in disregard of social sanction, has ever been or can ever be ethically satisfactory, serene and lasting. How pure soever, however seemingly sufficient to itself, it has within it the germs of death. The troubled restlessness that comes from disaccord with social law may seem at first to be only the pressure from without, but when retirement from the world's sight, and closest mutual clinging fail to remove the oppression of that nameless dissatisfaction, it is seen to be the pressure from within of a law of the soul's own being violated and renounced.

Thus, as in the consideration of nature we find the prevalent error nowadays to be insistence upon the outward, so conversely the error in morals to which the genius of the present, or of the recent past, is most exposed is insistence upon the inward. Yet the latter error is but the distortion of the higher truth of morals. We cannot hold with the rigid conservative that the "ethic," or subjective, view, is merely an outrage upon the common conscience of mankind. There is in it the recognition of a truth, as well as the impulse of high and noble feeling. It is true that the character, the spirit, the inward quality of soul from which the deed proceeds are the supreme concern in conduct. We sympathize with Carlyle's many eloquent utterances on this point. We may even sympathize with the pure-souled Shelley, the honest-hearted George Sand, and others of that revolutionary time in their fierce and utterly blind struggle against "the Anarch, Custom." We must agree with them that to be true to oneself, and one's deepest convictions is

nobler than slavishly to follow the fashions of the herd. We must admit, that is, that ethic principle is higher than moral rule, abstractly viewed. But the error just lies in viewing them abstractly; the error lies in taking either truth to be exclusive of the other; in failing to see the essential correlation in which the two are one. The error of the ethicists is that of high-souled and independent intellects who despise a "Philistinism" of convention which takes all its judgments at second hand from the general average; which regards only appearances, quite satisfied with observance of the proprieties and a clean outside of the cup and platter; which, caring nothing for motive and intention, puts a premium upon hypocrisy while it is correspondingly severe upon conscientious departure from the general rule. Yet it is an error no less intrinsically false than its opposite, and one far more fraught with practical danger; throwing away as it does all safeguards of conduct, throwing open the door to a riot of individualism in which, as in the days when there was no king in Israel, every man shall do that which is right in his own eyes.

III. ART.—In the sphere of art the antithesis between inward and outward appears in the rival theories of Idealism and Realism. In so far as these theories are pronounced and extreme—in so far as they urge either the Ideal or the Real as a principle which excludes the other, they are based on a half truth, which, as we have seen, is the general form of error. The truth in art as in philosophy is absolute idealism—that unity of ideal and real in which the one is essential inwardness and the other essential outwardness, and each goes into the other as its ground. The ideal is not by itself, alone, but it is as given in the real; and the real is nothing in itself, but only in that it gives expression to the ideal. The first is the content of the second, and the second is the form of the first. It is the error of abstract idealism that it denies the esthetic quality of the real, and so drives the ideal from its native home and leaves it to wander in a vague beyond. And so nothing is really left it for a principle but the negation of reality. The positive, from the very urgency of our insistence on it, turns into a negative; as in ethics the inward light, or the regenerate heart

turns out to be practically anti-nomianism. This non-realism only give us a false art. There is loud homage to the called classic; correctness of style is insisted on; the "unit must be observed in the drama, and in painting the pyram form of composition; each art has its Medo-Persian law time-honored narrowness; it is the despotism of conventionality. In such an atmosphere art degenerates into artificiality. Nature is improved on, dressed up, smoothed down,—as in French landscape gardening of the last century; rustic life parodied in the Pastoral; all living, genuine feeling in poetry picture must be toned down to the neutrality, or refined the euphemism agreeable to polite taste. Such an idealism disdains reality and spurns earth must find itself in the air can have no standard or criterion but subjective concept and that is to have none, for a standard must be fixed, subjective conception is just what is variable. Not principles which remain unchangeable through the generations, but *ensemble* of opinions, fancies, caprices which make up dominant mode or fashion of the day—these prescribe the mate by which a work of art is judged, and condition the manner in which it is produced. And so art falls into a slave-pedantry, affectation and conceit in which it quickly perishes.

When realism appears as a reaction from this effete idealism it will be apt to gather to itself all earnest minds and find wide acceptance of its call: Let us go back to nature and truth. But what is meant by this summons? We readily admit only the true is the beautiful, but what is the true? This general question demands a brief consideration.

Average men have a high regard for facts. They tell with a certain complacency that facts are stubborn things, they relied upon these solid tangibilities, which cannot be smoothed, away to protect them against the subtleties of ingenious theorist. They are practical men, as they are of telling us; for their part they have enough to do in dealing with the simple actualities of life, and they intimate pretty distinctly that they consider themselves more usefully and sensibly employed than those who spend their time in chasing the bows of fancy or spinning cobwebs from the brain. There is nothing to this kind of talk that commends it to our ears, until we stop and think. The practical man wishes to deal with substance

not with shadow ; with definite realities, not with illusions. In other words, the practical man would have truth. With the spirit, then, which prompts his demand for facts all must sympathize ; but the demand itself is a mistake. It assumes that fact is the substantial ; that realities addressed to sense-perception hold more of truth than idealities addressed to imagination ; that of all knowledge the knowledge of facts is most positive and most important. This we hold to be a false assumption, and on this we join issue squarely with the practical man. If we seem to maintain a paradox, let us first remark that the practical man does not follow out his view consistently, and thus he virtually confesses its weakness. He lives in the real world, a world of material phenomena and current events, a world of facts for sense-perception. These are in themselves unconnected, isolated, individual occurrences. If a man is to confine himself to these, he must take each one by itself, without reference to any other. There are men who do this. There are men who sleep and rise and get their food, and eat and sleep again ; contented to take as they come the facts of daily routine and familiar surrounding ; drifting with the lazy current of sense-perception like the lower animals which crop the grass and bellow at a red rag and are driven by a dog and stumble from particular to particular, knowing no better and knowing no other. These men act consistently on the demand for nothing but facts. They have never generalized such a formula as the practical man's : "let us confine ourselves to facts ;" they simply do it. But these men we call savages. Now the practical man is not a savage, and his life is not consistent with the animal theory he professes. His whole action is at variance with this profession, and his whole effort is to transcend facts and arrive at wider truth. No matter how one may determine to cling to immediate facts, or persuade himself that in that way he is keeping hold of the actual, he is nevertheless always engaged in classifying, generalizing, inducing and deducing ; transfusing these "stubborn" facts with thought and transforming them into truth. As a practical man, busy in the civilized world, he must always be annulling the sensuous conditions of facts perceived, and widening the sphere of their consideration until they lose their sensuous character as isolated phenomena

and are brought within a view which connects them with before and after. Suppose he is a merchant dealing in indigo; what a complex of manifold conditions he has to coördinate and reduce to systematic unity in carrying on his business. After all, however purely "practical" one may wish to be, man is by nature a thinking being; and to think is to generalize, and to generalize is to transcend the sphere of sense-perception, which is the sphere of fact as such.

To come to the question more directly: What is fact, and what is its value in relation to truth? We shall find this the test question in respect to intellectuality and culture. As we have intimated, a high valuation of facts is in direct ratio to a low degree of intellectual activity, because facts do not address themselves to thought, but to perception. They will be taken as sufficient in themselves—a man will not care to go beyond them, just in so far as one is an unthinking man. An individual fact is as such obvious to the meanest capacity. He who runs may read. But the question remains, what does it tell, what does it show, what does it teach, what does it represent and signify; in other words, how does it stand related to other facts, what is its place in the universal system. As to this the individual fact is silent; it does not explain itself. A fact then is for each observer just as much as he is able to discover in it. The fall of an apple from a tree was a fact of continual occurrence in the sight of men and animals for ages before Newton saw in it the law of planetary motion and the rationale of the material universe. After all, the philosopher and the practical man both seek to grasp the *fact*, but the question is what is the compass of the fact. Here is where they differ. In its phenomenal aspect it is easily appreciable, but the exposition of it in the whole circle of its ultimate relations will certainly be pronounced "obscure" or "mystical" or "nonsense" by those who are not equal to the task of re-thinking those relations. A fact is simply a relative synthesis; and since it is conditioned and determined by all that exists in the universe, we cannot comprehend a single fact in its entire compass except by thinking the universe. This is to arrive at truth, for Truth is simply the Universal Fact, the whole fact of which the individual fact is a fraction.

Thus in the scale of relation to truth facts stands at the bottom and principles at the top. The value of all intermediate generalization depends upon its relation to these respectively. The farther a generality is from fact and the nearer to principle—that is, the farther from what is particular and the nearer to what is universal—the more valuable and important it is. Fact is apprehended by the senses, law is comprehended by the understanding, and principles are contained in the reason. A fact then, as such, does not take us beyond itself; as fact it is neither universal nor necessary. When by comparison with other facts it is understood as a generality, it is regarded as determined by external necessity and said to be governed by law. This is the present position of the natural sciences. Under the “reign of law” all things are necessitated; there can be no such thing as chance. The inadequacy of this position is obvious at a glance. “All things are necessitated;” *all*, but *by what* is the All necessitated? Is there anything more than the All? Can we go beyond the All to something else? If the All is necessitated, then, it must be necessitated by itself; but to be its own necessity, that is precisely freedom. Necessity, or determination by another, rests on freedom, or self-determination. This latter is alone the concrete and absolute principle, and hence it is just as wise to talk about the impossibility of necessity as about the impossibility of chance; these two being but the “moments” of immediacy and of mediation inherent in the principle of the actual all. There is a sphere then into which fact must be carried higher than that of law; a sphere in which it is seen to be what it is not by an external, but by an internal necessity, a necessity in which it shares. We may say that the process of finding truth is a process of reducing fact to principle through the medium of law.

The bearing of these considerations in reference to art is plain. Realism would have truth; that is well; truth is the one object of art. But when men go for it to nature and reality, what they find is not truth, but only fact; and fact is no more the content of art than it is of philosophy. Art is genuine and high in quality just in so far as it is removed from fact. Art, that is, is essentially idealism. For him who truly feels, as for him who truly thinks, that which appears to sense is not that

which is to soul. For the true artist, or the seeker of truth in art, the natural fact is nothing but raw material. It is the error of realism to take the natural fact for the sufficient end of art. That was but the unintelligence of the child, in whom esthetic perception is yet unawakened, which lauded the genius of the two artists, one of whom painted grapes so that birds pecked at the picture and the other a curtain so that his rival asked him to draw the curtain and display his work. As the reaction from a false and cramping conventionalism,—

“The musty laws lined out with wretched rule and compass vile,”

the movement to realism has its part of truth; but the whole truth, which alone is truth, is never found in mere reaction. The realistic spirit, such as found expression, for instance with the English Pre-Raphaelites in their humble veneration for nature and devotion to its faithful reproduction, is a blindness to the true meaning and purpose of art. If art is mere imitation of nature, what is the use of it? We have the original. But in truth to tie up art in nature is to strangle it in its cradle. Nature as nature has no place in art, for art is precisely the transcendence of nature; it is the transfiguration of the real into a revelation of the ideal. That is to find the truth of the fact. In the particular, the relative, the finite the artist must see the universal, the absolute, the infinite, and then his creative imagination must reproduce that vision so that others shall share it. In so far as he succeeds in this—the representation of the spiritual in the material, he is an artist and his work a work of art.

Aristotle is sometimes quoted as an authority for realism on the strength of his saying that art in general is *mimesis*, a term which is translated imitation and taken to mean imitation of nature. Prof. Masson in a recent volume of essays refers to this dictum, contrasts it with passages from Bacon advocating idealism in art, and after lengthy consideration concludes that Bacon is right and Aristotle wrong. This conclusion, however, rests on a failure to understand Aristotle, who meant by *mimesis* not the imitation of sensuous fact, but the representation of rational truth. It has long been the *communis error* to regard Aristotle as the empiricist who opposed rather than the idealist who completed Plato, but in the matter of art his position

ought to be sufficiently clear. A single quotation from the Poetics will meet the imputation of a shallow realism: "Art is more philosophic and more earnest than History." This indeed will perhaps be going too far for Prof. Masson. What! one may exclaim, is the record of fact to be assigned a lower place than the inventions of fancy? Do not art-critics from Lessing to Palgrave tell us that the end and aim of art is production of high and refined pleasure, and is this elegant amusement to be declared more serious and more important than the story of all human experience? But the Epicureanism which views art as a ministry to refined enjoyment is as radically mistaken as that which makes the end of virtue to consist in the happiness it brings the well-doer. What in a word is art? Again Aristotle will furnish us with a definition: "Art is the exercise of a creative faculty based upon reason." In this lies the explanation of the other saying that art is more philosophic and more earnest than history. A few words will make this clear.

The lowest form of mental activity is sensation, which in the lowest organisms does not amount to perception. Next comes this latter, the power of distinguishing between sensations. Higher than this is memory, which reproduces past impressions, and so is the condition of understanding which induces and deduces laws. Above all stands reason, the organ of principles, the vision of inward necessity, as understanding is the organ of laws, or the vision of outward necessity. Now history is the record of past events in their genetic sequence, and hence is based upon perception, memory and understanding; but if art is based on reason, it stands higher in the mental scale, and is plainly "more philosophic and more earnest than history." The principles which underlie history are a secret for it. They belong to the philosophy of history, not to history proper. But art has intelligence of principles, and deals consciously with absolute truth.

Art is creation based upon reason; here is a rebuke to that extravagant romanticism which finds anything artistic if it only have a place in reality. Not all that is real is material for art, but only that which contains a rational element. There are artists—take for a specimen Baudelaire—who not only give us a Chinese copy of reality, in which the trivial is as fully and

carefully rendered as the important, but who turn from presence to the evil, the ugly, the repulsive as an unworked field reality capable of yielding new and striking results. In loss of all sense of discrimination and selection as to its subject-matter, realism becomes a path no less fatal to art than opposite path of idealism.

I have said that art deals with absolute truth ; a word as its mode of doing so. The absolute presents itself to us under three aspects, correspondent to his three-fold constitution : it is to reason the true, to imagination the beautiful, to will the good. But as human spirit is one in its triune constitution the absolute is one in its three-fold relation. Philosophy, art, and religion are but the same thing under different aspects of man's elevation to the absolute, in which, being himself spirit and partaker in the absolute, he comes fully to himself. The natural man beholdeth not the things of the spirit, neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned. The spirit, that is, is the idealist proper. As merely natural, man's life is a delusion and a disorder. Philosophy, art, and religion have this one common aim, to lift man above the facts of natural existence to the truth of his spiritual life. Philosophy lifts him from the blindness of sense and the antinomial understanding to the clear vision of truth. Art lifts him from devotion to the worldly and the vain, to luxury and fashion, to adoration of that beautiful which is "the splendor of the truth." Religion lifts him from the sway of selfish passions to the infinite peace of communion with the divine. Each in its several way leads him toward the full self-consciousness in which he knows, feels, and lives as a being that shares the divine nature.

It is then a low and false view of art which would make it a servant to an idle dilettantism. Art is an entirely earnest thing. It is to make us pure and strong and free ; it is sacrificial to make it pander to our weakness, our vanity, or our passions. There is not much genuine art in the world, but there is more than can be mastered in a life-time. It is these great works of genius that have made the thistle-bearing earth more habitable and the gift of life more welcome to us. And great work is only done by men who greatly thought and wrought. T

knew their art for one among the potent agencies of spiritual culture.

"For Beauty, Good, and Knowledge are three sisters
That dote upon each other, friends to man,
Living together under the same roof,
And never can be sundered without tears."

Art is the necessary complement to philosophy and religion, and a necessary co-worker to their common end. It is related to one of the three equal parts of man's nature, as they to the other parts. It is one equal strand of the triple cord of vision, love, and obedience which make up the spiritual life. And that spiritual life is our organic union with the Absolute. Truth, beauty, and goodness are no abstractions; they live in the character of the Living God. The beauty that dwells in outward nature, the beauty wrought by human hands is but the faint reflection of the glory of the Majesty Divine. The Madonnas of a Raphael, and the Symphonies of a Beethoven are but broken lights and far off echoes of His ineffable harmonies and the loveliness unpicturable. Thus all art is a hymn of praise. Its aim is to lead the soul through avenues of sense and outward things, refined and spiritualized, to where it shall catch some glimpse of the beauty of the Highest, of that Light which being compared with light is found before it,—more beautiful than the sun and above all the orders of the stars. And this the heathen Greek well knew. The speaker in the old dialogue exclaims: "That life only is the true life which is passed in communion with Beauty. But if a man had eyes to see the true Beauty, I mean the Divine Beauty, pure, clear, and unalloyed, no longer dressed by human fancy or clouded by human coloring, how splendid the destiny of that mortal to whom, thither looking and holding converse with Beauty in its own infinite majesty, it should be given to become immortal and the friend of God."

ARTICLE IV.—SCIENCE IN THE PENTATEUCH.

WE have often met with the assertion, very confidently made, that the writer of the Pentateuch, however well versed in the academics of his own time, was wholly ignorant of the true sciences so well established now. More definitely: It is often stated, as if a matter beyond doubt, that Moses, the Hebrew prince, knew nothing of true astronomy, nothing of geology, nothing of analytic chemistry. We think that *this* opinion is emphatically expressed alike by eminent students of the Hebrew Scriptures and by adepts in natural science. We do not call it in question. On the contrary, we accept it. We shake hands over it. We wish to stand on the same ground with those who hold it. We wish to have it distinctly understood, as we start upon a short meditative excursion, that it shall be mutually held as if an opinion demonstrated.

Upon this premise we state our purpose. We propose under its light quietly to examine a few statements which we have culled from the many remarkable ones which distinguish the books of which Moses is the reputed author. We say "reputed," because, by some literary men whom we respect, he is thought to have been a compiler, to some extent, of the writings of others. We cheerfully concede this point because, as will be seen, it can only give to most of our citations the prestige of a greater antiquity, and therefore will not detract from any possible force which there may be in our course of thought.

Our first selection is this writer's description of *a day*: "There was evening and there was morning—one day." This description is emphatically the writer's own. It is peculiar to this one page of his writings. We have not met with it elsewhere, or heard of it as from any other source; and we firmly believe that its like has never been found on any other page of human literature.* Its salient peculiarity, we need hardly say

* In Dan. vii, 14, 26, the two words (עֶרֶב וּבֹקֶר) "evening" and "morning" appear in the same order. In the first case our version renders the two by "days," and the Septuagint inserts *ἡμέραι*. But in neither case does the Hebrew word *יוֹם* appear, nor do the two stand as descriptive of "day."

is this: that it presents to us a natural phenomenon which never has been apparent to any human eye and never can be—the phenomenon of day having its evening before its morning. This remarkable monography was no accident. It was no slip of the pen. The writer presents the fact as a characteristic of each of the six serial days which he brings to view. With this series the description ceases. In all the five books it never occurs again. From all this it is evident that upon this particular occasion he considered it to be of special importance that his readers should recognize this particular feature in these particular days, whatever they might think or not think about any other days. This six-fold repetition is, therefore, a six-fold emphasis. Not only does he present the phenomenon of evening in advance of morning as characteristic of each day (as we have already noticed), but he also makes a six-fold declaration of the characteristic itself.

Another point: Common courtesy requires us to understand him as describing successive days of *light*, and not as describing some other possible days, or some other days which we may conjecture to have been possible—such, for example as time-days, or as æonic days. Common courtesy requires this, because he expressly tells us so by citing their divine definition before introducing us to the first day. His “evening,” therefore, we must in courtesy hold to be an evening or waning away of light; and his “morning” to be an increasing of light. That is to say: He does state distinctly, and with six-fold emphasis, that the decrease of *daylight*, during the creative series, was uniformly in advance of its increase.

But if Moses was the original writer of these words, we owe him another tribute of courtesy: To accept his remarkable collocation of words as accurately expressing an idea in his own mind. That is to say: He understood his own words. If, however, he was only a transcriber of some other man’s writing—of some anterior generation—the same courtesy is due to that some other man.

What *was* the idea of the writer? We must get at it by his words. Was it that of an alternating influx and efflux of light from some *imperceptible* source; growing by slow degrees, and, by the like gradation subsiding? This would have corres-

ponded, indeed, with his description of successive days of light and with such days having evenings and mornings. But in no sense could he have conceived of the gradual efflux of such a day as being in advance of its influx. *Each being light* and the first day being the *coming* of light, its first morning must have been, in his mind, in *advance* of its first evening and not after, as we mean in respect to time. As for place, he could have had no idea about it, because, by the supposition, its source was imperceptible. The point of our enquiry is not what was his idea about successive days of waxing and of waning. It is, simply, what must have been his idea about their waning being *in advance of their increase*.

Again: Suppose his idea to have been that of the alternating efflux and influx of light from some *perceptible* source. Could it have agreed with an opinion that the sun, being that source, was in circuit around the world, the world itself remaining motionless? Not at all. Because, although in such a case he would have held as naturally as we do the idea of a day having morning and evening, yet he could no more have conceived of evening first and morning last than when thinking the light to have come from some *imperceptible* source.

The truth is, in no sense whatever can the evening of a light day be in advance of its morning, or even be imagined to be so, except in the case of exactly such days as we have, the light coming from a fixed source and the world always revolving upon itself and in one direction to get that light. In such a case, the fact is very simple and very apparent, not, indeed, to the eye, but to the mind. Evening always has been before morning, and always will be, and always must be, while the sun endures and the world rolls. With only one possible exception, in case of another shrouding of the world by a "cloud," so that once more "thick darkness should be its swaddling band." Therefore, in no sense whatever could the writer of these remarkable words have had any idea of a phenomenon such as they describe, unless he did conceive, when writing of this the only way in which such a phenomenon was conceivable, of the very way by which the evening of a day *is* before its morning. Consequently, the persistent and emphatic repetition of this precise phrase does show clearly that the writer

understanding his own words, did understand so much of astronomic science as this: That the world was revolving under a fixed sun; had its own shadow for its darkness; was constantly rolling towards its shadow and *into* it; and of course had its evening always *onward* and its morning, as related to its evening, always *rearward*.

It appears, therefore, from the relative position in which evening and morning (as the components of a day) are here presented, that the writer had seized hold of a grand astronomic fact, a fact in itself a clew to all astronomic science. It appears also, that Copernicus and Kepler, in demonstrating the relations and complex motions of our solar system have also demonstrated that in this one particular the Hebrew writer had laid open a profound and occult truth.

We now present the point of all this—the point which we have had in view: How did the writer get hold of this one pregnant fact that the morning of each world-day is preceded by its evening? Within the measure of two little words descriptive of day, is condensed an entire science which has been discovered and developed among men only by the severest labor and the most profound calculations of the most profound minds. The writer was ignorant of astronomic science. He grasped the core of the science! Here is a problem. How shall we solve it?

We select another specimen from the same page: “The earth was without form and void.”

In the English as well as in the Hebrew Bible, we find the same statement once again, and word for word in the prophecy of Jeremiah (4: 23.) In the latter case, it sets forth, prophetically, the condition of the land of *Judah*. In the former case it sets forth, retro-prophetically, the condition of the land of *the world*. The landscape in its general features, is the same in the one case as in the other. But in the latter case the context gives us an illustrated exposition of the statement, while in the former there is no such illustration.

In Isaiah also (xxxiv, 11) the same two words occur which here chiefly attract our attention and rouse our enquiry. In the two former cases they are rendered, “without form and void.” In this case, “confusion” and “emptiness.” The latter word, *bohu*

(בוהו), is found but three times in the whole Bible; and in the places which we have now mentioned. In each case it is used *geographically*. The former word, *tohu* (תהו) occurs nineteen times. In only eight instances, however, has it any *geographical* application. Three of these cases we have given, the one in Isaiah, the one in Jeremiah, and the one in Genesis. In each of these three cases the two words appear together. We have, therefore, the two cases given to us in which the words are used *geographically* and are explained in the context, by which to find their meaning in the Mosaic text where they are used *geographically* but are not thus explained.

Let us first examine the text in Isaiah. In this case the prophet is portraying a future condition of the land of *Idumea*. "For" (not "and") "for he (Jehovah) shall stretch out upon it the line of *confusion* (*tohu* תהו) and the stones of (*bohu* בוהו) *emptiness*." Divested of its metaphor and with a literal rendering of the two words, the passage reads thus: "For Jehovah shall mete out to Idumea [the allotment of] a *desolation* and [the doom of] a *void*." We now turn to the context. "The streams of the land, pitch; the dust, brimstone; the land burning pitch" (poetic tropes); "thorns in the palaces of the kingdom; nettles and brambles in her fortresses; the whole country * * * lying waste from generation to generation!" Such was to be the *tohu* (תהו), or the "*desolation*" of Idumea. But again: "The great slaughter; the land soaked with blood; no nobles in the kingdom; her princes—nothing; no person passing through her borders," here we have her *bohu* (בוהו), her "*voidness*," "a voidness of intelligent life." The "*desolation*," a ruin of habitations and of sightly vegetation; the "*voidness*," depopulation.

We now turn to the text of Jeremiah. "The earth" (the land of Judah) "was without form and void (תהו ובוהו). Literally: "was a *desolation* and a *void*." We notice the explanatory context. "Destruction upon destruction! The land waste! The fruitful place, a wilderness! The cities broken down! The whole land, desolate' This was the *tohu* (תהו) the "*desolation*." For the *bohu* (בוהו), the void, we find: "No man! All the birds of the air fled! The whole city, fled into the thickets, skulking among the rocks! Every city forsaken; not a man dwelling therein."

Territorial desolation and depopulation in Idumea; territorial desolation and depopulation in Judah—expressed by each prophet and by the same words; by the very words, too, which are selected by Moses to describe the condition of the *world-land* before its creating on the Six Days.

Yet the prophetic description is but half comprehended except we keep in mind that, *before*, Idumea and Judah had been replete with natural thrift and beauty, and had been filled with people.

We think that the Hebrew Bible has a right to expound itself; especially as its writers, covering themselves, cry one to another in the same refrain of praise to him whose glory is displayed in the whole history of the earth and of all its peoples. And so, taking the words used by Isaiah and Jeremiah, and by each graphically explained, we reverently transfer their exposition to the same words applied to the *whole* "land" where they *first* appear in the Bible. We have, then, this legitimate result: The writer, in the simplest terms and with wondrous brevity, assures us that the earth (the "solid land," Gen. i, 10), during an age whose term he does not specify, had been a *desolation and a life-void*; that, indeed, it had been more—a *wreck*; a *ruin*; that it had once been (he does not say how long) as a garden of the Lord for beauty and as a city of the Lord for its wealth of inhabitants. Thus do we think ourselves obliged to interpret Bible by Bible. We trust to Isaiah or to Jeremiah rather than to Jewish rabbi or to Gentile scholar.

Without pretence to chronological precision, we state the era of the Mosaic Creating, as generally received, to have been six thousand years ago. But abundant evidence of a far more ancient geogony is disclosed in the records of geologic monuments. Some of them show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the world itself was once conditioned very differently from its present condition. And, so far as the data of geologic science yet in its childhood, and so far as its arithmetic, are to be trusted—fossil remains have been found anatomically corresponding to our own organic structure; thus showing the existence of Pre-Adamites who were Adam-like, but who (of course) could not have been Adamic. Not only, therefore, is it true, that the world is indefinitely older than the period of its Mosaic

creating; but it is also true, that, in that older age, it was laden with flora, with fauna, and (perhaps) with intelligent beings not unlike mankind. Now these facts, opened to us by the opening of the old-world catacombs, tally most wonderfully, most precisely, with the Mosaic statement before us; a statement which reveals his general knowledge of a trackless ruin long buried in the sepulchre of the Past. The geologic science of to-day testifies unequivocally to the geologic veracity of this one Hebraic statement. "The earth was a desolation and a life-void" expresses a world-wide truth; over-reaching and antedating the world of *Adamic* Nature. He who wrote the words knew their meaning and did set them here as an inscription marking the boundary between the coming Lives and the sepulchre of the Dead. As by two little words the writer shows that he held the key to astronomic mysteries, so also by two little words he shows his knowledge of one great fact which geologic science demonstrates. As he had the astronomic key, yet was ignorant of astronomic science, so he had the geologic fact, yet was ignorant of geologic science. Under these conditions, his knowledge of a ruined world is as much a mystery as his knowledge of the world's rotation. We have asked—How shall we solve the one? We now ask—How shall we solve the other?

We produce another extract: "Now Jehovah God had formed the man (dust of the ground he was) and did breathe into his nostrils the breath of lives. Thus did man become—a *living* person."

The clause which fixes our attention is in the parenthesis. It is an incidental statement only. But it is made with great clearness and positiveness, as expressing a fact of which the writer was *certain*. So far as we know, the like had never been written or said or thought before. It was a new doctrine; strange, startling, incredible to his own generation. Yet, as if conscious that it would never be refuted; as if sure that it would be illustrated and confirmed in due time—he throws out a most audacious and unwelcome truth, *to take care of itself*.

The bodily organism of the first man—and so, by natural consequence, the bodily organism of all its derivatives—was earthy material *entirely*. The blood, bone, fibre, tissue, every

particle of the prince of Forms, of the divine vicegerent of all around him—nothing but a composite of sordid, senseless earth. Such is the full meaning of the words.

Whether they were first written by "Moses the man of God," or by "Enoch the seventh from Adam," before they were written generations had died. Dissolution, as being in all cases the mysterious effect of death, had been a matter of sad and reverent observation from its first appearance on the person of righteous Abel. Men had come to put their dead out of sight, knowing that quickly they would become unsightly. But, however closely the resolution of the body may have been watched, the solution of these words—"dust of the ground"—could never have been given to the watcher's eye. The process and the result were too subtle to be apprehended by mere observation. Nor could the riddle have been solved by any examination of the living human form, or by any rational deductions based, analogically, upon any examination of brute forms. Neither vivisection nor autopsy could have mastered the mystery of living flesh. Possibly, a profound and patient and philosophic mind, observing the routine of organic nature, seizing upon the probable fact that inorganic matter was the nutriment of every vegetable organic, and upon the obvious fact that all flesh, man included, was sustained, directly or indirectly, upon vegetable products—might have reasoned from effect to cause, from ultimate to primary, and have reached the conclusion that the human body, like all the others, took *aliment* from "dust of the ground." But even that conclusion would have been a failure. It would, indeed, have been an approximation to the truth, but only an approximation. It would have been no demonstration of the proposition—"Man is dust of the ground." It never could have justified the certainty, the emphasis, and the oracular authority with which these words were originally penned. Indeed, it seems to us self-evident, that a doctrine of such a nature could not have effected a lodgment in any human mind by the ordinary processes of observation and induction; and that the only human process by which it could possibly have been developed is that of chemical analysis. By this process it has again been revealed. By this process it has also been demonstrated. By persistent investigation, modern physi-

ologists have proved it. By their patient and varied experiments, they have compelled nature so far to take nature's pieces as to resolve her noblest mechanism of life into its original elements, and thus to confess that it is made—as the bee and the reptile are made, as the thistle and the weed are made—of pure inorganic earth. Thus, and only thus, has the truth of these old, old words been proved.

It is of no consequence to us, in this examination, whether this analytic discovery is, or is not, peculiar to modern science. Perhaps it is. Perhaps it is not. An art may be lost and leave no sign. Science herself may yet be blotted from off the face of the earth, and all her proud records, too. What may have been, and so (we cannot swear to a negative), the ancients may have been philosophers versed and expert in the cabala of chemical science among the sages of Pharaoh's court, or among the Epicurei of Enoch's generation. But if there were, the fact does not concern us; for, by mutual compact at the outset of our excursion, we stand all the way upon the same platform of hand and glove, with the modern infidel who cynically maintains that the author of this Hebrew book of Genesis was himself wholly ignorant of the physical sciences. It is "nominate in the bond" that he was thus ignorant. For the occasion, like Shylock, we claim the letter of the bond.

If, now, it be granted (and we think *no* man will deny it) that the pure earthiness of our entire physical constitution could not possibly have become known to this writer by observation, by subjective examination, or by philosophic deduction, and if, at the same time, it be conceded that it was not made known to him through the medium of analytic demonstration—then the question is not only opportune but it is pressing—*By what means did he know it?*

Our next selection asserts the prolific influences of the moon: "And of Joseph he said: Blessed of Jehovah be his land * * * for the precious products of the sun, and for the precious produce of the moons."* This occurs in the farewell

* Deut. xxxiii, 14. "Products" and "produce." These two words express exactly the difference between the two corresponding Hebrew words. Gesenius reads "months." See Lex. He is justified by the vowel points. But it seems to us that the apposition of the word to "the sun" is a better index and better authority than the vowel points, which are comparatively modern. *Heb. plu.*—"moons"

benediction of Moses upon the several tribes of Israel. The entire invocation was pronounced by him in public, and, doubtless, was also inscribed by his own hand.

The moon, from time immemorial, has been regarded as being something more to the world than a mere luminary. "The moon shall not smite thee by night," indicates that her light, in given cases, may be productive of bodily malady; and, if our memory is not in fault, medical science recognizes an oriental moon as the cause, not unfrequently, of purulent ophthalmia. Her attractive influence in the production of the tides is well known. Our word "lunatic," meaning moon-struck, and the Greek word *σεληνεάζομαι* (used by different writers in the New Testament), which means the same, show the popular belief in her agency in producing mental insanity. Not a few in our own latitude and climate dare not sleep under her full light; and we have rumors, from all quarters, of her baleful influence upon provisions exposed to her rays. The new moon over the left shoulder; the new moon over the right, are considered as omens of evil or of good. The farmer sows his grain or fells his timber or cuts down intrusive shrubs, and the butcher slaughters his beeves or his swine, according to the age of the moon. All these things prove nothing except that, in times far back and in some unknown way, there have sprung up pervading beliefs that our satellite is capable of mischief and works mischief. And yet the question arises—could such general opinions and such old traditions have arisen from *no* germ of truth?

The Hebrew patriarch, in the words which we cite, agrees with the popular creed on *one* point: that the moon is *doing something* on the earth besides giving us reflected light. In other respects, his doctrine is the very reverse of the popular doctrine. He recognizes and avows lunar influence for *good*. The doctrine slips from his lips incidentally, it is true. But it is impressive as uttered by a man of six-score years, when taking leave of a people who had grown up under him for two-score years; impressive, too, as the words of one glowing under the influence of a prophetic afflatus. Every syllable from such a man, under circumstances so grave and so pathetic, is worthy of reverential regard. Incidental as this particular clause was,

we owe to him, at least so much respect as this—to believe that he believed what the clause means.

What is its meaning? We confess that, beyond a certain point, we do not know. But we perceive *one* thing: The venerable Seer parallelizes the productive influence of the moon with the productive influence of the sun. He distinctly states that as the sun is genial, producing precious things, so the moon is genial also. Now we all recognize the former fact as bearing upon every form of life, whether developed or in embryo. The prophet assures us that a like agency of the moon exists and merits our regard; although, while that of the sun is obvious and felt, her's is unperceived. He proclaims a fact in natural philosophy: "*Precious* produce of the moons," of successive moons, of moons which seem successive, though all the while there is but one. The *succession*, then, is essential to her products and to their preciousness. According to Moses, therefore, there is a benevolent reason for the moon's *phases*; much as we may wish she were always at the full.

But of this Mosaic doctrine, we have no confirmation in human observation. It belongs to the province of natural science; and yet, thus far, it has baffled her researches. Natural philosophers have not found it out. It has been written down here for some thousands of years in a book which has not been secluded in a cloister or thrust into a corner. Yet of all the savans of historic generations, not one in a thousand has heeded it; and the few who may have heeded, have passed it over as an old man's whim, because science, forsooth, was not born in his day!

But, whether true or false, this doctrine of lunar influence in the production of natural values *claims* a place in the catalogue of the natural sciences. That scientific men have not found it out, does not disprove it. We say more: There is such evidence of its truth that it ought to have our respect. We say even more: That there is such evidence of its truth that it ought to have our credence. What evidence? We reply—*Mosaic* evidence; credible evidence. Let us explain this.

There seems to be as much reason, or more, to accept Moses as the author of the book of Genesis as there is to accept Homer as the author of the Iliad, or Cicero as the author of "*De*

Senectute." But be this as it may, he did *publish* these three doctrines which, *as written* down in this book, are intelligible to us, and therefore must have been understood by him, viz : the rotatory movement of the world ; its existence and its superficial ruin before the creating which he records ; and the entire earthiness of physical man. Father or godfather, he vouched for them and is responsible for them. Besides, they have each been *proven* ; proven by men who were not stimulated at all, in working out their proof, by any Mosaic partizanship. Now this same man is he who first propounded, and is the only man who has propounded this *fourth* doctrine ; which pertains as truly to the department of natural science as do the other three ; this fourth doctrine of the prolific influence of the moon. The others are his doctrines. *This* is his doctrine. We claim therefore, that inasmuch as the three have been demonstrated and on disinterested grounds, the remaining one, although not demonstrated, ought to be accepted (presumptively, at least) on the ground of *such other demonstrations*. We have three times as much reason for asserting its truth (which we do) as for doubting it. Three to one, its *untruth* will never be demonstrated. Three to one, its *truth* will be demonstrated in due time ; that is, when wise men have grown wise enough. Hence we say, that the *Mosaic* evidence on this particular point is *credible* evidence. On these rational and cogent grounds—cogent even in the lower court of common gentlemanliness—we claim that the genial influence of the moon, twin to that of the sun, should be accepted as a fact. We mean—the salutary and essential influence of a *changing* moon upon terrestrial life. Now as, by our postulate, Moses did not get his knowledge of this fact by philosophic investigation—*How did* he get it !

Let us look back in review. Here are four separate and irrelative facts ; facts of no trivial nature. The one is astronomical and phenomenal ; another, cosmical and historical ; another, physiological and chemical ; the fourth vital and terrestrial. They all pertain to the vast and complicated movements of material Nature. Although the simple knowledge of them does not involve a knowledge of their philosophy, yet they all belong to the province of natural science. Of these

facts Moses had cognizance. His knowledge of them presents to us a problem : To find the mode by which he came to this knowledge. Not one of them was cognizable by the senses. Therefore, they could not have been known to him by *observation*. He had no physical data upon which to start a process of reasoning, or from which to make scientific calculations. Therefore these facts could not have become known to him by *induction*, or by *demonstration*. He does not state them as hypothetical, but as certainties. Therefore, he did not get at them by any fortuitous freak of *fancy*. Instinctive perception, however fitted betimes to lay hold of certain sorts of practical truths, is incompetent to grasp such sorts of facts. Therefore, he did not get at them by *intuition*. But if not by observation, nor by induction, nor by demonstration, nor by imagination, nor by intuition, then he must have attained them by some *other* tuition.

At this point we meet with some embarrassment. The waif of the Nile was the pet of Pharaoh's daughter. Yet his position was not that of a royal toy or of a pampered minion. It was that of a child. He held the rank and the privileges of a princely child. He was therefore educated as a prince ; and, as he grew up, the sages of the court, the literary stars of the world, were his tutors. These men were either versed in the true natural sciences as they are known to us, or they were not. If they were, it is preposterous to suppose that their royal pupil, at the ripe age of forty years, was ignorant of the same sciences. But it is our fundamental premise in this our course of thought, and a premise of *compact*, that he *was* ignorant of these sciences. And as we may not retract this to admit what, with or without it, is a preposterous supposition, so we must insist that the wise men of Egypt, whatever their learning, were not learned in the true sciences. Whence it follows, as of course, that the particular knowledge to which Moses had attained and which is now the subject of our investigation, could not have been imparted by them ; nor even by others—for his teachers were confessedly the magi of the world. The question, therefore, re-appears before us and with intensified force : If Moses did not teach himself of these great facts in nature, and if no man taught him—WHO DID ?

Conceive now, if possible, of the Hebrew annalist or of any other man ignorant of cosmic philosophy, ignorant of geology, ignorant of geological phenomena, ignorant of practical chemistry, and ignorant of the arcana of animal and vegetable vitality—grasping such peculiar facts as are attested in these records, yet neither having taught himself nor having been taught! Taking hold of such profound and invisible realities at a glance, just as one takes hold of the simple realities of a landscape! Why! we have a superhuman man! a man who is not a man! But if our natural philosophy (we had almost said—our natural *theology*) be too straitened to admit so marvellous a prodigy, *then* the question—Who taught him? crowds us to the wall. We cannot silence it. We cannot evade it. We must answer it, or—it will throttle us. It is useless to say—“No one taught him.” That is the *very thing* which throttles! the very thing which gives grip to the question. It bounds back upon us with more vigor than before; with more tenacity; flashing scorn at us for a reply so audacious, so silly, so mendacious; interjecting the scorching comment—“*a cowardly lie!*” and repeating itself in our teeth—“*Who taught him? WHO?*” “We do not know!” But *that* will not do! We *do* know. No man, unless content to stultify himself in the eyes of others and in his own eyes; no man, unless he would be the executioner of his own common sense, will thus play fast and loose with a question which has the impetus and the edge of the guillotine. We *do* know that no man, not cognizant of demonstrative science, could have made the several statements which we have quoted, unless the facts had been given him by another. And we do further know that, human science (as by our supposition) being not yet born, he must have become cognizant of them through a tuition *super-human*. So that—what with his scientific poverty and his scientific facts standing side by side—we have but two alternatives: to be silly and belie ourselves: or to be manly and honorable in avowing a *divine* tutor. In the latter case, we acknowledge the seals of a divine warrant upon documents drawn up by a human pen.

Well, if these significant statements are the writer's diplomatic vouchers of a higher than a human tuition, we do but dishonor our own manhood, if we do not respect other state-

ments of the same pupil when he gives as facts *other* matters of which he had no personal cognition. If he had superhuman tuition in the one case, it is no assumption to claim that he must have had it in the other case. Or, if we doubt this, is not the superhuman tuition which we are fain to recognize in the one case a superhuman *testimony* to his truthful accuracy in other cases? We think it is. We claim, therefore, that when the same writer, whose brow is yet aglow with the celestial aureola, enters upon the plane of human life and tells of what transpired among men before he was born, he is not less reliable there than when on the higher plane of scientific mysteries. Has he not the prestige, still, of a divine supervision, and even of a divine tuition! It seems to us in all honesty that the sanction given to the greater cleaves also to the less. More especially, when the same pupil, under the same pupilage, writes of his *own* times and of events which passed under his *own* eye.

Our reasoning upon this particular point may be stated thus. Certain statements of the writer compel us to regard him as having been under divine tuition at the opening of his historic records. We therefore regard him as in the same relation all through his records, wherever any tuition is needed; and under divine supervision wherever tuition was not needed. That is to say: The knowledge of three recondite scientific facts (since demonstrated), betrayed by the *unscientific* writer, and demonstrative of divine tuition, claims and compels our confidence in *all* which he writes.

This conclusion may be thought, at first view, to be premature and illogical. For, while it may be frankly admitted that such statements from such a man sufficiently indicate divine tuition and therefore claim our faith, yet we may rightly and consistently doubt other statements which he makes, which unlike these, are *unscientific* and even *anti-scientific*. There seems to be much force and fair logic in this exception. We think, to be sure, that a statement may be *thought* to conflict with demonstrated science, when it does not. But let this pass.

We view the matter rather in this light. The exception is taken, chiefly, against the Mosaic "miracles," so called; it being assumed that they are antagonistic to the simplest principles of natural science—an assumption, however, which we do not con-

cede. At the same time the exception is itself even *based* upon the admission by the objector, that Moses had been under divine tuition, so far as his knowledge of certain facts was involved. *Otherwise*—that indisputable knowledge would stand confessed as great a “miracle” as a talking serpent, or the creation of a living one from a wooden rod. And so the objector would nullify his own exception. Well, then: The divine tuition of our writer is admitted to a certain point. Beyond that point, it is denied; denied, because some statements beyond are denied, and therefore the exception is necessary to exempt them from any divine complicity or sanction. That is to say: The divine teaching and the divine sanction were vouchsafed to Moses a little way in his historic enterprise, and then withdrawn. Consequently, left to himself, the same man filled out his writings with more than a modicum of *untrue* statements. Which seems to us like saying, that the good God took his protégé a little way to a certain point in a certain grave undertaking (historic) and there—deserted him! This seems to demand a prodigious credulity on our part, and to involve a credulity on the objector's part more voracious than would be necessary to accept as true, that Moses had laid hold of Nature's secrets without any teaching at all! Not only so, but it seems to involve a “miracle” infinitely more astounding than any or all which Moses records—an act of heartless treachery on the part of his divine tutor! On the whole, therefore, we may be permitted to doubt whether our final conclusion be “premature and illogical”—after all. And so, we still hold and still urge that the simple statement, by our unscientific writer, of these three notable scientific facts, discovered by unscientific (i. e. divine) means, compels us to give credence to his *entire* historic records. The demonstrations of modern science have demonstrated the truth of statements most amazing when made by one who had had no scientific training, and we cannot see that his *anti*-scientific statements (so called), are *any more* amazing. The demonstrations of modern science have, indeed, demonstrated *his divine pupillage*, and we cannot see why she would, or how she can, ~~un~~-demonstrate this particular one of her own demonstrations.

We have tried to give some prominence to certain scientific statements in “The Five Books” of Moses. To our vis-

ion, the great significance of these statements lies upon the very surface of the text; and we have no present wish to show why or how they have been brought under a cloud. Conceding a position of which a class of scientific men are very tenacious, we have framed upon it a plea for the divine authority of these writings which will pass for what it may be worth. We have given only specimens of such statements; for these have seemed sufficient for our purpose. Three of them have been illumined by demonstrative science. Another we have selected, partly because of its simplicity; and partly because, *not* demonstrated, it sufficiently indicates that it may be but one of many in the same condition.

At first view, one would think that the Mosaic fragment from which we have made our first selections is strangely meagre in proportion to the magnificence of its scope—the grand drama of the re-ordering of a devastated world. It is so. And if it were the writer's purpose to manifest any processive phenomena of Nature, he has utterly failed; for not a single such process is specified. But, according to our own fallible apprehension, his only purpose was, to disclose the mastership and the self-devotion of Nature's *Maker*. Consequently, the primal disobedience is stated, not to show forth its strangeness, but to disclose, in the several scenes which were its immediate consequents, the wondrous affectionateness of Him who had been disobeyed. And *this* is done with the pen of a master. So the first homicide is recorded in the briefest possible way; and is only used as a foil to bring out a vivid illustration of the divine gentleness. Even in the last note from the house of Cain, by a single stroke of the pen (Gen. iv, 24), we have a most touching illustration of divine grace.

The same paramount purpose stands out in bold relief all along the Mosaic books (indeed, throughout the Bible), even to the last cadence of song, on the eve of the ascent of Pisgah. The books are not books of natural science. Nor are they books of genealogy, or of human history. They are books sacred to the single task of revealing God by the record of his doing toward men, even through all their waywardness. Human behavior and natural phenomena are brought out only as necessary to the development of the divine character. Hence, w

—to be instituted and raised up in God's own time and his own way. At last the time has opened; the day has come, and men begin to enjoy its freshness and its choral song. The book of science begins to verify the book of God. The former revelations of the former have just become able to do "the first principles" of the latter. But the exposition goes on. The sages of science have been but the servants of Jehovah, working out problems which he has stated to his servant Moses. As they have done, so shall they do, whether willing or unwilling; whether as hewers of wood or diggers of water; whether as quarry-men among the rocks or divers of the seas; whether as analyzers of the sunbeam or workers in the laboratory: step by step they will wring out, and yet more, the testimony of Nature herself to the truth of the Mosaic records, even of their "miracles;" until Nature herself shall teach these workmen how to read her ONLY as it is declared and emphasized, again and again, in the chapter of Genesis. Or else, tired of searching, amid atoms and protoplasms, for the grand mystery of Nature's mystery, the gray-headed philosopher shall yet become a little child and have it unfolded for him while sitting at the feet of

Thus far, the demonstrations of natural science *have* been expositions of the Mosaic records; and, being such, they show the grand result to which her labors are trending—the complete verification of *all* the scientific mysteries recorded in the sacred writings. We bid her—God-speed!

ARTICLE V.—THE FOLLY OF ATHEISM.*

"THE FOOL HATH SAID IN HIS HEART, 'THERE IS NO GOD.'" Ps. xiv, 1.

THE word "fool" commonly means, in the Bible, not a person actually devoid of reason, but one who, having reason, fails, through some wrong quality of character, to use it aright, but proceeds in his thinking or conduct in a way contrary to the dictates of a sound intelligence. There are two sorts of fools; first, natural fools, and secondly, fools from choice,—or those who, from haste or conceit, or some evil inclination, occult it may be, are grossly misled in their opinions, or in their practical action. When, for example, we read in the Proverbs that "Judgments are prepared for sinners, and stripes for the back of fools;" and, in another place, "Though thou shouldst bray a fool in a mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness depart from him," the allusion is plainly not to men whose native talents are below the average, and whose attainments of knowledge are small. Everything like contempt for inferiors of this class is utterly at variance with the spirit of Christianity. The pride of knowledge, like every other kind of pride, is rebuked in the Bible. But the allusion is to one who, while possessed of the attributes of a rational being, chooses, nevertheless, to adopt principles, or pursue lines of conduct, that are perfectly unreasonable. Even then, to call the brother "fool" in any bitter temper, to despise or to hate him for any cause, is forbidden in the Sermon on the Mount. Yet there is nothing to hinder us from designating folly, not passionately, but in a calm and sober way, by its true name. Not to tarry longer upon the explanation of words, I wish to speak of the folly of Atheism under two heads; first, the futility of the reasons that lead to it, and secondly,

* This Article consists of a Sermon, preached in the Chapel of Yale College, October 22, 1876. It is printed as it was delivered, with the addition of a few notes.

th of the evidence for the being of God which it

the sources of Atheism, one is the fact that God is
The remark has been attributed to La Place that,
the heavens, he could not find God with his tele-
is doubtful whether he ever said it. But whether
not, it indicates the spirit that often tacitly underlies
l and practical Atheism. God, when sought for as a
ject, cannot be found by traversing the sea, or ex-
e sky, even if one pursued his journey to the farthest
t what folly to conclude that God does not exist,
He is not visible! Men—unless you call the body
—are not visible. The thinking principle, neither in
or in others, have you ever seen. You may say that
onscious of it in yourself. But how do you know
sts in another—in the friend, for example, who sits at
? You cannot see it: all that you behold is certain
ions, or phenomena, which reveal its unseen, mys-
esence. You may be in daily, intimate converse
er, but his soul ever remains invisible: for

“ We are spirits clad in veils:
Man by man was never seen:
All our deep communing fails
To remove the shadowy screen.”*

disbelieve in God because you cannot see him? If
he look, the tone, the gesture of a man at your side
ehold, with the eye of faith, the invisible mind that
thin, the seat of thought and affection, why refusé to
the Supreme Intelligence, of whom it is true, as an
as said, that “The invisible things of Him from the
f the world are clearly seen, being understood by the
it are made, even His eternal power and Godhead?”
on the ground that we are now considering is espe-
lish, because within the sphere of nature itself, invis-
, some of them of vast power, are admitted to exist.
us that matter is composed of atoms: who has seen
Who has seen the force of gravitation, and can paint
of it? Who has beheld the subtle ether which, it

* From a poem of C. P. Cranch.

is believed, pervades all space? He who believes in nothing but what he, or somebody else has seen, will have a skeptical creed. He must begin by denying the existence of anything as a power of thought or volition behind the actions and expressions of his fellow men. He must deny that he is endowed with such a power himself. There is no need to go farther. When he has emptied the world of everything but brute matter, which can be weighed and clutched, he may, perhaps, logically reject God.

A second source of Atheism, is the notion that as far as second causes are brought to light, the first cause is excluded, or the notion that second causes are disconnected from God. In the Bible, we read, in a sentence that has hardly a parallel for beauty: "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of His mouth." Now suppose the nebular hypothesis, as broached by Herschel and Laplace, to be true. Whether it be true or not, I cannot say; but the astronomers have not yet made up their minds about it. But suppose it to be true. Then a homogeneous, nebular matter diffused abroad in space, by a long process of attractions and repulsions, combinations and motions, solidified into the bodies and systems which now form the visible world. Does this rule out the sublime declaration of Scripture—"by the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of His mouth?" Before attending to this question, let us turn for a moment to another illustration. A person, after a lingering illness, dies. The minister and the physician happen to be together. The minister says: "It has pleased God to terminate the life of our brother." "No," says the doctor, "he died of a fever." "You are wrong," replies the minister, "it is God—it is He that killeth and that maketh alive." "You are wrong," rejoins the other, "I have watched the progress of the fever from the beginning: such a fever seizing upon such a constitution can have no other issue." The one party falls back on religious conviction, and the testimony of the Bible; the other appeals to the obvious connection of antecedent and consequence. Now shall this unseemly wrangle between the minister and the doctor be dignified by the high-sounding name of "a confi-

between Religion and Science?" In such a contest, both are right in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny. Let all the links of secondary causation be exposed as completely as possible, each of them bound to the one before and after it, it is not less true that, when life ends, it is God who brings it to an end. The instrument used does not exclude, it includes His agency. If a bird is shot by a rifle, it is a man still that kills the bird. Many appear to think that God is to be found, if found at all, only at the origin of things—the origin of matter, the origin of life, the origin of different species,—at crises, so to speak. But "He maketh His sun to rise"—*daily* maketh His sun to rise—"on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." He is present with His agency in the *course* of nature not less really and efficiently than at the beginnings of nature. "Not a sparrow falls to the ground without your Father." We revert now to the question of the origin of the stellar universe. God is not less its author even if the material of which it is composed were carried through a succession of changes, reaching through a long series of ages. There is, to be sure, the origination of the material to be accounted for, with all its latent properties and tendencies. But God is presupposed not only at this initial stage, but at every subsequent movement, until the glorious work was consummated. "By the Word of the Lord"—by His will and in pursuance of His plan—"were the heavens made."

Science has for its business the investigation of second causes. Let it have a fair field. I sympathize with the resentment which the students of nature feel when the attempt is made to furnish them with conclusions beforehand. Their peculiar province is to unfold all the links of secondary causation—every *nexus* between antecedent and consequent—which they can ferret out. But the origin of things—I mean, the primary origin—and the end, or design, it belongs to philosophy, in the light of Revelation, to define. The man of science may, also, be a philosopher; and he may not be.* The particular fallacy, however,

* It is a remark of Archbishop Whately, to be found somewhere in his *Biography*, and a remark characteristic of his sagacity, that science has nothing to do with religion. If I ask a man of science for the origin of an eclipse, it is not for

which I would here point out is the false and unauthorized assumption that where secondary causation begins, divine agency ceases, and that as far as secondary causation extends, divine agency is excluded. How much nobler is the conception of the Bible, in the New Testament as well as in the Old! It is God by whom the lilies of the field are clothed with beauty. The fowls of the air—it is your Heavenly Father that feedeth them!

A third particular in which Atheism demonstrates its folly is in the assumption that the laws of nature—or the uniformity of nature's laws—excludes God. Must there be then a break—discord where there is order—to prove that God reigns? Is there no God, because there is a reign of law? Imagine that in the room of the universal sway of law, there were a jumble of events, no fixed relation of antecedent and consequent; in a word, chaos. Would there be more or less evidence of a God than there is now? It is because nature is an orderly system, that the universe is intelligible, and science possible. This very aspect of nature shows that the head of the universe is an intelligent being. Miracles would not be credible, if they were, as some suppose them to be, anti-natural. Though not the mere effect of nature, they harmonize with it, as parts of a more comprehensive system.* What a strange idea that for the heavens to declare the glory of God, it is necessary that the planets should leap out of their orbits, instead of keeping their appointed path with unfaltering regularity! We count it the perfection of intelligent control, when the railway train reaches its destination, day after day, at the same appointed moment.

him, that is, not for him in his character as a man of science, to answer that God caused it. This I knew before. His function is to explain the antecedents which constitute the ground on which the event can be predicted. What is true of an eclipse is true of everything else in nature. With respect to the origin of man, it is perfectly legitimate, it is, in fact, the proper function of the scientific man, to find out the mediating process—if there was one—in his creation.

* Miracles surpass the capacities of nature. But, as Augustine long ago affirmed, the ordinary operations of nature are just as truly from God, as are miraculous phenomena; and those operations would be just as marvelous, were we not familiar with them, as any miracle can be. What marvel greater than every new-born child? But the point made above is that miracles have their law—their *rationale*—as parts of the divine plan.

"O, no!" cries the Atheist: "let the train, now and then, run off the track into yonder meadow, and I will believe that it does not go of itself, and that an engineer guides it." A government of law is opposed to that of wild chance or mutable caprice. What should we expect of perfect wisdom, and of perfect goodness too, but a system of nature, a fixed order, on which men can build their plans? Of all the grounds for Atheism, the rationality of the universe is the most singular.

Another pretext for Atheism is the alleged contrariety of the teaching of the Bible to the discoveries of natural and physical science. An odd conclusion surely, even if such a contradiction were found. For the Bible does not first make known the existence of God. If the Bible were shown to be full of errors, it would not disprove the being of God. His being is assumed in the Bible. It is declared to be manifest in the universe around us, and within us, so that heathenism is without excuse. But there is no discrepancy between the ascertained truth of science, and the essential teaching of the Bible respecting God and His relations to the world. The Bible is our guide in morals and religion. It does not anticipate the discoveries of science, or of art. Paul was a tent-maker. The inspiration that so exalted his spiritual perception as to render him an authoritative teacher of the Gospel, did not, as far as we know, enable him to make tents any better than other workmen of the same craft. There has been, doubtless, since his time, a progress in this art as in almost every other. These two things are true of the Bible: first, it is written from the religious point of view. That is, God is brought directly before us, in describing the works of Providence, as well as the phenomena of nature,—secondary and intermediate causes being, to a large extent, dropped out of sight. The veil that hides Him, so to speak, from the dull eyes of men, is torn away, and His agency is brought into the foreground. Secondly, the Bible writers take the science of their time, or the ordinary conceptions of men respecting the material world, and proceed upon that basis, casting out everything at variance with true religion. They stand substantially on the same plane of knowledge as their contemporaries; and from that plane they exhibit the attributes of God as the Creator and Ruler of

nature. The Astronomy of the Bible is that of the ancients. Its authors had no idea of the Copernican system. They simply eliminate all heathen mythological conceptions, leaving no room for Baal-worship. Their concern was to reveal God as the Maker and sustainer of the visible universe; they did not, as they could not, explain the sidereal system.* As for Geology there was none. The Pentateuch records the giving of the law upon Sinai, but does not tell us that the rock is of granite. The journey of the Israelites in the wilderness was not a geological excursion. We know not when, or by whom, the story of the creation was first recorded in the form in which we have it. But that sublime passage of Holy Writ is plainly the old Semitic tradition, cleansed of polytheistic error, and made the vehicle of conveying the loftiest moral and religious truth. Compare it with the cosmogony of Assyria, or Babylon, and you will see wherein the inspiration of it lies. There may be striking correspondences with modern knowledge, as in the creation of light before the heavenly bodies.† But I should not expect to find in this old panorama of the creation, as it was presented to the purified imagination of the primitive Hebrews, any rigid conformity in detail with that vast book which modern science has unrolled. It passed for literal history in by-gone ages but it must be read now as a poem—a product of the imagination, as it really was in its primitive inception; yet a poem full of the evidences of divine inspiration, containing the essential principles of the Old Testament religion, and embodying more moral and religious truth than all other books not written in dependence on the Bible. The first utterance—“In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth”—is a truth to which heathen philosophy, on its highest stage, never absolutely attained.‡ The Bible fares hardly in these days, between a

* It was a wise as well as witty remark of a celebrated ecclesiastic, supposed to be the Cardinal Baronius, to whom Galileo refers, that the Bible was given to teach us how to go to heaven, and not how the heavens go.

† Yet it seems to have been a prevalent conception that light was independent of the heavenly luminaries. It has a dwelling-place, (Job xxxviii, 19.) Even in the Greek conception, “the rosy-fingered Dawn” preceded the chariot of Apollo.

‡ In the first three chapters of Genesis, we find asserted the truths that the universe owes its being to the creative agency of one personal God,—as against Dualism, Pantheism and Polytheism; that man is like God in his spiritual nature.

infidel theology, on the one hand, which is blind to the supernatural wisdom that belongs to it, and a Rabbinical theology on the other, that allows no space for the human element which pervades the Book from beginning to end. The Bible is crucified, as it were, between these two theologies. But the Bible, containing as it does the word of God, has an immortal life in it. It has shown its power to outlive the changing systems of its human interpreters. There is no inconsistency, then, between the Bible, taken as the teacher of moral and religious truth, and the results of scientific study. There is no room for contradiction, since they move on different planes. Hence Atheism founded on this pretext is a folly.

Another ground of Atheism is the supposed imperfection in the Creator's work, or government. This, if shown to exist, would not disprove the being of God, though it might affect our view of His attributes. If a house is leaky, we do not infer that it was never built, but only that the workmen lacked skill, or were guilty of negligence. It was thought, a century ago, to be a ridiculous boast when Thomas Paine said of the Bible

ties: that sin is not a physical or metaphysical necessity, but has its origin and seat in the will of the creature; that guilt brings shame, and separation from communion with God; that immorality is the natural fruit of impiety. These are truths of vast moment; peculiar, in their pure form, to the religion of the Bible.

Ordinarily we find it to be the method of Providence that sacred history, like other history, should be recorded by "eye-witnesses or well-informed contemporaries." Witness the almost complete silence of the Evangelists upon the first thirty years of the Saviour's life. "Wherefore," said Peter (Acts i, 21, 22), "of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John, unto that some day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection." The early part of Genesis, the Prolegomena to the Mosaic legislation and to the record of the founding of the Hebrew Commonwealth, precludes contemporary authorship, except so far as earlier documents may be intervened. It is to be expected that difficulties, and questions for criticism, would arise in extraordinary measure respecting this section of the Bible. Especially is this true of the first ten chapters, which carry us far back into the primeval era, anterior to the beginnings of the Jewish people. But whatever may be here set down to "the human element," the homogeneity of these narratives, as to their moral and religious spirit and content, with the rest of the Scriptures, and thus their elevation above all heathen literature, must not be overlooked. The divine element is not less conspicuous, and impressive on the mind of a thoughtful student of the history of religion, than in those portions of the Bible which emanate directly from persons who participated in the events which they record.

that he could write a better book himself. But we have had to listen, in our time, to criticism equally daring upon the system of nature itself, which has been pronounced in various particulars defective. Complaint is, also, made that righteousness and prosperity are not always united; and, hence, that a perfect moral Ruler, one possessed of infinite goodness and infinite power, cannot be supposed. This last is an old objection. We might stop to ask whence the skeptic derives the faculty by which he undertakes to criticise the natural and moral system, and the standard on which his judgments are based? If the universe is so at fault, what assurance has he that his own judging faculty, the source of this unfavorable verdict, is any better constructed? But, passing by this consideration, the whole objection, as Bishop Butler has shown with irresistible force, is an argument from ignorance. It is a rash judgment upon a system not yet completed. I will suppose a man to enter the Cologne Cathedral, the grandest monument, as it appears to me, of the genius and piety of the middle ages. He paces up and down its long aisles, follows with his eye the columns, ascending upward, like a mighty forest, to the far-off canopy of stone which they support, pauses at

"The storied windows, richly dight,
Casting a dim, religious light;"

but, just as the grandeur and symmetry of the vast edifice touch his soul with a sensation of awe, he espies portions of the wall left in the rough, the towers abruptly broken off, and cries out "the artist was, after all, a bungler!" What would you say to such a man? You would say, "O profane babbler, the building is not yet done!" Enough is made to prove the skill of the Architect. You can see to what result the construction tends. Wait till the plan is complete, before you utter your disparagement. So it is with the moral system, and the moral administration of the world. Now we know in part. We see that the direction is right; we can securely wait for the consummation.

Turn now, for a moment, to the positive evidence of God which Atheism fails to acknowledge in its real import.

There is, first, the revelation of God in the soul. There is within us a sense of dependence, and a consciousness of a last

imposed upon us by the Power on whom we depend—a law moral in its nature, and thus revealing that Power as having a preference for right—in other words, as personal and holy. An almost audible voice of God in the soul discloses to us His being, and intimate relation to ourselves.* Connected with this inward experience of dependence and of duty, there is in the depth of the spirit a yearning for communion with Him in whom we live, and move, and have our being. These inward testimonies of God can never be absolutely silenced. A recent writer has defined God as the Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness. There is a Power, then, that gives law to the will, cheers with the hope of reward, and menaces with the dread of punishment, and actually secures the reward to the righteous; and yet that power has no *love* of righteousness, and no hatred to iniquity! It is impossible without a perversion of reason to believe this. Behind the mandate of conscience is the preference and will of God. Coleridge is right in saying that it is our duty to believe in God; for this belief is necessary to the life of conscience. The only correlate for the unquenchable yearning of the human spirit for a higher communion, is the living God, who, though not seen by us, Himself “seeth in secret.” Faith in God springs up in the soul spontaneously, where the soul is not darkened and perverted. It is strictly natural. Hence religion, in some form, is universal, or as nearly so as are the exercise of a moral sense, and the rest of the higher powers of man. Religion, the belief in God, is like the domestic affections. They may be weakened, they may be corrupted, they may be deadened, and, to all appearance well-nigh extirpated. Nevertheless, they remain, an indestructible part of human nature. A man may argue that these affections—filial, parental, conjugal love—are

* Suppose the notion of the gradual genesis of the moral faculty, that it is the result of the accretion of hereditary impressions, to be held; still the moral faculty exists. Moreover, it stands as well, as to its origin, as the intellectual nature; and legitimate deductions from the phenomena of our moral consciousness are equally valid with the science which rests for all of its conclusions on the validity of our intellectual faculty. It is difficult for the most erratic speculation to strike at religion without, at the same time, not only striking at morality, but annihilating itself; for the science that casts distrust on the organ of knowledge commits suicide in the very act.

irrational, the product of fancy, or an heir-loom from tradition. Pseudo-philosophers have done this. He may profess to emancipate himself from these superstitious feelings. But if he succeed, he will only starve his heart; and, in the end, nature will prove too strong for him.* Religion is not a doctrine merely; it is a life, an integral part of the life of the soul; and without religion, man is a poor deformed creature, more dead than alive. Every organ, deprived of its correlated object, feels after it. There is an effort, a *nus*—from which there is no rest. So it is in a man who undertakes to live without God—at least until higher sensibility is paralyzed. In these ways does God give a witness of Himself within us, to disregard which is not less irrational than wicked.

Secondly, Atheism disregards the revelation of God in the structure of the world, the marks of design that everywhere present themselves to the unbiased observer. "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see?" The mind refuses to believe that the author—the cause—of the eye and ear, is itself void of perception. The adaptations of nature exhibit on every hand a contriving mind. The thought of God springs up within us involuntarily, whenever we consider the human frame, or look at any other of the countless examples of design of which the world is full. There is proof of arrangement everywhere. The heart rises in thanks and worship to "Him who alone doeth great wonders;" "to Him that by wisdom made the heavens;" "that stretched out the earth above the waters;" "to Him that made great lights, the sun to rule by day, the moon and stars to rule by night." This evidence of God has impressed the greatest minds of the race—men like Socrates and Cicero—and the humblest minds alike. One would think that a man, knowing by consciousness and observation what the marks and fruits of intelligence are, must have put out his eyes if he fails to discern a plan in the marvelous order of nature. How *can* an invisible, spiritual being reveal Himself to other minds, if

* If the attempt were made to bring up a child without the exercise on his part of domestic affection, all the propensities and feelings that relate to the family being, as far as practicable, stifled, the experiment would be analogous to that which John Stuart Mill suffered, as regards religion, at the hands of his father.

the works appropriate to intelligence do not inspire a conviction of His presence and agency?*

Nor is the force of this evidence weakened by the doctrine of evolution, unless it is pushed into materialism, in which case it can be overthrown by irrefutable arguments. Suppose it were true that all animals—nay, all living things—could be traced back to a single germ, out of which they are developed in pursuance of certain laws or tendencies. Then they were all contained in that germ. Nothing can be *e*-volved that was not before *in*-volved. What a marvel that gelatin—or protoplasm—or whatever it be called—in which are shut up all the living things that exist? Who made that germ? Who laid in it the properties—the tendency to variation, the tendency to permanence, and the rest—by the operation of which this endless variety, and beauty and order emerge? You see that God is required as much as ever. This new doctrine, whether it be an established truth, or an unverified speculation, strikes at religion only when it assumes to deny the existence of mind in the proper sense, and holds that thought is only a function of the brain, perishing with it. That is to say, there is no free, contriving intelligence in man. What is called that, is only a pro-

* The argument from final causes in nature is not weakened by our inability to discern, in many cases, what they are, or by mistakes made in presumptuous endeavors to point them out. The objection of Hume to affirming an analogy between works of nature and works of art, is futile, since in respect to *design*—the feature in both on which the argument turns—the analogy holds. The eye is an instrument employed by a rational being for a purpose; and when we see how it is fitted to this use, we cannot resist the persuasion that it was *intended* for it. The idea of the organ we discern, as Whewell well puts it: *we have in our minds the idea of a final cause, and when we behold the eye, we find our idea exemplified.* This idea, then, governed the construction of the eye, be its efficient causes, the operative agencies that produced it, what they may. Every *part* of an organized being, also, displays design; for there is no better definition of a living thing than that of Kant, that in it every part is both means and end. Some talk of the "Unknowable," but they contradict themselves by admitting in the same breath that the Unknowable is manifested as the first cause. But this cause is further manifested as intelligent and holy, as a Person. Nothing can be more *sophistical*, than the remark of Spencer, that could the watch, in Paley's illustration, think, it would judge its Creator to be like itself, a watch. Could the watch think, it would be rational, and would then reason like other rational beings, and conclude that the artificer of such a product as itself must have designed it beforehand,—that is to say, must be a mind.

duct of the movement of a blind, unintelligent force. Then, of course, we cannot conclude that there is a free intelligence anywhere. But materialism is not less fatal to morals than religion, for it annihilates responsibility. In truth, it is fatal to the higher life of man. It gives the lie to consciousness which testifies to our freedom, and our guilt for wrong choices. It destroys the difference between truth and error in mental perception; for both are equally the result of the molecular action of the brain. It destroys science, for the molecular movement by which science is thought out, may at any time change its form and give rise to conclusions utterly diverse. There is no escape to the absurdities of materialism; a doctrine which can be maintained only by a disregard of phenomena, the reality and proper significance of which no reasonable person can call in question. Let scientific exploration be carried to the farthest bound—it will never be able to dispense with God. It is plain that the world is a cosmos—a beautiful order. It came to be such by the operation of forces moving steadily towards their end; for anything like accident, or properly fortuitous event, science can never admit. The world is the necessary product of the agencies, be they few or many, near or remote, that gave rise to it. The time occupied in the process is a point irrelevant; were it a billion, or ten billions of years, a moment of thought transports us to the beginning, and the whole problem stares us in the face. There is a plan; rational ends have been reached by adaptations and arrangements; and thus God is revealed.*

* The statements made above are corroborated, it would seem, by remarks of Professor Huxley, who says: "The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are, not necessarily, mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume primordial molecular arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are consequences. The more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe." Quoted in Jackson's *Philosophy of Natural Theology*, p. 136. On the Relation of Evolution to Theism and Teleology, see the excellent remarks of Dr. A. Gray, in his lately published work *Darwiniana*—(New York: 1876), which I have read since this Sermon was written. The only refuge from teleology is in the doctrine of an eternal sequence of causes and effects, a notion which, as Dr. Gray says, "no sane man" will per-

Thirdly, the folly of Atheism appears in its failure to discern the revelation of God in the history of mankind. It ignores, also, the God of Providence. The history of mankind is not a chaotic jumble of occurrences, but an orderly sequence where one set of events prepares for another, and where rational ends are wrought out by means adapted to them. There is a divine plan stamped upon history :

“—thro’ the ages one increasing purpose runs.”

And, irrespective of this plan, the records of the past, it has been well said, have little more interest for us than the battles of crows and daws. There is a design connected with history : it is not an aimless course of events—a stream having no issue—a meaningless succession, or cycle of phenomena. Now the Atheist shuts his eyes to the evident traces of a providential guidance and control of the world’s affairs. It is chance, he says; or if there is law, it is law without a law-giver. That moral government which appears in the prosperity accorded to righteousness, and in the penalties that overtake iniquity—

mentally hold. Such a notion is equivalent to a denial of all real causation, since the eternal regress can never bring us to the thing sought,—a real cause which is not itself an effect. The principle of causation, as a subjective conviction, or demand of the intelligence, involves the belief in the reality of such a first cause.

As to the question of the origin of man, it is evident, that we are, on one side of our being, composed of matter. This is an undeniable fact. What is the origin of this material part? It may be supposed that it was created outright, in the organized human form, by a fiat of the Almighty, when the first man was called into being. This is one supposition. Another is that man was made out of the “dust of the earth”—out of pre-existing inorganic matter. This is the mode of conception in the Biblical writers. See Gen. iii, 19, Ps. xc, 3, civ, 29, cxlvi, 4, Job x, 9, Eccl. iii, 20. Or, thirdly, it may be supposed that man was made out of previously existing *organized* matter—developed from a lower class of animal beings, either by easy gradations (according to the Darwinian creed), or *per saltum*. If by slow gradations, the proposition amounts to this, that beings intermediate between man and the existing lower animals, once lived on the earth. This remains to be proved; it is an open question. Neither of these hypotheses necessarily denies the reality of the higher endowments of man. They impinge upon the Christian system only when they are connected with a denial of the distinctive qualities of man as a spiritual being—his free and responsible nature. Precisely how and when he received from the Creator this higher nature—the *quæstio*—is a question, however interesting, of secondary importance. It is only materialism—or, what is equivalent, a monism which identifies soul and body—that cannot cohere with the truths of religion.

that sublime manifestation of justice through all the annals of mankind—declares the presence of a just God. The minds of men, when unperturbed by false speculation, instinctively feel that God reigns, whenever they behold these providential allotments. It is necessary to stifle the voice of nature, and to resort to some far-fetched, unsatisfactory solution of the matter, in order to avoid this impression. In this way, the conscience of mankind convicts Atheism of folly.

Fourthly, Atheism discerns not the revelation of God in Christ. God is manifest in the flesh. I waive all discussion of the Bible, its authority, and inspiration. The character of Jesus disclosed in the Gospel record could never have been imagined; it vouches for its own reality, and thus for the history in and through which it is made known to us. In Christ there is a manifestation of God. The power that actuates him is not of the earth and not of man. The righteousness and love of the Father are reflected as in an image. The Father is known through the Son. In his face we behold the Invisible. His soul is obviously in uninterrupted communion with the Father. When he quits the world, he says: "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." Was there no ear to hear that voice? Was it lost in boundless space, obtaining no response? Then, verily,

"The pillared firmament is rottenness,
And earth's base built on stubble."

Then let us draw a pall over life, with its flickering joys, so to be quenched in eternal night. All that is most elevated, and that is most consoling, all that raises our destiny above that of the brutes that perish, is built on illusion! There is no grand future, no serene hereafter, where the longing soul shall have its profoundest aspirations met in the fellowship of the spiritual world, and in the everlasting dominion of truth and righteousness. "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." The senses, at least, do not mock us. The pleasure that they give is real, as far as it goes.

* This impression was actually made on those most intimately associated with Him. See John i, 14, xiv, 9, Matt. xvi, 16.

ARTICLE V.—JOHN STUART MILL

I.

NOTHING could be more unpretending than Mr. Mill's estimate of himself. Speaking of the extraordinary attainments of his childhood as within the reach of any boy or girl of average capacity, he says: "If I had been by nature extremely quick of apprehension, or had possessed a very accurate and retentive memory, or were of a remarkably active and energetic character, the trial would not be conclusive; but in all these natural gifts I am rather below than above par; . . . and if I have accomplished anything, I owe it, among other fortunate circumstances, to the fact that through the early training bestowed on me by my father, I started with an advantage of a quarter of a century over my contemporaries."* His latest and humblest acknowledgment is to his wife, as his first was to his father. "During the greater part of my literary life," he says "I have performed the office in relation to her, which from a rather early period I had considered as the most useful part that I was qualified to take in the domain of thought, that of an interpreter of original thinkers, and mediator between them and the public, for I had always a humble opinion of my own powers as an original thinker except in abstract science, but thought myself much superior to most of my contemporaries in willingness and ability to learn from anybody."† The whole Autobiography testifies to the sincerity of this conviction that he was rather an inferior man in native endowment and superior only in what he had the good fortune to receive from abler men than himself. None of his admirers is likely to accept this estimate; nor indeed is it just. Mr. Mill is assuredly something less than an interpreter of Wordsworth and Plato, and more than an interpreter of his father, Jeremy Bentham, Comte, Bain, or Mrs. Mill. For he had, what he hesitates to credit himself with, a real if not a very distinct and decided personality of his own, and we get from him as from any orig-

* Autobiography, p. 30.

† Autobiography, p. 242.

inal man, not only an interpretation of his teachers, but a new reaction upon old doctrines. Happily or unhappily the reaction was more aesthetic than rational, an affair of the temperament rather than of the understanding, so that what, even in so exact a paper as the *Nation*, is called Mr. Mill's "philosophy," is in fact an assemblage of discordant opinions from different quarters, all refracted through the turbid medium of Mr. Mill's sensibility. We have been occupied hitherto with varieties of the Empirical Philosophy which seem to be as indifferent to sentiment as they are to fact, in which the thinker is hid behind the thought and the universe behind the theory; wherein triumphant System suppresses whatever it cannot comprehend. There is no doubt a real Mr. Spencer living somewhere in a real world like the rest of us, but it would hardly be worth while to go to *First Principles* for either one or the other. Before taking leave of the subject we ask the reader's attention to an Empirical philosophy as innocent of system as it is possible for a philosophy to be; in which impulse and foreign influences reign supreme, and all things happen by the grace of God—or at any rate not according to the programme of the philosopher.

The earliest and much the most influential of Mr. Mill's teachers was his father, Mr. James Mill. Were the artist anybody but the son, we should be tempted to suspect the remarkable portrait at the beginning of the Autobiography of caricature. Mr. James Mill was the son of a small tradesman in the county of Angus, Scotland, and was sent to the University of Edinburg on a charitable fund to be educated for the Scottish church. He finished his studies and was licensed as a preacher, but never followed his profession; having satisfied himself that he could not believe the doctrines of that or any other church; an appropriate consequence of offensive charities anywhere. However, the turning-point of his mind upon the subject was the argument of Butler's Analogy that there is no greater difficulty in believing that the Old and New Testaments proceed from a perfectly wise and good being than in believing that the universe does. To the unfortunate demonstration that Christianity is no more unreasonable and immoral than nature is, Mr. Mill replied that both are bad. "He found

it impossible to believe that a world so full of evil was the work of an Author combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness." After this rejection of Christianity and Deism it is somewhat puzzling to learn that Mr. Mill was not an atheist. Dogmatic atheism—the assertion that there is no God—he considered absurd; but finding dogmatic deism—the assertion that there is one—equally absurd, "he remained for a time in a state of perplexity, until he yielded to the conviction that concerning the origin of things nothing can be known;" which means that nobody knows whether there be any God or no, or if there be one whether he is not the devil. This is the state of mind which Mr. Leslie Stephen has recently dignified with the title of Agnosticism and which he has put in a plea for as a most reasonable state of mind. We say nothing to the contrary, but it is evident that it must be extremely unreasonable unless the state of the heart corresponds with the state of the mind. If a man's intelligence is perplexed and in suspense, it is quite unbecoming in him to let loose his passions; since to do so is really to decide the question and to make up one's mind. This is the sentimental non-sequitur which Mr. James Mill fell into. His fierce antipathy to the deity of Christendom as the "*ne plus ultra* of wickedness" is an effectual renunciation of Agnosticism, for it involves the assertion that the most conspicuous of all the pretenders to the dignity in question either is not, or is not the good and wise and strong being he says he is. Equally gnostic, or knowing, is his impatience with the deity of Natural Religion. "His intellect spurned the subtleties by which men blind themselves to the open contradiction" between the evil which fills the world and the character given of its author by the deists. That is, to the dogma that the author of this evil world is not the God of the church (although the "*ne plus ultra* of wickedness" might very well be the author of this evil world), Mr. Mill added the larger dogma that he is not a being who "combines infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness." This may be nescience; but then what is knowledge? If Mr. Mill had been content to dismiss the Deity from the universe with the distinguished consideration of Mr. Spencer, or the pensive regret of Prof. Tyndall, or the tranquil unconcern of Mr. Lewes,

room might still have been found for a not inconsequent profession of Agnosticism; the ceremony might have been disguised under the amiable pretence of consigning the Unknown to the limbo of the Unknowable. But to add vituperation to dismissal; not so much to ignore a pretender as to depose the reigning sovereign, because his character is so bad and the empire so full of evil—this is to profess a very large and exact knowledge of the universe and of its origin.

Mr. Mill's notion of life followed his notion of the universe. He was a Stoic and a Cynic in the ancient sense of the words.* "He thought human life a poor thing at best, after the freshness of youth and unsatisfied curiosity had gone by. It was a topic on which he did not often speak; but when he did it was with an air of settled and profound conviction. He would sometimes say that if life were made what it might be by good government and good education, it would be worth having; but he never spoke with anything like enthusiasm even of that possibility;" not, observe, because the possibility is so remote, but because life even when worth having at all is not worth much, "being but a poor thing at best." That ideal life which good government and good education might procure is not so much better than the miserable reality that we need be enthusiastic about it. For Mr. Mill had scarcely any belief in pleasure. He was not insensible to pleasures, but "he deemed very few of them worth the price which must be paid for them." Of these few he rated intellectual pleasures above all others, and, apparently, the pleasures of the benevolent affections next. But for extremes of pleasure, and for passionate emotions of all sorts, and for whatever has been said or sung in praise of them, he professed the greatest contempt. They seemed to him to be a sort of madness. "He regarded as an aberration of the moral standard of modern times, the great stress laid upon feeling. Feelings, as such, he considered to be no proper subjects of praise or blame. Right and wrong; good and bad, he regarded as qualities solely of conduct—of acts and omissions." Briefly, life as it is, is not worth having: the only emotions strong enough to interrupt our misery are madness; and

* *Autobiography*, p. 47.

the pleasures of the higher life which good government and education might give us are barely worth the price that must be paid for them. Upon this theory the conduct of life—if we consent to live—is extremely simple. The cardinal virtue, the rule of all action, “the central point of educational precept is temperance in the “large sense” of the Greek philosopher. We should submit to the inflictions of this evil world with fortitude: make a moderate use of such intellectual and benevolent pleasures as are within our reach; and suppress all extreme pleasures and violent emotions, bodily or mental, and “enthusiasms,” all those volcanic passions which have filled the world with the “madness” of art, poetry and religion.

This seems to be the bright consummate flower of pure Cyrenaicism. But here again when we come to try Mr. Mill by his principles, we are thrown out of our reckoning by the contrasts in his character. For the temperament of the man continually got the better of the settled and profound conviction of the philosopher. There is already a shrill dissonance in the very profession of his faith. “For passionate emotions of all sorts he professed the greatest contempt;” and “the ‘intense’ with him was a bye-word of scornful disapprobation.” But “greatest contempt” is usually reckoned one of the sorts of “passionate emotion,” and “scornful disapprobation” is undeniably nothing if not “intense.” So too, “his aversion to many intellectual errors partook of the character of a morbid feeling,” that is of the character which he denied of all feeling whatsoever, as such. In explanation of these and other unexpected displays of sensibility we are told that Mr. Mill “in a degree once common but now very unusual threw his feelings into his opinions.” Surely no more inappropriate receptacle could have been found for them. Where should the Greek temperance of the Stoic be manifest if not in the profession of Stoicism? How are we to classify a philosopher who throws intense feeling into the opinion that intense feeling is a form of madness?

However, it would be ungracious to lay too much stress upon these vivacities of temperament. There is latent heat in ice itself, and the emotional incontinence of the age may very well have drawn a good deal of emotion from the most con-

ment of Stoics. Our perplexity becomes serious upon discovering that this irascible and vehement Stoic found no difficulty in being Epicurean too. "In his personal qualities the Stoic predominated. His standard of morals was Epicurean, inasmuch as it was utilitarian, taking as the exclusive test of right and wrong, the tendency of actions to produce pleasure or pain." The Autobiography puts this upon record in the most tranquil manner, as if it were an everyday affair for thistles to bear figs and for a Cynic to blossom into an Epicurean. We venture to say that it is a remarkable sample of that infirmity and confusion of thought which is rapidly carrying philosophy into chaos. As defined elsewhere by the younger Mill, Utilitarianism is "the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle."* But in a world so full of misery as this one, where life as it is is not worth having and the possibility of a better life not worth discounting, Utilitarianism is to pay away what is good in Stoicism without getting in return what is good in Epicureanism; to substitute an impossible chimera for those absolute and available intuitions of right and wrong, on which the ancient Stoic founded morality. Still more explicitly, this creed holds "that actions are right, in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, that is, pleasure and the absence of pain; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness, that is, pain and the privation of pleasure." But pleasure and pain are feelings, and feelings as such have been decided to be no proper subjects of praise or blame. Right and wrong, good and bad are qualities solely of conduct—of acts and omissions. Moreover, the aberration of the moral standard of modern times, that is, the corruption or degradation of modern morals, is the great stress laid upon feeling. So that all the morality there is in this world consists in the tendency of an act or an omission to produce that which has no moral character at all, and which for that very reason becomes contemptible if any stress is laid upon it. The modern world is scornfully rebuked for its extreme susceptibility to feeling; and is summoned to recast its moral standards and ethical systems on the principle that con-

* *Utilitarianism*, p. 9.

duct is right or wrong only as it tends to promote or to obstruct a particular kind of feeling.

It is easy to understand that a mission was hardly to be found for an apostle of this perplexing character and of this kind. Cynics were not wanting in England seventy-five years ago; Epicureans; but neither were ready to receive in the same breath the philosophy of despair and the ethics of Utilitarianism. In truth there never was a time more unfitted for the advent of a dejected utilitarian. Rationalism and Optimism ran riot in both hemispheres. Confident prophecies of a new civilization in which universal happiness was to be founded on absolute right rang everywhere above the uproar of falling compromise and conventions. Of what avail was it to preach the doctrine of expediency to a generation which had subverted ancient oppressions in the name of eternal justice; or to stem the torrent of enthusiasms which produced the American and French Revolutions with an epigram from Ecclesiastes? Still there was some probability that these mistaken faiths and fervors would spend themselves in time as others had often done before, and something perhaps might be effected by training up a despondent disciple for an era of exhaustion. So it came to pass that the energies which might have been employed upon the counterbalancing of the rare illusions of mankind, were largely given to the education of Mr. John Stuart Mill.

It is now about three hundred years since Bacon, breaking with the traditions of the schools, took Philosophy out of the cloister. Unfortunately a greater than he came after and took it back into the cloister again. Man, said Bacon, is the interpreter of Nature because he is her minister; *Homo naturæ minister interpretis*: he conquers only where he has the tact to obey. *Natura non nisi parendo vincitur*: there must be practical submission before we can make use of her, and we must have made practical use of her before we can understand her. Only explanations that are good for anything come to the man who has lived much in her society, a daily disciple, ruler, and friend. But to Descartes the condition of knowledge was solitude. From an experience of man, of life, and of nature greater than Bacon had he retired within himself for the solution of his problems and built him a cosmology out of his

ideas. The universe of his theory is not only not the actual universe we live in, it does not even pretend to be; it is avowedly an intellectual artifice or "ideal construction," an imaginary similitude of the real universe which might have arisen out of the simple elements of Mind, Matter, and Motion, had the Creator chosen to adopt the plan of Descartes. So the Idols of the Cave were set up anew in Modern Philosophy, nor has any thinker arisen since strong enough to take them down. From Descartes to Spencer and Lewes, Philosophy has dwelt within the cloister, and as was to be looked for, has only drawn pallor and emancipation from confinement. Its "constructions" are more distinctly "ideal" than ever before, its theories of the universe the "realization" of thinner "abstractions." The Dualism and Substantialism of the Cartesians, which are the necessary assumptions if not the sure intuitions of all real life, have faded out into the Monism and Nihilism of our times, in which all traces of real life and the actual world have disappeared. What has happened is this, that a scanty stock of purely subjective abstractions has been distributed into all manner of combinations by a succession of ingenious recluses until the last glow of vitality has vanished from their faces at the very moment when farther redistribution is impossible. Let some new contributor to the *Nation* arise and turn the hesitations of recent speculation into pure Nihilistic Idealism and Modern Philosophy will be "brought to a conclusion" not only "for the present" but forever.* The last of the Idols will have been set up over the fragments of its predecessors in the silence and gloom of the Cave.

Now it was the peculiar fortune of Mr. J. S. Mill not only to have done his thinking within this secluded close, but to have been born and reared in it. The renunciations which most philosophers make for themselves were made in advance for him by this father; with this very important difference that the renunciation was not a mere philosophical artifice in aid of the intellect but a conscientious safeguard against depravation of character. Of the four great influences which are concerned in the vicious training of most men—the four Factors of which all ordinary life is the product—namely, the Family, Religion,

* *Nation*, No. 534.

Society, and Nature, Mr. Mill had passed sentence on three. Religion, of course, in England meant Christianity and Christianity is the *ne plus ultra* of wickedness. Being so evil the society of which it is a foremost institution cannot be but evil too, and in England there is this special misfortune that society has the most to do with the training of young Englishmen. It is not, for instance, the tutor and professor, or any of their methods of instruction which determine the results in the public schools and universities; somebody is always busy with the reform of these; but the reflection of public life, the mimic forms of the state, the silent utterances and steadfast pressure of the present and the past. A thousand years of English history expand their cloudy wings around the undergraduate of Oxford, in the England of to-day, and the sure consequence is that he comes forth English even if plucked. If there is anywhere in the world a nobler training than this there is certainly no other so effective; and none so noxious if, as Mr. Mill believed, it is bad.

Both of these ideas of Mr. Mill were among the common places of the time. Europe was astir with the feeling that what we call civilization is the mischievous product of an evolution which has gone wrong from the very beginning; an artificial barrier built up between Man and the Universe, incapable of improvement or even of reconstruction, to be remedied only by being removed. Salvation, said Rousseau, is to be had by reverting to the primitive condition, in which the unsophisticated impulses of humanity are directly prompted by the kindly influences of the heavens and the earth. We have tried Art for three thousand years and are the worse for it: let us go back to Nature. Accordingly a good many people did go back, or tried to. There was the impetuous return of the French Revolution; the sentimental *Sturm und Drang* of the Germans whose epos is the *Sorrows of Young Werther*; and there was the sober-minded British return with Wordsworth for poet and seer. If these enthusiasts were out in their reckoning there is this to be said for them that they put into action one of the great sentiments of our modern times as compared with the Dark Ages and Antiquity, namely, that in the search for the supernatural and ontological, for the causes and essences of

things, for their origin and destiny, man had got out of right relations to the things themselves and must resume them before he can be bettered; must in some sort go back from the institutions which embody his premature aspirations to the Nature which he has forgotten. But Mr. Mill had no share in this sentiment and could not go along with this Exodus; not that he cared for the flesh-pots of Egypt but that he had no faith in the grapes of Eshcol; the promised land was no fairer to him than the land of bondage. Society is bad enough no doubt and its Religion quite the wickedest thing there is; but Nature too is full of evil, so full, indeed, that it is only good government and good education, that is, some improved form of society, which can make life worth having at all. Meanwhile here was a child brought into this unhappy universe—by Mr. Mill of all persons—and something must be done to fit him for the situation. In truth there was but one thing to do and Mr. Mill did it. Religion, Society, and Nature having been put aside he took their places and brought up the boy himself.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the studies which gave Mr. J. S. Mill an advantage of a quarter of a century over his contemporaries. He began Greek when three years old and Latin when eight. Before he was fourteen he had been carried over an immense range of classical reading, to which he added on his own account, along with much besides, history and experimental science. These on a smaller scale are the studies of most boys; nor had they much to do with Mr. Mill's real education. They would have compromised the experiment had it been otherwise; for history and classical literature are records of Religion and Society, or what were so once, that is, full of the influences which it was necessary to exclude. The elder Mill, himself one of the best classical scholars of the time, probably shared the curious belief, which on the whole is justified by results, that some mysterious disinfectant accompanies a dead language, an old chronicle, or other relic of the remote past; or that the noxious properties of ancient modes of thought and feeling decay along with the races to which they belonged, time itself cleansing an atmosphere which was once loaded with contagion. At any rate Mr. J. S. Mill breathed it with such impunity from his childhood that beyond the mental

discipline acquired, his great erudition hardly appears in his works. For the most part these early studies served to occupy his attention and to deepen the solitude in which he grew up, the pale ghosts of the old world, so to say, helping to alienate him from the living world about him. What really determined his character was the companionship of his father, from whom he can hardly be said to have escaped for thirty years. It was even forbidden the society of other children, his father being bent upon his avoiding "not only the corrupting influence which boys exercise over boys, but the contagion of vulgar modes of thought and feeling." One of these vulgarities was self-conceit. Driven at a pace far beyond the strength of any child, he was continually rebuked for shortcoming; denied all holidays and the "practicalizing influences of school-life" for which no substitute was provided, he was "incessantly smarting under severe admonitions for his lack of bodily activity and his inattention, inobservance and general slackness of mind." Learned beyond most men he was carefully reminded of his ignorance or of the debt he owed his father. "From his intercourse with me I could derive none but a very humble opinion of myself. If I thought anything about myself, it was that I was rather backward in my studies, since always found myself so in comparison with what my father expected of me. I remember the very place where, on the eve of a long absence, he told me that whatever I knew more than others, could not be ascribed to any merit in me, but to the very unusual advantage which had fallen to my lot, of having a father who was able to teach me and willing to give the necessary time and trouble; that it was no matter of praise to me if I knew more than those who had not had a similar advantage, but the deepest disgrace if I did not."* On the whole religion, society, and nature, even of the Scotch varieties, could hardly have borne more heavily upon Mr. James Mill than upon his pupil. The former "kicked over the traces" at the appropriate moment of receiving his license as a preacher; but the latter had been caught too young, and the result was that he entered manhood to begin war upon the beliefs and institu-

* Autobiography, p. 34.

tions about him as docile and timid a conservative as any in England, with the instinct strong upon him of self-abnegation and submission to whomsoever or whatsoever he recognized as an authority. The only one of his contemporaries with whom we know how to compare him for depth and power of obstructed feeling, for humble-minded loyalty at all costs to an oppressive domination, is John Henry Newman. The latter no doubt is the richer genius of the two, although if anything in recent English prose deserves to rank above the *Apologia*, for style and for pathetic and impressive associations, it is the *Essay on Liberty*; but we believe that the differences between them are largely due to this, that the child of Oxford and the convert to Rome has lived beneath a spacious, if an inexorable despotism, while it fell to the other to find what room he could for repressed sympathies in the ideas of Mr. James Mill. He found other teachers in later years, and more and more as he grew older he passed under the influences which had been averted from his childhood; but on the whole it is not an inaccurate description of him to say that his life was an endeavor to "realize" the abstractions he had inherited from his father.

His first distinctly original experience is a sufficient illustration of this. The bar having been selected as "on the whole a less ineligible profession" for him than any other, he began in his sixteenth year a course of reading in Roman and English law. In the opinion of Bentham, legislation hitherto has been the supreme expression of that delusive subjectivity and rationalism, that neglect of the principles of Expediency taught by Experience, and that blind reliance upon the fanciful inner sense of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, which have been uppermost in the mismanagement of human affairs. The deliverances of this spurious faculty, what Kant calls the Categorical Imperatives of Practical Reason, in common phrase the dictates of conscience, are arrant dogmatism in pompous disguise; unauthenticated ideals of the interior consciousness realized in the outer world by the strong arm of the law. This being so it would seem that to send a young Benthamite to the bar was hardly less ineligible than to send him to be educated on a charitable fund for the Scottish church. But as we know, Mr. James Mill had better hopes of society and the state, whose

service he had entered himself, than of religion and the church whose service he had left. So, although he held "the perfection of human reason" to be a perfect chaos of barbarism, Roman Law probably not much better, he consented to the law as the best thing going for a young man who had his living to earn, contenting himself with providing the necessary correction in the shape of Dumont's *Traité de Legislation*. There was nothing in this redaction of Bentham which young Mill was unfamiliar with already, but as it was written with the French genius for orderly and luminous statement the old doctrine broke upon him with all the force of surprise. He saw for the first time how hollow are the common modes of reasoning in ethics, with their illusory deductions from such sound phrases as "the moral sense," "right reason," "laws of nature" and "natural rectitude." The feeling rushed upon him that all previous moralists had been superseded and an end put to the malign invocation of a baseless *à priori* conscience. With the vision of the superseded moralists rose the bright prospect of the coming era in which all things were to be renovated by the great *à posteriori* principle of Utility. All Punishable offences were to fall into fair and stately symmetry of Scientific classification under the guidance of the ethical principle of Pleasurable and Painful Consequences; and with scientific classification of offences were to come control of the offender and suppression of the motive to offend. "I felt taken up to an eminence from which I could survey a vast mental domain and see stretching out into the distance intellectual resources beyond all computation. There seemed to be added to intellectual clearness the most inspiring prospects of practical improvement in human affairs. When I laid down the volume of the *Traité* I had become a different being."* In the hands of Bentham himself and most of his followers the Great Happiness Principle had been a mere counter or symbol in a complicated process of abstract calculation, so that, as *Autobiography* reminds us, a Benthamite had come to be regarded with all his sentimental ethics as a mere reasoning machine. With the elder Mill it was hardly more than a fanciful speculation of what might be had in a better universe than

* *Autobiography*, p. 66.

one where there is little hope for anything. But Mr. J. S. Mill was still a boy and had arrived at the first turning-point and eminence in his life; and all the accumulated emotion which his father's cynicism had made scorn of, found vent into his father's Utilitarianism. "The principle of utility fell exactly into its place as the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary component parts of my knowledge and beliefs. It gave unity to my conceptions of things. I now had opinions; a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses of the word, a religion; the inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principal outward purpose of a life." In his seventeenth year an appointment under his father in one of the East India Company's offices released him from the drudgery of the bar and gave leisure and room for the propagation of the new faith. In 1823 he organized a "Utilitarian Society;" in 1824 he assisted in founding the *Westminster Review*, of which he was the principal contributor for several years; in 1825 he edited Bentham's treatise on Evidence and along with some of his associates began an investigation of Political Economy, Logic, and Psychology, on all which topics he wrote and talked industriously. It was by far the happiest portion of his life, the horizon daily widening around successful labors beneath the ample heaven of the new Theory and the utilitarian millenium coming in upon all the wings of the winds. How long the brilliant illusion would have lasted if left to itself is hard to say; very likely it would have faded out in the natural decay of youthful emotion; or it might have yielded to the cynicism of the elder apostles; or have been shattered against the hard realities of the outer world. In point of fact the catastrophe was precipitated from within, by one of those revolts of self-consciousness which no man can guard against, and which have wrecked so much of the ideal construction of empiricism. "The time came," says the Autobiography, "when I awakened from all this as from a dream.* I was in a dull state of nerves, such as everybody is occasionally liable to; unsusceptible to pleasure or enjoyment; the state, I should think, in which converts to Methodism usually are, when smitten by their first 'conviction of sin.'" In itself this was an intelligible

* p. 133. This was in 1826.

and harmless ailment, a pathological condition due to excitement and overwork which would have yielded readily to tonics and rest. Its importance was that it left the patient exposed, for the first, and, so far as we remember, for the last time, to the unprompted action of his own mind. "In this frame of mind it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself: 'Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?' and an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, 'No!' At this my heart sank within me; the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have been found in the pursuit of this end. The end had ceased to charm. I seemed to have nothing left to live for." However the calamity was a new and most interesting psychological phenomenon and the sufferer sat down, alone, among the ruins to inquire into the causes and probable consequences of it. He could not go to his father for help, for his father would have simply told him that his lost enthusiasms were a form of madness, that the pleasures of the benevolent affections are good in their way but only on condition that no great stress is laid upon them, that cynicism is the true temper to take into Utilitarianism. Nor was there anyone else to apply to, for had he loved anyone enough to make the confidence of his griefs a necessity he would not have been in the condition he was. Left to himself he resorted for an explanation to the great empirical doctrine of the Association of Ideas which he had already learned to apply to the other phenomena of Consciousness. All the contents of the mind are either associated sensations or the results of association. Among these results are our moral feelings and qualities, good or bad. Pleasurable feelings cling to (are associated with) some of the associations; painful feelings cling to some of the others: where this clinging, or compound association, is artificial, as in our vitiated consciousness it often is, it is almost certain to be fugitive—the association is disintegrated and the pleasure flies away. Permanent pleasures are those which adhere naturally to certain sensations (as the physical and organic sensations), or which have been trained to

where by an education continued long enough to amount to a second nature. Now the good of others, and especially of mankind on a large scale, as objects to live and work for, are the greatest and surest sources of those pleasurable feelings which constitute happiness. They ought to have made Mr. Mill happy; they had failed to do so for the reason that his education had failed to bind the pleasurable feelings permanently to the objects proposed; nor had it provided any other associations which could contribute to his happiness, while it had developed a precocious talent for destructive analysis in all departments of consciousness. He was thus left "stranded at the beginning of his voyage," without any real desire for the ends which he had been so carefully fitted to work for; "no delight in a virtue or the general good, but also just as little in anything else." Having ascertained the nature of the evil it remained to apply the remedy, which he found in a theory of life "very unlike that on which he had before acted," and involving, as it seems to us, a new contradiction of the whole scheme of utilitarian ethics. He retained as the first great object of life the well-being of others, adding as a second his own internal culture, but leaving happiness to take care of itself. "Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness. Aiming thus at something else they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing when taken *en passant*, without being made a principal object. Once make them so and they are immediately felt to be insufficient. The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life." This if noble, is not epicurean or even utilitarian. It is to declare that the consequences which determine the moral character of one's life are not the proper objects of one's life; that the well-being of others and of oneself is what we have to work for, but that happiness is distinct from well-being however essential to its perfection; and in itself so coy and evanescent a thing that when wooed with rude directness it is not to be won—its favors being reserved, with feminine prudery, for the man who wants, or makes the solemn pretence of wanting, something else. Not the faintest suspicion seems to have crossed Mr. Mill's mind that his new artifice

had completely knocked the bottom out of his ethical system; that any attempt to be virtuous on these terms is, in the rude proverb of Kant, milking a he-goat into a sieve. How are we going to ascertain the moral character of acts, habits, qualities, policies or institutions by their tendency to secure a thing which vanishes upon the suspicion that we are seeking to secure it?

On the whole there is no mistaking the import of this remarkable confession. It did not mean that Mr. Mill had been the victim of fictitious emotion, or that the ends he had proposed to himself were false and bad; but simply that in his boyish seclusion he had formed a set of artificial conceptions of those ends which had no enduring power over his feelings because no root in reality. The happiness he talks of as something distinct from all other states of mind, to be associated with or dissociated from them by nature and education, to be sought directly or indirectly for itself; the general good or greatest happiness of the greatest number; utility, virtue, life, experience, expediency—all these were, in his mind, wholly subjective fabrications like the moral sense, right reason, natural rectitude, and natural law of the dogmatic moralists; an assemblage of abstractions which, whatever objective realities they correspond to, were unreal to him and so no foundation for solid happiness or safe speculation. The misfortune was that the crisis in his mental history was not sharp enough to save him. It sufficed to disturb permanently the composure of his mind and to bring into suspicion the whole throng of ideas which had settled about him, but not to drive him beyond them into any world of greater reality. If he could have broken away completely, as his father did from the Scotch church, and betaken himself to travel, or hard work in his office, or to new studies, the character of his life would probably have changed. The remedies he proposed to himself were of the right sort, but unluckily his conception of the welfare of others was itself, as we saw, an abstraction, and the labors he undertook for this end, however valuable to mankind, all went on within the old circuit; while his new project of self-culture was if possible a deeper plunge into subjectivity than ever. The idealism and nihilism of his later speculations were a fore-

gone conclusion when he sat down disconsolately in the familiar seclusion to wait for such revivals of emotion and such gleams of happiness as might come of themselves.

In this condition of irritated and morbid self-consciousness, when, if ever, the cynicism of the elder Mill or some substitute for it would have done good, it was the misfortune of the patient to fall under the influence of Wordsworth, having previously tried a course of Byron without being the better for it. "While Byron was exactly what did not suit my condition, Wordsworth was exactly what did;" Byron being a subjective poet full of the despair of extinct feelings and Wordsworth another full of the bliss of feelings which are alive. There is no occasion here for an estimate of the most significant (we do not say the greatest) genius since Shakspeare, for the reason that the real Wordsworth, who could have served him, was quite unknown to Mr. Mill, as to a multitude of smaller men whose maladies he has aggravated. All the sources of his inspiration were outside the regions Mr. Mill's experience had occupied. The intense realism which vivifies the feeblest and dullest lines of his verse, the deep, full and tranquil flow of emotion which testified in his own consciousness to the grandeur of the soul and of the powers in nature and above her by which the soul is moved and filled—the very testimony needed—were foolishness to Mr. Mill. He saw nothing in his new teacher but a somewhat common-place man, "the poet of unpoetical natures" as he calls him, who had betaken himself to the stimulation of self-consciousness by scenery and had caught in his solitude a laborious trick of turning natural feeling into simple verse. For spontaneity and fullness of genius he ranks Wordsworth below Shelley, the very poet of strenuous inefficiency, whose aspirations were beyond his real emotions as his emotions were beyond his vocabulary; the first of a line of poets, represented to-day by Swinburne and the Rosettis, whose business it has been to wreak upon expression a set of feelings never thoroughly felt. "What made Wordsworth's poems," says Mr. Mill, "a medicine for my state of mind, was that they expressed states of feeling, and of thought colored by feeling, under the excitement of beauty. They seemed to be the very culture of the feelings which I was in quest of. In

them I seemed to draw from a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be shared in by all human beings."* In other words, all that any man has to do to be happy is to sit down and pump up perennial bliss from the wells of his own consciousness; a theory safe enough perhaps for a man like Wordsworth, although in Mr. Lowell's opinion even Wordsworth's pumps suck occasionally, but no safe for a good many of us and certainly not safe for a nihilist and a puzzled utilitarian.

The mental sequestration deepened by the influence of Wordsworth's poetry was confirmed by the new teacher who superseded all others and took possession of Mr. Mill's life from his twenty-fifth year to its close. In common with all the critics we are at a loss in speaking of Mrs. Mill. There are few distinguishable traces of this lady outside the *Autobiography*; and there she figures in the large proportions and vague outlines of anthropomorphic myth, an impressive presence in which the real character of the person disappears in the cloud of impossible traits and achievements ascribed to her. She was more a poet than Carlyle, whom Mr. Mill thought a great poet and more a thinker than Mr. Mill himself. In general spiritual characteristics he often compared her as he first knew her to Shelley: "but in thought and intellect Shelley was but a child compared with what she ultimately became. Alike in the highest regions of speculation and in the practical concerns of daily life, her mind was the same perfect instrument, piercing to the very heart and marrow of the matter. . . . Her intellectual gifts did but minister to a moral character at once the noblest and the best balanced which I have ever met with in life."† It is hardly possible that a genius so strong and a character so large and lofty as this could have consented to concealment or could have been concealed. The only conclusion we can come to is that the real personage who was the most intimate companion of Mr. Mill's mature years, who of all beings stood nearest to him and touched him at most points had been transmuted in his consciousness along with all remote things; a new and more inveterate abstraction which however suggested by the reality was a product of his own ideation, and

* *Autobiography*, p. 148.† *Autobiography*, p. 180.

erved to throw back his own image magnified and re-
like the cloud of the Brocken.
complete estimate of Mr. Mill's character and writings
d beyond the bounds of a sketch like this. He was a
t enough to be understood only along with the whole
which he belonged. The early training he received
influences which limited his later life are but striking
of that disintegrating tendency toward individualism
activity which in spite of all the restraints of ancient
ism and all the manifest perils of democracy are silently
ing the world about us and ourselves along with it.
al of isolation to which he submitted from first to last
imposed upon him by his teachers alone but by his
is ours too in one form or another, and in his case, as
he result was decided by the manner of man he was.
ossible to speak otherwise than with respect and even
of Mr. Mill for the perfect sincerity, rectitude and
ss which make his writings a revelation of character
a mere impersonal manipulation of philosophic the-
t the truth is that he belonged to a class of men who just
rmine the cast of English thought, men who have in-
he ideas of the century but not the interior resources
n with whom the ideas were born. The poets, for
are full of the self-consciousness of Wordsworth:
hem, like Mr. Whitman, sings himself; the trouble
t the self is so rarely sufficient for the song. In all of
l in most of the great prose writers too, the art of ex-
is bewildered between an ambitious ideal or aspira-
a defective power; and it is out of this bewilderment
whole crop of affectations in thought and mannerisms
which disfigure English literature to-day have grown.
ill's dream is of Liberty, but there is the clank of the
all he wrote; and of the greatest happiness of the
umber, yet he is not a happy man. What he wanted
ccording to Tennyson, we all want—"Life, more life,
r;" that is, amplitude, profundity, and power of feel-
that clear intelligence and victorious force which
m them. For a nature of this sort the only salvation
wide and varied culture, an unceasing intercourse

with the best there is in man and nature. Literature alone cannot give it; or art; certainly systematic philosophy cannot: there must be nothing less than the perpetual play of the whole of what Mr. Spencer calls the "environment." Where original genius is wanting the only adequate substitute is that culture which is the genius of mediocrity. It is proverbially easy to be wise after the fact, but we have seen the sort of culture Mr. Mill received and the consequences appear to have been very nearly what might have been expected. Carefully sheltered from wholesome wind and weather his mind was usurped and overpowered by a growth of alien and discordant ideas beneath whose chilling shade self-consciousness sickened into idealism and languid emotion into nihilism. The excluded and distant universe resolved itself into "permanent possibilities of sensation," or the "unknown condition" of sensation; mind, into the series, or assemblage of sensations themselves. This latter doctrine, of qualified phenomenalism or nihilistic idealism, is more Mr. Mill's own than any of the others and is the one by which his rank in philosophy is to be fixed. Here we desire particularly to call attention to the inevitable incoherence of theories which originate after this fashion. If Mr. Mill had been a mere passive recipient and interpreter of some established school of philosophy or system of thought we should have got from him at least consistent exposition: or if he had been a man of abundant resources and aggressive temper he might have added to philosophy a system of his own. Beyond most men of his time he combined the critical faculty and the habit of analysis with distrust of himself, and the natural product of the combination was a collection of doctrines half borrowed, half his own, which had no outer or inner bond of unity because coming from different quarters they found in his reception of them no sufficient faculty of assimilation, none of that white heat of the intellect and the imagination which fuses ideas into a homogeneous whole. The best illustration of what we mean is afforded by the papers on Nature, Religion and Theism published after his death by Miss Helen Taylor. The editor is aware of certain discrepancies between the first two of these essays which belong to the years 1850-1858 and the last which belongs to 1868-1870 but is of the opinion that they

would have disappeared had the essay on Theism received the final corrections of the author. They are alike in this, that all of them are the reactions late in life of Mr. Mill's milder but more melancholy temperament upon the hard abstractions of his father; but no revision could have eliminated the ruinous contradictions between the abstractions themselves and the fundamental principles of his thinking. Nature, as Mr. Mill describes her, is a compound of intractable material and omnipotent, or at least ungovernable power, wholly destitute of intelligence, conscience or compassion; a vast embodiment of brute force, part of which she spends in torturing and killing the sentient creatures engendered in her womb—a mother and an infanticide. Something might be said for this conception as a piece of pure anthropomorphic personification did it issue from the brain of a despairing rationalist, but nothing can be more certain than that Mr. Mill could have had no experience of a Nature like this and therefore that in his hands the speculation is extreme metempiricism; for the living world is as much a part of Nature as inanimate matter, so that what is called murder is in fact suicide or at any rate innocent death; the cruelty of Nature is her mortal agony—she is herself the Prometheus Bound and not the malignant power who sends the vultures. Mr. Mill's deity is if possible more inexcusably metempirical than his Nature. We can best describe him by saying that in intelligence and moral character he ranks indefinitely below Mrs. Mill, the one abstraction which awakens Mr. Mill's enthusiasm. He is a respectable and disinterested person who has undertaken to call Nature to order and to set her right; and has been lamentably worsted in the trial, the best that can be said of the creation so far being that it is as good as the "intractable material" and vicious temper of Nature has permitted. There are certainly no traces of this good-natured incapability in the universe and consequently none in Mr. Mill's experience. There are natural forces which encounter other natural forces and we who are caught in the collision suffer, but who can find any battle field where God and Nature have fought or any victory won by either. Mr. Mill's God is simply a very considerable Mr. Mill (which accounts for his inferiority to Mrs. Mill); a large being who has a critical

faculty and a conscience equal to the detection and disapproval of Nature's vices but not strength enough to compel her to reform. As to Religion, Mr. Mill does not say what his father said of modern Christianity that it is the *ne plus ultra* of wickedness, but that it is of doubtful utility and that we are quite as well off without it. This is logical if God and Nature have been represented truthfully; if we are right in our Manichæanism we cannot be wrong in our irreligion. But it must be observed again that Mr. Mill confesses to having had no experience of religion, standing in this respect quite alone among his contemporaries. "I am," he says, "perhaps the one person of my time who has—not rejected a religion, but—who never had one." We do not say that this disqualified Mr. Mill from having an opinion on the Utility of Religion, but only that such an opinion must have been rationalistic and not empirical.

We have only one more question to put here. If the universe is of this sort; if there is the victorious incarnation of evil in the material world and an incapable apotheosis of good in a real creator however impotent and a real providence however baffled and thwarted over against the fatal dualism of nature; what becomes of sensationalism, idealism, and nihilism? Matter must be more than the bare permanent possibility of an unknown condition of sensation if it wields all these tremendous forces: mind, divine or human, more than a bare aggregate of sensations if it sustains, even discomfited, this conflict. It is the old dilemma of the Dualism of Force which has stared philosophers out of countenance from Spinoza to Spencer, and which as we hope to show makes short work with Mr. Mill's phenomenalism.

VI.—WOMAN'S VOICE IN THE CHURCH.

of 1 Cor. xiv, 34, 35. "Let your women keep silence in the churches ; permitted unto them to speak ; but they are commanded to be under also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them ask as at home ; for it is a shame for women to speak in the church."

Passage is exciting very great attention in our day. Question of woman's place in the church, as well as in the world, is being widely discussed ; and this teaching of Paul on this subject cannot be ignored. We have lying before us many able and learned treatises, all issued within a short time, and representing various different theories of this passage.* The foremost of these take the most extreme and emphatic ground against woman's speech. Thus, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct., 1874, we are told, "that the injunction of silence is of perpetual validity," "forbidding the women to speak at all in the church ;" "because in its very nature, whatever the manner may be, speaking in the assembly is inconsistent with the position of women in the churches." So also Professor Clapp.

These writers go to the very opposite extreme, and maintain that there is no limitation whatever put, either by the text or by reason, upon the speech of woman, any more than that of man. In the *Congregational Quarterly*, April, 1874, we are pointed in this direction.

The interest excited upon this subject, and such the diversity and contradiction of views concerning it. An example and determination of the passage before us is, therefore, very important for us all at this time ; not only that we may guard ourselves and others from the loose and dangerous

silence of Women Required in the Churches. By Rev. A. H. ROSS. *Bib.* April and Oct. 2. An Argument against Women's Voice in Church. By BARTLETT, in reply to Rev. Mr. Helmer. *Advance*, 1869. 3. Women not to Speak, but to Babble. By Rev. HARMON LOOMIS ; *Cong. Quar.*, April, 1874. 4. Woman may not Speak in Meeting. By Miss AUGUSTA MOORE ; *Cong. Quar.*, April, 1874. 5. Speaking, not Babbling, forbidden. A reply to Mr. Clapp. *Quar.*, Oct., 1874. 6. Several Essays in favor of Woman's Speech, published. 7. Professor Clapp's essay before the Illinois Association, May, 1874, and man not a Public Character, and sundry replies to it in the *Advance*.

views so prevalent; but also, that the minds of all, and especially of our women, may be settled and grounded as to personal duty, and they may go forward without misgivings to the fulfillment of it. We love our Bible; and we mean to do just what it enjoins. But while our view of its teachings on this point remains unsettled or disputed, under the mixed and dubious utterances of our times,—many are faltering in the activity, wondering who may, or who ought to take part in our meetings; and what little is done, is without the courage and success that comes from well settled conviction.* A review of the ground is surely needed; and this we now attempt.

We have in this passage, seemingly, a plain divine prohibition of all female utterance in the assembled church. But such a complete prohibition is so singular, being found in no other passage,†—and so unlikely, for any reason that has been assigned, could be assigned,—and so undesirable, for the good of Christianity itself, that all Christians have understood the language with some limitations. And the only question among them for ages, has been, how far the laws of language will allow those limitations to be carried, in harmony with the rest of Scripture.

Thus, it is almost universally conceded, that this injunction of "silence in the churches" was not intended to forbid singing either in chorus or in solo. And many would go further, and say that, for the same reason, praying could not be included under the prohibition, or indeed any purely devotional exercise, such as responses or readings from Scripture or other such service. If the silence enjoined be not absolute, but allow of singing, then the command here was not directed against devotional utterance at all, but at something else here described more definitely as "to speak."

Again, it is universally conceded, that this injunction "silence" is not a bar to class-teaching in the church assembly.

* Even so learned a man as Dr. Edward Beecher, publicly stated in Illinois years ago, that "there are grave difficulties about this passage, and all that I do is to wait for light."

† Mr. Ross wrongly speaks (p. 751, 756) of the "passages enjoining silence upon women in the churches. This one passage before us, is the only church passage to be found.

as a bible-school, or to the repeating of Scripture, or even other exercise, before the whole, or to the giving of evidence or information when called for. And many would say, that, for the same reason, this passage cannot mean to prohibit any Christian testimony or statement of experience, or other modest womanly utterance not made in violation of any other Scripture. If the silence required be not absolute, but allow some use of the voice, then the speaking here forbidden is only that sort of speaking which is everywhere else prohibited, namely, that which is insubordinate and dictatorial to man, and therefore unwomanly (as taught in 1 Tim. ii, 11, 12, etc.).

Interpreting the passage in this common-sense way, as sanctioned by the Church in all ages, we shall have it in harmony with all other Scripture, as well as with reason and the expediency of things; while at the same time we shall do no violence to the language of the apostle, and put no contempt upon his inspired authority in the case. But of late, the idea of any limitation upon female speech has become so distasteful to many, that the present generation are attempting to ignore the apostle's teaching entirely. And, instead of debating how far his injunction admits of limitation, the sceptical are boldly declaring, that it is of no force to us. Even some good people have fallen into this sceptical snare. It takes two forms:

1. Some, more flippant than reverent, assert, that this passage is only the unadvised utterance of "an old bachelor," in which Paul without divine warrant gives his own ascetic notions, begotten of his celibate habits; whereas we are better situated than he to judge what is right in the case. But here let it be observed, in the first place, that we are far from knowing certainly that Paul was a bachelor, as an able writer has shown; nor would this teaching be any more likely to come from the "crusty bachelor," than from the "tyrant husband" of whom these objectors talk. Secondly, the general tenor of Paul's teaching is in the direction of elevating woman, far more than was the current sentiment of his day; so that the passage could not come from any such feeling as alleged. Thirdly, thus to charge, is not only to put unjust contempt on the character of Paul, but to deny his inspiration, and so to despoil the Word of God. When we treat one passage thus, we have nowhere to

stop till we reject the whole Bible. Of course, no true disciple of Christ can wittingly maintain this view.

2. Others assert, that the command was only a temporary and local one, growing out of the peculiar habits and circumstances of the Corinthian church; and that therefore it has become obsolete, and has no binding force on us. In reply we say: There may indeed be found here and there a few remarks of Paul, of a merely prudential and advisory character, without special authority to us,—where he expressly announces that he is not speaking by divine command. But to extend this view to any passage not so announced, will be to subvert the whole inspired authority of the apostle. And the passage before us is one, which, instead of being thus specifically released from general obligation, is most expressly enforced as of universal application. It begins with the language, “As in all the churches of Christ, let *your* women, etc.;—which the best critics now agree in punctuating thus as properly one continuous sentence: (so Lachman, Conybeare, and Howson, etc.) The passage ends with a severe rebuke (v. 36–38) of any one who should reject this teaching, concluding with this decisive language: “Let him acknowledge, that the things that I write unto you are the *commandments of the Lord*.”

A passage thus announced, not only without hint of being exceptional, but with solemn asseveration to the contrary, cannot be thrown aside as not intended for us. Any one who treats this portion of Scripture thus, must be quite unsettled as to anything and everything in the Bible. If we begin such a process of ignoring what does not answer our purpose, there is no barrier we can put up against any amount of caviling and rejection of truth. To accept such a view of Paul's teaching here, is not only to undermine our own basis of reliance upon Scripture as any sure guide for us,—but is to give full license to the universalist, the sceptic, the most heretical mutilator of the Bible, in all his daring denials of every unwelcome statement.

We confidently say, therefore, that to the Bible Christian there is no possible escape from the difficulties of this passage in any of these modern devices for ignoring it as of no force to us. As loyal to God's Word, we must look only in the other direction; and, seeing that Christ's Church has always found

here a prohibition binding upon all, but not in the unlimited sense of absolute silence,—we must simply decide,—how far may we go, under a fair interpretation of the apostle's language, in the allowable limitation of his seemingly absolute prohibition.

Several limitations have been attempted, which cannot be approved :

1. An attempt to limit the prohibition to public meetings, or to business meetings. This cannot be maintained; for the passage says simply "the church" and "the churches," that is, the Christian assemblings of every sort, whether for worship, for prayer, for business, for search of the Scriptures, or for any other organic design. Whatever is here forbidden, is just as wrong before a Sunday-school or a concert, as before any other church gathering. The error here attempted is sufficiently exposed in the *Bib. Sacra*, 1870, p. 743.

2. An attempt to limit the word "speak," as here meaning only to preach, or as meaning only to babble,—one or the other of these—preaching or babbling—being understood as all that is forbidden to women by Paul. The latter view, the "babble" theory, is fully presented by Rev. Mr. Loomis, in the *Congregational Quarterly* for April, 1874; but is very ably and critically overthrown in the October number (as rehearsed by Professor Clapp). And neither of these theories can make any headway, as their very contrariness indicates.

We must fall back, therefore, on the only remaining and legitimate limitations of the passage; which we proceed to set forth, in the method we have held for years.

We have here three different expressions of Paul, which seem peremptory against woman's right of speech in the church.

1. "Let your women keep silence in the churches." 2. "For it is not permitted unto them to speak." 3. "It is a shame for women to speak in the church." Let us try to interpret these three expressions in their order.

1. "Let your women keep silence in the churches." As already stated, it is conceded by all that this does not mean absolute silence. In 1 Tim. ii, 11, 12, we find the same requirement, of silence in a limited sense, that is relative silence, for woman, everywhere; abstinence from authoritative

teaching, or self-assertion over man. "Let the women learn in silence [relatively] with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach or usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence" relatively to him,—that is, in that silence which abstains from "authority over the man,"—so much silence as is needful in order to "learn with all subjection." The passage before us is only an application of this general principle to the church in session. Its meaning must be, "Let your women keep silence [relatively] in the churches,"—so much silence as is needful for the good order I am enjoining in this chapter, and especially in the verses next preceding. That this is the limitation upon the word here, the same limitation as in the other passage from 1st Timothy, is evident from the reason immediately added,—“For it is—to them—to be in subjection.” Such silence is required as is needed for subjection, and no other.*

So then, the meaning is not—"keep entire silence with this or that exception,—except in singing or except in something else,"—as most interpret it. If the writer had meant to make exceptions, he would have said so, in this clause as in the next. But the meaning is simply this;—"keep the silence of subjection, the womanly quiet and reserve which is everywhere enjoined,—keep this same in the church, as it is required at home and in all places."

The relative silence here prescribed is drawn directly from the previous verse (30)—the intervening sentence ("for," etc., v. 31-33) being clearly a mere parenthesis, explaining the propriety and feasibility of the thing required. Paul there first enjoins a relative silence on all, the men included. V. 29, 30. When "two or three" are to speak in rotation, "let the first one hold his peace," that is, stop speaking for the time being, as soon as

* According to the principle of the passage, voting is certainly more questionable than any other mode of expression; for this carries "authority" rather than "subjection" in it. And if the actual majority vote of all the men composing a church be over-ruled by votes of women turning the scale, it may be hard to see why this is not the very using of "authority over the man" which Paul forbids: though certainly the women do not "usurp" it, if this over-ruling power is voluntarily conferred by the men themselves. Must it not be more scriptural, for every church taking women's votes, to except from their operation, by special provision every such case as that just referred to?

the divine prompting calls for "another that sitteth by." In other words, if one by our side is divinely prompted to occupy the floor, we should give way to him, so that all may have opportunity to speak, (as is altogether reasonable and practicable, he adds in parenthesis.) And then he forthwith (at v. 34) applies this relative "holding of the peace" to the women particularly, as most subject to such subordination, and perhaps as there in Corinth most needing the caution.* "Let your women [particularly—in such a case] hold their peace in the churches;" for they particularly are "to be under obedience." Not "keep silence" absolutely, but "hold their peace" relatively, as expressed in the previous verse (30), (where Conybeare and Howson render it—"end the discourse;") for it is the same Greek expression in both places, (*σιγάω*). Let them stop speaking when others wish to speak; especially let them stop conversational inquiries in church, as he proceeds to particularize (v. 35). Let them keep quiet and orderly, as "under obedience." This is all the word means, as shown by the connection; for this matter of order is the very subject the apostle is discussing.

2. "For it is not permitted unto them to speak, but [they are commanded] to be under obedience; as also saith the law." Here the translators have unfortunately inserted the proposition "they are commanded," supposing that this would make the sense plainer; whereas, the real sense is perverted by this gratuitous interpolation. They mistook the idea from a wrong understanding of the word "but" in this place.

In Greek as in English, the conjunction *but* with a negative before it has two uses: (1) Disjunctive, (*οὐκ . . . ἀλλὰ*, not . . . but) on the contrary to what has gone before; as, "I came not to destroy, but to fulfill," Mat. v, 7. (2) Subordinate, somewhat like a preposition, (*οὐκ . . . ἀλλὰ*, not . . . but) save or excepting what follows, which is thus excepted from the negative that has gone before: as, "He hath not grieved me but in part," 2 Cor. ii, 5; that is, "not . . . except in part."

* Paul's mention of the disorder indicates its existence at Corinth. And this shows that the customs of the day gave women a chance to speak in meetings. Hence Paul's teaching cannot be a mere outgrowth from some austere notion of those times in that respect.

The apostle seems at first to say, that the offender has not grieved him; but his whole statement, with the "but" upon it, shows that he has grieved him by way of exception. Here the "but" limits the previous "not;" so that it is not absolutely not, but not except in a certain respect.

Thus again, in Mark ix, 8, "They saw no man any more save (but) Jesus only," (*οὐκ ἄλλ᾽*);—the very translation "save" or except instead of but,—and the fact that Matthew (xvii, 8) actually substitutes except (*εἰ μὴ*),—shows clearly this use of the word. We are first told, "They saw no man;" but the whole statement shows that they did see a man; for the last clause is an exception to the first.

So in the passage before us: "For it is not permitted (or appointed) unto them to speak, (*ἄλλ᾽*, but, except,) save to be under obedience." Here, as in the other cases, there seems at first to be an absolute "not" given, but the added words of exception make it only a limited "not," that is, a "not save" or except, or only in a certain way.

It belongs then to women, to speak only (or not except) in a way of subordination, just as enjoined in 1 Tim. ii, 11, 12, and in all other Scripture, or (in Paul's own added words) "as also saith the law." This appended expression shows, that the sentiment here is only a parallel reiteration of the general doctrine concerning women everywhere, as being specially applicable to them "in church." They are to "hold their peace" or be quiet there as elsewhere, so far as needful in order to be "in subjection," and not "to usurp authority over the man." But this does not require them to be absolutely silent at home; and no more does it require them to be absolutely silent in church. "It is appointed to them not to speak except [so as] to be in subjection;" for exactly thus the verse may be rendered.

Besides the cases given above, 2 Cor. ii, 5, Mark ix, 8, 1 Cor. xiv, 34, we add the following, as plain cases of *ἄλλ᾽* but in this subordinate sense of save, except, or unless. Gal. i, 12, "Neither was I taught it but (except) by revelation of Jesus Christ;" 2 Cor. i, 13, "We write none other things than (other than or except) what ye read;" Heb. v, 4, "No man taketh this honor unto himself but (except) he that is called of God;"

1 Cor. iii, 5, "Who then is Paul, and who Apollos, but (except) ministers?" So also, 2 Cor. vii, 9, "I rejoice, not that ye were made sorry, but (except) that ye sorrowed unto repentance;" 2 Cor. v, 4, "Not that we wish to be unclothed, but (except or unless) to be clothed upon;"* Rom. vii, 17, 20, "It is no more [that do it, but (except or save only) sin that dwelleth in me;" Mat ix, 24, Mark v, 39, Luke viii, 52, "The maid is not dead (save that she) sleepeth,"—(death is only a sleep;) John xi, 1, "This sickness is not unto death but (save) for the glory of God;" 2 Cor. xiii, 7, "Not that we should appear approved, but (except) that ye should do that which is honest." The following may be added: Mark ix, 37, John xii, 44, "He that believeth on me, believeth not on me but (except as he believeth) on him that sent me;" John vii, 16, and xiv, 24, "My doctrine is not mine but (save as it is) his that sent me;" Acts v, 4, "Thou hast not lied unto men but (except in lying) unto God;" 1 Cor. vii, 10, 12, "I command, yet not I but (except or without) the Lord;" xv, 10, "I labored, yet not I but (save or unless) the grace of God with me;" Mat. x, 20, "It is not ye that speak but (except or without) the Spirit." We have here given seven cases that are certain, with eight more quite clear, and eight others probable; in all twenty-three cases of this usage.† So certainly is our translation of this verse in accordance with New Testament usage.

This mode of speech is derived from the Hebrew, as Winer reminds us. For examples, see Gen. xxxii, 27, "I will not let thee go except (Heb. *אם כי* but if) thou bless me;" Lev. xxii, 6, "Shall not eat of the holy things unless (but if) he wash;" 2 Sam. v, 6, "Thou shalt not come in hither except (but if) thou take away the blind and the lame;" Ruth i, 17, "If aught but (except) death part me and thee;" Gen. xxxix, 9, "Nothing hath he kept from me except (but if) thee;" xxviii, 17, "This is none other but (but if or except) the house of God;" Esther

* Here note, that we have the infinitive after *ἀλλὰ* but, just as in the passage above us.

† The following nineteen other passages perhaps belong here: Matt. xx, 23, and Mark x, 40; Mark xiv, 36, and Luke xxii, 42; John v, 22, 30, and vi, 38, and xii, 9, and xvi, 13, 1 Thes. ii, 4, and iv, 8, Heb. xi, 13, 1 Cor. vii, 19, and xv, 37, Cor. i, 24, and ii, 4, and xii, 16, Gal. iv, 7, and vi, 15; possibly also, John ix, 31, and xxi, 8.

ii, 15, "She required nothing but (but if or except) what the king's chamberlain appointed;" Isa. xlii, 19, "Who is blind but (but if or except) my servant?" (See in Gesenius' *Hebrew Lexicon*.)

NOTE.—Donnegan in his Greek Lexicon defines,—"'Αλλὰ, but,—and so ἄλλ' ἢ, except, unless, after οὐδέν ἄλλο, in Eurip. Hippol. 932, Valcken." Again he says: "'Αλλ' ἢ, viz: ἄλλὰ ἢ, unless, except, following a negation or the word ἄλλος," etc. So we find it at 2 Cor. i, 13, "None other than;" Luke xii, 51, "I tell you, not [to bring] other than (or save) a sword;" 1 Cor. iii, 5, (com. text.) "Who is Paul, and who Apollos, other than (unless or but) ministers." Now mark how easy it was for writers to drop the ἢ, making ἄλλ' ἢ into simple ἄλλ', as it is here in 1 Cor. 14, 34. As Donnegan says: "'Αλλὰ, but,—or indeed than, answering to ἄλλος, Odys. 8, 311, and at 21, 71, instead of ἢ, also in prose, Thucid. 1, 83, Isocrat. ad Nicocl., p. 23B, and Plat. Protag., p. 177, ed. Heind." And although Winer, in his N. T. Gram., §53, 10, 1b, does indeed deny that ἄλλὰ is ever equivalent to εἰ μὴ, (—how can he do this, in face of Mark ix, 8, compared with its parallel, Mat. xvii, 8?—) yet, at §53, 7a, note, he exhibits this ἄλλ' ἢ as from ἄλλο ἢ, for which ἄλλὰ might very readily be used. And there is certainly no other way to explain such passages as those we have given above.

There is another way of arriving at the same result. Winer (in his N. T. Gram., §55, 8) says: "It has frequently been laid down as a rule, that sentences which contain a single negative followed by ἄλλὰ (or δέ) but, are not always to be understood as purely negative, but (in consequence of a construction, which though Hebraistic occurs also in Greek prose) must be rendered—not so much . . . as. Thus, Mark v, 39, 'The maid is not dead but sleepeth,' where the latter thought exactly overturns the former."* And Winer concedes (at b) that in many such cases "Οὐκ . . . ἄλλὰ logically means—not so much . . . as."† So Stuart (in his N. T. Gram., §184, 3) gives this as "a softened and comparative negative," adding: Matt. 10, 20, "It is not so much you who speak as it is the spirit. So Mark 9, 37, 1 Cor. 15, 10, John 12, 44; et al.

* He cites in illustration as follows: Matt. x, 20, 34, and xv, 11, Mark v, 39, and ix, 37, Luke 10, 20, Acts v, 4, 1 Cor. xv, 10, 2 Cor. 13, 7, 1 Thes. iv, 8; 2 Cor. 2, 5, as given by Schott, Luke xiv. 12, by DeWette; also, John xii, 44. So is Demosth. Energ., 684b, Aesop 148, 2, Klotz Devar., p. 9 (note 1, b).

† Yet he thinks it still should be grammatically rendered as usual—"not . . . but,"—the implied sense being only "the rhetorical coloring of the composition." But here we ask, would it indeed be better in Mark ix, 8, to change from "save" to but, in face of the parallel Matt. xvii, 8, where it must be "save?" Or, in the passage before us, where the same "save" evidently gives the true sense, is it better to retain the "but," which leads everybody astray?

Let us give a list of passages wherein this usage occurs. The following are cited by Winer and others under this head: Matt. x, 34, "I came not to send peace but (so much as) a sword;"* Mat. xiii, 11, "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man, but (so much as) that which cometh out;" 1 Thes. iv, 8, "He therefore that despiseth, despiseth not man but God," (not so much man as God). We add all the eight clear, and the eight probable, and several of the nineteen possible uses of "but" for except (as given before;) eight of which cases Winer also gives. We also add Mark x, 8, "They are no more twain but (so much as) one flesh."† Thus we have over twenty clear cases of this usage, besides some twelve other possible cases.

And thus is confirmed the testimony of the great scholar Winer, citing also what is "frequently laid down as a rule," that the Greek expression *οὐκ ἀλλὰ* *not but*, is often "not to be understood as purely negative," but as logically (if not grammatically) meaning—"not so much one thing as another." Hence the passage before us reads as follows: "For it is not permitted (or appointed) unto them to speak, so much as to be in subjection;" that is, they are to speak only as they can do it in subjection; or, they are not to speak, save to be (or except as being) in subjection. And this is the very result we arrived at before.

3. We now come to the third statement of Paul, v. 35: "It is a shame for women to speak in the church." The error usually committed here is, in understanding this as an independent assertion; whereas, it is only a dependent part of the whole verse, thus: "And if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home; *for* it is a shame to women to speak [it] in the church." To speak it, that is, the speaking he has just referred to, the questioning and answering on some

* Mark here also the implied infinitive after *ἀλλὰ* *but*, just as in the passage before us.

† Schott wrongly adds 2 Cor. ii, 5; and most of the seven certain cases of "but" for except (as before) are strangely overlooked and ignored by Winer and others. Here perhaps may belong, John vi, 26, 27, and vii, 22, Phil. 16, 1 Cor. xiv, 22, 22; also i, 17 given by Meyer, vii, 4, 4 by Flatte, x, 24 by Meyer and Schott, Luke xiv, 12 by DeWette, Eph. vi, 12 by others. Winer adds the similar expressions in Luke x, 20, Schott 1 Pet. i, 12, and some Matt. ix, 13, Heb. xiii, 9.

disputed point, which would tend to the disorder he is rebuking in all this part of the chapter. His language is, "And if they will learn anything;" that is to say, the previous injunction, to be in subjection by holding their peace or stopping their discourse when others wished to speak, might sometimes prevent their fully getting the reason of something taught or done, by means of cross-questioning on the spot.

"Let them ask their husbands at home," (Gr. their respective men). That is, in such a case of difficulty on their mind, let them get further light out of meeting, instead of trying a colloquy back and forth in church. For this "is a shame to women," he says, "to speak [it thus] in church." He means to say, "A shame it is to or with women to speak [it thus] in church." For this is the very order of the words in Greek; and the word "for" before "women" in our common translation, is by no means the requisite rendering.

In truth, there is an ambiguity here; since we may read either "it is a shame to women [for them] to speak" it thus, or—"it is a shame [for you] to or with women to speak" or dispute it thus in church. In other words, (1) There is no doubt that the dative word "women" here means to or with women, not being simply the subject of the infinitive "to speak." (2) It is more probable that this infinitive has an indefinite subject understood, than that it has its accusative subject (by attraction) implied in the dative "women." For,

(A) If the word "women" were simply the subject of "to speak," it would certainly be in the accusative instead of the dative, as all authorities teach. "The subject of the infinitive is regularly put in the accusative;" (Stuart's *N. T. Gram.*, p. 258). And so all authors. Thus we have the accusative between "is" and the infinitive in 1 Cor. xi, 13, (this very same epistle,) "Is it fitting—a woman to pray to God uncovered?" John xviii, 14, "It is expedient—one man to die;" 1 Pet. ii, 25, "It is the will of God—you to put to silence," etc.; Matt. xvii, 14, Mark ix, 5, Luke ix, 33, "It is good—us to be here;" Matt. xix, 24, Luke xviii, 25, "It is easier—a camel to go," etc.; Mark ix, 43, 45, "It is better—thee to enter," (so corrected by the best copies. L. T. Tr. ;) Heb. xiii, 9, "It is good—the heart to be established;" Psa. cxxxiii, 1 Sept., "How good it is—

brethren to dwell," etc. So then, as the dative word "women" here cannot be simply the subject of "to speak," it must be an adjunct either to "shame" or to "speak," and we must read, 'it is a shame to women,' or "it is a shame to speak to or with women."

(B) If we read—"it is a shame to women to speak," then the unexpressed subject of "to speak" may be an accusative implied (by attraction) in the dative "women," thus: "It is a shame to women—they to speak [it] in church." But this is not the most probable meaning here. For, (a) In that case, instead of the infinitive, a *ὅτι* would have been likely, as in *Psa. cxix, 71 Sept.* "It is good for me *that* thou hast afflicted me." (b) If "women" were thus adjunct to "shame," it would be likely to be placed next to it, as usual in such cases. So *1 Cor. xi, 6*, "It is a shame to woman;" *vii, 1, 26*, "good for man;" *Matt. xviii, 8, 9*, *Mark ix, 43, 47*, "better for thee is it;" *1 Cor. ix, 15*, "better for me;" *Phil. i, 7*, "it is meet for me;" *29*, "it is given to you;" *Heb. ii, 10*, "it became him;" *Acts xv, 25*, "it seemed good to us;" *Psa. cxix, 71 Sept.*, "it is good for me." So in *v. 34* before us, "permitted to them;" and so almost invariably. But in the passage before us, the verb is inserted between,—*"a shame it is to women to speak;"* and we have found it in no case thus between a word and its dative adjunct preceding an infinitive, except in *2 Pet. ii, 21*. Thus it appears, that the position of the words puts the probabilities very greatly against the idea, that in the passage before us "women" is adjunct to "shame." The very correcting of *Lark ix, 45* from a dative to an accusative, shows to the contrary. (c) If the subject of "to speak" were thus by attraction absorbed in the dative "women," the infinitive would be likely to have an article with it, as in *1 Cor. xi, 6*, "It is a shame to woman—the (i. e. her) being shaven or shorn," (where the similarity of the words to those before us sets off strikingly the difference we are noting in the construction.) So also *Phil. 29*; and without dative, *Heb. x, 31*, *Rom. xiv, 21*, *Gal. iv, 18*.

(C) Therefore, the word "women" here, does not probably belong with "shame" which is away from it, but is probably adjunct to "speak" which is near to it; and the meaning is, in accordance with the Greek order of the words,—*"a shame it is*

to (or with) women to speak" it,—that is, for you "to speak (it thus) with women," cross-questioning in church, to the danger of good order. (a) That the subject may thus be unexpressed, appears from a very similar expression at Eph v, 12, *αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ λέγειν*, "it is a shame even to speak." (b) That "with" is a proper translation of the dative in this position, see Heb. xiii, 9, "it is good with grace to be established—the heart." *καλὸν γὰρ χάριτι βεβαιοῦσθαι τὴν καρδίαν* here note that a subject has to be supplied, distinct from the dative. So also, Stuart (*N. T. Gram.*, p. 179) has: "*Μάχηται αὐτῷ*, he contends *with* him." (c) That "with" is a common translation of the dative with *λαλέω* speak, see Luke xxiv, 40, 32, "He talked with us by the way;" so Matt. xii, 46, 47, Act x, 7, 32, and xvi, 3, 1 Cor. xiv, 28. See also John xiv, 23, and xv, 3, 11, 22, and xvi, 1, 4, 6, 25, 33, Acts vii, 38. See Stuart (p. 179, 182), "*Λαλεῖν τινί*, signifying intercourse or communication. . . . *λέγειν τινί* and *πρὸς τινά*." (d) We add

The rendering "to or with women" in this passage, is required by its connection with the previous clause. What is here spoken of is, a wife's asking questions at home, and thus getting information from her husband; to which the writer adds, "It is a shame for this questioning and answering to be done in meeting,—a shame to be thus talking to or with a woman or wife in church."* This verse shows, that the privilege of speech is indeed put under limitation,—contrary to the radical view of our day. But it shows also what that limitation is,—not a proscription of modest orderly address, but of colloquial controversy or disorderly conversation in meeting, such as women then it seems were liable to, and such as we too have sometimes occasion to rebuke.†

* The present is continuative—"to be talking;" and many of the best copies (S. V. A. Lach. Tisch.) have the singular "woman" or wife. If the reading of the MSS. S. V. A. in v. 34 be insisted on, "but let them be in subjection," then we may also apply this same rendering of the dative there: "Let the women (thus pause (when others speak;)) for it is not allowed to be talking with them (thus in the church.) But let them be in subjection, as also saith the law."

† When certain females were once whispering together, and disturbing the service at which the present writer was officiating,—he paused in his discourse, and turning over the Bible to the passage before us, he quietly read: "It is a shame for women to speak in the church." Going back without comment to his sermon he was no more disturbed. We regard this as a legitimate use of Paul's prescription; showing that it was no transient utterance, but is of benefit to us still.

Thus have we analyzed the teaching of Paul; and we find that his whole object in this passage, is the cure of disorder in meetings. And all he says is based on his view (so constantly urged elsewhere,) of the subordination of woman with man as "one flesh." He asserts no such unnatural and undesirable dogma as is sometimes claimed from him, that a woman must not under any circumstances utter her voice in meeting. But he only says, she is to be quiet, or "hold her peace," or pause when others wish to talk, and not to speak except in a way of respectful subordination,—doing all further needed discussion out of meeting,—because a bantering with women in church is shameful or shaming, as tending to disorder.

The proper reading of the passage, as we have expounded it from the original, is this:

V. 30. "If anything be revealed to another that sitteth by, let the first hold his peace; for" (it is reasonable and feasible thus to avoid "confusion" and keep the "peace," v. 31-33).

V. 34. "Let (your) women in the churches [thus] hold their peace (or restrain their speech). For it has not been permitted (or assigned) to them to speak, save (or so much as) to be in subjection; as also the law says."

V. 35. "And if they wish to find out something, let them ask their respective men at home; for shaming it is to (or with) women to talk (it thus) in church."

Thus the whole matter is plain. Paul is made consistent with himself, in his not only permitting but regulating the speaking of women, in this very epistle before us, (1 Cor. xi, 1-16). In the *Congregational Quarterly* for April, 1874, (p. 280,) it is argued wildly, as if the earlier teaching of chapter xi were superseded by the later teaching of chapter xiv! when we know that the whole epistle was certainly sent to Corinth at the same moment. About as unsatisfactorily, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for Oct., 1870, (p. 750,) is given the frequent argument, that in the 14th chapter Paul condemns as "shameful" all praying in church by women, while very much exercised in the 11th chapter lest they should "pray to God uncovered." But why should he waste his strength through sixteen verses to correct the method of their praying, when by a single verse he is going to demolish all their praying entirely? Nothing

short of the present exposition can satisfy the candid mind upon this point.

Thus also the Bible is made consistent with itself, in its frequent recognition of woman's open testimony for God. Passing by all other testimony, look alone at the prophecy cited by Peter upon the day of Pentecost, (Acts ii, 17). It certainly is a very sad resort, when the argument on the other side, (both in the *Bib. Sac.*, 1870, p. 747, and in the *Cong. Quar.*, 1874, p. 282,) has to claim that "the last days" are over and gone, and that to us God is no more issuing that sweet promise by Joel "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy . . . in those days." Our long ing faith, on the contrary, looks on this blessing as if only just begun! It was not particularly on Pentecost that the "hand maidens" prophesied; but long years afterwards the "virgin did prophesy," (Acts xxi, 9); and in this very paragraph before us (v. 31,) Paul says expressly, "ye may *all* prophesy, one by one," though women should do so only with covered head, (ch xi, 5). Who has any right to say, that this gospel prophesying foretold of "the last days" for "all," and for "all flesh," is never more to be seen in the church?

In this view no extreme course is necessary. Apostolic teaching need not be forced or repudiated; and woman need not be shut up in her modest efforts to do good. Let her only keep to her divinely appointed position as the submissive help meet of man, and her loving lips, like her tender heart and her gentle hand, shall shed the dew of grace upon the church as well as the home.

It is true, there is a limitation here put upon woman's speech, in the church as everywhere else. Paul's doctrine is and all other Scripture harmonizes with it, that woman is to "be under obedience," and is to speak and act only in consistency with this view. It is not our business here and now to expound and enforce this doctrine. If any dispute it, their quarrel is not with us, but with God's word that teaches it. And would obedience be deemed a hard or wicked thing? Do not all mankind have to obey? Must not man as well as woman yield to the demands of law and order? Does not God wisely assign to us all our fitting lot and place?

Let Scripture admonitions, therefore, be cheerfully accepted. Let a difference be made, as the Bible enjoins, between the speaking of woman and that of man. If the head-covering, or the long hair, or the unprominent posture, or absence of gesticulation, or abstinence from discussion and formal preaching, or quickness to pause and "hold the peace" and yield the floor,—if these or the like be the fitting tokens of womanly subordination according to Paul, then let them be conceded in child-like docility. But beyond this, there is a wide and blessed sphere for woman's voice in the church.

The gospel view of this subject is thus seen to be a plastic one, adaptable to the changing times. Under the apostle's teaching, a full supply of men fully occupying the time, may keep the women out of sight; as has been the case in older, larger churches. But all unoccupied time ought to be improved by women, or "the very stones may cry out." Scripture left this subject in such shape, that harsher times might keep less cultivated woman in the shade, as they have done; while still the advanced culture of these "last days" should have free scope, to receive developed woman's aid in the church, just so fast and so far as developed man himself is ready to accept it as not exhibiting insubordination.

The Scripture principle does indeed make women absolutely "keep silence," where the men insist upon this as the only sufficient token of their subjection. But whenever the men give express invitation to utterance, this certainly relieves the women from all risk or hindrance in speaking properly in their presence. When the men of a church themselves come forward, as in many little mission churches, and ask, and even entreat the women to aid them in their worship, then surely they cannot accuse themselves of the insubordination here condemned, if they kindly and helpfully do their part. Nay, they are more in danger of incurring apostolic malediction, when, in such circumstances of requested aid, they fail to "come up to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty."

ARTICLE VII—ANDERSON'S HISTORIES OF FOREIGN MISSIONS.

History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. By RUFUS ANDERSON, D.D., late Foreign Secretary of the Board.

The India Mission, 1 vol.

The Sandwich Islands' Mission, 1 vol.

Missions to the Oriental Churches, 2 vols.

Foreign Missions and their Claims, 1 vol.

THIS series of volumes is the admirable record of some of the best fruits of the ripest modern Christianity. The Board of Missions which it represents, stands confessedly in the front of missionary organizations, as one of the oldest, wisest, most catholic, most enterprising, and most efficient of them. It originally combined the efforts of three great Christian communions, and furnished the earliest missionaries of a fourth. Its counsels have been conducted, on the whole, with singular harmony among its managers at home, and with its agents abroad. Its plans have been laid, in the main, with a statesmanlike wisdom, and pushed with an apostolic faith. Its financial credit, though hanging upon the individual wills of myriads of men, has been kept unimpaired. The providence and grace of God have averted many and great dangers. Its founders and active patrons have comprised a vast number of the choicest spirits of this nation. The consecrated business talent of Boston has managed its funds. The short roll of deceased secretaries contains such honored names as Worcester, Evarts, Cornelius, Wisner, Armstrong, and Green. The long list of preachers who have uttered its annual messages of hope and cheer, begins with Dwight and proceeds with such names as Appleton, Spring, Day, Nott, Griffin, Lyman Beecher, Richardson Alexander, and the like. Among its missionaries are registered a body of men whose practical wisdom, zeal, and power, show them to be no mean successors of the early evangelists. Whether in the history of the Church, are there to be found groups

of nobler men than Newell, Hall, Meigs, Poor, Scudder, and Ballantine, in India; Bingham, Thurston, Richards, in Hawaii; Grant, Perkins, Stocking, Stoddard, Rhea, in Persia; Parsons, Fisk, and Eli Smith, in Syria; Dwight, Goodell, and Azariah Smith, in Turkey,—to say nothing of the living? What finer female characters than Mrs. Newell, Mrs. Winslow, Mrs. Sarah Lanman Smith, Miss Fiske, and the great company of accomplished ladies that have diffused the Christian graces in benighted lands? What more remarkable scenes of awakening than those which have attended these missionary labors? What more marvelous exhibitions of the transforming power of the gospel of Christ? The history of this Board exhibits every form of Christian pioneering and activity, from the task of committing twenty languages to writing up to the founding of colleges and theological schools; from the first utterance of the Saviour's name to naked savages, up to the ingathering of those savages by tens of thousands, clothed and cleansed, into the Church of Christ; from the first union of two or three in the name of Christ, up to the marshalling of mission churches themselves for the missionary work. Nearly every conceivable form of Christian experience, almost every variety of gift and grace, and every kind of trial, heroism, and deliverance, stands here recorded.

This record of God's doings is fortunate in its authorship. Few narratives of so broad a series of events have ever been written by one so amply fitted for the office. It would be difficult to specify a qualification in which the venerable author is lacking. He has from the beginning watched and accompanied the work he narrates, in all its aspects, from within and without. He was present when the first band of missionaries was ordained at Bradford by Woods, Griffin, Spring, Morse, and Worcester. A few years later he entered the service of the Board, was connected more than forty years with its foreign correspondence, took every missionary by the hand as he went to his destination, sat in the deliberations of the Prudential Committee, attended all the annual meetings at home, and made four official visits of investigation to the missions in India, the Sandwich Islands, and the countries on the Mediterranean. And now he has had access to all the

sources of information whether in print or in manuscript. It would not be easy to mention a historian of greater opportunities. And would it not be equally difficult to mention one of more trustworthy qualities? The breadth of view, calmness of judgment, and sagacity of discernment that constitute a statesman and a leader, are joined to a conspicuous fairness of spirit, and to a distinctness of statement cultivated by long intercourse with clear-headed men, and by the constant necessities of careful and terse communication. Dr. Anderson never writes a hazy or an ambitious sentence, never warps fact for an effect, nor makes a statement that betrays a pique or a prejudice. He freely mentions the mistakes of the Board or its missions, and the short-comings of the converts. If he exposes the oppositions of enemies, it is done without bitterness. He frankly utters his own judgment, and at times pleasantly mingles with the narrative his own relations to the facts or the persons. And while disavowing the intention to write a philosophy of missions, he yet from time to time indicates the relations and significance of the facts in compressed statements of much interest and value. Thus his chapter on "The Opening of India," explains the state and progress of British sentiment more clearly and compactly than it can be found elsewhere.

While these volumes may fail to attract the class of readers who are drawn only by "fine writing" and scenic effects, they will possess the highest value for those intelligent Christians who can be interested in a thoroughly trustworthy narrative written in transparent English, of some of the most remarkable events in the modern history of Christ's kingdom. Such persons will give them a prominent place among the standard works of a Christian library. The chief regret they will feel will be that the limits necessarily observed by the author exclude such an amount of the thrilling incidents and striking personal details that mark almost every stage of its history. Perhaps, however, they will be induced to seek these things in missionary biographies and correspondence. The missionary magazines have been full of them. Many will wish individually that for this purpose the size of these volumes had been doubled, while yet they recognize the wisdom of the restriction

s of this series have received suitable consideration as appeared. But there are aspects of the subject, and those the most striking, which are fully recognized only upon view of the completed whole. Here are lessons to be read and pondered by every young minister of the gospel, lessons fruitful to the mind and heart. To enumerate them all, more to set them adequately forth, would be beyond the scope of a review. We can only suggest some of the more striking.

These histories present a most impressive and cheering illustration of the certain success of the gospel. They narrate, not the part of the work of one Missionary Board. Yet, embracing so wide a range of time, space, character, and circumstance, they enable us to measure the power and drift of the gospel. We get away from the windings and eddies of the sea and out of the thickets that hide its course, and are brought from an eminence, to trace its clear unmistakable flow to the ocean. And how sure, and often how signal, has been the progress. The Divine Saviour has invariably proved the power of God and the wisdom of God. There has never been a failure. Sometimes there has been long delay. Hall toiled twelve years in India, and died, having only seen a hopeful convert. Judson had labored long without little fruit when he declared the prospect to be "bright promises of God." And in due time, everywhere the harvest or the first fruits have come. The divine message has held on the low, sensual Hawaiian, the tameless Indian, the ferocious Zulu, the earthy Chinese, the Druze wrapped in superstition, the keen, formalist Armenian, the demoralized Nestorian, the cultivated Japanese, the Brahmin and the Pariah at the bottom of Hindoo society, and it has begun its work on the fierce and bigoted Mohammedan. No race, class, or character, has proved impervious to its power. And if it be true, as Dr. N. G. Clark has strikingly remarked, that the evangelists and church-members of America are now far more numerous than a century ago, it is perhaps also true that the hopeful converts now in the mission fields are more than twice as many as all the evangelical church-members of America at that time.

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In this career of progress, it is most instructive to observe how steadily and often unexpectedly Providence has prepared and cleared the way. The portion of the heathen world that was open to the gospel when the American Board began its work, was almost as small as that which is closed to it now. A series of remarkable changes at the right time opened India, and soon transferred the heavy hand of the government from determined opposition to steady protection. No more singular and timely event stands on record in the history of the gospel, than the overthrow of idolatry in Hawaii while the brig *Thaddeus* was conveying the missionaries to the islands. Equally remarkable has been the unlocking of China and Japan. The rebellion of Mohammed Ali and the death of Sultan Mahmoud paralyzed the right arm of persecution in Turkey, when it was raised to strike its most terrible blow. Just when the Maronite Patriarch boasted that his high hand had closed the mountains of Syria to the gospel, he was overthrown and taken away, and his plans reversed. The death of the Shah of Persia in 1847, and again, ten years later, the sudden displacement of two high officials in Oroomiah, one by assassination and one by insurrection, arrested plans and beginnings of violence. More than once have Mohammedans in Turkey and Persia secured justice and given protection from renegade Christians. How often in the history of the Sandwich Islands is the reader forced to recognize the most timely Providences, as when King Liholiho sailed for England and left the regency to the noble Kaahumanu; when Rear-Admiral Thomas suddenly appeared to suppress the arrogance and threats of his countryman, Lord George Paulet; when the United States sloop of war *Vincennes* came with the friendly letter of President Quincy Adams to sustain the native government in its new code of laws, assailed by the British consul; and when the *Vandalia* arrived at the critical moment to prevent the outrage of the French Commissioner Perrin. From all kinds of foes this history shows how God has defended his cause; from the scoundrelism of abandoned sea-captains and sailors; from the inroads of Romish Priests and Jesuits, and reckless High Churchmen; from the anathemas and persecutions of the Maronite, Nestorian, Greek and Armenian Patriarchs; from wars in Mount Lebanon; from

the lifted scimeter of the Turk; from the violent intrusion of the French government; and, for a time even from the misguided opposition of the East India Company and the British power. Long ago, however, the English government made ample amends for its early error by its manly testimony, protection, and even co-operation in India, its friendly interposition at the Sandwich Islands, its many courtesies and good offices in Persia, and its noble and indispensable stand for complete religious freedom in Turkey. And though the navies of Britain, France, and America have had their honor deeply sullied by the foul and ruffianly conduct of their officers, there are British and American naval officers and statesmen whose names will be held in lasting remembrance by Christian men for their noble course. At the Sandwich Islands the infamous deportment of the American Lieutenant Percival, and the disgraceful doings of the British Consul Charlton and Captains Buckle, Clark, and Lord George Paulet, may in meekness be forgotten, but Christian gratitude will not forget the manly help of the American Commodores Kearney and Wilkes, and of Captain Jones at the islands, and of John Quincy Adams in the Presidential chair and the United States Congress, nor the friendly offices of Sir George Simson and the interposition of Admiral Thomas. In Greece, Daniel Webster, Edward Everett, and Sir Edward Lyon will be held in honorable recollection, Lord Elphinstone and other British Governors in India, Lord Cowley, and above all Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in Turkey.

It is equally instructive to read how God has raised up the very men to meet all the exigencies of this great movement. Not more conspicuous was the wonderful adaptation of Carey, Grant, and Wilberforce for the preparatory struggle in England, than that of Spring, Worcester, and Evarts to organize the enterprise in America, of Judson, Hall, Newell, to be its pioneers abroad. Indeed, it would be easy to follow the history somewhat in detail and trace the singular adaptation of many of the missionaries to their special fields and functions, if it would not require us to speak too freely of the living. Many a convert, like Kapiolani, Blind Bartimeus, Bedros, and John Concordance, could in like manner be mentioned as "raised up" to do some special thing.

A very noteworthy preservation, too, has been extended to the missionaries themselves. In the whole history of this Board, but one missionary, Mr. Coffing, has "suffered a violent death inflicted because he was a missionary at the hands of the people among whom he labored." Mr. Meriam probably would not have been killed by brigands in Bulgaria, had he not fled, nor would Munson and Lyman have been slain in Sumatra, had they not been armed, and their purposes misunderstood. Seldom have they found it necessary even to defend themselves. Thurston, indeed, once rescued his wife from the assaults of a vile Hawaiian priest by the strength of his muscular right arm, and Grant once saved Perkins from the assassin's dagger by a well-aimed stroke of his riding-whip. Faithful natives twice defended the house and life of Mr. Richards from British and American sailors, the former of whom came with knives, pistols, and the black flag. The missionaries were wonderfully exempted from harm during the scenes of warfare in Syria. In the bombardment of Beirut where shells and balls fell around and within the mission premises, and soldiers encamped on their grounds, everything even to the philosophical apparatus and printing type, remained uninjured, and the orange and lemon trees were found loaded with fruit on the return of the owners. Through the butcheries of 1860 in the mountains, the family of Mr. Bird remained safe in a village that was reduced to ashes, and Mr. Calhoun, against the consul's remonstrances, staid in quiet at his home while both contending parties deposited their property in his enclosure. Mr. Montgomery was two hours in the hands of an infuriated mob at Marash, was dragged from his horse, stoned, kicked, and beaten, but delivered by "a great strong man" who all the while yelled in unison with the crowd. Dr. King was protected by the soldiers' bayonets from an Athenian mob, and escaped a conspiracy at Syra to take his life. The calm courage of these men and women has been everywhere conspicuous, whether it be Grant facing robber bands and the fierce emir of Hakkarah, or Mrs. Scudder, with her little son abandoned in the jungle by her bearers, and praying through the night in hearing of the tread of wild elephants and the howls of ravenous beasts.

But notwithstanding these toils and exposures, the good providence of God has given these faithful servants a fair average of life. Many have indeed passed away by casualties and epidemics, and some by sheer exhaustion. But in the hot climate of India, Ballantine did a work of thirty years, Munger thirty-four, Scudder thirty-six, Poor thirty-nine, Meigs forty-one, Winslow forty-four, and Spaulding fifty-three. These are remarkable cases, but not unparalleled. Perkins was spared thirty-eight years in Persia, Goodell forty years chiefly in Turkey, King forty-six, mostly in Greece, and Thurston forty-eight in the Sandwich Islands. Many now living have had a long career. We are also permitted to see in these narratives how God often utilized even the death of the missionary, and made it the germ of life. No man can doubt that the decease of Henry Obookiah before he was ready to leave America, of Mrs. Newell before she found a field of labor, and of the first Mrs. Judson after a short life of terrible toil and trial, by the intense interest they awakened at that stage of the missionary course did vastly more for the world's conversion than could have been accomplished by these missionaries in person had they lived till now. Still oftener have such influences been felt on the mission fields. The death of Mrs. Grant, devout and accomplished, after but four years in Persia, produced an unparalleled impression on bishops and people, and a tenderness of feeling that probably remained till the revivals began. A Brahmin gazed earnestly upon the peaceful face of Mrs. Fairbank, and said, "the religion must be true, which secures a death like this." The wife of the Brahmin, Babajee, was awakened by the happy departure of Mrs. Hervey. Many such instances are on record.

No slight element in this course of success has been the entire satisfaction and delight in their work which has characterized the laborers. It has found utterance. Said Mr. Whittlesey, near the close of his life, "I had rather be a missionary in this dark land pointing these ignorant heathen to Christ than to be enjoying all the pleasures of a civilized and Christian country." Stoddard wrote after his last departure from America, "I consider it the greatest privilege on earth to go." A month later he wrote, "Brother Dwight said to me

yesterday that he saw no situation in America that would be the least temptation to him to leave the missionary work. The remark is not a strange one. I have often heard it from the missionaries and often made it myself." It was one of the last declarations of Mrs. Sarah L. Smith, that she would not for worlds lay her remains anywhere but upon missionary ground. Mr. Graves, after twenty-five years of missionary labor, went back to India on purpose to die in his field. It was a touching incident in the history of each of three young wives, cut down soon after their arrival in India, Mrs. Newell, Mrs. Catherine Winslow, and Mrs. W. W. Scudder, that they left on record the strongest disavowal of all regrets or misgivings. Whole families, father and sons, have sometimes thrown themselves into the breach, as the families of Williamson and Riggs among the North American Indians, and the Scudder family in India. After the death of Mrs. Harriet L. Winslow in Ceylon, three of her sisters joined the same mission.

It is also a noteworthy aspect of the case to see how often the capacities of the missionary seemed to be vastly enlarged by the emergencies of the situation. In numerous instances men of moderate promise seemed to be expanded into colossal proportions. Persons who, to all human appearance, would have filled but a limited sphere of usefulness at home, have become a conspicuous power abroad, not merely by comparison because of the degradation in which they labored, but because of a wonderful positive growth in themselves. It would be easy, but hardly expedient, to mention instances. Their largeness of heart, elevation of aim, and the stimulus of the situation, wrought actual expansion of powers. And men of marked ability are found to have achieved results apparently far beyond anything they would have accomplished at home. Dr. Anderson well asks concerning Dr. Perkins, "Where in his native land could he have labored with the prospect of so large a spiritual harvest, taking no account of the widely reacting influence of his labors on the churches at home? And we might propose the same inquiry with respect to Stoddard, and Rhea, and Grant, and Fidelia Fiske." The truth is that men who would have been but pastors at home became, so to speak, apostles abroad.

These narratives exhibit most impressively, also, the unfailing power of the sacred Word and its agencies. We are brought by steady experience to learn that however valuable may be educational instrumentalities of various kinds, as auxiliary to the gospel, the only sure hope of radical improvement in society or in man, is found in the word of God. And his, when it can gain access, will everywhere perform its office. Often in unexpected ways. The first hopeful convert at the Mahratta Mission, was a man who resided four hundred miles away. He was awakened, while on a visit to Bombay, by reading a tract. He was afterwards heard from as having led ten others to the faith, and then, like a stream hid in the sand, he disappeared from sight. Two priests in Nicomedia read the *Dairyman's Daughter*, which Mr. Goodell, as he passed through the place, had given to a boy. Six years later Mr. Dwight found these priests and fourteen of their flock, converted men. When Dwight and Hamlin visited this little group, a stranger called upon them, whose curiosity had been aroused by the Patriarch's warnings against them. He returned twenty-seven miles to his home in Adabazar, carrying a testament and some tracts. Eighteen months afterwards a missionary visited Aadabazar and found there a little circle of Protestants, comprising several hopeful converts, and he learned that the spirit of inquiry was awakened in many villages around. In the wars of Mount Lebanon, a Bible that had been carried off from a plundered village, opened the eyes of the plunderer to the errors of his church, and brought him with his wife and relatives, into the kingdom of heaven. The church in Marsovan sprang from a tract bought in Beyrout, eighteen years before, on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. In one instance a restless Armenian had long sought peace of soul. He entered a monastery and performed menial offices. He plunged into the wilderness, clothed himself in sackcloth and lived on coarse fare. He returned to the city and tried the strictest forms of Romanism. But in vain. A friend brought him to Mr. Hamlin's meeting. He sat near the door, raised objections, then listened more attentively, became astonished at the doctrine of the cross, almost immediately found peace, and went forth a living witness of the truth.

The word has often employed most unexpected agents. In

India Mr. Allen found, a hundred and twenty miles from his station, a Christian society of forty or fifty members, without pastor. They had been gathered by native Christian servants of British officers, stationed there. At Aintab, in Turkey when colporteurs were suppressed as vagabonds, five mechanics went forth into different towns with their tools and their Bibles. They worked at their trades and preached Christ. The spirit of religious inquiry spread in all directions, and urgent calls came from half a score of neighboring places. The Armenian Patriarch banished the vartabed Bedros and the priest Vertanes. The former inaugurated the Church in Aintab. The latter preached the gospel all the way to Caesarea and, in the words of his enemies, "secured many in that city."

Whatever the agency, the word has never failed, in due time to prove "quick and powerful." And one of the striking features of its power has been the accelerated rate of the Christian movement. There is commonly a time more or less discouraging, sometimes protracted, of preparatory work, with little show of fruit. Then come small results, then greater, as the visible breadth and depth of the progress usually increase in an increasing ratio. Sometimes the slow preparatory work is followed by a sudden and remarkable harvest. This may be due in part to the improvement in methods, but is to be recognized in part, also, as the law of growth. Some of the most extraordinary awakenings, as at the Sandwich Islands and Madagascar, have been preceded by many years of labor and waiting. India was one of the slowest and hardest fields. And yet the native Christians of India are already a great host numbering fifty eight thousand in the province of Tinnevely alone.

We see a specimen of the method of progress in the Ahmednuggur branch of the Mahratta Mission, where in ten years previous to 1831 there were but sixteen accessions to the church; in the next ten years 138, and in the next ten 431. In the district of Nellore (not under our care) the first ten years showed but ten church members, the second ten but twenty-three, and the third ten, six thousand four hundred. All the missionary societies in China reckoned but 351 native Christians after eleven years labor. But the next ten years increased them to 1,95

and the next eight years to 8,000. This law of accelerated growth would appear quite as strikingly in other fields, as in Persia, Africa, Turkey, the Fiji Islands. "He that goeth forth weeping, bearing precious seed, shall doubtless come again with joy bringing his sheaves with him."

Another lesson made singularly impressive, in glancing over the various events here recorded, is the essential identity in the workings of God's Spirit everywhere. Through all the lands, is the same aggressive, penetrating and irrepressible power. These several mission fields show varieties of the same phenomena which have appeared in the whole history of the church at home. On individuals of all races, classes, and conditions, like has this Divine Agency asserted its power, upon the scholarly Armenian priest Kevoork, the clear-headed, impetuous merchant Meekha, Ararkel the bitter and violent opposer, and Maghak, "the thief;" on the mild Nestorian bishop Elias, and the vile mountaineer Guergis; on the high Brahmin Haripunt and the mang-caste beggar Bhagaji, on King Kamehameha's extraordinary wife Kaahumanu, and on his blind and misshapen buffoon, Pauiki. And in these and every other variety of character and condition the "fruits of the Spirit" have fully appeared. The thief stole no more, but became a pillar in the church that he founded. Ararkel the opposer became a winning advocate of the gospel. The wealthy merchant held the faith with unflinching docility and steadfastness under long continued insults. The priest Kevoork became a powerful agent in the reformation. Bishop Elias died at four score and left a record in which any bishop in Christendom might rejoice. The wicked Koord became eminent as "the Mountain Evangelist." The brahmin Haripunt lived and died an honored Christian pastor, and the mang beggar, a consistent and exemplary deacon in the church. The powerful Hawaiian Queen-regent was so signally transformed that "the new and good Kaahumanu" passed into a proverb, and the degraded jester Pauiki, became the "blind Bartimeus" of the most blessed memory. These are but well-known examples of transformation, equally signal, wrought on great multitudes of men and women in all missions by "the same Spirit." The Divine Agent has proved equal to every emergency, not only to raise men from every

form of vice and degradation, but to lift them to any height of Christian strength and manhood, although the average character is naturally lower than among those who have inherited Christian influences. It has reclaimed vast multitudes from every conceivable form of vice and sin,—falsehood, lewdness, theft, profanity, intemperance, cruelty—as when old Ling abandoned the opium he had used for forty years, saying, “I would sooner die conquering this sin than live an opium smoker.” It could not only rouse the idle and sensual islander to industry and spirituality, but it could nerve Kapiolani to defy the traditional terrors of Pele in the crater of Kailua; and not the least of its victories was to overcome the dreadful bondage of caste in India, and seat the brahmin, mahar, the mang and the pariah together at the table of the Lord. It could generate in some parts of Turkey a Christian beneficence surpassing that of Protestant America. It could everywhere train men to be teachers and pastors, and enable churches to govern themselves and spread the gospel. It has wrought out among those converts some of the most beautiful characters that the church has seen. When Bedros Khamaghielyan died, Dr. Dwight wrote, “Thus has passed away one of the choicest spirits this world ever saw.” Words almost as strong might be uttered of Marr Elias, Priest Eshoo, Bartimeus, Yesuba Salave, Sarah Eshoo, Raheel of Beirut, Kapiolani, and very many others.

Equally conspicuous has been the power of the Spirit in the special awakenings which, from time to time, have taken place in all these fields and in almost all parts of them. In some regions they have been often repeated. As long ago as 1859 there had been ten revivals in the boys' school at Oroomiah, and eleven in the girls' school, marked by all the best experiences of similar awakenings at home. The awakenings in Turkey have extended through large districts at the same time. The “Great Awakening” in the Sandwich Islands, it is well known, spread through the islands and brought more than twenty thousand persons into the churches in three years. Quite as extraordinary has been the movement in Madagascar, the Feejee Islands, and among the Karens and the Shanars of India, under other Missionary boards. And “already in more

on three hundred islands of eastern and southern Polynesia," said Dr. Mullens, "the gospel has swept heathenism entirely away."

An analysis of these various revivals, did our space admit, would be a most profitable investigation. It would show the peculiar characteristics and the same fruits as at home. It would reveal in many cases the suddenness and surprisal with which the heavenly influence came down, and yet, quite as often, a special preparation, in prayerful hearts, increased activity and enlarged force of the mission band. Thus, the great movement in the Sandwich Islands went forward, humanly speaking, as a great and well planned spiritual campaign. And the question arises, how much earlier and greater results, undoubtedly, might have been secured, as for example in Syria, by timely reinforcements at the right time, and how suicidal is the parsimony of the churches when it prevents an expansion, or cripples a mission at critical junctures.

We are made to see moreover how ineffectual is all opposition to the work of the Spirit. In 1846 "scores of men, women, and children were wandering houseless for the faith of Jesus in the streets" of Constantinople, but it only served to knit them together. During the same period the bastinado was relentlessly applied in Erzerum, but the truth never made more rapid progress among the Armenians of that city than during these outrages. At Adabazar, Trebizond, Tripoli, and various parts of the empire, the converts have had to endure not only social ostracism and business oppression, but poverty, insult, imprisonment, beatings, and stonings. Similar outrages have occurred at Hasbeiya, Alma, Akkar, Safeeta in Syria, as well as at various points in China and India. The converts have endured all this quite as well as the Christians of other lands and times. There have been, as elsewhere, failures and obstacles. But there have been remarkable exhibitions of the martyr spirit. "Better lose my life than my soul," said Hajib at Ahmednugger, though his enemies felled him, beat him, and kicked him till he was laid up for a week. Three converts at Solapur were beaten by the brahmins till they were faint from loss of blood, and their clothes crimsoned from head to foot. But they said, "We are ready to give up our lives for

Christ's sake." When priest Haritun of Nicomedia was stripped of his robes, insulted, violently abused in the streets, and thrust into prison, "I entered prison," said he, "with a joyful heart, committing myself to God." Asaad Shidiak stood firm, not alone when delivered up by his mother and brothers, but when chained by the neck in a loathsome dungeon, scantily fed on bread and water, deprived of books and comforts, separated from all human sympathy, and fiercely beaten from time to time, till after four long years of suffering and steadfastness he passed away. Often the spirit of meekness has been the test of the thorough work. The brawny Osee of Mardin endured the violence of a band of Papists and quietly escaped from them, when "they knew," said he, "that I could thrash the whole of them, but they think I won't strike back." Li Cha Mi, though almost stoned to death and falling over a precipice in his escape, prayed, as he fell, "Lord have mercy on them;" and his countryman, Ling Ching, who had received, it is said, the incredible number of two thousand stripes, as soon as he could move, brought some of his assailants to Christ.

And yet we see that the missionaries were often strangely distrustful of the reality of the work of grace. They sometimes doubted the convictions, the conversions, and the stability of the converts. Though the proceedings at the Sandwich Islands have been charged with haste, they really seem to have been sometimes culpably slow. Even Kapiolani was not received to the church till after her descent into the crater, and still longer after her conversion. Her husband Neena, later yet. Miss Fiske in Persia, cautioned Mr. Stoddard not to be imposed upon by the supposed conversion of Guergis. There was everywhere a great backwardness to recognize the fitness of the churches for self-support, and of the native Christians for the pastoral work. Babajee should have been made a pastor almost twenty years earlier in India, and Puaaiki in the Sandwich Islands. This step was delayed far too long in all the earlier missions of the Board. The Lord at length convinced the missionaries, almost against their will, that the spirit of God imparts a living force fitted for all the functions of the Christian life, and that a true church of Christ, even in heathen lands, can acquire the same power of preservation and propagation as the home church, and sometimes more.

it has become apparent at length that the whole movement of the gospel must shape itself in some degree according to the forms of life and thought that are native to the land. Adhesions to foreign ways must give place. Pastors are to be supported as Americans, but as natives. The churches and salaries must correspond to the indigenous mode of life. The style of preaching must be native. In Bombay the missionaries even found expedient, as early as 1833, to adapt the hymns to native tunes, although this method is not universal. These things indicate the general policy which has resulted, largely the fruit of experience, a retention of the essentials and a plastic modification of the accidentals of piety. The experience also proved that the pastors must be trained on the ground. The mission school at Cornwall died a natural death.

One of the most impressive aspects of the work of the Spirit in these missions, is the remarkable exhibition of primitive and heroic traits in modern times. We would love to linger on this aspect of the movement, but we must be content with a passing allusion. It is safe to say that no brighter exhibitions of noble Christian manhood can be found since the times of the apostles, than are seen in many of the missionaries and their converts; none which for breadth, depth, and energy so much more nearly remind one of the faith and activity of the primitive churches, and of the men who were full of the Holy Ghost. It is a scene which the Church could not afford to neglect, and of which church members cannot afford to be ignorant.

The power of the gospel as the great civilizing agent is incidentally displayed in these narratives. One of the earliest lessons learned by the Board at the Sandwich Islands, was the superfluity of the plan which sent "farmers" with the preachers. Trained ministers of the gospel, with their families, carried wherever, whether to these islands, to Syria, Turkey, or the West Indies, the germs of a Christian civilization, which sprang up and flourished contemporaneous with the power of religion. The gospel has a mighty quickening power, the missionary and his wife living impersonations. Under this stimulus and example, the idle natives grew industrious. The naked islanders soon

clothed themselves. Dirty Nestorian girls became clean. Kraals and wigwams changed into houses. Parents and children crystallized into families. The missionary wives seen "angels" at Harpoot, and woman steadily rose to her position given her by the gospel. Taste and culture began enter the household. Schools of every grade sprang up. A multitude of cases a written alphabet has come first with word of God, and still oftener have the grammar and the dictionary followed. A young and growing literature has been created. The press, the plough, the chair, the clock, the tea and scores of comforts also entered. The arts of civilized life have gradually spread, till the annual commerce of the Sandwich Islands even has become four and a half million dollars.

Among the numerous other impressive lessons with which these volumes are pregnant to the thoughtful reader, but which we may not pause even to indicate, there is one that must not be passed by. We refer to the remarkable educating process of Christendom and the church, which is here recorded. The growing enlightenment at home during this era of foreign missions, has been quite as great as the progress on heathen ground. Perhaps greater. A hundred years ago the Protestant world seemed profoundly unconscious of its great duty to the benighted. What a startling indication was that tremendous reply of Ryland to Carey, not ninety years ago, "Ye men, sit down. When God pleases to convert the heathen will do it without your aid or mine." But God used the young shoemaker as a forerunner of a revolution of sentiment that spread through the Protestant churches. Then came the necessity of training the British people and the British Government, especially the "Old Indian" portion of it, to admit the compatibility of Christianity in India with the safety of the British Empire. It was surely but slowly accomplished; not till 1832 would the government permit an increase of missionary force in Ceylon. The American churches equally needed a special training. It seems absurd that Judson should have visited England in 1811 to get help in the support of American missionaries. But perhaps it will seem equally strange, sixty-five years hence, that 340,000 church members in 1876 should fail to raise five hundred thousand dollars for

same great cause. When the enterprise was fairly launched, a long further training was needed to learn the true method of success. Christians at home were at first quite too enthusiastic over the opening of schools in India, although in the beginning not a pupil paid his own expenses. The missionaries may have placed too high hopes upon the teacher and the printer as the chief agents of influence; and it was a slow result and the fruit of a second generation and of another mission to place the main reliance on the direct preaching of the word by the living voice. They were still more slow in looking for the mature fruits of the gospel in native pastors and in self-sustaining and missionary churches. It took a quarter of a century to open their eyes to the fact that a native makes, after all, the best preacher and even the best pastor. At the end of fifty years not one fourth of the native churches of the American Board had native pastors. But since then the change has been rapid, and it is cheering to read from opposite quarters and witnesses the most diverse, the clearest testimony to its success. Dr. Anderson, in describing the native pastor of Waialua affirms that he preached "such sermons as no foreign-born missionary in the land could preach for Hawaiians;" and in India a native church member "wept like a child" at the call of his native pastor from Chavagacherry to the Jaffna High School, and said "We respect the missionaries, but our pastor knew our trials, and instructed us in a way that the white man cannot do." With similar slowness was it seen that native churches could be made competent to their own management and their own work. The pastors at the Sandwich Islands are now banded together in two great Evangelical Associations and are working efficiently all the agencies of the gospel. The pastors in Turkey have their Evangelical Unions, where they discuss the great practical questions of the Kingdom of Christ with all good Christian manhood; the churches are vigorous and largely self-supporting, and Mr. H. N. Barnum of Harpoot, affirms that in his district "church discipline is better maintained than it is in the American churches." Not the least significant event was when in 1874, before the Jubilee of Oodooville Seminary in India, its graduates met and adopted a series of resolutions beginning, "We the educated women of Gaffna," and founding,

"The Spalding and Agnew Fund" for the benefit of three beloved instructors, and, afterwards, of the Seminary. Already we begin to see that a time must come, and that not far distant, when in each of the missions the churches shall be left to the Word and Spirit of God to perform all the functions of life, growth, and propagation. The inherent vital force of the gospel has not been seen in our day anywhere so conspicuously as in these benighted lands. In hundreds of places already it has been introduced so effectually as to be beyond all human power to dislodge or arrest.

And at length we have learned the true theory of missionary operations. The word missionary is nearly a translation of the word *apostolos*, and the modern missionary performs, in some important sense, the work of an Apostle, but without his miraculous gifts, his divine inspiration, and his binding authority. He is not a pastor of some single church, but a founder of churches and a trainer of pastors. And the function of our Boards of Missions, as it is now understood, is not to furnish the whole heathen world with foreign pastors and churches supported and guided by foreigners, but, through the light and dew of God's word and God's grace, to raise up on the soil, all the activities of Christian life and power. The missionary's work is, therefore, though radiating from some convenient center, not local but territorial. Except in the infancy of the movement he is not to manage the ecclesiastical affairs of the native brethren, nor to belong as a member to their ecclesiastical bodies. This method of general oversight and development has been admirably exhibited in the fields of Central and Eastern Turkey, where great advantages have been enjoyed in the experiments and influences already tried elsewhere.

The one grand missionary agency is the gospel. "We make it our chief duty," say the brethren at Arcot, "to go into the streets, and towns, and villages, holding up Christ and him crucified as the only hope of the sinner." Schools are now used only as auxiliary to the gospel; not to give a simply secular education to heathen children—an idea long since discarded—but to give a Christian training to the young, and also to raise Christian teachers and preachers. The training of this latter class is to be shaped so as to fit them, not to be inter-

ers or gentlemen of education, or even Christian scholars, for the duties and realities of an intelligent, native pastor—varying somewhat with their talents and their sphere. The methods and support of these pastors are to be gauged not by European conventional standards, except so far as these are upon obvious necessities and proprieties, but by the conditions of life where their lot is cast. So, too, the arrangements for appointments of their church edifices. The evidences and exhibitions of piety in the converts are not to be judged by conformity to the exact phases of religion at home, but by the substantial fruits borne in the very circumstances in which they are placed. Church members are to be trained, as fully as may be, to assume all the responsibilities of independence and maturity, while the missionaries themselves act under the expectation of closing their labors at no distant day, and going on to other fields. Each mission church is thus having on to take its place in the great sisterhood of churches, a mature and inextinguishable force in the home of its activity, and another vital power in giving the gospel to the world.

Dr. Anderson's volumes, including the Lectures, are fruitful of many other suggestions which cannot here be enumerated. They open up lines of thought which might well be prosecuted beyond the limits of these narratives. It is safe to say that the wisest and most thoughtful ministers and laymen will be deeply interested and profited in reading them, and most strongly persuaded that this book of the acts of the modern missions is well nigh indispensable to a clerical library.

ARTICLE VIII.—HORACE BUSHNELL.

A MEMORIAL SERMON PREACHED IN THE CHAPEL OF YALE COLLEGE, SUNDAY, MARCH 26TH, 1876.

Isaiah vi, 5-8. 5. Then said I, Woe is me, for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts. 6. Then flew one of the seraphim unto me, having a live coal in his hand, which he had taken with the tongs from off the altar. 7. And he laid it upon my mouth and said, Lo, this hath touched thy lips; and thine iniquity is taken away and thy sin purged. 8. Also I heard the voice of the Lord saying, Whom shall I send and who will go for us? Then said I, Here am I; send me.

THESE words indicate my theme. In commemorating our honored and beloved friend and distinguished alumnus, I propose to sketch his character and his career, only so far as they illustrate what the Christian faith can make of a gifted man. That Horace Bushnell was in many respects a great man, no one doubts who knows anything of his person or his works. But perhaps few of us are aware how much his greatness and his power were owing to the transforming energy of his faith. It is to deepen your impressions of this truth, that I ask you to follow me in the tribute of love and honor, which I would pay to his memory.

He was born in a grave but gentle household, in which plain living and high thinking taught him the first and best lessons of life. His father, though fixed in his opinions, was courteous in his ways, and his mother though notable in household industries, was fond of books, and refined in her tastes and culture. The home of his childhood and youth was in a stern but picturesque region, being nestled on a pleasant slope at the foot of a broad-backed hill which stretches a mile upward and westward till it introduces the traveler to a smooth and rounded summit. On this height the church was placed, and from it, you can see more than one other distant church, each sitting on its own hilltop. Near by was the parsonage in which President Day was born and bred, whose father was the long remembered pastor. Very near Dr. Bushnell's home is one of the finest mountain

as in Connecticut, to which he was devoted in boating and fishing in his boyhood. A lonely rock rises directly from the border on the east, on the summit of which some scholar or explorer had long ago traced a few enormous Hebrew letters. From this "pinnacle" one looks down upon the lake and far away over all the neighboring townships. On one occasion, I succeeded to meet Dr. Bushnell at the foot of this rock; we climbed slowly up and ran quickly down as he had been wont to do in his youth. As we stood upon the top, he remarked, "I have found every time when he reviewed this landscape, that his eyes had in the interval become better educated to appreciate its beauty as a picture. The remark revealed the poet's sensibility and the self-analysis of the philosopher, as well as the loyalty of the man to the scenes of his boyhood sports and

The community in which Dr. Bushnell was trained was made up of sturdy men, who were about equally interested in education, religion, politics, and thrift. Their peculiar way of life has been well delineated by himself in his "Age of Homespun," a charming picture and vindication of the old New England life. The bracing climate and rocky but vigorous soil made these men and women somewhat severe in aspect and self-reliant in character; but intelligence and hospitality brightened their daily life, while an earnest Christian piety refined their feelings and purified their lives. Farming was their chief occupation, though an active business in excavating and sawing lumber brought many of the people into contact with other towns. In this community Dr. Bushnell spent his youth. He was a strong, resolute, practical and kindly boy, a leader and a favorite, yet remarkably free from little vices, and irreproachable in his morals. From his earliest years he was self-reliant and self-asserting. At the age of fifteen he attended the academy—then recently opened—into which the master had introduced the monitorial system. This was maintained for a while, but when it became Bushnell's turn to serve as monitor he refused, saying, that he came to school to study for himself and not to teach others. The system was soon abandoned. Soon after this he became somewhat skeptical in his religious views and joined an infidel club in a neighboring town—at the head of

which was a hard-headed Deist of the type of Paine—where upon his father interposed his authority and refused to assist him in a college education, and he remained for some time in his father's domestic cloth works. Subsequently, in 1821, he became decided in his Christian faith and profession and was fitted for college, and entered, in 1823, at the age of twenty-one. In college he was mature in every way. Even his peculiar style of writing had assumed some of the features which it never lost. He was equally energetic on the play-ground and in the class-room. The ambition of his later years impelled him to excel in every form of activity whether intellectual or physical. He was behind no one in athletic feats. But his position as a Christian was nearly nominal. While he attended the communion services, the growing spirit of doubt which he had so early cherished took strong possession of his mind as he advanced in college life. But scarcely a word of this escaped him. He undermined the faith of no man. He was disposed to check rather than further vicious tendencies in any of his young classmates. His conscientiousness was scrupulous, his integrity of the sternest kind, his honor was the truest and noblest. Even when he was the leader of a foolish college rebellion—for which he and his associates were sent home—he took pains to acknowledge his folly and rashness to one of the youngest of the class, who did not join the movement, and bade him “not mind what the fellows said to him but to hold up his head, for he was in the right and they were all in the wrong.” He graduated in 1827 at the age of twenty-five. His oration at commencement attracted general attention for the boldness of thought and the freshness of its style and led to an engagement after a few months as an assistant editor upon the *Journal of Commerce*, then recently established. In this occupation he was eminently successful, but he left it after a year's trial and came to New Haven to study law, with the design of entering upon this profession as an introduction to public and political life in what was then called the west. Being invited to become a tutor in this college, he was persuaded to accept the offer against his own wishes and decision, by the counsel of his mother. As a tutor he was the same strong-hearted, self-asserting man that he had always been, and devoted himself to his

work and to his pupils with a manly and quickening sympathy.

It was while he was tutor that there occurred the most important crisis of his life. Early in the year 1831, this college was moved by an extraordinary religious revival. It affected officers and students alike, leaving none unmoved. It was emphatically sober, serious, and earnest, leading every man to acquire concerning the reasons of his faith or his want of faith, and constraining almost every man to make his faith a supreme and living power over his character and life. Of the six tutors men in the Faculty, three had been pronounced in their adhesion to Christ and three were not. Among the latter was Horace Bushnell, known to himself and to his pupils as unsettled in respect to every point of religious belief, if not a positive rejector of the Christian revelation. As the movement proceeded, two of his fellow tutors yielded to its power and threw themselves into active sympathy and labor for the welfare of their pupils. Bushnell stood alone, apparently unaffected, and his division with him, indifferent if not contemptuous with respect to all that was going on. His associates did not dare to approach him. The silence was broken by himself, as he said to his most intimate friend, "I must get out of this woe. Here am I what I am, and these young men are hanging to me in their indifference amid this universal earnestness." He announced what he would do, that he would invite them to meet him and would define his position to them and declare to them the decision which they ought to take with himself. The result was as might have been expected. The division was dissolved in tears and fixed in earnest resolve. Many of these young men remember that interview as the turning point of their lives. For many, if not all of them, it was a far easier thing to believe and obey the gospel than it was for him, entangled as he was with the self-reliant and dishonest doubts of years.

Indeed, the only decision which he could announce at that time was that he would seek after God, if so be he might find Him. Even then he scarcely knew whether there was a God, or whether he was responsible to God, or whether God had made himself known to man. Concerning Christ and salvation

by him he had no settled opinions. But one thing he knew and felt to the very depths of his soul—that the position of contemptuous indifference and satisfied uncertainty in which he had lived for years, was wholly without excuse; that his confident unbelief was false and hollow, because it was in no sense a rational and final conviction; and therefore he resolved that an end should come to this position at once and forever. He used all the energy of his resolute will in the purpose, that if there were a God he would find Him, and if God had spoken to man he would know it. He consecrated this purpose by prayer to the living God for guidance and light. He followed this consecration of himself to the as yet unknown God, by avowing his position to his pupils and his associates. He at once frequented their meetings for prayer. For weeks he was a searcher for truth, now seeming to get a firm foothold and anon losing every standing place. By and by a great light concerning God and Christ shone into his mind, and his strong and hitherto self-sufficing heart was filled with wonder and joy, at the glory of God, as revealed in the face of Jesus Christ. As he read, and studied, and thought with unabated hunger and thirst after truth, he found rest and peace—yet at first not uniformly. As some new aspect of Christian truth, or some unthought of difficulty presented itself, his mind was shaken. Again and again was he called to struggle and grope and feel after God. On one occasion he came into the room of a friend, threw himself into a chair, and thrusting both his hands into his black hair, broke out half desparingly and yet laughingly, “Oh! what shall I do with these arrant doubts I have been nursing for years. When the preacher touches the Trinity and when logic shatters it in pieces, I am all at the four winds. But I am glad I have a heart as well as a head. My heart wants the Father my heart wants the Son: my heart wants the Holy Ghost; my heart says the Bible has a Trinity for me and I mean to hold by my heart. I am glad a man can do it, when there is no other mooring, and so I answer my own question, ‘what shall I do?’ but that is all I can do yet.” This memorable utterance which came glowing from his own struggling soul, is the keynote of his subsequent history. It interprets his theory of Christian Theology. It explains scores of his sermons. It is

us into his inmost thoughts. It shows the reader of his most characteristic writings, at what cost of painful misgivings he learned to believe and teach.

He fought his doubts and gathered strength.
He would not make his judgment blind,
He faced the spectres of the mind
And laid them; thus he came at length
To find a stronger faith his own;
And power was with him in the night,
Which makes the darkness and the light
And dwells not in the light alone,
But in the darkness and the cloud.

When at last he believed, and as long as he believed, he believed with all his heart. When he came into the daily meetings of his associates, "was there ever such a child"—writes one of their number, "as this strong, self-reliant, repelling man of twenty-nine years?" On the first occasion of his presence "the conversation turned upon the desirable posture in prayer, and it set our hearts flowing to hear that voice, hitherto so full of command in opinion and action, quivering with the words: 'Well, there is one posture settled for me at any rate, flat on the floor, alone with Jesus.'"

As might be expected Dr. Bushnell threw all his manhood into his new life. He labored at once to bring his pupils into the same purposes with himself. I remember well how patiently he reasoned and how affectionately he pleaded with one of the most gifted young men I ever knew, who had been as bold in his doubts and more bold in his denials than himself and withal grossly wicked in his life.

As his faith began so it proceeded to the end of his days. It was founded upon conviction. He accepted the gospel because he believed it to be true. He accepted it as true because he had known his own wants, and its power to relieve them. He did not love Christianity, nor Christ himself better than the truth; but he loved Christ because he was to him the truth. He looked upon his face with a searching and steady eye and when Christ met his gaze with an answering look he answered, "My Lord and my God." Nor did he fear to look a second time nor a third at the grounds of his faith. Every new assailant of Christ's claims found in him an open and candid

hearer. The infidelity which first took possession of his mind was the old infidelity of the last century, which rejected the supernatural Christ, because of its own superficial views of man's capacities and man's needs, and its low conceptions of Christ's idea of perfection and its flat and prosaic explanations of the Christian history. He tried this by the test of his honest conscience and his conscious needs. His own sense of manhood, of duty and of God could not be satisfied with the needs of man which this infidelity assumed and the version of Christ which it supplied, and he therefore abandoned it in the name of God and of the truth.

It was some years after this that the new infidelity of Strauss and Theodore Parker presented its theories and urged its arguments. He studied these most carefully and did not hesitate thoroughly to re-consider the grounds of the faith which he had preached. I well recollect lending him a pamphlet of twenty pages, which he returned to me, saying it kept him awake and almost in agony for one long night. In the same spirit he became conversant with the various types of unbelief which have followed each other in rapid succession for the last thirty-five years. He did not profess nor care to be a learned scholar in order to test the credibility of the gospel narratives. He did not wait to be a subtle or erudite metaphysician in order to answer the modern versions of atheism, pantheism, and "the unknowable God," which have of late held the public ear. He did not stay till he was an accomplished geologist or zoologist before he decided upon the question whether it was an hypostatized abstraction called evolution or the living God which "in the beginning created the heavens and the earth." He did not pause to study Chinese or Sanscrit before he should decide the question whether the Christian Bible is so much superior to the teachings of Confucius or Sankhya-Muni, as to warrant the reception of its claims. That he did not despise science or learning as such is evident, in that he was eager to learn the best results of both. That he did not wait till he should master either before he decided what he should believe, was because he had such clear and earnest convictions concerning the place of both God and man in the universe, concerning man's relations to God, and his high destiny, concerning man's guilt, and concerning man's

helplessness and God's pity, that when he read the story of God in Christ reconciling the world to himself he did not care to inquire further of Strauss or Parker, of Rénan or Darwin, of Spencer or Huxley, of Tyndall or Stuart Mill, in order to decide whether this Christ was from God. And yet he was always ready to hear what these men had to say. He found them aids rather than hindrances to his faith, because they so manifestly left out of their reasonings the weightiest elements, and even then differed from one another so widely and labored so heavily with the theories and explanations which they urged, that whatever else might be true, he knew their conclusions were false. It was neither from ignorance nor weakness that, while he was eager to read the speculations of the very newest and latest writers who exalt atheism into the holiest religion and hallow the denial of immortality with the semblances of that worship and prayer which they prove to be unscientific, he rejected them with a half pitying, half indignant scorn.

He was a bold thinker because he sought for the truth. Near the end of his life, he said playfully, to one of his friends, as the two were fishing in the wilderness, "It is my joy to think that I have sought most earnestly and supremely to find and to live by the truth." He was broad-minded and many-sided, because he would look at the truth from every point of view. He was careless of traditions because he sought solid standing place for his own feet. He was independent of others, because he must satisfy the consuming hunger of his own soul. When he found the truth he applied it fearlessly to himself and to other men, to principles, institutions, and dogmas. He abhorred shams and conventional phrases in argument, because he believed so strongly in realities. What offended others as irreverent, often—not always—betokened his higher reverence for what he received as positive truth. He was also manly in the expression and defense of his faith. However he might appear to others, in the sanctuary of his inner self, there ever dwelt a prayerful, magnanimous, loving spirit toward God and man.

The same type of faith was manifest in his interpretations and expositions of Christian truth. To many he seemed fanciful, rash, and mistaken in his theories of some of the most important doc-

trines of Christian Theology. I do not care to ask whether he were or not. I am not here as a defender or critic of his opinions, nor do I care to discuss his theory of theology as a science. Upon many of these points I have expressed and defended my dissent from his teachings. But for this reason I am the more desirous to declare that I believe him to have been impelled in all his speculations by the supreme purpose so to set forth the truth in Christ as to make it a commanding and renewing power over the lives and characters of men. It was unfortunate for his influence and his reputation, that he was not a better instructed and a more trustworthy interpreter of the New Testament Scriptures. It was equally unfortunate that he had so little respect for the formulas of theological doctrine and the history of their development, and in general for a logical theology when it interfered with or contradicted his own opinions. Many of his interpretations must seem fanciful and violent to any well instructed scholar, even though he may admit the reach and elevation of his conception of the truths, and motives which give the New Testament its power. His contemptuous defiance of logic when it made against himself, did not deter him from using it with masterly effect, as against his critics and antagonists. For theology as a pure science he cared but little—neither for the history of its doctrines nor the constructions of its formulas. He was in no sense of the word a trustworthy exegete, although some of his interpretations are like flashes of genius. But he did desire that God the Father, the Son, and the Spirit should rule in the hearts of all men, and that the incarnate Christ should dispel their fears and purify their souls by faith in His life and death. He did desire that the teachings of the Scriptures should enter as living forces into the being of the living men about him, and thoroughly transform the thinking and the feeling of the present generation. It was for these reasons that, as he interpreted the voice of Christ to the church of the present day concerning the formulated theology of the past, it sounded thus: "Let the dead bury their dead, but come thou and follow Me." That such were his supreme motives with some admixture of human infirmities, I desire to aver, standing by the grave that has received him so lately from our sight and following his manly and heroic soul

to the Christ in whom he believed and for whose honor he 'kept the faith.' .

Such was the Christian faith of Dr. Bushnell. What did it do for him? By nature he was a gifted man. His self-reliance and self-assertion were founded upon the consciousness of insight and power. His intellect was quick, sagacious, and penetrating. He had a poet's eye for nature and a poet's heart for man. He loved the earth and the sky, the mountains and the sea, the laughing spring, the solemn winter, the song of birds, and the roaring of the tempest. He sympathized with a genuine man whenever he found him, the simple, honest, loving, kind-hearted, noble-souled man in the plainest of speech and the humblest of garbs. He delighted to contrive and invent; he had a heart for adventure and the stomach for a fight. Above all he had that subtle gift of affluent and creative imagination which men call genius, by which he could find analogies and illustrations faster than he could use them, and invest the most familiar truths with novel fascinations, and embellish the tritest of common places by a startling picture, or embody a whole argument in a single word or phrase. He was a born leader of men; always aggressive; not infrequently rude and rough in speech; but as truly kindly in thought and feeling, and noble in aim and purpose. He was broad-minded and public spirited. He was fruitful in generous and far-reaching plans for the hamlet in which he sojourned for a summer, or the distant state whose growth he delighted to watch, or the city to which he gave his heart, or the nation whose honor always moved his soul, or the two Asiatic Empires that have so strangely and so recently brought their sons to our colleges and our homes.

He was indeed a gifted man and a man of mark and power. In view of these manifold gifts we repeat the question—what did his Christian faith do for him? We answer with confidence, it made him ten, nay, a hundred-fold more of a man than he otherwise would have been. It transfigured and harmonized his excellences, and it softened and dwarfed his defects. Had he gone forth into life without the faith which inspired his genius, he would doubtless have made his mark in the world. He would in some sort have achieved success. His

genius and generosity and his resources might have won for him fame and a fortune. At the bar, through the press, or in political life, he would have compelled his fellow-men to heed him. Possibly his special defects might never have been so repressed as not to have hindered his highest success. It is hazardous to conjecture what he might have been. It is as to contemplate what he actually became.

We notice first that his Christian faith did not interfere with his individuality. Not a few persons seem to think that they consecrate themselves to Christ they must nail their individuality to the cross. For this reason some refuse to believe altogether; others hold back their whole-hearted zeal for Christ's service. Their mistake proceeds from an inexcusable ignorance of Christ's teachings or from a miserable perversion of His words by priests and bigots. It is the old man—that corrupt according to the deceitful lusts—which is to be crucified. It is the new man into which the believer is to be transformed and this new man is simply the individual self that has room to grow and expand after the image of Him who created him. It was certainly true of Dr. Bushnell that the more of a Christian he became the more individual he was. Everything that was characteristic of him flourished in the sunshine of his faith. If Christ was his, everything was his, and most of all his living self. His faith increased his energy. It stimulated his imagination. It gave it form and power. Before his new life of faith began, the poet in him was scarcely known to himself. But after his eye was opened to those inspiring realities, which engirdle and penetrate this world of sense, he found himself possessed of a poet's imagery and a poet's fervor. His literary resources were enlarged a hundred-fold by the elevating power of his faith. His faith also increased his joy in nature. It softened his heart toward man and kindled and sustained his public spirit. It justified his ardent hopefulness in human progress by his faith in the resources that are provided for man by Christ, and in the possibilities, nay the certainties of his kingdom. It stimulated his inventive activity as it warranted the hopefulness in which his sanguine nature rejoiced. It increased his sympathy with men, making him more brilliant in conversation and more genial in society. No more decisive proof

this can be named than the quiet but kindly humor which was constantly bubbling forth in the extreme weakness of the later years of his life, and brought many a ripple of sunshine in scenes where jests and humor never dare to appear, except Christ is very near and very precious. It gave to his protracted and heroic struggle for life the charm of a slow but cheerful sunset, such as gives the certain tokens of a brighter morning. So much did the Christian faith do for him as a man.

We ask next, what did it enable him to achieve for others? What of power and influence did it give him among his fellow men? and we reply—

First of all, it gave him zeal and ardor in his profession as a preacher. His faith in Christ was so earnest and so exalted that he threw all his energies into the work of commending Christ to his fellow men. His sermons and his pastoral activities represented the best work that he could do. While he sought to be understood and felt by his people, he also sought to educate them up to his own conceptions and aims. Hence his instructions exerted a positively stimulating influence upon earnest and receptive hearers, and were to such a molding and educating power. He sought to be thoroughly alive to the actual thinking and living of those about him, that he might interpret Christ in such a way as to meet their wants and to move their hearts. He entered with all his heart into the social and family life of his people, and into the ordinances and appliances of the Christian church, that he might unite both in a noble and quickened Christian life. He did not make orations instead of sermons; he was far too much in earnest for that, but by reason of his earnest faith, his sermons became noble orations through the force of the irrepressible convictions which they expressed. One of his best and most useful works to his generation was his *Essay upon Christian Nurture*, which came of his desire as a pastor, that the family life of his people should be so supremely Christian, that every child should need no conscious conversion. This simple practical treatise embodies a profound and sagacious philosophy and exemplifies most happily how the Christian ministry may task and reward the noblest gifts when these are used for practical results. Many of his published discourses have strengthened the faith and elevated the life of not

a few gifted men and women wherever in the world the English language is spoken. Their power to do this is not in their rhetoric nor their imagery. It is not explained by their soaring and somewhat ambitious diction, nor their startling word-pictures, but by the earnest spiritual convictions and the exalted conceptions of Christ and the Christian life which are embodied in winged and fervent speech. In spite of not a little strained diction and incoherent imagery and occasional forced conceits, the deep spiritual earnestness of the man and his fervent reverence for Christ and his lofty and heartfelt impressions of spiritual truth give to these sermons permanent interest and power. It is no slight achievement for a man to have ushered into the world quickening forces like these—beginning to act while he lives, and going on after he is dead.

Next it gave him power to understand and meet the wants of thinking men in his generation.

One of the best services which he rendered to them was his defence of supernatural Christianity, and the supernatural Christ, against the unbelief of the times. His own struggles after faith had prepared him to appreciate many of the difficulties of modern unbelief. His wide-reaching sympathies and catholic temper preserved him from any narrowness of treatment, or ignorance of the occasions of doubt, or want of sympathy with the temper of the times. He was a lover of nature, and sympathised most ardently with the promises and the achievements of modern science. Though least of all a proficient, and scarcely a neophyte in any single department of physics, he was fully alive to, and in hearty accordance with all its most sanguine predictions. Years before the atheistic pretensions and the materialistic denials of the present hour had been heard of, he predicted the oncoming conflict between science and faith. He felt the storm in the atmosphere which was to gather every minor current into one central vortex of strife, between nature and the supernatural, between matter and spirit, between law and miracle, between force and God, between culture and Christ. Long before the extreme necessity seemed to have come, he prepared and delivered a series of lectures which he afterwards published, but which when first delivered were so premature as scarcely to be understood. That he anticipated

oming need does credit to his sagacity ; that he met it so assfully is a tribute to his power. Whatever weaknesses are in his "Nature and the Supernatural," it contains one of the noblest essays in the language in its chapter on the character of Jesus. The power of this work is not chiefly in its action, nor in its imagery, nor in its analysis, nor in its reasoning, nor in the union of all these, but rather in the fervent conviction of the writer in the principles which the Christian revelation teaches, and in the truths and the facts which the Christian faith declares. No merely sensational preacher or hair-splitting theologian, or learned commentator, no profound philosopher or astute logician ; no one but a whole-souled hero of the Christian faith could have written that work. It shows on every page the evidences of his own personal conflicts with the sordid and pretentious unbelief of the times, as truly and as directly as the battered spear and the dented shield which the warrior hangs in hall or temple is a speaking memorial of desperate struggles for his own life. That it is a book of great intellectual power and sagacity no one who reads it would be disposed to deny, that it has made a strong impression for good on the man who is acquainted with its history will question. Not a man of mark in the kingdom and service of Christ in all the English-speaking world have expressed their thankfulness for the help which it gave them in a critical hour. The genius and power and usefulness of this book are largely to be ascribed to the energy and glow of the faith of its author. While the energetic faith of Dr. Bushnell not only strengthened the faith of many, it also elevated and liberalized their conceptions of the Christian life. The faith of not a few preachers and writers seems narrow in proportion as it is strong. The example of many earnest Christian men has almost hardened into the maxim, "To be spiritually minded is to be ascetic and consoracious or ascetic," or what is far worse, "a glow-worm for Christ may be set over against injustice and dissimulation towards man." Dr. Bushnell's life and teachings were wholly in the opposite direction. His own manhood was in its main noble and magnanimous. Whatever defects were inherent to his strong self-assertion he gradually if slowly outgrew. Otherwise he was exceptionally generous, courteous,

affectionate, and frank, and alive to every noble impulse and aspiration. His conceptions of Christian manhood were exalted and refined, and all his teachings are a perpetual inspiration toward whatever things are honest, or true, or just, or pure, or lovely, or of good report. Some of his sermons are unsurpassed expositions of the ethics which are characteristically Christian. The sagacity and effectiveness of these teachings and incitements were all explained by the entireness and positiveness of his faith in Christ as the example and inspiration of Christian manhood for the loftiest and lowliest relations of life.

The faith of Dr. Bushnell enabled him to render an important service to the cause of tolerance and catholicity. He came upon the stage of thought and action just after the crisis of a stirring theological controversy. Its surges had scarcely begun to subside when he became the occasion and the hero of another. It was by no abrupt or violent transition, however, that the community and Dr. Bushnell proceeded from the one controversy to the other. The discussions of the first circled around man's responsibility and God's sincerity, the nature and extent of sin, the nature and reality of God's moral administration, and the moral and spiritual significance of the provisions of the gospel for man's redemption. The authors most earnestly studied were Edwards and Butler, Locke, Reid, and Stewart, and the commentators of the new exegetical or historical school. After this controversy was well advanced, and the new generation had become familiar with its discussions, the writings of Coleridge began to be read in this country, and the philosophy of Germany gradually lifted its mysterious form from across the sea, half repulsive and half attractive, but ever challenging curiosity and compelling investigation. Carlyle, too, began to be read in here and there a paper strange in dialect and more strange in import. Kant was also studied with indifferent success indeed, but with indomitable perseverance. Schleiermacher and Neander re-opened the way to theological conviction through the heart and the imagination. These influences were just beginning to be felt when Dr. Bushnell brought his hitherto secularized intellect to grapple with the great truths of Christian theology, which have always fascinated and stimulated the greatest of men, who have learned the

et of the child-like spirit. These new influences excited intellect, and stimulated his imagination. Though indolent in his thinking and never given to confess any special dependence upon any teacher or writer living or dead, he found both atmosphere and aliment in this new philosophical literary life, which vibrated with convulsive if not revolutionary energy through every school of theology in this country from Cambridge to Princeton. Nor should it be forgotten that those were times of great religious activity and aggressive-ness in the way of revivals and measures to promote them, that every form of moral and social reform was publicly promoted and earnestly embraced or as earnestly rejected by multitudes of aggressive souls; that whole communities were agitated and churches were divided, that pastors were unseated, that the political fabric was almost lifted from its foundations by these excited discussions, which invoked earnest and extended argument, and called in question every custom and tradition of the past.

In all the discussions of those wakeful times Dr. Bushnell took an active part, and bore himself gallantly in them all. He early took the position that the great objects of faith must necessarily be apprehended through the forms of the imagination, and must consequently be incapable of sharp and fixed definitions and an exact terminology. He thought to introduce a new method in theology, and he conformed his own practice to his theory. His views were not new. I do not even, as he held and applied them, that they are true, though the half-truth which they express is most important. They had been propounded before his time and formulated with great ability and eloquence, but they were dear to him as brought out by himself, and he applied them to the doctrines of God and of Christ in a series of elaborate treatises, in which the most sacred formulas were brought into question on grounds of reason and revelation. Had he been held to a strict and logical construction of his language he had not escaped condemnation. It was well for him and better for the church that he was judged by men who were capable of trying him by the real significance of his thinking and believing, rather than by his verbal interpretations and his formulated

theories. But in all this ordeal it was the earnestness of Christian faith of the man that saved him from being condemned as a theologian. How nobly he has justified generous construction of the real import of his creed, formally revising and amending some of his earlier teaching I need not say. But the charity by which he was judged not bless him alone that received it. It also blessed those who gave it and acquiesced in it when given. If theology in Protestant denominations is now more tolerant of difference and more charitable in its constructions of import and variety of phraseology, if it is more kindly in its spirit, it is some measure owing to the earnest Christian faith which Bushnell exemplified, while with heroic boldness he contended for his rights to be accredited as a teacher of "the faith delivered to the saints." No man needs now to be told the methods of theological judgment which prevailed in Protestant Christendom fifty years ago can never again return, except the spirit of Christ shall be driven out from His temple by dogmatism of the schools.

The Christian faith of our friend was eminently conspicuous in his conflicts with infirmity and his anticipations of death. In the year 1854 he was overtaken by an acute disease which seriously interrupted his regular labors in his parish. From that time he lived the life of an invalid. For twenty-one years he labored with varying degrees of hope and success. For a little more than twenty-one years he battled with threatening death. How heroically he contended for his life many of his friends know full well. How resolutely he combated infirmity, with what energy he summoned his mind to new activities and occupied himself with new interests, it has been inspiring to see and learn. He visits California, and, instead of thinking of his health alone, he throws his whole soul into prophetic anticipations of the new empire that is to rise upon the Pacific coast, and gives counsel and spirit to the founders of the college which was the nucleus of its promising university. He devotes himself with sagacity and perseverance to the realization of his darling scheme for the adornment and betterment of his adopted city. He preaches here and there with unabated energy and zeal, either occasionally or in longer or shorter

gements. One of the latest, if not the very last, of these was performed in this chapel,—some of us remember what interest to us and with what painfulness to himself; especially how a tender pathos unusual to him, entered his last appeal to the young men who heard him. He sent volume after volume forth from the press. He maintains unabated interest in old friends and lavishes a youthfulness of affection upon those newly acquired. But it is all while apparent that he does not struggle against death, because he is afraid of death; but rather that he has conquered death, because the life he is now living he lives by faith in the life of God. He becomes more genial in his ways, more kindly in his judgments, more sweet in his affections, more overflowing in his humor, more demonstrative in his tenderness. He is contented to live. He is not afraid to die. God is with him day and by night. Christ has become more and more completely the indweller within his soul, and more and more the center of his wonder and joy.

One of the last days of the last year, I spent two or three hours with him in what I believed would be a farewell visit, as it was. He was cheerful in spirits and even buoyant with humor.

He talked of the present and the past with more than his usual spirit and freedom, but with an indescribable simplicity and directness. At parting he asked me to come again for another hour as pleasant as these we had spent together. I bade him good-by, never to meet with him again in what we call the present life. I know not how or where we may meet again, with what surroundings: whether in scenes to which his scenery has no analogies, or in some place like that in which his boyhood was spent—"a land of brooks of water, of fountains and depths that spring out of valleys and hills." But I am certain, that wherever and whatever that land may be, the glory of God will lighten it and the Lamb will be the light thereof;" and of this also, that the man whose character was formed most completely by faith in the love of God in this life will be transformed into a manhood which shall be proportionately glorious in the life which is to be.

ARTICLE IX.—THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF WEALTH.

PRACTICAL wisdom was never more in demand than at present. Questions concerning currency, free-trade, taxation, etc., are demanding and receiving the attention of Political Economists, and it is in this part of their science that the attractive fields lie both for the writer and the reader. The period of radical and irreconcilable diversity in the fundamental principles of the science seems to be past; the so-called "Mercantile Theory" exists no longer among scientists; the school of the "Physiocrats" has passed away, and a period of relative unanimity, in thought if not in language, appears to have arrived. If it be true, however, that this unanimity is, at best, only relative, and that even a small amount of obscurity and inconsistency hangs over those fundamental conceptions the clear apprehension of which is essential to all reasoning on the subject, then the removal of never so small a proportion of that obscurity may shed more light on practical questions than a large amount of discussion of specific applications. In the present state of the public mind financial heresies receive a ready circulation, and, if these false doctrines connect themselves, in any way, with fundamental errors of Political Economy, it is time that those errors were exposed and their teachers discredited. Those practical questions on the solution of which the prosperity of the nation so largely depends cannot be satisfactorily solved without the clear apprehension of correct principles.

Nothing can be more fundamental, in the science of Political Economy, than the conception of Wealth. John Stuart Mill, the legitimate successor of Adam Smith, has given the whole weight of his wide-reaching authority to some of the most mischievous errors of his great predecessor. While his definition of wealth presents nothing peculiar, his application of the definition is positively erroneous and inconsistent with the logical consequences of the definition itself. He has classed as wealth some things which do not possess the very attribute of "exchangeable value" which he states as essential, and he has

excluded from the classification things which do not possess his and other essential attributes, as he states or implies them. His conception of wealth has obliged him to revive the pernicious classification of labor, as productive and unproductive, and expressly to exclude from the list of productive laborers such persons as "the actor, the musical performer, the public declaimer or reciter, and the showman;" also "the army and navy, the legislator, the judge, and the officer of justice." On the other hand, a school of writers under the leadership of M. Bastiat, while recognizing the evil resulting from Mr. Mill's classification, have found no other remedy for the evil than that of abandoning the conception "wealth" as the subject of the science and substituting the plausible but ambiguous and elusive conception "services." Few recent writers have cleared clear of both these errors; a majority bear the marks either of Scylla or of Charybdis, and an open and obvious channel between them would be a boon to all who traverse these regions. It is not promised for this essay that it will furnish such a channel, or that it will remove for its readers all obscurities and the difficulties that hang about the conception wealth, though it has measurably accomplished this for its author. It is offered as furnishing a conception of wealth which renders the classification of all labor as productive, both possible and obvious, and, if it prove to be correct, it renders it easy to place every variety of laborer in exactly that class of wealth-producers where, from the nature of his function, he belongs.

Political Economy has for its subject the nature and the laws of wealth. Whether avowed or not, this is the real subject of every treatise on this science, and its recognition and exact definition are essential to clearness and accuracy in the detailed discussion. The distinctive attributes of wealth are indicated by the derivation and historical use of the term. The Saxon "weal" indicated a condition of relative well-being, the state of having one's wants relatively well supplied. No possession common to all men can constitute this relative well-being; the things which produce this condition are necessarily possessed by some but not by others. The free enjoyment of air and sunlight constitutes absolute but not relative well-being, and

only that which, besides satisfying wants, is capable of appropriation can produce this relative condition. The term *wealth* as now scientifically used, indicates those things the possession of which constitutes the state of relative well-being, and its distinctive attributes are want-satisfying capacity, or utility and appropriability.

These distinctive attributes of wealth have long been recognized as such, but the logical consequences of this definition have not, it is believed, been fully realized. Mr. Mill and his school, as has been said, excluded from their classification things which possess these attributes and include some which do not. They recognize as wealth only those things which are sufficiently substantial and durable to constitute a more or less permanent possession, things which would appear on the inventory if society were suddenly to cease producing and consuming and devote itself, for, say a month or two, to taking an account of stock. It will be maintained in this essay that durability is not an essential attribute of wealth. Durability is a factor of *value* and determines, in so far, the measure of wealth in any particular product. But products are of all degrees of durability and there is no ground for excluding any product from the conception of wealth on the ground of this simple difference of degree. Even the school of writers referred to would not hesitate to class the ices of the confectioner in the same category with the stone wall of the mason, though they are at opposite extremes in the scale of durability. They would, however, exclude music from the conception, on the ground of its immediate perishability and its apparently insubstantial character. It is maintained in this discussion that, in the things which constitute wealth, there is no difference other than one of degree between music and a stone-wall; that both possess the essential attributes of wealth, want-satisfying capacity and appropriability, and that the difference in their durability is only a factor of their relative value. On the other hand, this school class the acquired abilities of the laborer as wealth though they differ from it in kind and do not possess its essential attributes. They are not a possession; that implies externality to the possessor. They are what he is, not what he has. Popular thought and speech broadly distinguish the able man

from the wealthy man. A man has a potential fortune, not an actual one, in his abilities. The term itself indicates a state of being able and implies a possibility, not an attained result. Labor creates wealth, and acquired abilities are potential labor. They are to be regarded as the potentiality of the human factor of production, and it introduces an element of confusion into the science to class them with the completed product. Appropriability, in the broad sense in which the term is used in our definition, implies that a thing should be free to be owned by any one of various individuals under the necessary conditions. The term implies that one man may become the owner of something previously without ownership or in the ownership of another, and it incidentally involves transferability. Nothing can be regarded as possessing this essential attribute which is an inseparable part of one man's being. This error is widespread and appears in the works of some of Mr. Mill's opponents. As acute a writer as J. B. Say* characterizes acquired talents as "a species of wealth, notwithstanding its immateriality, so little imaginary that, in the shape of professional services it is daily exchanged for gold and silver." The illustration is its own best answer. Talents are not exchanged and cannot be so, and they lack the attribute of "exchangeable value," which Mr. Mill himself states as essential. Their product only is transferable and that alone is a commodity. It will hereafter be shown that the human effort which creates a product calls into exercise activities physical, mental, and moral. If the talents which create wealth are to be confounded with the wealth which they create, every talent and activity acquired by effort, involving, in practice, the whole man, will have to be classed as a commodity. The error is confusing and disastrous in its practical effects. Man produces wealth and consumes it; but man himself is always distinct from it.

The condition of appropriation is a relation between commodities on the one hand and persons on the other, and implies, therefore, that both the commodity itself and the society where it exists should possess the attributes which render the relation of ownership possible. The commodity must not only exist in

* Say's "Treatise on Political Economy." Introduction, page XLII.

limited quantity but it must be of a nature capable of appropriation. The former or quantitative attribute is the only usually mentioned as necessary in works on this subject. Atmospheric air is inappropriable from its unlimited quantity. Summer showers are in limited quantity but are inappropriable from their nature. On the part of the society where the commodity exists something is also requisite in order that the relation of ownership may subsist. The attributes of society which render ownership possible are, it is believed, usually ignored altogether in treatises on this subject. The existence of these attributes is secured only by the labor of a distinct class of persons, and the true function of these persons can be apprehended without noticing the attributes which they impart to society and to the wealth which exists in society.

In order that the essential attribute of wealth, appropriability, may be realized, the rights of property must be recognized and enforced either by personal prowess or by the agency of functionaries. In the earlier stages of society the enforcement of the rights of property is largely performed by the producer in person, greatly to the detriment of production. After the division of labor has been developed this enforcement of rights is committed to particular persons, officers of justice, who perform this office for society as a whole. Moreover, the recognition and definition of rights is as important as their enforcement and the legislator as well as the sheriff is, therefore, instrumental in producing that social condition which is necessary in order that the attribute of wealth, appropriability, may be realized. Legislators and officers of justice are, therefore, wealth producers. They impart to the commodities of the society which exist in them the essential wealth-constituting attribute of appropriability. Commodities may exist in society and may possess a degree of utility; they may even be appropriable, as far as they are themselves concerned; but if social causes in the society where they exist prevent their attaining the state of appropriation, they lack, in fact, the attribute of appropriability, and are not actual wealth. The production of social modifications which result in giving to commodities the attribute of appropriability is the function of legislative and judicial labor as it concerns property. It is as truly a wealth-creating function as the direct production of useful commodities.

Concerning this important class of laborers much misconception has existed. Mr. Mill, repeating the error of Adam Smith, classes them as "unproductive." M. Bastiat and M. Garnier term their efforts "services," but offer no satisfactory substantive conception of anything as a product of their labor. M. J. B. Say, one degree nearer to the truth, classes them as producers, on the ground that they enable the industrial classes to give their undivided efforts to their own occupation, and thus contribute indirectly to their products. This indirect mode of proving any class of laborers to be productive, though plausible and frequently employed, is extremely objectionable. Every class of producers contributes in this manner to the products of every other. The shoemaker contributes indirectly to the productions of the farmer by saving him the necessity of turning aside from his labor to mend shoes: yet he considers that the shoes and not a share in the farmer's harvest are the direct product of his labor. In like manner the farmer contributes indirectly to the productions of the shoemaker by saving him the necessity of turning aside from his occupation to cultivate the ground; yet the farmer regards his grain and not a share in the shoes as the product of his labor. A direct product must be exchanged if any class of producers is to share in the wealth created by another, and every class must have a direct product if they are to be classed as productive laborers. The direct product which legal officers offer in return for their support is in the attribute of appropriability which they impart to commodities. They put, as it were, the finishing touch to the products of society, which finishing touch renders them marketable wealth; and this modification, which constitutes a difference between potential and actual wealth, is that which they exchange for their subsistence. If the term productive were to be taken in a narrow sense, as meaning not productive of wealth but productive of specific useful commodities, there would be ground for classing these laborers as unproductive, and this is the origin of the misapprehension concerning them that has existed from the time of Adam Smith to the present day. These classes are protective of useful commodities but are unproductive of wealth.

All labor creates wealth; yet in every form of wealth nature

furnishes the substance and man only the modes. It has been shown that one general class of laborers create the attribute of appropriability; the other general class create the attribute of utility. The latter is invariably accomplished by producing modifications in natural agents external to the laborer. Industrial labor is always the applying of a human effort to a natural agent. The modification produced enables the agent to satisfy a want which it was previously incapable of satisfying. The labor confers a want-satisfying power on the agent. This want-satisfying power is a "utility," and, if the attribute of appropriability be also conferred, wealth is created. A natural agent possessing utility and appropriability is wealth, and this only wealth. The natural agent need not be of a substantial or permanent character. Any substance, force or activity whatsoever of physical nature external to the laborer which receives want-satisfying power by means of his efforts, appropriability being presupposed, becomes wealth, and, though its duration be momentary and its character insubstantial or intangible, there is no ground for its exclusion from the category so long as it retains the above characteristics. Mr. Mill and his followers would call a violin manufacturer a productive laborer but the artist who plays the violin an unproductive one. The violin would be called wealth; the music, the sole end of its manufacture, not wealth. The product music satisfies a direct want, the violin only an indirect one; the latter is an instrument for producing that which satisfies direct desire. The direct want-satisfying product is, if anything, more obviously wealth than the indirect one. Relative durability and tangibility are non-essential attributes. The mechanic who makes the violin imparts utility to wood, the artist who plays it imparts utility to air vibrations. One product is perceived by the senses of sight and touch, the other by the sense of hearing. One is extremely durable, the other extremely perishable; but both alike come under our definition. In both a natural agent has received a utility through human effort; both products are wealth and both laborers productive. So the sculptor imparts utility to marble, the painter to colors, the photographer to chemical agencies and solar light. The designer and mechanical draughtsman impart a high utility to a small amount of

plumbago, and the writer to a small amount of ink. No utility of a higher order is conceivable than that which the writer imparts to ink and paper and the speaker to air vibrations, namely, the capacity of conveying intelligence. A bridge across a stream renders an interchange of products possible between dwellers on opposite banks. Previously each side produced for itself; after the building of the bridge they produce partly for each other, and to the great advantage of both. Two isolated societies become, by virtue of the interactivity caused by the bridge, one organism. The writings of an author are mind-bridges. They render an interchange of mental products possible, as the bridge over the stream does of material products. Mental interactivities take place by means of the mind-bridge, as physical ones do by the ordinary bridge. Minds are united in organic life by the one means of communication as bodily activities are by the other. If the writings of an author are a mind-bridge, the words of a speaker are a mind-ferry. As the ferry boat conveys the agricultural products of a farmer to the market, so the words of a public speaker, floating on air as a boat on water, convey his intellectual products to the place where they find their market. The mason imparts utility to the stone of the bridge and the boat-builder to the wood of the boat; the writer imparts a higher utility to ink and the speaker to sound. All are productive laborers: their products, in each case, are utilities imparted to natural agents and fall within our definition of wealth.

It is obvious that, in literary and oratorical products, the utility imparted by the human effort vastly transcends the natural agent which is its substantial basis. The articulate sounds of the speaker are the ferry boat; the ideas are the cargo, and the latter may exceed the former in value to an indefinite extent. In this case boat and cargo are a simultaneous product; the boat is fitted, in form, to every different lading, and the two, as an industrial product, are inseparable. This illustration affords the most searching test of our definition of wealth. The thought, as existing in the mind of the speaker previous to its utterance in words, does not fall within the conception. It lacks transferability, a subordinate attribute under appropriability, and it only acquires this attribute when it

attaches itself to the agent, the vocal sound. This apparently trifling agent transfers it from a simple activity to an industrial product. Again, with the consumers, the audience, the thought continues to exist or, at least, other thought induced by it does so; but, after parting with its material vehicle, the sounds that convey it, it loses again the attribute of transferability and, thus, of appropriability in the broad sense, and becomes again a simple activity, not an industrial product. To again become an industrial product it must be freighted again on vocal sounds. Then only can it be transferred from hand to hand, receive its price in the market, and, for the brief period of its duration, be entitled its place on the inventory of social wealth.

As the widest range of application is given to the term natural agent, so an equally broad application must be given to the term labor. The human activity which produces wealth is an activity of the entire man, physical, mental, and moral, and there is no industrial product so simple and so purely material that these three elements of the human agency are not represented in it. In proportion as the intellectual element in the labor predominates over the physical, and as the moral element predominates over both, the product rises in the scale of respectability and of value. The labor of a stone mason involves a physical effort in the simple moving of materials, an intellectual effort in their skillful combination, and a moral effort in the conscientious use of proper materials and methods. The result of the physical effort is seen in the position of the materials that have been moved in the construction, that of the intellectual effort in their strong and tasteful arrangement, and that of the moral effort in the certainty that, in ways not obvious to the eye, the interests of the owner have been consulted by the builder, at his own expense, and that the wall is, in all respects, as strong and as durable as it seems. In literary, professional, and educational labor, the intellectual element, of course, predominates to an indefinite extent over the physical, and the moral element is greatly increased. The latter appears, in the labor of the writer, in his general truthfulness; in that of the lawyer and the physician, in their disinterestedness; and, in all the more intellectual kinds of labor, in their general faithfulness and conscientiousness. Reliability is an attribute of the

product in each case, and the moral factor in the labor is that which produces this attribute in the product. The debated question whether moral qualities are paid for is thus simply and easily decided. The product is paid for; reliability is an attribute of the product which determines its value, and the laborer who can produce a product having the attribute of reliability can secure the enhanced price of the product in the market. All labor is indirectly paid for; its compensation is in the market value of its product, and, in so far as moral efforts are represented in an industrial product, they are paid for as truly as other activities of the laborer. No activities of man, physical, mental, or moral, are paid for when not embodied in an industrial product, and it is of importance to remember that labor, as such, is not paid for. No employer takes pleasure in the sweat of his laborer's brow; he regrets it, and would willingly pay the same compensation to the same person if that particular product could be produced, by that person only, without effort. The product is the desired object in each case and the labor, apart from its product, is not paid for and is never a commodity, and nothing but confusion results from so viewing and treating it. The statement so frequently met with in works on Political Economy that "labor is a commodity and is governed by the same laws as other commodities" is one of the mischievous errors that still cling to the science. On the other hand, light is shed on the question of the relative wages of different kinds of labor, on that of the relation between capital and labor, and on many other similar questions, by bearing in mind the above simple distinction.

In view of the constant presence of these three elements in labor, the physical, the mental, and the moral, any effort in the supposed interest of the working classes to depreciate mental labor in comparison with physical is unintelligent. All labor is mental. To a large and controlling extent the mental element is present in the simplest operations. With the laborer who shovels in the gravel pit the directing and controlling influence of the mind predominates, to an indefinite extent, over the simple foot-pounds of mechanical force which he exerts. The latter could be better furnished by an ox. It would take certainly three stout men to exert as many foot-pounds of force

as a single ox, and if such a laborer is able to secure larger wages than the third part of the cost of the labor of an ox, he may place the difference to the credit of intellectual labor. The numerical estimate has been made liberal, since something is to be allowed for the superior physical form of the man.

Whatever possesses want-satisfying capacity and appropriability constitutes wealth independently of the source from which it is derived. Its origin is unimportant in the classification and it may or may not be the result of human labor. In some instances it is not so. The original and indestructible properties of the soil are not the result of human effort, and recent German thought has demonstrated that they possess an original value, from limitation in quantity, independently of the increased value which results from their artificial improvement. The original forest trees, water powers, minerals, ~~some~~ wild game, and many other things owe the value which they possess to their want-satisfying capacity, and their appropriability, not to the mode of their origin. That origin is not labor. The *measure* of their value is determined, in an indirect and general manner, by labor. A man might be willing to give for one of these spontaneous products of nature the amount of labor which would produce or purchase another product of equal utility. Labor is the measurer, not the originator, of their value, and even as a measurer is indirect and tardy in its operation. The doctrine that labor is the sole originator of wealth is, perhaps, the central doctrine in the system of Adam Smith, and it was an efficient instrument in his hands for combating the Mercantilists and the Physiocrats. It was accepted as a grand truth, as opposed to these pernicious systems, and it has served the purpose of a truth in the history of the science. It is, in fact, a grand error and the time has abundantly arrived for its critical examination and essential modification.

Few statements are more common in text-books of Political Economy than the assertion that "nothing can constitute wealth which is not the product of labor." As the statement stands it can only mean that every commodity classed as wealth must have actually been produced by labor. In this form it requires but a single illustration to refute it. The original and indestructible properties of land are wealth and they are not the

ct of labor. It is less erroneous to say that, though odities may be produced by nature, their exchange value product of labor. A diamond accidentally discovered not owe its value to any labor actually expended in its ction, but it does owe the measure of its value to a calcu- in the mind of the purchaser as to how much labor be necessary in order to obtain another like it. The will demand and the buyer will give what would pur- a similar commodity. Actual labor is not the criterion posed labor or mental considerations relative to labor. ver a farther distinction must be made between the sim- ct of exchange value and its quantitative measure. The existence of exchange value is not due even to supposed its quantitative measure only is so determined. The y of human wants is sufficient, independently of labor, der a commodity exchangeable, and thus, to create an ge value. It is only when questions of quantity are lered and the measure of this value determined that con- tions of labor are introduced. The measure of the ex- e value of all commodities is determined indirectly, ximately, and tardily, by considerations relative to labor. ch only of this doctrine can be maintained. A few sim- ustrations will sufficiently establish this point. Suppose ice medical discovery were to create a demand for some previously valueless. The plant would have value imme- y and would at once be exchangeable for something; gnoring the additional value resulting from gathering it, ue in the field would not be traceable to any labor ded in its production. For a time it would be unknown uch labor would be necessary for its production, and g this time, neither the existence of its exchange value nor easure of that value could be referred to considerations , or. Only after a time would labor determine this meas- If labor were the talisman which turned everything to the slag of a blast-furnace should have value as well as ron. The difference between them is in their utility, not eir origin. A chance chemical discovery might confer y on the slags and they would then constitute wealth as as the iron; but they would have been a product of labor

before they became wealth as well as after. The existence of their newly acquired value could not be referred to labor, and for a time, even its measure could not be so determined. Aside from questions of measure, wealth and value are traceable, not to labor, but to the want-satisfying capacity and the appropriability of commodities.

While all wealth is not originated by labor, all labor originates wealth. Man toils not because labor necessarily precedes wealth but because wealth necessarily follows labor. The possession of want-satisfying products is what the laborer seeks, and desire is the moving force in the whole process. Labor is not to be conceived of as the *vis a tergo* that pushes wealth forward; but wealth is to be conceived of as the siren that lures labor onward. Wealth is always the cause of labor; labor is not always the cause of wealth. There are spontaneous natural products as there are industrial products; the earth may be self-subdued or it may be subdued by labor. Nature subjected and appropriated is wealth; man's subjection of nature is labor.

Labor imparts want-satisfying powers, or utilities, to natural agents. These utilities are of four kinds, and the values in use resulting from them may be arranged in four corresponding classes, namely, elementary value, form value, place value, and time value. New matter can not be created by man, but by chemical and vital changes in existing matter new material may be produced. The production of new material creates elementary value and this is preëminently the province of the agriculturist. Mining involves some change of place in the ore, but the labor of discovering and freeing it from the superincumbent earth is, prominently, a creating of elementary value and mining should, in general, be classed with agriculture.

Existing materials generally require changes of form to fit them for satisfying wants, and the utility conferred by these changes is form value. This is the office of the manufacturer and, to a large extent, of the merchant. The forming of wool into cloth, of iron into tools, of wood into buildings, of stone into walls, etc., are obvious illustrations. The subdivision of articles purchased in bulk to suit the wants of the consumer is to be regarded as the creation of form value. The man who desires only a pound of a particular commodity can afford to

it at a higher rate than if he were compelled to purchase greatly in excess of his needs. The adaptation of the utility to his needs creates an actual utility to him and many enjoyments within his reach which would be otherwise unattainable. Subdivision creates form value and is legitimate.

Material in the requisite form may need removal to the place to enable it to satisfy wants. Transportation commodifies the utility of being where they are wanted and creates place value. This is obviously created when commodities are brought to the consumer, but is not less truly created when the consumer is carried to the commodity. Place value lies in the relative position of consumer and commodity and both freight and passenger traffic produce it. The fact is relative and not absolute place which determines this distinguishes it from form value as in manufactures. Manufacturing processes can be resolved, in the last analysis, into changes of place. The carpenter moves shavings and shaves the wood which he is shaping. The mason locates sand and mortar in contact with one another. The woolen manufacturer locates fibres of wool and coloring matter in certain positions. All these changes of place are irrespective of the consumer and result only in giving form to the product, but place value requires a relative position of the consumer to the commodity.

Material in the necessary form and place may not be so readily available at the requisite time for satisfying wants. Ice in winter, agricultural implements out of season, and, in general, all commodities at a time when they are not wanted are obvious illustrations of commodities requiring this additional utility to fit them for consumption. The utility of existing at a time when it is needed gives to a commodity the attribute of time value. The function of this value is the office of capital, and the nature of this value does not come within the limits of this discussion; but it is sufficiently obvious that time value results from human labor and abstinence. Its creation is a chief function of the merchant and it is of inestimable benefit to his customers. If the consumer were obliged to keep on hand a supply of commodities he requires for sustenance and comfort during indefinite

periods of disuse the number of comforts which individuals could enjoy would be reduced to a minimum. The idle capital of society would be increased a hundred fold and the list of its comforts proportionately reduced. The creation of time value by the merchant is one of the most beneficent of human industries and its reward one of the most legitimate.

These utilities are all different varieties of value in use. Value in exchange signifies the quantity of commodities in general for which a particular commodity can be exchanged. To an individual possessing a supply of a single commodity, its value in exchange signifies an indirect value in use. The farmer's supply of grain possesses, through the medium of exchange, the capacity to supply his want of shelter, warmth, and various comforts and pleasures. Value in exchange is a purely relative attribute, as ordinarily viewed, and is determined by the law of demand and supply, the operation of which requires a separate and extended discussion. It is only necessary here to notice that light is thrown on the discussion of this law by recognizing that the nature of value in exchange is an indirect value in use and that the law of demand and supply rests, fundamentally, on the nature of man and the relative intensity of his wants.

Having defined our conception of Wealth, Labor, and Value it may be well to apply to the definition a few of the cases most difficult of classification under prevailing systems. All artistic productions are creations of form value and differ from each other only in the different agents to which this utility is imparted. The architect imparts form value to buildings, the sculptor to marble, the painter to colors. The musician imparts form value to the natural agent sound, and the public reciter and speaker give a different kind of form value to the same natural agent. The teacher is a producer of form and place value, more especially of the latter. The confusion which arises from considering that the product of the teacher's labor is found in the mind of the pupil has already been noticed. The pupil is not the natural agent which the teacher uses; he is the consumer of that which the teacher produces, and, in practice, he, or others in his interest, pay the teacher for his product. The acquiring of instruction is the consumption of

intellectual nourishment, as eating is of bodily nourishment; both are facilitated by the labor of attendants. The waiter at the table gives place value to food by placing it within reach of the person eating; and so, in like manner, the teacher gives place value to the materials of education by placing them within the reach of the learner. As it would be absurd to say that the waiter and the cook found the product of their labors in a utility imparted to the body of the eater, so a similar absurdity exists in supposing that the teacher finds his product in the mind of the pupil. Both eating and learning are acts of consumption. They each result in a capacity to labor on the part of the consumer, but this capacity to labor is not to be confused with the product of labor; it is the result of consumption. The waiter at the table creates, as has been said, place value; but, in the carving of meat, the cutting of bread, etc., there is a certain creation of form value. The teacher's labor is chiefly the production of place value, but there is, on his part, a certain carving and cutting process which gives form value. The intellectual cook is, generally, the author of the text-books which the teacher uses, but, in the higher stages of education, the functions of author and teacher are more or less united.

It is unnecessary to state that any natural agent not originally wealth becomes wealth when it receives, through the agency of labor or capital, either of the four utilities above noticed. Air has place value when forced into a mine or a diving bell. Water has form value in a fountain, place value in a street hydrant or watering cart, and time value in the reservoir of a manufacturing village, where it is retained for use during the dry season. If there are any products which, at first glance, appear as exceptions, they are, on closer inspection, clearly seen to be illustrations of our definition of wealth. Some classes merit more extended consideration than is here possible, but it is believed that the above classification will be found to cover the whole field of industrial labor. Wherever human effort produces commodities it will be found to be conferring one of these four values on a natural agent, or, in other words, to be subjecting nature. This view is, singularly enough, presented in a work that is old and familiar enough to have well attracted

the notice of those who have ransacked the classics for fragmentary and erroneous allusions to economic science. In the picture of the origin of society found in the book of Genesis man is first represented in the primitive paradisaical state, conscious of no artificial wants and supplying his few natural wants from the gratuitous productions of tropical nature. He eats of the tree of knowledge, and, by this means, becomes conscious of his simplest artificial want and of the necessity of supplying it by making nature serviceable. He passes to the state of actual development, with the primitive paradise behind him and a restored paradise, as the ever receding goal of progress, in the indefinite future before him, and it is here that the injunction is laid upon him, or the law is written within him, the fulfillment of which involves his whole economic development, the command, namely, to "replenish the earth and *subdue it*."

ARTICLE X.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

HUMILIATION OF CHRIST.*—The purpose of these lectures employ the teachings of Scripture concerning the humiliation of the Son of God, as an aid in the formation of just views of Christ's person, experience, and work, and in the criticism of Christological and Soteriological theories. In the first lecture the doctrine of the New Testament respecting the humiliation of Christ is ascertained, especially from Philippians ii, 5-9, and from the Epistle to the Hebrews. He deduces the following:

1. The pre-existence of a divine personality, capable of freely performing the act of "kenosis." (Phil ii, 7.)

2. His act involves a change of state: an exchange, relative and absolute, of the form of God for the form of a servant.

3. This does not mean self-extinction, or the metamorphosis of the Divine Being into a man; the personality remains the same.

4. The humiliation (Phil ii, 8) is a perseverance in the mind, which led to the "kenosis," and implies the identity and continued consciousness of the subject.

5. Christ's life on earth was a life of service.

6. In the "kenosis" and the humiliation Christ was a free agent; he did not merely experience them, he emptied himself, he humbled himself.

7. The service which Christ came to render involved likeness to men in all possible respects, both in nature and experience.

8. Christ's whole state of exinanition was not only worthy to be rewarded by a subsequent state of exaltation, but was itself characterized by moral sublimity and dignity.

9. Guided by these principles, he proceeds to consider what the state of humiliation is in three aspects: the *physical*, the *ethical*, and the *soteriological*.

10. The discussion of the *physical* aspect three lectures are

Humiliation of Christ, in its physical, ethical, and official aspects. The series of the Cunningham Lectures. By ALEX. B. BRUCE, D.D., Professor of Theology, Free Church College, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, George Street, 1876. New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, 743 and 745 Broadway, pp. xii, and 502. Price \$6.00.

devoted. The method of the author is the statement and criticism of the doctrines and controversies on the subject from the time of the Council of Chalcedon, when the Christology of the ancient church took final shape, until now. These three lectures treat successively the Patristic Christology; the Lutheran Christology, and the Reformed; the modern Kenotic theories, especially those of Thomasius, Gess, Ebrand, and Martensen.

In the fifth lecture the *ethical* aspect of the humiliation is discussed in the same method. The discussion has special reference to the possibility of temptation and of moral development.

In the last lecture the *Soteriological* aspect is discussed in the same method. In this lecture the author considers chiefly the more recent theories of atonement.

The mass of learning in these lectures overlays the author's own thought, and we rise from the perusal with a confused and feeble impression of the points which he himself would make. Our readers are aware, from their studies in ecclesiastical history, that at different periods the discussion of the constitution of the Godman has degenerated into a bewildering tenuity and massiveness. Here in five lectures we are led through the successive eras of this discussion from Hilary to Edward Irving. The most vivid impression left on our mind is that our wisdom consists in accepting the fact of the Incarnation and its sublime practical significance as set forth in the Scriptures, and in not attempting to answer the question of Nicodemus: "How can these things be?" by an exact psychological and physiological definition of the "Word made flesh." It emphasizes the caution given by the theologians of different periods. Says Prof. Hill, formerly of St. Andrews: "When men began to speculate concerning the manner of that union which the Scriptures teach us to believe, they soon went far beyond the measure of information which the Scriptures afford. They multiplied words without having clear ideas of their meaning, being never perfectly apprehended by themselves; and the controversies on this point, which at the beginning involved a fundamental article of the Christian faith, degenerated at last into a verbal dispute conducted with much acrimony in the mere jargon of metaphysics." Says Richard Hooker: "Howbeit because this divine mystery is more true than plain, divers having framed the same to their own conceits and fancies, are found in their exposition thereof more plain than true." Says Döderlein, as he opens the

ic: "We have reached a field, which we have long been dread-
 , ample for crops, yet sown and tangled with briars and diffi-
 lies, the seeds of which have been sown broadcast by the
 tful ingenuity of theologians and nourished by the heats of
 neils and synods, mingled with the tempests of anathemas—
 s which many good men seem to think ought to be cut down,
 if the sacred thicket must be spared, that it should be aban-
 ed to theologians to cultivate and disentangle it."

MESSIANIC PROPHECY.*—This work consists of three articles
 Messianic Prophecy, written by the author for *Studien und
 tiken*, in 1865 and 1869, with modifications here and there,
 ing clearer and more complete expression to his views. He
 udes in Messianic prophecy all predictions of the growth and
 l completion of God's kingdom on earth, as well as Messianic
 phecy in its narrower sense; predictions of an ideal king of
 l's people, springing from the house of David, with whose
 ent the new dispensation begins. While he acknowledges
 ernatural revelation as the origin of the expectation of the
 esiah, he also recognizes a genetic connection of the prophecy
 h the fundamental ideas of the Old Testament religion. "Mes-
 sic hopes might and did necessarily spring from the inmost life
 he divinely revealed religion of the Old Testament dispensa-
 This ground lies in the ideas of the Old Testament
 gion; that is, by divine revelation ideas were planted in the
 ds of the people of Israel, so lofty, and rich, and deep, that in
 existing religious condition they could never see their perfect
 lization; ideas which, with every step in the development of
 religious life and knowledge, only more fully disclosed their
 n depth and fulness, and which therefore necessarily led them
 look to the future for their fulfillment. The more vividly pious
 elites realized the contrast between the idea and the reality
 . . the more their faith, and hopes, and desires looked to the
 ure abolition of this contrast, and the complete realization of
 idea." He discusses, as the most influential, these three: the

*Messianic Prophecy: Its Origin, Historical Character, and relation to New Testam-
 t Fulfillment.*—By DR. EDWARD RIEHM, Professor of Theology in Halle.
 elated from the German, with the approbation of the author, by Rev. JOHN
 VERNON. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1876. New York:
 ibner, Welford & Armstrong: 743 and 745 Broadway. Crown 8vo. pp. xii,
 1266. Price \$2.50.

idea of God's covenant with his chosen people, the idea of the kingdom of God on earth, and the idea of the theocracy. Thus the very existence of God's covenant people and his theocratic kingdom carries in it the prophecy and promise of the universal extension of that kingdom, and becomes the basis of Messianic expectation and prophecy. Specific prophecies of the Messiah are seen to be the legitimate outgrowth of this conception of God's chosen covenant people and his theocratic reign. Hence "Messianic prophecy forms an essential part of the utterances of the prophets No prophet neglected to point to the ultimate design of Jehovah We find generally, even in the shortest prophetic writings, a portion of Messianic prediction."

The author recognizes a great variety both in the contents and forms of the predictions. No one prophecy presents the Messianic conception in its wholeness; one aspect is prominent here and another there; and the forms in which the Messianic conception is set forth are as varied. This variety is partly due to the peculiarities of the prophet; but much more to the limiting influence of the historical conditions of the time on the contents of the predictions of each prophet. The latter influence the author exemplifies at considerable length.

The third section traces the relation of Messianic prophecy to New Testament fulfillment.

Perhaps the author gives too much prominence to the "human element" in his explanations. But the work is of great value as showing a reasonable basis for the interpretation of the Old Testament, as pervaded with Messianic prophecy. To those who have been taught to study Messianic prophecy by selecting a few passages here and there, declared to be Messianic solely because specifically quoted as such in the New Testament, the course of thought suggested by the author will give liberation, enlargement of view, and great relief.

PRIESTHOOD IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.*—This work consists of eight lectures, being the Congregational Union Lectures for 1876. They are designed to prove that in the gospel dispensation there is no official human priesthood analogous to that of Judaism, and to vindicate the inalienable spiritual priest-

* *Priesthood in the light of the New Testament.* The Congregational Union Lecture for 1876. By E. MELLOR, D.D. A. S. Barnes & Co. New York, Chicago and New Orleans. 1876. 8vo, pp. 423. Price \$4.00. Sent by mail postpaid.

every true Christian. By priesthood the author means only the function of offering sacrifices to God, but any formal mediation between man and God, by virtue of ordination or exterior rite authorizing persons to dispense salvation to

In the two first lectures the author examines the New Testament to prove that priesthood is not recognized in it as an essential part of the Christian church. In the third he discusses the alleged origin and lineage of the priesthood as recognized in Sacramentalism, and shows that the claim of apostolic succession is unfounded. In the fourth, fifth, and sixth, he discusses the alleged necessity of the priesthood at the altar, in which he considers the question of the real presence and of the Lord's supper. The seventh and eighth are devoted to the discussion of the Confessional.

The work treats of the subjects which have been debated in the Roman and Anglican controversies in England, as well as of the sacerdotalism of the Church of Rome. The lectures are the result of much study, and are full and elaborate in the treatment of several subjects.

MAHAN ON SPIRITUALISM.*—While the author is aware of many impositions connected with spiritualism have been examined, he believes that there are many indisputable facts not explainable in accordance with any laws of nature at present known. He attempts to prove that these facts can be accounted for as the effects of natural causes, without the intervention of disembodied spirits. He argues that they imply the existence in nature of a "polar force" distinctly recognized in philosophy, a force having when developed very strong attractive and repulsive power; a force, the nature of whose action, when certain conditions are fulfilled, depends on mental states and is determined by the same; a force, through which the mental states in one mind may be reproduced in others." The author adduces a multitude of facts, and from them in the elucidation and support of this general conclusion. The reputation of Dr. Mahan will attract attention to the work, and the work has intrinsic value as a contribution to the solution of the subject.

Phenomena of Spiritualism scientifically explained and exposed. By Rev. J. A. MAHAN, D.D., first President of Oberlin College. A. S. Barnes & Co. New York, Chicago, and New Orleans. 1876. Small 8vo, pp. xiv, and 421. Price postpaid, \$2.50.

THE FOOTSTEPS OF ST. PETER.*—The readers of Dr. Macduff's "Footsteps of St. Paul" will understand the design of this when it is called in the preface "a companion volume." While in late years so many elaborate works have treated of the character, writings, and travels of the "Apostle of the Gentiles," it seems the more suitable to give separate attention also to his great associate "of the Circumcision," who was a companion of the Master and a leader in the inauguration of his religion, and if the most cultured or eloquent was not less intrepid, faithful, and effective among the Jews. He is generally allowed a certain precedence, though not the primacy asserted by the Romanists, and his life takes us into the scenes of the gospels and the favored society of Jesus. It is the writer's purpose to trace the life by all the light shed upon it from Scripture and authentic tradition, and he seems to us to have carried out this aim with diligence and skill. It is meant not so much to add to learned investigation as to furnish intelligent and devout reading, and cannot fail to make the apostle's character and labors more familiar and interesting to all classes.

THE MORALS OF TRADE.†—An excellent little book to be put into the hands of business men—at once useful and handsomely enough for a gift to young men in business. The first Lecture is "an Inquiry into the actual Morality of Trade;" the second "on the Causes of the existing Demoralization, and the Remedies therefor." Foot-notes and an Appendix add to their value, especially by citations from eminent authorities on the points in question. It is a good sign of our times that so much attention is drawn to this subject, and this lecturer properly considers it an indication not so much of increase in the evil exposed as of awakening of conscience in this direction. His treatment of the questions presented is at once high-toned and practical. The style is that of a scholarly clergyman, perhaps not so direct and simple as one might wish for the class of readers chiefly in view. I question the quality of the word "*skimp*" (for sharp dealing), and also for "*exhibit*" used as a noun, the latter being a technical term in law and now obtruding itself more than before in connection with the labels in the Centennial Exposition.

* *The Footsteps of St. Peter*: being the Life and Times of the Apostle. By J. MACDUFF, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1877. 632 pp.

† *The Morals of Trade*. Two Lectures: given in the Anthon Memorial Church, New York. By R. HEBER NEWTON. New York: T. Whittaker, 2 Bible House. 1876. 110 pp.

"THE JUDGMENT OF JERUSALEM."* By Rev. WILLIAM PATTON, D.D.—The ten chapters of this neat volume give an account, with the help of some plans and pictures, of the city and temple of Jerusalem in our Lord's time; of his prediction concerning it; of the causes of the war, and the safety of the Christians; of "the six signs," "the trench about the city," and the sufferings of the besieged; of its capture by the Romans, and the destruction of the temple; and of the "subsequent history of the Jews." A leading object is to show the fulfilment of our Lord's words in that terrible catastrophe as it is described to us principally by Josephus, and to impress the appropriate lessons. Dr. Patton's style is plain and direct, and he has evidently taken pains to gather and arrange the materials to the best advantage within the limits of this work. It is adapted to popular use, and ought to have a good circulation.

THE COLLEGE HYMNAL.†—The appearance of this neat little book, prepared "for divine service at Yale College in the Battell Chapel," seems to deserve notice in these pages. The work of selection, arrangement, and editing has been, as is well known to many persons connected with the College, a labor of love performed by one who was remarkably fitted for it, as well by his familiar knowledge and love of sacred verse as by his power of faithful industry and dread of prominence for himself. The book is to be used at daily morning prayers and in the Sunday service of the chapel, and is of course adapted to the peculiar congregation for which it is prepared. It therefore omits entirely certain classes of hymns, as designed for occasions which do not occur in the experience of a college church. In all classes too the selection for such a purpose as this is naturally somewhat more rigid and exclusive than in preparing a book for the use of an ordinary church. For instance, hymns adapted rather for private use, which make the hymn book a help to personal devotion, are rather less fully represented in this collection. There are fewer doctrinal hymns (for only by that adjective, inappropriate as it seems, can the class be described), fewer of sad strain, fewer containing the phraseology of the Old Testament, than are usually found. In

* *The Judgment of Jerusalem, Predicted in Scripture, Fulfilled in History.* By the Rev. WILLIAM PATTON, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1877. 281 pp.

† *The College Hymnal.* New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1876.

other directions a similar limitation will be found, which may be ascribed partly to the necessarily restricted size of the book, partly to severity of taste. It may serve to indicate the wide range of selection and also the conscientious industry of the editor, to state that of the 511 hymns, 38 being anonymous, the remaining 473 are drawn from 151 different authors. We may compare it in this respect with the "Songs for the Sanctuary," which happens to lie nearest at hand, and in which of 1342 hymns, 284 being anonymous, there are 228 authors. On the other hand more than twenty authors are represented in this book who do not appear in "Songs for the Sanctuary." The anonymous hymns are about 8 per cent. of the former and 21 per cent. of the latter collection. But in the College Hymnal the old favorite authors are not by any means neglected. Watts leads the list, as he deserves to in any collection, with 85 hymns; next come Charles Wesley with 32, James Montgomery with 24, John Newton with 18, Doddridge with 17, and J. M. Neale with 15. No other author contributes more than ten. Here are also many hymns from more recent English authors, which are comparatively unknown among us now but may well become familiar in our churches. We miss some hymns that we should be glad to find in the book; among these are "Inspirer and hearer of prayer," "Lord, forever at thy side," "Welcome, sweet day of rest," "My God, the covenant of thy love," "To our Redeemer's glorious name," and others. But on the whole this is certainly an admirable collection, not less interesting and valuable in itself than well adapted to its special purpose. It has so peculiarly the latter merit that it might well be adopted by any collegiate institution with such a congregation as that at Yale, and we hope it will become known and be used in many such places. To each hymn is prefixed a brief phrase from Scripture, and the full name of the author is added at the end. The utmost care has been used to give the pure original text of the hymns, and the appearance of the volume does great credit to the good taste of the publishers.

JOHN THE BAPTIST.*—The "Congregational Union of England and Wales" have reflected honor on their own denomination, and on English evangelical non-conformists at large, by "the well-

* *John the Baptist*; a Contribution to Christian Evidences. The Congregational Union Lectures for 1874. By HENRY ROBERT REYNOLDS, D. D. Second edition. A. S. Barnes & Co. New York, Chicago, and New Orleans. 1876. pp. 548.

own series of works entitled *Congregational Lectures*," prepared at their request and under their auspices. It is understood that they are not necessarily delivered, before publication, to miscellaneous audiences, and the preface of this volume informs us that its contents have been first given only to a select class of students in a theological college of which the author is an instructor. As it may be inferred from the request made to him for a treatise to be placed in such a series, Dr. Reynolds holds a high position in his own communion, and this work will make him still more favorably known in a wider circle. He has been happy in the choice of his subject, for while John the Baptist has ever been one of the most striking figures in the New Testament, and his career claims an important place in "Christian Evidences" and generally in the study of the Bible, but few monographs have been devoted to him, and the discussion to which he has necessarily given rise in the more comprehensive treatises makes the reader desire a fuller treatment, such as he will find here. This theme, however, is closely related to others in recent biblical criticism, and hence is necessarily expanded. We can now only indicate the course of thought by the titles of the several lectures: "The significance and sources of John's Biography;" "Examination of the Biblical record of his nativity;" "John the Exponent of the Old Testament dispensation;" "the Preaching in the Wilderness;" the Baptist's "transitional work;" his "later Ministry and Special Relations;" "the Ministry of the Prison;" "Results, Echoes and Lessons of his Ministry." Under each of these heads interesting subordinate topics and questions are discussed, and an appendix to the whole is added. The author's studious reading, judgment, candor appear throughout, and not less his evangelic fervor, the latter especially in what is said of prophecy on pages 210 to 215. He is acquainted with the latest criticism whether orthodox or rationalistic. The style is clear and manly. It is a work that not only meets the wants of theological students but must interest and profit all intelligent and devout readers. They will find it the simplest exposition of our Lord's judgment (cited on the title page) that while none had been greater than the Baptist, "the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he."—The word "bulk'd" (for enlarged or swelled) we suppose to be a Scotticism.

STEPHEN'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.*—The history of opinions is a branch of literature which has thus far flourished far less among the English than among the Germans. A few works, like that of Sir James Mackintosh upon the British Ethical Philosophy, and similar works by Dugald Stewart and by Whewell, are notable exceptions to the general sterility of our literature in this department. On the Deists, the main subject of the volumes before us, we have the laborious and trustworthy treatise of Leland. Lechler has written in German an excellent book on the same subject. Rev. John Hunt, in his *History of English Thought*, traverses the same field. Mr. Stephen's discussion is characterized by ample learning, and by frequent examples of acute criticism. It is entitled to no mean rank as a contribution to religious philosophy from the author's point of view. His point of view, however, we regret to say, is not that of sympathy with the peculiar truths and the supernatural authority of the Christian religion.

MARTINEAU ON MODERN MATERIALISM.†—This little volume comprises, first, the author's Reply to Tyndall's criticism of his lecture upon "Religion as affected by Modern Materialism;" and, secondly, another article from the *Contemporary Review* upon the same general theme. Mr. Martineau treats his distinguished opponent courteously and fairly, but subjects his utterances respecting religion to a searching and rather destructive criticism. These essays are quite valuable, and, along with other recent publications by the same writer, constitute an effective answer to the assertions and arguments of those who have sought of late to revive, under the name of "science," the old dogmas of materialism.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

PRESIDENT McCOSH, under the title of THE DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS: IS IT SUFFICIENT?‡ publishes four papers, three of which have been previously given to the public. The first is enti-

* *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*. By LESLIE STEPHEN. In two vols. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876.

† *Modern Materialism; its attitude towards Theology*. By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876.

‡ *The Development Hypothesis: Is it sufficient?* By JAMES MCCOSH, D.D., LL.D., President of Princeton College. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1876.

ed "Arguments for and against the Development hypothesis;" the second, "Is the Development hypothesis sufficient?" the third, "Geology and Scripture;" the fourth, "View of our World given by combined Science and Religion." The four make a pamphlet volume of 104 pages, which is very readable and contains many suggestions and arguments in the author's well-known style of writing. The author has not slighted his reading in preparing his work. The force and effect of his reasonings would have been greater, as it seems to us, had he adopted a somewhat more direct style of treatment and a less ambitious diction. But he was writing for a popular audience, rather than for learned critics, and his work will be read by uncritical readers, and he doubtless wisely adapted his style to the demands and tastes of the majority of his hearers and readers. We recommend the work as one of great value, which is as yet almost unknown to American readers.

THE anonymous author of *ULTIMATE GENERALIZATION** is a thinker trained in the school of Herbert Spencer, who while he agrees with his master in holding that the Philosophy of Science can only be consummated by attaining some ultimate generalization in the domain of *abstracta*, differs from Spencer in respect to the abstraction which should crown the edifice. The pamphlet is more than curious, it is instructive and suggestive to those who understand and interpret it.

PROFESSOR STANLEY JEVONS' *LOGIC PRIMER*† is characterized by the characteristic features of his familiar method of treating abstract topics and is perhaps as thoroughly successful as a Primer of Logic could possibly be made. We cannot say that we esteem such a book very useful except for the purposes of reviewing knowledge which has been gained from a more extended treatise. If a primer means an introductory treatise it must necessarily be a failure whenever the subject is necessarily so abstract as Logic. The advanced student will find the treatise convenient and serviceable.

* *The Ultimate Generalization: An effort in the Philosophy of Science.* New York: Charles P. Somerby, 139 Eighth street. 1876. pp. 56.

† *Science Primers. Logic.* By W. STANLEY JEVONS, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., Professor of Political Economy in University College, London. New York: Appleton & Co. 1876.

MISCELLANEOUS.

ALPHABET IN FINANCE.*—This addition to "Putnam's Financial Manuals" is very timely. The author is or was editor of the *Brooklyn Times*, and the directness and raciness of this little book spring no doubt from his experience as a journalist. He covers the subject "An Alphabet," and he begins with the A. B. C. of the subject; but the reader is pretty sure to follow him to the X of his result.

He treats of the "origin of money" and the reasons for the choice of gold to serve as the medium of exchange. An important chapter is on what is meant by a "standard unit." He shows how and why an inferior currency always drives out a superior one. He discusses the subject of a double standard for metals; values; is money a creation of government; how much a country needs, and how the quantity of gold in a country is regulated. He explains the credit system, and considers the use of bank notes and their convertibility, and how the quantity of circulation is regulated; who should issue paper money; tenders and inflation; fractional currency, foreign exchange, banking; what is a specie basis, and the balance of trade. These are live questions, and are treated by a live man in a plain manner. We have hardly seen a book so well adapted to the needs of novices in the questions of the day about finance and the currency. It is not written in a scientific manner, but, generally avoiding an abstruse discussion and technical terms, the author expresses himself in plain and familiar language so that any one can understand him. He states that the book purposely deals chiefly with principles and makes slight use of illustration, but we think that if it does use illustrations they are very pertinent and furnish a support to his arguments.

The part of the book which appears to us the ablest and adapted to do the most good is that in which, after explaining what is meant by the "credit system," he treats of "pure credit money," "the closed circle," "the three-sixty-five bond scheme," and "the bond scheme at its best."

* *An Alphabet in Finance.* A simple statement of permanent principles and their application to questions of the day. By GRAHAM MCADAM. With introduction by R. R. Bowker. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 182 Fifth Avenue. 1876. 12mo.

In the chapter on "pure credit money," he thus pays his respects to Mr. Peter Cooper:

"In its simplest form the theory starts with the proposition that money is the 'creation of the government,' and hence evolves the bold dogma, that the government can make a 'dollar' out of a bit of tin, or a bit of iron, or a bit of paper, just as it can out of a bit of gold—simply by putting upon it the stamp of supreme authority. We have already considered this delusion. . . . But certain of the paper philosophers have put the notion in a subtler form: In the beginning was barter; then came gold as a medium; and then came 'credit.' The higher the civilization, the less the proportion of coin used and the greater the proportion of 'credit' paper. Hence, in a supremely civilized state, coin will disappear altogether, and paper be the sole currency. . . . It is as if one should say to his grocer, 'My friend, when I moved into this neighborhood, I had to pay you cash down for every pound of butter and peck of potatoes I bought of you. But you soon came to know me and were willing occasionally to give me 'tick.' At the present stage of our intercourse, you have acquired entire confidence in my honesty and the extent of my resources, and are willing to sell me all I want on credit. Suppose now, in the interests of a higher civilization, we carry out this process of evolution and abolish the bothersome system of periodical settlements. Let us make the thing credit all the way through.'"

We give a part of his reply to Rev. Thomas K. Beecher, on the "closed circle."

"This is the theory. A buys a hundred dollars' worth of goods from B; B buys a hundred dollars' worth of goods from C, and C 'closes the circle' by buying a hundred dollars' worth of goods from A. The entire indebtedness of the three can be discharged by circulating a hundred dollars from any point all around the circle. But the work might have been as well done with a button or a bit of leather, or, better still, by a scrap of paper with 'one hundred dollars' inscribed thereon. Now let the government issue these notes for its debts, let them pass from hand to hand in the work of exchanging goods, and let the circle be closed by their return to the government for taxes and custom duties.

"This to some looks very fine; but suppose we examine it. 'A buys a hundred dollars' worth of goods from B.' Why a hundred dollars' worth? How a hundred dollars' worth? Of course this means that A buys goods which are equal in value to a hundred of those bits of gold we call 'dollars.' So again we strike gold performing its great office of a measure of value. This measurement of value cannot be made with a button, nor a bit of leather, nor a scrap of paper having no value in itself, and no definite value as a claim to anything else. 'How can you say,' exclaims the paper-money man, 'that these proposed notes have no definite value! The government puts its stamp upon a piece of paper for One Dollar. There you have your measure of value. A hundred dollars' worth of goods would be measured in value by a hundred of these dollar notes.' But if the government puts its stamp upon a bit of paper, 'one pound,' will the paper measure the weight of a quantity of sugar? Or, if it stamps a bit of leather 'one quart,' can you find out with that how much water there is in the cistern? To measure weight you must have weight—not something which 'represents' weight, or is

'based' on weight, or is 'good for' weight, or is redeemable even in weight; to measure length you must have length; to measure volume you must have volume; to measure value you must have value."

But we cannot continue the argument, for our extracts are too long. We have perhaps sufficiently showed the manner in which the author enlivens the discussions of a subject which sometimes thought dry and abstruse.

The book closes with three chapters on the subject of fiction, in which various modes are discussed and the principles given to a funding of the greenbacks.

TWENTY POEMS BY ROBERT WEEKS.*—Some years ago on occasion to commend a small volume which contained ten poems of Mr. Robert K. Weeks. We have not forgot the impression which was then made upon us of the delicate taste, and the genuineness of his poetical insight. In that there was such promise of future excellence, that we opened a new collection of poems with eagerness, and find our anticipation fulfilled.

Perhaps we cannot better convey an idea of what Mr. Weeks is capable of than by transferring to our pages one of the poems of his "miscellaneous poems."

A CLIMBER.

To climb and climb for hours and hours,
O'er rocks and ice and snow,
To see at last the flower of flowers
Long sought, unseen till now.

Bruised, bleeding, breathless to attain
At last the final ledge,
Lean over, look and see it plain,
Just under the rough edge

Of that ice-worn, frost-splintered rock,
In that keen upper air,
Where never shepherd seeks his flock,
A lovely wonder there;

To gaze at it, and love it more
And more, the more 'tis seen,—
Star-like, but blood-red at the core,
With cool green leaves serene;

* *Twenty Poems.* By R. K. WEEKS. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 12mo, pp. 167.

To feel its fragrance like a kiss
 Awake and take the heart,
 Its motion like a smile dismiss,
 And keep despair apart.
 To love it, long for it, to lean
 Far and yet farther still,
 With trembling fingers touch the green
 And trembling leaves, and thrill,
 And thrilling reach again, and fall
 Whirling to where the slow,
 Cold, mockery glacier rivers crawl
 And waste away below,—
 This was his life, this was his fate,
 A hard, long, lonely climb,
 A failure; but he stood elate
 Once in the air sublime!

To make another short quotation; what can better describe the joyous enchantment which is unconsciously diffused like sunshine on all around by a true and noble woman.

"But as the unconscious
 Breeze blesses and goes,
 So went she, more blessing
 And blest than she knows."

Of the longer pieces, "How Roland blew the Horn," will take rank among the best specimens of ballad poetry.

TALKS ABOUT LABOR.*—This book is a contribution to the discussion of the questions involved in the mutual relations of capital and labor. It is in the form of conversations, extending through five evenings, in which an imaginary judge is the principal talker and gives we suppose the author's views. We think this setting does not aid the merit of the essays.

The positions taken are that at present capital has the power of dictating terms to labor, and that this is unreasonable in view especially of the way in which capital is frequently, not to say generally, obtained: that it is not right for the capitalist to exact from the laborer all that he has power to exact, and that business is so arranged that it is impossible for a mechanic or artisan or other laborer to extort more than a decent living: that labor has been rendered so enormously productive since the present century

* *Talks about Labor.* By J. N. LARNED. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 549 and 551 Broadway. 1876. 12mo.

began by mechanical devices, that the laborer is entitled to a larger share of the profit than he receives.

This cannot be accomplished by strikes or trades-unions, but the author advocates the concession, on the part of the employer, to every man in his employ, of some little share of interest in the business in which he is engaged. The author would prohibit every branch and division of government from contracting debts unless the payment of the debt within three or five years should be provided for by taxation. In this way he would prevent the enormous accumulations of wealth in those who cannot or will not use it productively. These "talks" may be instructive to some who would be deterred from a larger work, which should discuss the questions raised with greater fulness.

WIT, HUMOR, AND SHAKESPEARE.*—This volume having no preface, we are not told whether any of these twelve essays have before appeared in magazines or been delivered as lectures. They are grouped together as being congenial in their themes and the style of treatment. The first is on "The Cause of Laughter," and the second on "Wit, Irony, Humor." The others might be called studies in Shakespeare, all relating to his principal characters, and largely to the women among them, the dramatist's wit and humor coming in naturally for a share of critical attention. The fourth essay is on "Falstaff, his Companions, Americanisms," and sets him forth as a type of the droll rollicking exaggeration characteristic of what is called American humor, of which some good instances are given, new to us. By the way the critic falls into an English provincialism if not a proper "Americanism" in language, when he used "wilted" for "withered," p. 273. One of the best chapters (the eighth) handles the theory of Lord Bacon's authorship, which, we need not say, like other lovers of Shakespeare, he strongly rejects, yet with more candor toward it advocates than some have shown. Mr. Weiss has been well known as one of the radical thinkers and preachers of the day and his critical discussions here have much of the attraction that is looked for in such a quarter,—enthusiasm for his subject, not a few fine observations, and strokes of delicate analysis. Yet his style shows an excess of elaboration. The reader is not always rewarded by the thought when he has found it among epithets

* *Wit, Humor, and Shakespeare. Twelve Essays.* By JOHN WEISS. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1876. 428 pp.

lications. He is not as clear as one would have him of
ained rhetoric of later writers" which on p. 263 he happily
s with "the pregnant moderation of Shakespeare's style."
hanical execution of the book is all that can be desired.

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXXXIX.

APRIL, 1877.

ARTICLE L—DEAN STANLEY.

IN 1864, Richard Chevenix Trench became Archbishop of Dublin, and Arthur Penrhyn Stanley was appointed to succeed him as Dean of Westminster. The appointment caused great dissatisfaction in the Church, and a loud outcry. "The question is," said Dr. Wordsworth, then Canon in Residence of Westminster, who formally undertook the office of expostulation, "whether a person who has caused much grief and trouble of conscience to many faithful members of the Church, ought to be admitted to one of the highest places of trust and dignity in it?" "We owe to our Rulers," he pursued, "the word of warning and admonition, that whosoever 'offends one of Christ's little ones, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depths of the sea.' . . . If we, who ought to speak, remain silent on such critical occasions as these, . . . we shall shake the confidence of the people in the moral courage and honesty of the clergy, and shall render it impossible for them to love and revere the Church of their Country, as a faithful Witness of the truth. The Church itself will then become like 'salt that has lost his

savour,' fit only 'to be trodden under foot.'" Canon Wordsworth gives his reason for this remonstrance, confining himself to a single charge:—"Dr. Stanley has given scandal to many by statements in his recently published writings, tending, in their opinion, to unsettle the faith in the truth and inspiration of the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament." For instance, "he asserts that 'the History of Israel is not the History of an inspired Book, but of an inspired People' . . . 'that the acceptance of every part of the Old Testament as of equal accuracy is rendered impossible by *every advance* made in Biblical science, and by *every increase* of our acquaintance with eastern customs and primeval history.' . . . In another place Dr. Stanley apologizes for Deborah the Prophetess, as 'enlightened only with a very small portion of that divine light which was to go on ever more brightening to the perfect day,' and thus a shadow of doubt is thrown upon the inspiration of the still earlier prophecies, as for instance, those of Jacob and of Noah; . . . and he tells us that 'the very *errors* and *defects*' of the Bible 'are guides to the true apprehension of its meaning.' In the same place he suggests that there are errors in St. Stephen's speech in the Acts." All of which Canon Wordsworth finds irreconcilable with St. Paul's declaration, "speaking specially of the Old Testament, 'All Scripture,' or, as it literally signifies, '*Every Scripture* is given by *inspiration of God*;' and with the language of our own Church in the collect of this season, ascribing all Scripture to God: 'Blessed Lord, Who hast caused *all* Holy Scriptures to be written for our learning.'"

The opposition which Stanley encountered at the time of his elevation to Westminster was only the same opposition manifested repeatedly before and since; and his doctrines of Inspiration are perhaps the least obnoxious of the many that have made him a central object of the attacks of common Churchmen ever since he became conspicuous at all. For nearly twenty years, he has been used as a text for essays innumerable on "Anglican Neology" and "Infidelity in High Places," and "those rationalistic views which are unhappily so common;" all his words have been watched by a thousand microscopic eyes and "their true character exposed;" he has been called by all the dismally familiar names; he has been found to be a

lineal descendant of the Sadducees, and even to be walking in "the way of Cain," which is "the way of *natural religion*," and leads to hatred of the human race, and so makes men murderers; he "so mingles truth with fable, as to undermine where he professes to confirm the Word of God"—for "it has been well remarked that scepticism is far more dangerous when it clothes itself in Scripture than when it presents itself in its native audacity;" his works "leave no impression of any absolute conviction of truth"—they are marred "by this continual dabbling with infidelity;" he "labors to set wrong the right, and to make dark the clear," to "misrepresent and lower the sacred history." The "freshness and manly independence in his tone of thought" are admitted but they are of no value, since not "guided by that 'hidden wisdom which God has ordained.'" It is even owned that he is "never willfully dishonest," but that only his "invincible prejudices" are at fault. On the whole, "he gives the impression of a man ever learning but never able to come to the knowledge of the truth."

To the hard names which have been bestowed upon Dean Stanley we are not called upon to pay any special attention; the honor of having received them he enjoys only in common with all the prophets which have been since the world began. They have been stored up from generation to generation in cheaply accessible magazines, and been brought out to do service in each successive controversy between progress and prejudice—sometimes, indeed, snatched by men trained to the use of better weapons but unhorsed and excited in the battle, yet ordinarily the resource of "the weakest of mankind,"—to use words of Robertson—"who scarcely know the difference between Mesmerism and Mysticism," or any of the isms which they roll like sweet morsels under their tongues.

But the almost universal dislike of Dean Stanley's doctrinal positions among Churchmen, the belief that they strike at the foundations of vital truth, that they make his continuance in the Church even a thing unfair and wrong, it certainly cannot help being profitable at this time to consider with peculiar care.

Orthodoxy is a term of such variable significance, its methods of statement and defence are just now especially so fluctuating that, lacking clear expression of it in Nineteenth Century

English, and not knowing of anybody whom very many will allow to be its adequate representative, we may be helped to definition by seeing what nearly all who claim to be orthodox agree to be opposed to orthodoxy. Some such help, indeed, we might derive from considering an attitude of indifference to Church place and name, or even of pronounced hostility to Church doctrines; but the more valuable lesson depends upon a more delicate differentiation,—and in our subject we have perhaps the most conspicuous living instance of a Churchman *con amore* whose whole life has been earnestly and anxiously devoted to strengthening the place and influence of the Church in the world, to warding off impending dangers, to smoothing the way to things inevitable, to attracting the best thought of the time to the Christian religion and to Christian institutions, and yet who has earned the dislike and denunciation of all the divers kinds of men who pride themselves on orthodoxy. By a careful review of his life and writings, and by observing what is absent from them, we may hope to determine what is the savor of orthodox salt, and be helped to a correcter estimate of the goodness of the savor. But if this be a help that is not needed, the review may be regarded as simply an attempt to show to what point liberal religious principles have advanced in the Church of England, and what the Broad Churchism of to-day is; for Dean Stanley is unquestionably the chief representative, in the English Church, of an enlightened theology, and his writings, by their extent and character, afford the best field for studying the nature and tendencies of that great Broad Church movement, which has enlisted the hopes and zeal and efforts of so many of the purest and loftiest souls in these latter years.

There was a funeral in Westminster Abbey, a few months ago, such as is rare even in those venerable walls. Lady Stanley's life of unselfish labor, of charity and love, could not receive a tribute too high; but the presence there of Carlyle, and Browning, and Motley, and Gladstone, and Froude, and Lecky, and Max Müller, was chiefly a token of respect and love for one who has placed truth before custom, right before interest, the large before the small, who has held for the Church of his country a regard from the mind of his country which

had been else almost entirely forfeited. Miserable indeed, too miserable to be angry with, seems the man who, floating on the easy stream of popular prejudice, can throw stones at such a life of hardness, and purity, and nobleness, while he chants his own "moral courage."

In the first place, turning to the direct subject, Stanley was born, the son of a broad-minded father, one who afterwards became conspicuous among English bishops for his advocacy of toleration, the only bishop on the bench who ventured in his time to declare that the existing terms of subscription were more than could reasonably be exacted from the clergy, who repudiated the Athanasian damnatory clauses, and who treated Dissenters and Dissent with becoming respect. He passed from his home to Rugby, and became one of Arnold's favorite pupils, inspired with all the lofty views of social and religious institutions which took such strong hold of nearly all the thoughtful minds which came in contact with the great master. The intimacy which Arnold maintained through life with many of his pupils was noteworthy. "I never was less disposed than I am at this moment," he writes to Stanley himself, "to let drop or to intermit my intercourse with my old pupils; which is to me one of the freshest springs of my life." His friendship with Stanley became larger and richer as the latter passed from Rugby to Oxford, to brilliant university successes, and to independent work, and when Arnold fell suddenly in the very fulness of his strength, Stanley's was the office of telling to the world the story of his grand life-struggles. That story, told with a combined power and delicacy that constitute a biography almost unique in interest and value, shows us the nature and strength of the influence under which Stanley was educated. But it is especially interesting to turn over the pages and glance at the letters addressed to himself by Arnold, during the Oxford days. "It does not follow," Arnold says, at the very head of the first letter given, "because one admires and loves the surpassing beauty of the place and its associations, or because one forms in it the most valuable and most delightful friendships, that therefore one is to uphold its foolishness, and to try to perpetuate its faults." He is speaking of Oxford, but other applications immediately suggest themselves to us, as indeed

they did to himself, for at once he added : " My love for any place, or person, or institution, is exactly the measure of my desire to reform them." In the same letter, we find this sharp observation : " Of one thing I am clear, that if ever this constitution be destroyed, it will be only when it ought to be destroyed ; when evils long neglected, and good long omitted, will have brought things to such a state, that the constitution must fall to save the commonwealth, and the Church of England perish for the sake of the Church of Christ." The Tractarian controversy was at its height when Stanley went to Oxford, and naturally formed the subject of many of Arnold's letters. " It is clear to me," he writes, " that Newman and his party are idolaters ; they put Christ's Church, and Christ's Sacraments, and Christ's ministers, in the place of Christ Himself." Again, " and these men would exclude John Bunyan and Mrs. Fry, and John Howard, from Christ's Church, while they exalt the Non-Jurors into confessors, and Laud into martyr!" In another letter occurs this important passage : " Faith is not scriptural, but fanatical to oppose faith to reason. Faith is properly opposed to sense, and is the listening to the dictates of the higher part of our mind, to which alone God speaks rather than to the lower part of us, to which the world speaks. There is no end to the mischiefs done by that one very common and perfectly unscriptural mistake of opposing faith to reason, or whatever you choose to call the highest part of man's nature. And this you will find that the Scripture never does ; and observing this cuts down at once all Pusey's nonsense about Rationalism ; which, in order to be contrasted scripturally with faith, must mean the following some low part of our nature, whether sensual or merely intellectual ; that is, some part which does not acknowledge God. But what I abuse as Rationalism is just what the Scripture commends : knowledge, judgment, understanding, and the like ; that is, not the following a merely intellectual part of our nature, but the sovereign part ; that is, the moral reason acting under God and using, so to speak, the telescope of faith, for objects too distant for its naked eye to discover. And to this is opposed in Scriptural language, folly, and idolatry, and blindness, and other such terms of reproof. According to Pusey, the forty

fourth chapter of Isaiah is Rationalism, and the man who bowed down to the stock of a tree was a humble man, who did not inquire but believe. But if Isaiah be right, and speaks the words of God, then Pusey, and the man who bowed down to the stock of a tree, should learn that God is not served by folly." Finally, the following, the only further extract to which I can give place, is worthy of remark: "I am more and more anxious to organize, I do not say a party, for I dislike all parties; but a system of action for those who earnestly look to the Church as the appointed and only possible means of all earthly improvement for society, whether in its larger divisions or in its smaller. Nothing can or ought to be done by merely maintaining negatives; I will neither write nor talk, if I can help it, *against Newmanism*, but *for* that true Church and Christianity, which all kinds of evil, each in its appointed time, have combined to corrupt and destroy." It requires no great stretch of the mind to discover in these few passages nearly all those important positions potential with which Stanley has identified himself. The first is a protest against stubborn conservatism, especially as concerned with the question of Church Reform. Then comes the principle that the Church is independent of any particular external form, then a protest against Sacramentarianism, a vindication of Dissenters, an assertion of the supremacy of reason in the realm of religion, as everywhere else. And what is the final extract but the Broad Church programme? Indeed Stanley expressly says, in an address delivered in Rugby Chapel two years ago, "The effect of Arnold's character, and the lessons of his teaching have been the stimulus to whatever I may have been able to do in the forty years since I left school; and his words constantly come back to me as expressing better than anything else my hopes and fears for this life, and for the life to come."

I have said that Stanley's university career was a brilliant one. He entered Balliol College as an Exhibitioner in 1834, won the Ireland Scholarship, and took a first class in classics three years later, then the Latin essay prize, and in 1840 the English essay and theological prizes. He was at this time a Fellow of University College. and here, as tutor and examiner, he remained for many years. In 1851 he was appointed Canon

of Canterbury, in 1858 he was elected to the Professorship of Ecclesiastical History at Oxford, and in 1864 he became Dean of Westminster. To this brief biography can only be added mention of his journeys in the East, journeys undertaken largely for purposes of study, and which have served to vivify the pages of his lectures on the Jewish and Eastern Churches, and has given us the most interesting book extant on Sinai and Palestine.

The life of every such man as Dean Stanley is to be sought, for the most part, in his words. Although he is notably a many-sided man, one who reads all kinds of books, and whose interests are almost as wide as art, and science, and ethics, yet the great objects of his life range themselves naturally under a few heads. He has himself furnished us with a classification which is substantially complete. In the preface to his *Essays on Church and State*, reprinted because he thought it "well to leave on record the grounds on which a long battle has been maintained," he sums up the reflections which he trusts will be borne in mind in the perusal of the book.

I. In the first place, he dwells upon the advantages of studying extinct theological controversies, noting the convulsions which for a time agitated a whole empire, church, or community, but which have now become so utterly dead as to be scarcely intelligible. Controversies of our own time are many of them fast assuming the same absurdity. We find in all the same phenomena—a wild panic, a reckless agitation, an eager conflict, and then a complete subsidence. A knowledge of this should tend to reassure the minds of those who, in their turn, will have to pass through similar storms, and to beget among controversialists a becoming temperance.

II. His most constant aim and most important efforts have been "to maintain the advantages which flow from the Church as a national institution, comprehending the largest variety of religious life which it is possible practically to comprehend, and claiming the utmost elasticity which 'the will of our Lord Jesus Christ and the order of this realm' will permit." His position here is identical with that of Dr. Arnold, and is based upon the principle which dates from Hooker and is chiefly opposed by the influence of Laud. I shall presently show this position in

detail, and here I have only to call attention to the fact that in all the controversies in which Dean Stanley has been forced to engage, the paramount consideration with him is never the absolute truth or falsehood of the doctrine or method involved in the agitation, but the justification of the right to the belief or the practice within the pale of the Church, if the Church claims in any real sense to be national,—in a word, the enforcement of the great principle of toleration and comprehension. That he does not believe many of the doctrines at issue both false and mischievous by no means follows, nor that he has not a definite theology himself. This he has, and we shall presently see what it is. That it is not in strict accord with the intention of many of the formularies of the Church he would not hesitate to own; but he would urge that the principles of each of the great Church parties are out of strict accord with quite as many formularies, and that the only proper course is one of mutual forbearance and consent not to press the letter of old forms to full extent, till prejudices gradually die and outgrown words yield to those which are truer and more comprehensive. He feels that such a course subjects the man of liberal views to much misunderstanding, apparent inconsistency, and great difficulties. "Many a time would such a one gladly exchange the thankless labor, the bitter taunts, the 'law's delays,' 'the insolence of office,' the waste of energy," for a life more tranquil and independent. The choice seems to him to be "between absolute individual separation from every conceivable outward form of organization, and continuance in one or other of those which exist, in the hope of modifying and improving it." The most terrible catastrophe that could befall society he believes would be the assumption of such forms by the great existing ecclesiastical or academical institutions, as should render impossible the continuance within them of the more intelligent and inquiring minds. To strive to avert this, to vindicate the right to a place in these institutions, and to endeavor to reform them, bringing them into harmony with the larger truth and new life of the world, he deems the highest duty of thinking men.

III. From the position considered, it is easy to understand his strenuous efforts for the removal of Subscription to the Articles and Prayer Book. Under a strictly literal construction

of all parts of these, every clergyman would be driven out of the Church. Any sort of coercion of opinion is full of mischief, and rigid subscription to a mass of theological statements whose proper study would involve a lifetime cannot help inducing an amount of mental reservation and carelessness concerning sacred things, that must taint the very blood of the Church, while forbidding the most thoughtful and sensitive young men from casting more than a single look in the direction of her ministry. Those who do not sympathize with the Church's general purposes and methods would hardly offer themselves for her ministry at all, or would speedily withdraw as study revealed those objects and themselves to themselves,—and this general sympathy would be a true and sufficient safeguard; all others are certainly open to the gravest suspicions. No conditions, at any rate, should be imposed which limit the scope of free inquiry or stand in the way of the truth that comes from any quarter.

IV. This maintenance of Freedom of Opinion has been one of the two great objects to which Dean Stanley's life has been devoted. We shall see in proper place the results of his own use of this freedom. The necessity of maintaining it during this age of transition and complexity is especially important. It becomes us indeed to be quick to see, willing to own, and glad to retain all that is true and good in venerable confessions and usages. "Only let it be remembered that the one condition necessary for the genuine growth of free and sound opinion in any church is that the minority shall have not only the power but the courage and the will to persevere to the end in publicly denouncing as false what they have declared to be false, in publicly proclaiming as true what they know or believe to be true." "Leave on earth some Christians," wrote Bossuet to Leibnitz, "who will not render impossible infallible decrees on faith, who venture to place religion on a sure foundation, and expect from Jesus Christ, according to His word, an infallible assistance on these matters." "Let me entreat you, in your turn," answered Leibnitz, "to leave on earth some Christians who resist the torrent of abuses, who will not permit the authority of the Church to be degraded by evil practices, and the promises of Jesus Christ to be abused for the establishment of the idol of error."

turning to consider the religious controversies through Stanley has passed and his attitude towards them, it is necessary to remind the general reader, so familiar have violent clamors made the fact—that the various parts of the Church of England are far more hostile to each other, more jealous, more widely divergent in theology, in aims, in objects, and in general tone, than they are in relation to certain of the Nonconforming bodies, or than various denominations, generally speaking, of the American Church. The principal business of the bishops, in this regard, is to pat all parties on the back and tell them how they all are and what peculiar excellences each has—thus giving into the best possible content feelings that are too much to be openly opposed. The High Church party tends chiefly to a more or less extreme Ritualism, adopting vestments and movements, and tones, which bring its worship into the nearest possible accord with that of the Church of Rome; encourages confession, it looks with favor on clerical celibacy and things monastic, it magnifies the sacraments, believes in mystical regeneration, and the “real presence,” multiplies services, passes by on the other side of the way where heretics walk, and consigns them to the “uncovenant-mercenaries,” hates the term Protestant and despises the Reformers, regards the clergy a priesthood and the doctrine of apostolic succession most vital, lauding ever the “reverend fathers in Christ” whom it is ever engaged in stinging and snubbing. The Evangelicals or Low Churchmen, on the other hand, regard the doctrines, for the most part, as the very abomination of the flesh, and those who hold them as disguised Jesuits bent on undoing the Reformation and subvert the religious life of England. The rapid growth of the doctrines fills them with the deepest alarm, and their journals and public meetings are principally devoted to exposing them and protesting against them. They favor evangelical alliances rather than union conferences. They are glad to send men to sit on the same benches with Moody and Sankey, and they labor to convert the Dissenters, and in much co-operate with them. They are especially suspicious of anything sacramentarian or ritualistic, and they are unquestionably the most faithful

conformers to the Articles. It will, of course, be remembered that the extremes of these parties are united or separated Churchmen of all shades of Highness and Lowness. There are very many who must be classified with High Churchmen who are bitterly opposed to St. Alban's extravagances, and very many who must be classified with Low Churchmen, who draw a very sharp line between themselves and Dissenters or their own more Moodyish brethren. Yet when test questions arise we see nearly all ranging themselves pretty sharply on one or the other of the two grounds described. But perhaps the enmity of these two parties to each other is not so great as the enmity of both to the Broad Churchmen. The English people has even seen Dr. Pusey and the *Rock* newspaper shake hands in order to union against their common objects of suspicion. The term Broad Church has a double significance which it is necessary to define, so nice is the differentiation of these things in England. In the first place there is a large body of excellent men, who term themselves Broad and are in the sense of being broad-minded and tolerant, but whose theology can only be termed High-Low, or anything that stands for nothing in particular. In the second place, there are those to whom we are used to restrict the term, who approach Unitarianism in doctrine, who dwell upon the humanity of Christ and the divinity of humanity, who make salvation depend upon character, who have cast off belief in eternal punishment, who apply free and common rules to the interpretation of the Bible, who lay little or no stress upon miracles, who, in short, have labored to lift the Church and alter its formularies into conformity with or out of opposition to the highest culture of the age. Founded by Arnold of Rugby this school, always suspected and never large, has numbered such brilliant men as Maurice, Kingsley, Milman, John Robertson, Stopford Brooke, Colenso, and Stanley. These men, though keenly alive to what they count the faults and falsehood of both Sacramentarianism and Evangelicalism, have been quite content to rest the case against them on argument and have originated no prosecution of members of either of the two great parties. Such prosecution indeed would be opposed to the very central principle of their system, which

that every honest opinion shall have its natural scope. If the other parties assumes the right to monopolize it, and is constantly bringing both its neighbors to the Court of Arches. Hence it happens that each of the parties, during the last thirty years, has had to vindicate its life, in the midst of agitations which have shaken it to its very foundations and kept the hot fires of discordant hatred continually fanned into fierce flame. On this Dean Stanley has sought to turn men from their animosity to a calm consideration of the real issues and to enforce his great principle of comprehension. In his successive essays, we shall not only make plain the points but get a very good insight into the condition of English Church affairs.

In the Gorham controversy, the first of these great battles, is the question whether Calvinism is admissible within the Church of England. Bishop Phillpotts, of Exeter, refused to give Mr. Gorham in a living to which he had been presented, and put him through an examination of one hundred and thirty questions, which elicited the fact that he held that regeneration is not conferred in baptism, and in particular that infants are not made therein "members of Christ and children of God," as the catechism and formularies of the Church declare them to be. On this Mr. Gorham instituted proceedings. The Court of Arches decided against him, and baptismal regeneration to be the doctrine of the Church of England. Mr. Gorham appealed to the judicial committee of the Privy Council, and the previous judgment was reversed. It seemed that very different opinions on the subject had been held by the Reformers, that differences of

many such points were always thought consistent with subscription to the articles, and that opinions like Mr. Gorham's had been maintained without censure by many eminent divines. Mr. Gorham was accordingly instigated by the large body of evangelical clergy who had threatened secession in the event of a contrary decision.

It was impossible for Dean Stanley fully to sympathize with either party to this controversy. He could only

make it the occasion of pointing out the composite character of the Church's structure, the undoubted fact which Chatham expressed when he spoke of "the Popish Liturgy, the Calvinistic Articles, and the Arminian Clergy." The formularies have a mixed origin, the one part being an adaptation of the old Roman usages, the other the independent doctrines of Cranmer and Abbott. If one party cannot abide the one so strictly the other must fall by the other. Only by an agreement to let the opposing principles stand together can the National Church continue. This agreement, the comprehension of various elements, Stanley counts the highest advantage. So the Church's learning is enriched by rival schools of theology, and men are kept from laying all stress on one side of religious truth. He would be the last to deal harshly with men so able, so zealous, and so devout, as many of the High Church party have proved themselves to be; but they cannot be too often reminded that other parties have the same rights as themselves. By the very conditions of its being, the Church is not High, or Low, but Broad.* Men say to him, "Has the world ever before seen—does there now exist anywhere—another example of a religious sect or community which does not take one side or the other clearly and distinctly, upon at least a very large proportion of these doctrines?" He answers: "Yes; the world has seen one example at least, of a religious community, whose highest authorities did refuse to take one side or the other clearly and distinctly on the questions which were brought for their decision. There was once a council, in which, 'after much disputing,' it was determined not to 'put a yoke upon the neck of the disciple which neither their fathers nor they were able to bear;' and to whom 'it seemed good to lay upon the Church no greater burden than these necessary things, from which if the brethren kept themselves they should do well.' . . . There was once a controversy which distracted the Church with 'doubtful disputations,' and the answer which came from an authority now revered by the whole Christian world, was a decision which

* This term, since applied in a more restricted sense, was first used by Dean Stanley in his essay on the Gorham Controversy, having been suggested to him by Arthur Clough.

decided nothing, except that each party might be left to its own convictions, however opposite and contradictory they might be. 'Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. He that regardeth the day regardeth it unto the Lord, and he that regardeth not the day, to the Lord he doth not regard it.' " Descending "from that sacred atmosphere to the earth-born mists" of the Gorham controversy itself, he first notes the shifting character of the dispute in its various stages. "Down to the moment of the Judgment, 'Regeneration' was the word on which the whole question hinged. The moment that the Judgment was pronounced, 'Regeneration' was discarded, and a totally different phrase and idea,—'the Remission of Sins' was substituted for it. When we ask what is meant by 'Remission of Sins?' that expression itself changes into the 'Remission of Original Sin,' " &c. The statements continually crumble. The extremes are doubtless different, but the intermediate stages are absolutely indistinguishable. "Are those, who maintain the change in baptism to be an unconditional change of relation, divisible by more than a hair's breadth distance from those who believe it to be a conditional change of nature? Are those who believe in the conditional regeneration of adults," like Bishop Phillpotts, "so essentially different from those who believe in the conditional regeneration of infants," like Mr. Gorham, "that the same Church cannot contain them both?" In short, when the parties succeed in understanding themselves and making themselves intelligible, it will be quite time for those who have real things to attend to, to enter into the details of their controversy. A few things only are worth observing. The doctrine of the efficacy of Infant Baptism was not declared by any of the early creeds nor enjoined by the councils. The Bishop of Exeter succeeded indeed in raking out a canon of the Fourth Council of Carthage, which directs that no one should be ordained a bishop unless he believed original sin to be remitted in baptism. But there is much reason to believe that these canons are a forgery, from beginning to end; and, moreover, they direct with the same explicitness "that no bishop shall read a Gentile book," or "ever ordain a clergyman who has been twice married or who has married a widow." Thomas à Kempis, who

represents the best religious spirit of the Middle Ages, the very object of whose book is to build up the soul of the believer, never alludes to the doctrine now declared to be the necessary basis of all Christian education. With scarcely an exception, the doctors and divines of the Elizabethan age held doctrines inconsistent with the High Church view. An enquiry into the history of the doctrine "would show the immense elevation of the apostolic times above those which immediately succeeded, and the long toil by which subsequent ages have labored, consciously or unconsciously, to work back to that divine original from which the Church so suddenly and sadly fell. It would show, too, "how great is that agreement amongst all serious persons, certainly in this age, and, probably, in most ages, on the only point which really affects their practice." What Baptism was in the apostolic age it surely is not difficult to determine. "The plunge into the bath of purification, long known among the Jewish nation as the symbol of a change of life, was still retained as the pledge of entrance into the new and universal communion." "But gradually the consciousness of the 'answer of a good conscience towards God' was lost in the stress laid with greater and greater emphasis on the 'putting away the filth of the flesh.'" Nothing existing offers a likeness to the extraordinary ceremonies detailed to us as having been universal in the Church of the fourth and fifth centuries,—*"the exorcism and ex-sufflation,—the torchlight of the midnight hour,—the naked figures, plunging into the deep waters of the bath,—the bishop, always present to receive them as they emerged,—the white robes,—the anointing with oil,—the laying on of hands."* Immersion, even on death-beds, was deemed all but absolutely necessary. Only let a person be wrapt in water and he was redeemed. It was held that the boy Athanasius performed a valid baptism when he threw water in jest over his playmate, in the name of the Trinity; that the penitent thief in the water that rushed from the wound of the Crucified received the baptism which had else been withheld. Not upon the effect of divine grace on the soul, but of the actual water upon the body, were hopes of immortality built. The conclusion followed that the natural end, not only of all heathens, but of all the patriarchs and

nists of the Old Testament, was in the realms of perdition, and, last of all, that infants, dying before baptism, were consigned to the everlasting fire. Chiefly through the means of Augustine, this belief became universal. At last, however, the humanity of Christendom revived. One by one the chief strongholds of the ancient belief yielded to purer and loftier instincts, and now the superstition lingers only in the half-civilized churches of the East, in the sect of Baptists, and in that region in which the Gorham controversy raged. Let us trust that the moral and spiritual character of religion will not much longer have to suffer from such struggles.

2. The High Church party in its turn has been made to stand at the bar. I do not propose here to enter upon a history of the remarkable development of Ritualism in the English Church in our time, nor shall I specially refer to any of those trials in which the principles of the High Church party have been more or less successfully maintained. I have only to state Dean Stanley's position in regard to the general subject, which he has treated with great clearness and fulness. In the first place is to be noted his strong vindication of the right of the Ritualists to place within the Church. More than any other party indeed, do they expose themselves to the charge which has been made against them of being "Nonconformists within the Church."

"They introduce practices into its worship which confessedly have not been in use since the time of Elizabeth. They desire to substitute for it, as far as outward forms, gestures, dresses, teaching, suppressions, interpolations will allow, the worship of another Church. They speak with the utmost disparagement of the Articles. They explain away the meaning of them to such a point as to reduce them to an absolute nullity. They set aside the authority of bishops almost as entirely as if they were Presbyterians or Independents. They abhor the union of Church and State, on which the whole of the existing constitution of the Anglican Church is founded. They belong to a party which has, in late years at least, always attempted to claim the Church for itself. They present, therefore, the extremest case which can arise, to test the comprehensiveness of the National Church. But to that comprehension they are fully entitled, when they do not violate the wishes and rights of their congregations. As we would wish to include the Nonconforming members of the Church who are without its pale, so we would wish to retain those Nonconforming members who are within its pale."

The sole ground for action against the High Church clergy he holds to be their placing themselves in direct antagonism

to their congregations. Such cases have been by no means unusual in England during the last few years—cases where hot-headed incumbents have violently persisted in ceremonies which met with almost universal protest, and which, more than once, have been preserved from forcible interruption only by the presence of the police.” “Whenever such a collision occurs,” remarks Dean Stanley, “the authority of law, whether through the bishop or the legislature, should intervene—not on account of the ceremony itself in question, but to suppress an enormous scandal, to protect a congregation whose legal rights are outraged, to check a breach of the first maxims of Christian faith, charity, and wisdom. We are not disposed to overstate the extent to which Episcopal authority should be strained. In matters of opinion, a bishop is a man and nothing more. The value of his sentiments depends on the weight of character, learning or genius which he brings to his high office, or which his high office evokes. But in matters of discipline, if in anything, he has a claim to be heard.” It is important to observe that the High Churchmen, if they have repeatedly ignored the rights of congregations, have also treated Episcopal admonitions with constant disrespect, and often with open insult. As Dean Stanley remarks, “It has been reserved for those by whom the bishops are professedly regarded as the successors of the Apostles, as the one evidence of a true Church, to treat them with a contempt and a defiance altogether peculiar to themselves.”

Turning to consider the questions of Ritualism itself, he finds along with a notable development in this century of a love of beauty and of antiquity, “that amongst all educated men there is an increasing sense of the solemnity and grace of simplicity in all public ceremonials—an increasing impatience of anything which distracts the attention from the inward to the outward in matters of real importance. . . . It is a characteristic story told of M. de Tocqueville, that, when standing on the steps of the throne on the august occasion of the opening of Parliament, he watched in silence the gathering of the Peers in their scarlet robes, the entrance of the Sovereign in royal magnificence, and then, when he beheld the Commons rushing to the bar in their plain, unadorned, rough, every-day

he exclaimed, '*Voilà, le maître.*' He seemed to see that y was come in the nation, as in a household, when it is wants only who appear in livery, whilst the real master above formality." The sentiment is applicable to the as situation. Men who at this day can waste their ener- ver discussions about vestments and ceremonies, or can serious thoughts upon them at all, simply prove that e not masters of the situation, and must expect to lose luence with a world that has to deal with very real

Dean Stanley assures his brethren who have been so in displaying their wonderful vestments, and those who een so alarmed by the display, that the attempt to give ny theological significance is utter vanity.

at the origin of these vestments. Both their supporters and their oppo- gard them as sacerdotal garments, symbolical of we know not what mys- meanings. Even Milton spoke of them as borrowed from the Flamen's and Aaron's wardrobe. What is the actual case? They have not the tincture of Flamen or priest in their whole descent. They are the of the Syrian peasant or the Roman gentleman, retained by the clergy y had been left off by the rest of society; just as the bishops long pre- e last relics of the flowing wigs of the time of Charles II; as the Blues recall the common dress of children under Edward VI; as Quakers the sober costume of the Commonwealth; as a clergyman's bands, ve been regarded as symbolical of the Cloven Tongues, of the two Testa- the two Tables of the Law, are but the remains of the turned-down e time of James I. Their very names bear witness to the fact that s originally no outward distinction whatever between clergy and laity. s strike, if they have any historical significance at all, at the root of the archical system, of which they are now made the badges and ornaments. ' is but the white shirt or tunic, still kept up in the white dress of the ich used to be worn by every peasant next his skin, and in southern was often his only garment."

ne same way the *cope*, the *chasuble*, and the rest of the ing garments are found to be only disguised, old- ed smock frocks or overcoats. In adhering to such clergymen, so far from dignifying themselves, simply o lag behind the rest of mankind. It is interesting to n this connection, that "in the oldest Roman mosaic, the church of Sta. Pudentiana, of the fourth century, ostles are represented in the common classical costume age. No thought had entered the mind of the Church, at that time, of investing even the most sacred personages

with any other than ordinary dresses." Dean Stanley cannot help observing that all this painful striving, on the part of the Ritualists, after a system which they have not, is offensive to common sense. "To Roman Catholics the attempt appears ludicrous. The walls of the Vatican resound with laughter at the reports which penetrate thither of the mimicry of rites which are natural to them, but which they feel must be artificial to others." He is reminded of a story which Sir Walter Scott used to tell with much zest "of a man who tried to frighten his friend by encountering him at midnight on a lonely spot which was supposed to be the resort of a ghostly visitant. He took his seat on the haunted stone, wrapped in a long white sheet. Presently, to his horror, the real ghost appeared, and sat down beside him, with the ominous ejaculation, 'You are a ghost, and I am a ghost; let us come close and closer together.' And closer and closer the ghost pressed till the shamed ghost, overcome with terror, fainted away. This we fear, is the fate which awaits the Ritualist imitators of the Church of Rome. That mighty ghost—the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire—the ghost of the dead middle ages—will press closer and closer to our poor dressed-up ghost, till the greater absorbs the less, or deprives it, by mere juxtaposition, of any true spiritual life."

But the real danger of this ecclesiastical movement is far deeper than any matter of vestment or ceremonial. "It is the exaltation of the minister into a priest, and the exaltation of the priest into an indispensable channel of communication between God and man." This comes out sharply in the development of the view of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, which the Ritualists make the center of their new practices. But the principle is asserted everywhere, in their doctrines of Baptism, Absolution, Apostolic Succession, and everything in the same field.

"They unquestionably profess to believe, that they are the depositaries of mystical, preternatural, almost magical influences, independent of any moral or spiritual graces, and communicated to no one else but themselves. One of the leaders has said that the opposition to their system is tantamount to a rejection of 'the belief of any medium between the soul and God.' This is probably a true expression of the state of the case. The acceptance or the rejection of this belief is the turning-point of the whole controversy. Helps, indeed, assistances innumerable

able, not only through the clergy, the Sacraments, and the Bible, but through example, through art, through nature, through science, through history, through poetry, through church, through home, through school, through advice, through love, through friendship, the human soul has always needed, and will always need, in her arduous, ever-retarded, upward flight towards a better world. But the belief in a fixed, external, necessary 'medium between the soul and God' on earth, is exactly that which—if we have rightly read the Psalms of David, the Epistles of Paul, and the Gospel of Christ—if we have learned anything from the sufferings and scandals of the Church before the Reformation and since—true Religion is always striving to dispense with, and the more it can be dispensed with, the nearer and higher is the communion of the human spirit with its Maker and its Redeemer."

Growing out of these sacerdotal pretensions is the extreme intolerance of the school. It is better for men to be busy about a stole or an attitude than to be always hunting for heresy. We have noticed the endeavors of the High Churchmen to drive out those who did not believe in baptismal regeneration. Towards the Liberal party in the Church their hostility is even more intense. They are ever sounding the tocsin of war against the advocates of Biblical criticism or any free inquiry. The Christian graces, almost the existence, of the non-episcopal Churches, they insultingly ignore. Another characteristic of the party is its anti-social and anti-national tendency, and especially its jealousy of the civil power. Hence the repugnance to the decision of ecclesiastical matters by any but ecclesiastical tribunals, the studied disparagement of Parliament, the increasing hostility to the nomination of the higher dignitaries of the Church by the Government. "The intervention of the supreme authority of the State to give the august sanction of the law and of the commonwealth to the highest offices of religion, is regarded as an intrusion into the sanctuary." "It would seem as if the partisans of this school read the apostolic precept backwards, and made it their avowed principle to resist every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, and to disobey the powers that be because they are not ordained of God." "Of all the deviations from the grand traditions of the Reformed Church of England on which the Ritualist party is embarked, none is wider than their repudiation of that joint action of Church and State, that subordination of the clerical power to the supremacy of law which forms the crowning characteristic of the English Reformation, of sound English philosophy and theology." Men

may be indifferent to silly ritualistic strifes, but the encroachments of this subversive sacerdotalism must be carefully watched and stoutly resisted.

3. The famous "*Essays and Reviews*" was the occasion of the arraignment of the Broad Church party. Dean Stanley's treatment of this case possesses of course a double interest, as the objects of persecution were his own brothers in the faith, and his defence of them is the defence of his own position in the Church. It is impossible here to give more than the merest sketch of the history of "*Essays and Reviews*," or to enter upon any analysis of it whatsoever; but this is of the less account, since every one at all familiar with modern religious controversy may be supposed to need no information on the subject, and since Dean Stanley's comments will very fully show the character of the work to any readers who chance to be uninstructed.

For many years the more liberal-minded English Churchmen had been planning the establishment of a journal to treat theological subjects in the free and scientific manner common in France and Germany, and it was this scheme, long delayed and hindered, which bore fruit in 1860 in "*Essays and Reviews*," a volume to which seven eminent (one Broad) Churchmen contributed articles of varied character and unequal importance. The preface stated that the authors were responsible for their respective articles only and had written in entire independence of each other, without concert or comparison. Dr. Temple, the master of Rugby, and Professor Jowett were the best known of the essayists; Professor Powell, who died just after the appearance of the book, Mr. Goodwin, Mark Pattison, now rector of Lincoln College, Dr. Rowland Williams, and Mr. Wilson, being the other five. Dr. Temple's essay had previously been read as a sermon from the Oxford University pulpit, without exciting remark. Its subject was the Education of the World, and all that can be said of it is that it states with some freshness a doctrine "as old as St. Paul." Prof. Jowett's essay, the last and the most valuable of all, was an attempt to clear away some of the misconceptions which hindered a true understanding of the Bible. Dr. Williams's essay was in the same direction, couched in sharper terms and taking the form of a review of Bunsen's

writings. Mr. Pattison wrote of the Tendency of Religious Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Mr. Wilson in defence of the principle of a national church, and Mr. Goodwin on the relations of Genesis and Geology. The book attracted little attention at first, but presently the Westminster Review arraigned the authors and implored them to leave the Church and embrace Comtism. This fired the train. The High and the Low caught up the cry and the Church was in uproar. The absolute unity of the book was assumed and it was declared to be the sign of a terrible conspiracy. The Essayists were the "seven stars in a new constellation," or "the seven extinguishers of the seven lamps of the Apocalypse," or "the seven Champions not of Christendom," or "the *Septem contra Christum*." The feeling led to the rejection of Max Müller at Oxford, together with an anathema against "the intellectuals." Meetings of the clergy were held to condemn the book, which they claimed the privilege of never having read. Extracts framed or prefaced in the most misleading manner were spread broadcast,—and the portent which the masses of English people were made to believe had appeared was that of "seven infidels, in the disguise of clergymen, asserting that the whole Bible was a fable, denying the truth of Christianity and repudiating the existence of God." Presently a Buckinghamshire clergyman published a letter, signed by every member of the then Bench of Bishops, passing an unqualified censure upon the book. This condemnation ought not to be forgotten,—for if the infallibility fever spreads, it may sometime prove to be a pill as useful as the case of Galileo for the present Roman malaria. It must be noted too that the most distinguished of the prelates who allowed the stream of a violent public prejudice and ignorance to drive them to this indiscriminate attack, have come forward to vindicate the cause of truth and freedom and to extricate themselves from their pitiable position. Convocation met immediately after and a vote of thanks was passed to the Bishops, though not without a sharp protest on the part of all the better members against the whole iniquitous proceeding. A Memorial condemning certain extracts—some of which simply stated the first axioms of theology—was sent to every clergyman of the Established Church, with an adjuration "for the love of God"

to sign it, maintaining "without reserve or qualification the Inspiration and Divine Authority of the whole Canonical Scriptures, as not only containing but being the Word of God" and "that the 'punishment' of the 'cursed,' equally with 'the life' of 'the righteous,' is 'everlasting.'" This declaration was signed by about half of the 20,000 clergy, the names of nearly all the deans, heads of colleges, and Oxford and Cambridge professors, being among the absent. "I cannot consider them," said Bishop Thirlwall, referring to the signatures to this remarkable document, "in the light of so many ciphers which add to the value of the figures which they follow; but I consider them in the light of a row of figures preceded by a decimal point, so that however far the series may be prolonged, it can never rise to the value of a single unit." The difference between 11 and 11,000, was a mere difference of ciphers. At last, the boldest of the Essayists, Dr. Williams and Mr. Wilson, were brought before the Court of Arches, on thirty-two charges of heresy,—and the case was argued with a thoroughness and eloquence rarely surpassed. When Dr. Lushington left the judgment-seat, only five charges of the thirty-two remained; and for those transgressions, as he considered them, he simply pronounced the penalty of a year's suspension. But the Essayists appealed from this decision and pleaded their own case before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In the course of those pleadings two of the five charges were dismissed or withdrawn, the three which remained involving the doctrines of Plenary Inspiration, Eternal Punishment, and Imputed Righteousness. After a delay of six months, the Judgment was given; it was declared that not one of the doctrines was a necessary doctrine of the Church of England, and the Essayists were left masters of the situation, though the more rash among the defeated cried, "If they cannot be hanged by Law, they shall be hanged by Lynch Law." "We will have no silver nor gold of Saul nor of his house," was the passage which Whately used to quote as illustrating this dogged pertinacity. ". . . . Let seven men of his sons be delivered unto us, and we will hang them up unto the Lord in Gibeah of Saul."

The "*Essays and Reviews*" case was discussed by Dean Stanley in two very exhaustive papers, the first published

the panic which succeeded the appearance of the book, and after the final judgment was pronounced. Observing first place that it was a book intended for scholars and clergy were themselves responsible for spreading it among people unprepared for it, he finds fault with its negative form which some of the essays assumed, presses upon the position formerly declared by Mr. Wilson that "no member of a communion or society is bound, by public or private duty, to unsettle received opinions, if they may seem to be erroneous, unless he have a reason, as it appears to him, that he shall be able to supply a better in their place. We should not rob weak wayfarers of this worldly scene, of the reeds on which they lean, nor can strengthen their feeble knees, or supply into their hands stronger staves to lean on." It seemed to him that Williams and Mr. Wilson were so absorbed in breaking down that they forgot to supply the staves. Passing to the questions of inspiration, he condemns the ignorance or perverseness of injournals like the *Quarterly Review* in propagating the notion that the volume contained anything new in the way of criticism. If it constituted an epoch in the English Church, it certainly did not in Christendom. Herder, Schleiermacher, Neander, DeWette, Ewald, all had worked in the same direction,—and so had Coleridge in England, and all of them had come under his influence. "The Epistle to the Romans was not written by Paul;" "the Book of Zechariah is of later date,"—such were the startling discoveries which ought to threaten the overthrow of Christianity. But the origin of the epistle was never settled, and its non-Pauline origin was not the accepted doctrine of all the most educated divines of Germany and England. Mounting to the question of Inspiration, Dean Stanley remarks that it is a question to be solved not by speculating what the Bible ought to be, but by what it actually is, and he notes as "a striking proof of the unanimity of biblical scholars on these subjects, that the few attacks on the present volume written with any candor or learning, exactly, though unconsciously, coincide with it on the points which have provoked the most excitement.

Another question raised by the volume is the relative value of External and Internal Evidence. In some minds and a the passion for external signs has been so engrossing, that the simple appeals to conscience and to the moral beauty of the Gospel have been accounted useless or heretical. The tendency has not been universal. Even Justin Martyr, in the morning of the church's history, rarely, if ever, appeals to miracles. At the beginning of this century, Coleridge vigorously protested against Paley's argument from miracles. The coarser doctrine is in favor, the doctrine which rests religion on mere power. Essayists tried to thrust the pendulum back.

"They do not deny miracles, but they feel the increasing difficulty which scientific and historical criticism places in the way of the old, unreasoning reception of mere wonders as interferences with natural law, or as absolute proof of a Divine Revelation, irrespectively of its contents. . . . They have attempted, in some mistaken or not—to place Christianity beyond the reach of accidents, within the sphere of science or criticism; to rest its claims on those moral and spiritual truths which, after all, are what have really won an entrance for it into the heart, not only of the wise, but of the poor, the ignorant, the afflicted, in every age of the world." "In the culminating instance of the Resurrection of Christ, the whole subsequent history of the Christian Religion,—the whole of that cheerful, hopeful, victorious aspect, which so characterizes both its actual triumph over the world, and its leading turn of mind,—doctrines,—appear to us living testimonies both to the historic truth, and to the endless moral significance, of that greatest of all events which profane or secular annals record. But our own assurance of this, and of like occurrences is important, ought not to blind us to the fact that the very events and words which to us are helps, to others are stumbling-blocks; and, though we are loath to treat those who prefer to lean on other and, as they think, more secure foundations, with the tenderness with which we cannot doubt that they would have been treated by Him who blessed with His sacred presence the sincere inquiry of the doubting Apostle,—and to whom the craving for signs and wonders was a manifestation of love and faith, but of perverseness and unbelief. And if in our studies we find that the limits of the natural and the supernatural are less definite than once imagined, this may well be a cause, not of fear and regret, but of thankfulness and hope."

But it is plain that, however strong Dean Stanley's apology for the doctrines of the Essayists themselves, his most anxious endeavor is to vindicate his great principle of comprehension in their case as well as that of the other great parties in the Church. He notes for especial condemnation the assaults against certain writers on the simple ground of their being clergymen. "The lay contributor, however offensive his statements, is missed 'as comparatively blameless.' But the Christian minister

ter, it is said, has 'parted with his natural liberty.' It is almost openly avowed (and we are sorry to see this tendency as much amongst free-thinking laymen as amongst fanatical clergymen) that Truth was made for the laity and Falsehood for the clergy—that Truth is tolerable everywhere except in the mouths of the ministers of the God of Truth—that Falsehood, driven from every other quarter of the educated world, may find an honored refuge behind the consecrated bulwarks of the Sanctuary. Against this godless theory of a national Church we solemnly protest." He does not deny that the whole state of subscription is fraught with evil. But the questions raised by the Essayists, with very few exceptions, he accounts beyond the range of the Formularies. "In spite of all the declamations on the subject, no passage has ever yet been pointed out in any of the five clerical Essayists which contradicts any of the Formularies of the Church in a degree at all comparable to the direct collision which exists between the High Church party and the Articles, between the Low Church party and the Prayer-book." Inspiration, prophecy, miracle, are nowhere defined. There are indeed contradictions. Mr. Wilson's speaking of the Athanasian creed as "unhappy" is doubtless repugnant to the Eighth Article, but so was Archbishop Tillotson's celebrated "wish that we were well rid of it." His belief that virtuous heathens will be saved doubtless opposes the Eighteenth Article, but so does St. Peter's declaration that "in every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted of him." And if agreement with every statement of the Formularies is the condition of a place in the Church, "all clergymen of whatever school, who have the slightest knowledge of their own opinions and of the letter of the Prayer-book and Articles, must go out one by one, beginning with the Archbishop of Canterbury in his palace at Lambeth, even down to the humblest curate in the wilds of Cumberland." There may be danger in such enquiries as those of the Essayists, but there is greater danger in their suppression. "Doubt," says Professor Jowett, "comes in at the window when Enquiry is denied at the door;" and Dean Stanley justly observes that the success of the prosecution of the Essayists, in discouraging all biblical study, in declaring a breach between religion and science, between devotion and truth, would have

repelled from the Church's ministry all the higher intelligence and more generous spirits of the rising generation.

"The day is ours," exclaimed the Spartan Brasidas, looking out on the approaching enemy through the gates of Amphipolis,—*"I see the shaking of the spears."* "We too," Dean Stanley, quoting the incident in his second essay, "seen 'the shaking of the spears.'" The unsteadiness and oscillations which marked the attack upon the Essayists, show that the alarm and the animosity engendered had no deep roots in the convictions of the Church and the nation. The doctrine of Plenary Inspiration, which the council decided against, was no longer held by intelligent and devout men. "Inspired" is a peculiar fulness by the Divine Spirit, by whose inspiration every good thought comes into the heart of man, the Bible taken as a whole, "The Word of God;" it is, in the general sense as we speak of a church as "the House of God" or a prophet as "the Man of God," but in no other sense. "What the Privy Council has done is to legalize the late opinions of our enemies would say 'heterodoxy,' but we boldly say—latent 'orthodoxy' of the great mass of English opinion on the subject." And so of the doctrine of Eternal Punishment. "How rarely in these modern days have our pulpits resounded with the detailed descriptions of future punishments, which so abound in the writings of the seventeenth century? How rarely does any one even of the strictest sect venture to read such descriptions to any one that he has personally known. The belief, where it exists, is rested almost entirely on a single word, in a single passage in the Bible, the interpretation of which is very doubtful. But the belief has been rejected by the leading spirits of the Christian Church from Origen downwards and is now fast dying. It is upon the love of goodness and the hatred of sin, not the hope of heaven or the fear of hell, that worthy action must be based and is based in the future." "It was no sceptical philosopher, no rationalist theologian, but the most devout and saintly of the 'most Christian King' of whom, as it was believed by his contemporaries, was revealed the vision, in which his envoys met, by the shores of Palestine, a woman of stately form approaching them, with a brazier of burning coals in one hand, and a vase of water

the other. They asked her who she was, and what she bore in her hand. 'I am,' she answered, 'the Christian Religion—and I come with these burning coals to dry up the rivers of Paradise, and with these streams of water to quench the fires of hell, that henceforth mankind may serve me for myself alone,—may hate sin and cleave to good, for the love of God and for the love of goodness.' A bold, perhaps too bold, conception, but representing a truth on which all Christian teachers would do well to meditate." And the doctrine of Imputed Righteousness, too, of which this decision relieves English Churchmen,—“firmly compacted as the popular theology seemed to be on this special point, on none, we are convinced, is it more entirely 'ready to wax old and vanish away.'”

I have thus followed Dean Stanley through these successive controversies, ranging round the three great principles that are struggling in the Church of England, not more for the sake of illustrating his own positions, than to represent as vividly as possible the present condition of the Church, as far as matters of doctrine and parties are concerned. Upon the various Judgments that have been considered, I shall not introduce any discussion. That all are in accord with the best spirit and culture of the time is at once plain. How different the results of trial before an ecclesiastical tribunal must have been, Dean Stanley has well pointed out, and we can ourselves easily infer from the temper and language we have seen to be current among the clergy during each agitation. That the interpretations of the courts are also accurate, cannot, I think, be gained, though in one or two instances we cannot help feeling the nearest possible approach to a strain. The truth is that the peculiar “heresies” of our time were not foreseen by the Reformers, and it would have been strange had their Articles been so framed as to condemn them in words so exact as to warrant the direct interference of the law courts. But is this the proper criterion for the measurement of the formularies of religion? Are not the Articles and Services of the English Church so unambiguous that they cannot possibly be misunderstood by any whom subtle theological experiments have not trained to find any meaning in any words? Must not many whom the Privy Council cannot condemn, be ever con-

demning their own position by the use of Creeds and Prayers plainly and confessedly repugnant? For how stands the matter, when the courts are all done with and the last has been said? In the Ordination Service the Bishop pronounces these words,—“Receive the Holy Ghost for the Office and Work of a Priest in the Church of God, now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands. Whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven; and whose sins thou dost retain, they are retained;”—yet neither Bishop nor ordained is bound to believe that then and so the Holy Ghost is conferred, or that the power to forgive or retain sins belongs to any man, and if they do not believe it, the form is full of mischief for the congregations who listen, and have not acquired the tact of explaining it all away, and becomes indeed a dreadful mockery. The clergyman must declare, whenever he has baptized a child, that now “this child is regenerate;” he must teach the child in the Catechism, to say that in baptism he “was made a member of Christ, the child of God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven;”—yet may himself reject the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration altogether and preach against it. He must declare, whenever he reads the Communion Service, that upon the cross Christ made, “by his one oblation of himself once offered, a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction, for the sins of the whole world;”—words repeated almost identically by one of the Articles,—yet he may believe the doctrine of Imputed Righteousness a heresy, “ready to wax old and vanish away.” He must pray once a week to be delivered from everlasting damnation, and must declare a dozen times a year, that he who doth not worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, “without doubt shall perish everlastingly,”—yet may utterly disbelieve in everlasting damnation. He must, in ordination, profess to unfeignedly believe *all* the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments,—yet may follow up the profession by *Essays and Reviews*, or *On the Pentateuch*. And such instances we might multiply, none of them taking us beyond the common offices of the Church into that field of the Articles, which we may well be afraid to enter after the mysterious discoveries that have been made there, but whose demands, at any

rate, seem to include belief that Christ's office was "to reconcile His Father to us," that "with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of Man's nature," He sitteth in Heaven, that the good works of unbelievers have the nature of sin," that virtuous men outside Christianity cannot be saved, though they be diligent to frame their life according to the law they profess and the light of Nature,* etc.,—all of which, whether true or false, involve positions of altogether too great importance to be trifled with; positions which it is not ungenerous to suppose most young men cannot very thoroughly have considered; positions which the ordinary mind would conclude a man had no right solemnly to subscribe to, if his opinions were not formed concerning them, and especially if his opinions were opposed to them. "How difficult it is," says Dean Stanley, "for foreigners to understand the institutions of England! What a mass of contradictions is involved in our constitution, in our Church, in our universities! But it is, in fact, a part, not only of 'the system,' as it is called, but of our character, of our situation." And in another place he says, "This double character is not peculiar to the *Church* of England,—it is the characteristic feature of *England* itself. It runs through the whole course of English character and history." He illustrates this by the two theological elements in the Liturgy, the two elements of the language, the struggles of the monarchical and democratic principles in the State, the combination of the collegiate and professorial institutions in the universities. "Our political constitution," he sagaciously observes, "is worked for the most part by the union of a theory and practice utterly at variance with each other. Our judicial courts, civil and ecclesiastical, vie with each other in the mass of irreconcilable doctrines which are involved in almost every turn of their most solemn forms." He is not himself insensible of the dangers

* "There is probably no well-instructed Oxford graduate or minister of the Church of England," says Dean Stanley in his Letter on Subscription, "who, however often he may have subscribed to the 8th or 18th Article, has any hesitation in affirming that it was possible for Socrates and Marcus Aurelius to be saved, by diligence in framing their lives according to the religious law which they professed and the light of Nature; and that the patriarchs, saints, and martyrs of the East, will not perish for the lack of keeping 'whole and undefiled' the doctrines of the '*Quicumque vult*.'"

involved in such a system, but his historical and antiquarian tastes impel him to dwell with special fondness on whatever there is in it of beauty and advantage. Nor can it be denied that it has its beauties and its advantages, and especially that the character upon which it rests is as strong and grand as any which the world has yet produced. "Happy that country," said a visiting sovereign, "where the new is intertwined with the old—where the old is ever new, and the new is ever old." But does any one suppose that the intertwining of old and new is contradictory, or that beauty would suffer by the elimination of what is repugnant in the old? Is England beautiful and strong by reason of this mass of contradictions or in spite of it? I venture to say that wherever such contradictions exist, they are a curse, and are gnawing at the very manhood and integrity of the nation. And that such contradictions do exist, and affect the whole body politic from center to circumference, is a very patent fact. As Republicans, we must check harsh expressions toward what seems to us the childish and enervating pleasure in the gewgaws of a court, and the adulation of the figure-head of royalty by a people for whom royalty has lost all political service and significance. But we may freely say, if we believe it, that these political and social contradictions are the very soil in which flourish abuses as flagrant as any people have to deal with,—fictitious and demoralizing standards of precedence, an iron system of caste, patronage where encouragement to self-help ought to be, assumption and servility of every degree, brutality and ignorance and wretchedness among the poorest classes, which are almost without parallel. "Of institutions characterized by real freedom," said Hegel, "there are nowhere fewer than in England." He said this before the Reform Bill, but even then I do not think it was strictly true. It is true, however, that while perhaps nowhere is liberty so complete and secure as in England, the principle of equality is but just beginning to permeate the social structure. It seems to me that no man of liberal feelings can resist the conviction that the removal of a few of these interesting contradictions, even at the cost, if necessary, of some velvet, and lawn, and high-toned pomp, would do very much to clear the air, to elevate social morality, and strengthen the national life.

may appear something of a digression, but it is not so. The reverence for old things so great as to deaden a quick sense towards their truth or untruth, their righteousness and advantage to men, is a feeling that easily takes root and rises,—and with us there is apt to be allied with the oftener than anything else, a special and indiscriminate reverence for English systems. May our admiration for all that is truly great and beautiful in the English character and English institutions continually grow from more to more,—our English morality and English patience and English resolution.

English reverence are the very bases of our society; the danger which I have pointed out makes it especially necessary to analyze English institutions and clearly distinguish between the good and the evil. But it is not chiefly for the sake of this, that I have introduced this discussion. I cannot deny that, whatever dualisms, whatever interesting contradictions, may exist in the English character and in English institutions, whatever their beauties or their advantages, there is a contradiction whose interest is only painful, one dualism which can only be corrupting to any people,—the dualism of a Church at the altar which utters what is not in the mind and does not reach the soul. It cannot be that Englishmen are so unlike the rest of mankind as to be able to escape the natural results of this practice.* The true solution of the present problem,

as the most flagrant of all these *interesting contradictions* is the continued use of the Athanasian Creed in the services of the Church. The mischievous results are well shown by Dean Stanley, in an article in the *Contemporary Review*, August, 1870.—“There are parish Churches, such as have been graphically described by an eminent pastor, as of his own experience—‘As soon as the Creed begins, the most thoughtful and devout of the parishioners give a signal for sitting down in silence. The rest of the congregation soon follow the example; the responses quaver and fail, and at last no one is left to sing but the children of the choir; and so out of the mouths of babes and fools proceed those terrible denunciations which they are not expected to understand, nor were intended to understand. The evil is aggravated by the fact that even when the Creed is read, it is not the clergyman but the congregation to whose lot falls the duty of listening to these withering declarations; and when it is sung, the whole Creed is committed to the choir, that is, usually on laymen, who are for the most part unaccustomed to the explanations by which the more educated clergy deprive the Creed of its meaning.’” Yet a strenuous effort a few years ago, for the purpose of removing the Creed from the public services, was utterly defeated by a charac-

the only one which can possibly save the Establishment, is of course the adoption of such changes in formularies and worship, that these shall not constantly contradict the positions of those parties in the Church whose rights are recognized. Surely such alterations in the Prayer Book as should leave it neutral towards Unitarians and Trinitarians, silent on questions of inspiration, Baptismal Regeneration, Apostolic Succession, Eternal Punishment, Atonement, and Miracle, need imperil no truth that exists in any of those doctrines, need call on none to surrender them, need forbid their teaching in no congregation where they are valued,—and would turn into services of peace and edification what are now series of reminders of disbelief, of half belief, of bitter strifes, of mortifying defeats, of miserable triumphs. Those who hold the truth should be the last to fear that their views could not abide this equal treatment and would not hold their proper place. All are now condemned; all would then be comprehended. This I say is the only course which to-day can maintain a national Church, the only possible preventive of Dis-establishment in England. That there is any likelihood of the adoption of such a course it is almost wild to suppose. The Church of England seems doomed to sink into a narrow sect along with the other narrow sects, and the dream of the “Christian Aristotles” that here was the possibility of realizing in the national institutions the oneness of politics and religion, to be rudely ended. It is of course in this direction that the efforts of such men as Stanley have tended. By removing subscription to Articles, by relegating this Creed and that office to the back part of the Prayer-book, where, their use outgrown, they should serve merely “to illustrate phases of religious history,” by turning the *musts* of the rubrics into *mays* where disagreement is general, should the first steps be taken. But until such steps are taken, it cannot be denied that the position of the Broad Churchmen is a very difficult and questionable one,—and the plea of greater inconsistency on the part of others is a sorry

teristic rally of that phalanx which we have seen to be always on hand for such work. It should be mentioned here, to the credit of the American Episcopal Church, that it rejected the Athanasian Creed in its very first Convention. It wished to banish the Nicene Creed along with it, but gave way to the demands of the English Archbishops, who made the retention of the creed a condition of consecrating the American bishops.

se for one's own. To our Puritanical minds, the real, ing service which they render to the cause of Truth by as- ng positions which involve so much compromise, must be ly doubtful ; nor can I help believing that all that is really in their work they would accomplish equally effectually as en, while the encouragement to double-dealing and con- with sacred words, which it cannot be denied their exam- as given, to an alarming extent, to those who have not exalted motives and cannot rise to their broad, philosoph- outlook, would be avoided. "The wisdom that is from e is *first pure*, then peaceable."

The founders of the English Church," says Frances Power e, "planted their young tree, not in the open ground, but lower-pot,—a goodly-sized and gracefully formed vase, it e, but still a flower-pot. The tree has long outgrown it; he question is, 'Shall we break open the pot, or suffer the o be dwarfed and stunted for want of free space wherein read its roots?' " And we may further ask whether he is ruest and most valuable friend of the Church, who, lest he ld be called an alien, pushes, with cramped arms, within ot, or who snatches a hammer and leaps to the ground de?

cannot pass from this branch of my subject without allu- to Dean Stanley's brave speech in Convocation at the time e Colenso controversy. This controversy of course ranged substantially the same ground as the "*Essays and Reviews*" and caused a stir which even that case hardly paralleled. substantiated," says an acute writer, "this very remarkable—that, by a series of Articles framed more than two hundred ago, Crowns, Lords, and Commons of England have kept the studies of the twenty thousand professed theologians ngland, so that their average opinions and convictions re- ing the verbal inspiration of the Old Testament are what average opinions of Christendom were two hundred years

It shows that inquiry or criticism, or any study which ves the name of study, on the Scriptures of the Old Tes- nt, has been kept in abeyance among the professed theo- ns of England, apparently on the impression that 'the less n knows the better' about such things. . . . England is

the only country in Christendom where, at this moment, the promulgation of these views could be welcomed with such a howl of indignation and surprise." That this language is not extreme, the most careless reference to the statements drawn out during the agitation will abundantly show. "Every word of the Bible,"—so declared Dr. Baylee, the head of a College which supplies one-twentieth part of the candidates for the English Church ministry—"every syllable, every letter, is just what it would be had God spoken from heaven without any human intervention. Every scientific statement is infallibly accurate, and all its history and narrations of every kind are without any inaccuracy. The words and phrases have a grammatical and philological accuracy, such as is possessed by no human composition." He maintained an almost equal infallibility, for Prayer Book and Articles, to every thing in which he declared every well-instructed and sincerely Christian clergyman must be able to give unfeigned assent and consent. To defend Dr. Colenso in an assembly of such men required no small courage, and of all Dean Stanley's efforts none is more sagacious and manly than this. It is impossible to follow him through his calm and masterly treatment of the legal grounds of the case, by which he proved that to affirm that Bishop Colenso was lawfully deposed would be to destroy all justice and liberty in the Church. Beseeching those who had agreed with him thus far not to deem what had been said less true because their opinions might then diverge, he proceeded to a thorough discussion of the theological questions involved, concluding with these stirring words,—“I might mention one whom you all know, who certainly on some of these matters has openly expressed the same opinions, I mean in principle, as the Bishop of Natal. I might mention one who, although on some of these awful and mysterious questions he has expressed no direct opinion, yet has ventured to say that the Pentateuch is not the work of Moses: who has ventured to say that there are parts of the Sacred Scriptures which are poetical and not historical; who has ventured to say that the Holy Scriptures themselves rise infinitely by our being able to acknowledge both that poetical character and also the historical incidents in their true historical reality; who has ventured to say that the narra-

of those historical incidents are colored not unfrequently by the necessary infirmities which belong to the human instruments by which they were conveyed,—and that individual is one who now addresses you. . . . At least deal out the same measure to me that you deal to him ; at least judge for all by a righteous judgment."

The "*Essays and Reviews*" and Colenso controversies were means of getting English eyes fairly open. Much indeed yet to be done before an enlightened theology will feel itself comfortably at home in the Church ; but thus much surely has been accomplished,—an "11,000," such as that which sent up an astonishing protest against "*Essays and Reviews*," it would be utterly impossible to rally, and if these pages should fall into the hands of any average members of the English Church, they would read such a declaration as that of Dr. Baylee's, which I have quoted, with a start of surprise. Even Bishops getting into the habit of sportively saying, in their charges, that after all it must be owned that the Church has assumed positions concerning the Bible which cannot be maintained.

In representing with so considerable fulness Dean Stanley's part in these great controversies, I have anticipated much that might naturally fall under other divisions of my subject. Especially is this true of many matters bearing directly on the connection of Church and State, a subject which we have seen to be almost constantly present to him. But this subject has received from him separate and explicit treatment. The essential features of the connection of Church and State are that the State should recognize and support some religious expression in the community, and that this religious expression should be controlled and guided by the State. Through all opposition to such recognition and control, Dean Stanley finds that there runs the same distinction between things secular and spiritual—a tacit assumption that some particular ecclesiastical organization is identical with the Kingdom of Heaven, and that all civil organizations are identical with the Kingdom of this world. Truly, in all earthly institutions, the State is that in the improvement and perfecting of which every class in the community has the deepest interest and whose objects should ever be made the chief,—it is what above all other institutions should embody

what is truest and best. "When our Scottish friends say that Christ is the Head of the Church, in any other sense than that in which He is the Head of all Churches and all States alike, they are clothing with a splendid name a very common-place institution." And when the State disregards the very highest of man's interests, Dean Stanley urges that its constitution must be most imperfect. At the start, it must be denied that the Church has any fixed external form or that any people may not adopt such a polity as they deem best suited to give to their religion proper expression and influence. As, in the first ages of the Christian Church, the whole community controlled ecclesiastical affairs, elected ministers, moulded creeds, so must the people of a religious nation deny all clerical independence or supremacy and assume the control of religious affairs, as of all others. The headship of the State in ecclesiastical concerns he believes has these essential advantages:—It secures the supremacy of equal law in the most important of human interests, a calm, judicial wisdom which petty sects, religious zealots, have never displayed. "The chief example of a judge on religious matters whom St. Paul and St. Luke hold up to us as a model of impartial justice, but whose name with ecclesiastical zealots has by a strange mistake of interpretation become a term of reproach, is the Proconsul Gallio. 'He cared for none of these things,' says the author of Acts, with a genuine burst of admiration, as he records his noble indifference to the popular clamor of the Jews at his judgment seat." "When Cardinal Wiseman taunted the Church of England with having appealed from the High Priest's Hall to the Hall of Cæsar, he might have remembered that this was exactly the course gladly pursued by the Apostle Paul before Festus, and that the judgment-seat of Pilate, the Roman magistrate, was the one opening of escape from the dark and iniquitous judgment of the High Priest Caiaphus." Secondly, it gives the highest opportunity for the gradual growth of religious forms and opinions and of that free expression of individual belief which is indispensable to any healthy development of religious action. The Reformation in every country in Europe, except Holland, was carried by the direct intervention and aid of the Government. Nearly all the beneficial changes in the ecclesiastical regulations of England—

those affecting Nonconformists as well as the Establishment—were effected by the Legislature. The various judgments of the Privy Council which we have been considering are acknowledged to have been the results of a wisdom which no excited sectarian tribunal could have summoned. Thirdly, a National Church must be comprehensive,—and Christian life and Christian theology thrive the most vigorously, not by separation, and isolation, and secrecy, but by intercommunion with the domestic and social relations of man. "There is some one," said Talleyrand, "more clever than Voltaire, more sagacious than Napoleon, more shrewd than each minister, past, present, and to come, and that some one is every body." So, says Dean Stanley, in ecclesiastical politics, "there is some one more learned, more able, and more versatile than any individual Bishop—more likely to be right than the Pope of Rome, or the Wesleyan Conference, or the General Assembly—and that is the whole community."

The objection that the incorporation of ecclesiastical affairs with the State causes great difficulty of change in ritual or creed, he answers by declaring that obstacles to advance, when tests have come, have not been from the State properly, but from the Clergy. The facility of effecting all desirable changes would be infinitely increased if the laity appreciated the true import of their position. To the objection of the worldly influences of an Establishment, he replies that it is an evil which depends more on the hierarchical constitution of the Clergy than on the influences of the State. In the Established Presbyterian Church of Scotland it hardly exists at all. For Episcopacy itself Dean Stanley's regards seem to be slight. He thanks the Nonconformists for their vindication of the sacredness of the individual conscience, the ideal of Christian purity, but he believes jealousies and narrowness must most abound in small religious circles. He holds the seats of the Bishops in the House of Lords important, as bringing them into free and equal intercourse with the laity, and under the direct control of public opinion and public questioning. The objection that it is unfair of the State to choose one creed, and set it up above the others, he admits to be a serious one, only to be truly met by making the creed as wide as possible, comprehending the

large majority of the nation. We have already considered his efforts for the enlargement of the Church formularies with a view to this comprehension, and shall notice them further in his letter on Subscription. Lastly, he meets the objection that the State recognition involves an unfair and injurious amount of social disparagement, by declaring that this evil likewise, in England, proceeds not so much from the *national* position of the clergy, as from an ill-understood view of the Episcopal succession; and that it is a fact that the language of American and Scottish Episcopalians is often far more contemptuous towards their Presbyterian brethren than that which is heard from the majority of English Churchmen. By community of preaching with the Nonconformists, and by all possible means, he would endeavor to draw them to the Establishment, and to make the Church truly national. "We do not deny," he says, "that State and Church, each in its relations to the other, as well as each by itself, need immense changes in order to make them represent worthily (we are not now speaking of the political but) the religious condition of England. The State needs to become more and more alive to what it may effect in raising the social and moral position of the mass of our people. The Church needs to be stretched to the utmost limits of which it is capable, in the hope of making it truly worthy of the name of National." But the framework of the system itself he believes, once fairly grasped, will secure a field for religious liberty and religious progress such as the world has never before witnessed. "'A Free Church in a Free State!'" he exclaims. "O most ambiguous phrase! even in the mouth of Cavour, as an eminent foreign statesman has expressed it, but a *mauvais calembour*, but in the mouth of those ecclesiastics who have now taken it under their protection, meaning only too clearly 'an enslaved Clergy amidst an indifferent Laity,'—a State where the Government shall so thoroughly despise the Church as not to think it worth controlling—a Church where the clergy are so dependent either on their congregations or their bishops as to lose the best chances of self-respect and of self-improvement." Not in this sense he ventures to trust the Church of England may continue as "a Free Church in a Free State," but "in the sense of a Clergy whose freedom is bounded only by Law, and a

late in whose free constitution and free press and free aspirations the voice of the Church finds its best expression."

It cannot be denied, I think, that this theory is ideally correct,—and it is to be hoped that the dream of the "Christian Commonwealth" or whatever we may be pleased to call it, which has inspired the world's purest and loftiest minds, will never be allowed to fade. But if we may trust in a time and order in which the springs and essentials of religious life shall be concordantly seen to be in real and necessary oneness with the grounds of political organization, nothing is so surely relied upon as the conviction that no such concord now exists or can speedily exist,—that those very conditions do and ought to obtain, which Dean Stanley himself substantially admits make the identification of Church and State unjust and impossible. When all the compromises and concessions have been made by the Church that it is within the bounds of reason to expect may be made, when indeed the leading Non-conforming Churches shall have been included in the Establishment, as in France, the catastrophe is only postponed, it is not averted. The establishment indeed of hostile sects does not fulfill, nor can it hasten the fulfilment of the idea of the Christian Commonwealth," which demands not legalized discord but organic unity; neither can it be maintained that such a system has any important practical advantages over the Voluntary system, whose history is a simple and adequate refutation of the charges that it means the despising of the Church by the Government and that it imperils, on the part of the clergy, self-respect and self-improvement. The evils of sectarianism are neither to be denied nor extenuated, but the effect of sectarianism, as bitter quite within the borders of an establishment as without, is one whose meaning is not to be defined in a word and whose existence can be terminated by no makeshifts. We may regard it, and I think truly, to use the language of the German metaphysics, as a "mediating" process, which can end in no re-dressed Nicene Catholicism, but only when it has purged from the Church all superstitious notions and accidents, and when the Church,—or whatever that department of the social organism may then be called, whose office is to move men to purity and duty and highest

hope,—becomes universal in interests and methods, its object the promotion of goodness, not of some special theological scheme. Then political and ecclesiastical things may be the same; till then they cannot be.

III. It will naturally be supposed that the attempts in recent times towards the "reunion of Christendom" have not been of a character to earn Dean Stanley's sympathy. "The phrase,—'reunion of Christendom'—as commonly used," besides falsely implying that Christendom has once been united, "is open to the objection that it suggests an organic union under the same ecclesiastical laws and government." Such an idea he holds to be not worth discussing. When we speak of union, we have to aim not at the representation of an imaginary past, but at the attainment of an ideal future. No union on the basis of the same external laws and creeds is desirable,—such a union as would be that of Episcopal against Non-Episcopal Christians or of the Evangelical Alliance against the Roman Catholics. However good, as far as it goes, may be a combination for a particular purpose, it cannot be called a reunion of Christendom, when it excludes vast and beneficent elements, pregnant with immediate and remote advantages. Unity is to be sought only in that oneness of intention which overrides all outward expressions of form or utterance. When it once becomes the chief article of the faith that the object of the Church is to make men better and wiser, and that goodness and truth are the chief offerings in which God delights—then the various objects and forms of religious interest and affection will assume their right proportions. So long as human nature is what it is, moral and intellectual improvement will be sought by different minds in different ways. "The educated world of Christendom has formed a unity for itself, above and beside and without the external unity or divisions of the Churches, in which those who wish can approach each other, without ever touching the barriers which politically and ecclesiastically part them asunder. A French or German Catholic, like Tocqueville, or Remusat, or Döllinger, has far more in common with men like Hallam, or Macaulay, or Tennyson, or Milman, than he has with the partisans of the Court of Rome. A Presbyterian like Chalmers, a Unitarian like James Martineau, has far more in

common with Coleridge, or Arnold, or Keble, than he has with many divines nominally of his own communion. And the higher we ascend in the intellectual scale the more we find the atmosphere to be one of attraction and not of repulsion. The theology of Lord Bacon, and of Bishop Butler, and of Pascal, can be used by Christians of every Church almost equally."

Believing that in spirit, not in external form or creed, true unity must be found, he accounts ecclesiastical confessions generally a great hindrance to the Church. As to the Thirty-nine Articles, Tract XC. had abundantly shown how useless they were in the hands of subtle men. But, looking at them reasonably, it is plain that many of them state truths in terms which many large sections of the Church cannot now account correct. The difficulty of assenting to a great number of propositions on the most intricate and complex subjects that can engage the human mind can scarcely be exaggerated,—and the mischiefs of subscription are much increased by the time of life at which it is usually imposed, that moment of a young man's career when his opinions are in the act of formation, his conscience most tender, the demand for sincerity most imperative. The hardship and evil are increased by the fact that there is hardly a statement to which any objection can be raised, in the Articles, which is not neutralized by some countervailing expression in the Prayer-book. The imposition of subscription habituates the mind to give a careless assent to truths which it has never considered, and naturally leads to sophistry in the interpretation of solemn obligations; and Articles and Liturgy are sure to be turned into weapons of bitter recrimination and exclusion, when controversies arise. It is a well known fact that the intelligent, thoughtful, highly educated young men who, twenty or thirty years ago, were to be found in every Ordination, are gradually withheld from the service of the Church, and from the profession to which their tastes, their characters, and their gifts best fit them. There can be no doubt that this is largely owing to their reluctance to entangle themselves in obligations with which they cannot heartily sympathize and which may hereafter be brought against them to the ruin of their peace and of their professional usefulness. They cannot make the same subscriptions which

were made without difficulty a generation ago. Till 1854, subscriptions to the Thirty-nine Articles were required from all students at Oxford and Cambridge, defended just as clerical subscriptions are defended now, their repeal denounced as "a desecration of what we held to be most sacred ; the destruction of what we deemed most valuable in this life, because it was connected with the interests of the life to come." "Has the faith of either University suffered from the change?" he asks. The effect on the minds of the students was often most pernicious. Bentham, from whom this requirement was made at the early age of twelve, declared that it left a stain upon his conscience which was never effaced in after life, and with this feeling he dissuaded a friend from going to Oxford on the ground that it was "a nest of perjury." How many stains upon the conscience would the history of clerical subscription reveal, if it could be told ! Let the history of the contentions within the Church, exclaims Stanley, tell how successful subscription has been in securing unanimity. As we have before noticed, Tract XC. showed how utterly subscription failed to check Roman Catholic opinions within the pale of the Church. And if the influx of German theology and the advance of criticism has made itself felt, it is not from any relaxation of subscription, but from the fact that the public itself has become impregnated with the doctrines which made their appearance amongst the clergy in point of fact shortly after they had taken root amongst the educated classes. And this public opinion, observes Dean Stanley, going directly to the root of the matter, while irresistible by any formulas, is and always will be the safeguard against eccentricities and extravagances of opinion and practice. The best security for sound doctrine is "the force of truth." The grandeur of Isaiah, the pathos of Jeremiah, the wisdom of Paul, the Divine pre-eminence of the Gospels, we acknowledge all the more readily, because we have not been entrapped into it. Would not an attempt to enforce "the unfeigned assent and consent to all and everything" contained in the *Da Imitatione Christi* and the "Pilgrim's Progress" and the "Christian Year," incalculably pervert and lower our appreciation and reverence of the graces of those works? "During all the ages when the oracle of Delphi commanded

the real reverence of Greece, the place in which it was enshrined needed no walls for its defence. The awful grandeur of its natural situation, the majesty of its Temple, were sufficient. Its fortifications—as useless as they were unseemly—were built only in that disastrous time when the ancient feeling of faith had decayed, and the oracle was forced to rely on the arm of flesh, on its bulwarks of brick and stone, not on its own intrinsic sanctity. May God avert this omen from us!"

This is a most meagre expression of the grounds on which Stanley based the most thorough and satisfying discussion of Subscription which the critical condition of the English Church has called forth, remarking upon the proofs which had before been afforded "that when the time has come for great and beneficent changes of opinion, when the champions of truth and freedom have the will and the power to make themselves heard, when the government of the country has the force and the courage to strike the blow, then the panics of even large portions of the clergy will prove to be so utterly groundless, that they who entertained the fear, the sincere fear, lest the religious faith of the Church should be shaken, will forget the very existence of those outworks which once seemed to them absolutely essential."

IV. In considering the more important and definite results of Dean Stanley's use of that Freedom of opinion to the maintenance of which his life has been so largely devoted, we cannot do better than follow the line which he pursues in his exposition of "the Theology of the Nineteenth Century." That there is such a thing as the Theology of a particular age is obvious and is illustrated by references to the Fathers, the Schoolmen, the sixteenth, the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. And now "there is a wide-spread belief or opinion expressed by many, and felt by more, that there have never been since the Reformation so many symptoms of a theological change; more gradual, perhaps, and less defined, but hardly less universal and important than that involved in the Reformation itself." The main impulse has come now, as then, from the German theologians. "But the effect of this teaching would not have been what it has been had it found a less ready reception in the general literature and in the religious instincts

of all Christendom. The works of Goethe and Walter Scott are full of its savour. It breathes through the whole of Coleridge, prose and verse. It is still more strongly marked in the poetry of Tennyson. It has lit up all the writings of men so different from each other, and yet so important each in his place, as Arnold, Robertson, and Milman." "*Essays and Reviews*" are its direct product, it has inspired all that is most alive in French theology, and the finer minds among High Churchmen and Roman Catholics unconsciously reflect it. This Theology may be considered under its three relations, to the Bible, to general history and philosophy, and to Christian doctrine.

1. The first of these relations is that which received Stanley's first attention and which he has treated most fully. I should like to make extracts from the Sermons on the Apostolic Age, which he preached before the University of Oxford in 1846 and 1847, and which foreshadowed that broad and free method of Scriptural interpretation which he has so well developed. His treatment was entirely based on Arnold's views, and in publishing the Sermons he observed that it was to Arnold that all similar works which he might undertake would in great measure be due. His Sermons on the Form and Substance of the Bible, published in 1863, showed a large advance. In this year also appeared the first volume of his brilliant *History of the Jewish Church*, whose poetical style only warded off an explosion as violent as was caused by the mathematical language of Colenso. It would be quite impossible here to enter upon any review of this extensive work, the third volume of which has just appeared, and I shall simply give one or two instances of the manner in which he approaches the more mysterious questions of the Old Testament history. "Dimly we see and hear," he says, in an eloquent passage on the Tenth Plague, "in the darkness and confusion of that night, the stroke which at last broke the heart of the King, and made him let Israel go. 'At midnight the Lord smote all the first-born in the land of Egypt, from the first-born of Pharaoh that sat on his throne, to the first-born of the captive that was in the dungeon; and all the first-born of cattle. And Pharaoh rose up in the night, he and all his servants, and all the Egyptians; and

there was a great cry in Egypt,—the loud, frantic, funeral wail, characteristic of the whole nation,—‘for there was not a house where there was not one dead.’ In the Egyptian accounts this destruction was described as effected by an incursion of the Arabs. The Jewish Psalmist ascribes it to the sudden visitation of the plague. ‘He spared not their soul from death, but he gave their life over to the pestilence.’ Egyptian and Israelite both regarded it as a Divine judgment on the worship, no less than the power of Egypt.” He would doubtless agree with us when we say that “the prominence given to the destruction of the Pharaoh is not to be taken historically, but as the popular, poetic language of tradition.” And so of the scene at Sinai:—the mountains were arrayed and unclothed, the mountains rose around them; their various shapes and colors were such as to carry their thoughts back to the days of old creation, ‘from everlasting to everlasting,’ before the mountains were brought forth, or ever the earth and the world were made.’ At last the morning broke, and every eye was fixed on the summit of the height. Was it any definite form, was it any distinct shape, that unveiled itself? . . . There were thunders, there were lightnings, there was the voice of a trumpet exceeding loud; but on the mount itself there was a thick darkness. It was ‘the secret place of thunder.’ On the summit of the mountain, on the skirts of that dark cloud, or within it, was Moses himself, withdrawn from view. It is this which represents to us the seclusion so essential to the stern idea—within certain limits so essential to any idea—the prophet; that,—

‘Separate from the world, his breast
Might deeply take and strongly keep
The print of heaven.’”

As to this description of the external circumstances,” says a hostile critic, “Professor Stanley selects none but the natural, such as might have, and no doubt have, been seen and heard a thousand times at Sinai—darkness, clouds, thick darkness, thunder, lightnings. He does, indeed, mention ‘the voice of a trumpet exceeding loud,’ but that he explains in a note—‘Mr. New witnessed a thunderstorm at Serbal, and exclaimed, unconsciously, “How like the sound of a trumpet!”’ . . . Dr. Stanley does not venture to say directly that God did not speak

with His voice, that the people did not hear the words of the Lord out of the fire, but he implies it, and by a quotation intimates that Moses in that seclusion necessary to the Eastern idea of a prophet, and separate from the world, received deeply and strongly in his breast the print of heaven, and from him it was communicated to the people." It would be interesting to follow Dean Stanley through many similar situations, and especially into the field of Prophecy,—but his treatment will readily be inferred by the reader. His efforts have been "so to delineate the outward events of the Sacred History as that they should come home with new power to those who by familiarity have almost ceased to regard them as historical truth at all: so to bring out their inward spirit that the more complete realization of their outward form should not degrade but exalt the Faith of which they are the vehicle."

"We must get rid of our preconceived theories of what the Bible ought to be, in order to be able to make out what it really is. The immense layers of Puritanic, Scholastic, Papal, Patristic systems which intervene between us and the Apostolic or Prophetic ages—the elevation of the point of view on which those ages stand above our own—aggravate the intensity of the effort to the natural sluggishness of the human heart and intellect." "Find out what the sacred writers really said—what they really intended—and then, whatever it be, whether it be prose or poetry, poetry or history, exact accuracy, or manifold inaccuracies, contradictions, imperfections—scientific, historical, linguistic,—that is, what must be included within the range of Biblical Inspiration." The results of modern criticism in determining the composite character of the Books—of the Psalter—of the Pentateuch—of Zechariah—of Isaiah—of the Chronicles—and of St. Luke, in the discovery of the peculiar date, tendency, doctrine, spirit, of each of the books, in fixing the distinction between Prophecy and Prediction, and between the literal and the metaphorical, give us an advantage which cannot be overstated. "Can any one doubt that the characters of David and St. Paul are better appreciated, more dearly loved, by a man like Ewald, who approaches them with a profound insight into their language, their thoughts, their customs, their history, than by a Scholastic or Puritanical divine from whom the

atmosphere in which the king and the apostle moved was almost entirely shut out?" "Does not the very magnitude of the subject thus brought home to us throw our former systems of theology into new proportions? Is it possible that we can now return from this higher knowledge of the Bible to the volumes of the 'Summa Theologiæ' or of the Westminster Confession?"

2. "As the Theology of our age is distinguished by its direct appeals to the facts of the Bible, not to theories concerning the Bible—so also, it appeals to the facts of history, science, and philosophy outside of itself, and endeavors to include them within itself." The mutual connection of the different stages of history, philosophy, and religion is beginning to be understood. The relation towards heathens, aliens, assailants of the established forms of religion, becomes completely shifted. How different too is the spirit in which religion is attacked by those who disbelieve! Compare the polemics of our time with those of the age of Voltaire. The whole principle of the *development* of doctrine is new, yet has taken the first place in every field of religious and philosophic thought. Another great characteristic of modern theology is its emphasis upon the *moral* and *spiritual* aspects of religion,—upon faithfulness and love and truth, rather than upon ceremony and formula and miracle.

3. The relations of modern theology to Christian doctrine are perhaps best illustrated by the entirely new way in which the character of Christ Himself is approached, the endeavor, on the part of men of all schools of thought, to set forth His real mind and minutely delineate His acts. The more this is done, the more fully will be understood the sense in which He was Divine, and the sense in which He was Human. "To know Christ—to ascertain the drift, significance, relative importance, of the tenderness, wisdom, truthfulness, love, comprehensiveness, elevation, of His whole appearance, and of the several parts of it, ought to be the object of the deepest theological researches everywhere. For the sake of a nearer approach to Him, much that shocks, much that distresses, may be tolerated, must be endured. For the sake of this, there are many passages in Renan's work which may be read with the utmost instruction and edification." Even in Keble's poetry this natural,

human manner of approaching the person of Christ is strikingly noticeable. No one who enters into the spirit of his lines can fail to see that the whole question of gradual, imperfect, partial knowledge in Christ is conceded, and that thus the door is freely opened to the student.

"Was not our Lord a little child,
Taught by degrees to pray,
By father dear and mother mild
Instructed day by day?"

Or again :

"E'en He who reads the heart,
Knows what He gave and what we lost, . . .
By a short pang of wonder cross'd
Seems at the sight to start."

"These instances might be multiplied to any extent. It would, of course, be preposterous to press each line of poetry into an argument. But the total result is to show how far nobler, purer, and loftier was what may be called the natural element of the poet's mind, than the artificial distinctions in which he became involved as a partizan and as a controversialist. This is no rare phenomenon."

The fundamental principles of this theology are as old as deep religious and philosophic thought. It can appeal to a long succession of great witnesses. Its character is universal. Its union with the wide-spread religious feelings of the age is the guarantee of its strength. The calmness and confidence of its advocates, contrasted with the alarm and feverish vehemence of its opponents, are pledges of its success. It does not pretend to completeness. The doctrine of progress implies that the full truth is a goal to be reached, not a starting-point. This theology "appeals, so far as it can, to certainties, because it distinguishes between essentials and non essentials, and endeavors to fasten on essentials. It accepts facts wherever it can find them—facts of history, facts of science, facts of philosophy, above all, the eternal facts of the moral nature of God and of man. . . Such an enlargement of our sphere of knowledge, and such a distinction between things and words, truth and custom, will at the outset breed doubt and difficulties. The language of a morbid and despairing theology is, 'Whenever a doubt comes into your mind, fling it away like a loaded shell.' The language of a healthy and hopeful theology is that of Lord Bacon, 'If a

man begins with certainties he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he will end with certainties.' Science, history, and the principles of our moral nature, re formidable antagonists to Theology if she sets herself against them; but they are her very best friends if she takes them as her counsellors, her advisers, her allies."

Upon the question whether the dispensation of the Church self is approaching its close, he thus remarks: "A serious comparison of the actual contents of the Scriptures with the actual course of ecclesiastical events almost inevitably brings us to the conclusion that the existing materials, principles, and doctrines of the Christian Religion are far greater than have ever yet been employed; that the Christian Church, if it ever be permitted or enabled to use them, has a long lease of new life, and new hope before it, such as has never yet been enjoyed. Look at the Bible on the one hand, and history on the other; see what are the points on which the Scriptures lay most emphatic stress; think how much of the sap and life of Christendom has run to leaf, and not to fruit; remember how constant is the protest of Scripture, and, we may add, of the best spirits of the universal Church, against preferring any cause, of opinion or ceremony, to justice, holiness, truth, and love; observe how constantly and steadily all these same intimations point to One Divine Object, and One only, as the centre and essence of Christianity;—we cannot, with these experiences, hesitate to say, that, if the Christian Church be drawing to its end, or if it continue to its end with no other objects than those which it has hitherto sought, it will end with its acknowledged resources confessedly undeveloped, its finest hopes of usefulness almost untried and unattempted. It will have been like an ungenial spring cut short in full view of the summer, a stately vessel wrecked within the very sight of the shore."

Here I must pause in a study which, already far too long, is still most incomplete. It is a study of absorbing interest, and ranges over nearly every important religious issue of our time. It has seemed to me that Dean Stanley's position is one which is quite unique in the number of vital questions which it involves. There is no subject bearing upon the connection of Church and State, upon ecclesiastical polity, upon the rela-

tions of old confessions to the new religious conditions of the age, for whose consideration he does not constitute a natural point of departure, and which he has not himself treated with a combined breadth and acuteness which command the most thoughtful attention. "If we were to attempt a description of Dean Stanley's characteristics," writes one of his admirers, "we should name first, and chief of all, his intense love for the light. His is not the half-despairing cry of Goethe for 'more light,' but the happy radiant hopefulness of the child, whose great joy is 'to go out and see the sun.' He hails it with incense in the morning. He basks in its rays at noon-day, and he watches its departing glories at the sunset hour. He opens every door and every window to let in the light. He is all eye and all ear, quick to receive all knowledge from whatever quarter it comes. He has learned to

'Seize upon truth where'er 'tis found,
On Christian or on heathen ground.'"

If I were to attempt a description of his characteristics, I should say they are the same as those of the wondrous Abbey whose greatest dean he is. In such proportion as old and new, the past and present, Church and nation, history, poetry, and religion, are mingled in the Abbey, so are they in the man. For the rest, I should use his own words. When Milman published his celebrated essay on Erasmus, a friendly critic remarked, "It is the description of himself." And when I turn over the pages of Stanley's essay on Milman, I can but say, 'It is the description of himself.'

"He belonged more to the English nation than to the English Church. His severe taste, his nicely-balanced judgment, his abundant knowledge, his keen appreciation of the varied forms of literary excellence, enabled him to keep always above, and at the same time almost always in sympathy with the intellectual movements of the age. . . . It was a rare spectacle in this age of broken resolutions and half-completed works, to watch his untiring and varied industry, his constant advance in power and knowledge. . . . He had shown that it was possible to combine with the fire of a poet the accuracy of a scholar, and the more unamalgamable qualities of a subtle theologian and profound historian. . . . The main course which he chose was

p that difficult and arduous road of philosophical and religious inquiry which few have walked without stumbling, and from which men of his refined tastes and cautious disposition naturally shrink. . . . He turned not to the right side or the left; only from whatever quarter of heaven or earth, of science or religion, he seemed to catch any new ray of light, thither he turned, with the eagerness and, we must add, with the humility of a child . . . never fascinated by the love of popularity, nor deterred by the fear of unpopularity, from sympathy with an unpopular cause or an unpopular name. Against injustice and intolerance everywhere was raised the protest, sometimes of his dignified voice, sometimes of his no less indignant and significant silence. To him, want of charity and want of truth were the worst of heresies. For him, to do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly with the God of Justice and of Love, were the highest orthodoxy. Many have been the younger and the weaker brothers whom he has cheered, strengthened, sustained, along the dark and perilous way; not, it may be, with the heroic energy of Arnold, or with the soul-stirring fervor of Robertson, but with the hardly less assuring encouragement, because more unexpected, of the world-old, world-wide experience of one who, under his multiform familiarity with many men and many times, had still retained a sympathy and an intelligence for whatever moved the conscience or sought the light, from whatever quarter. So long as he lived, secure in his high position, there was a lasting pledge for the freedom, the generosity, and the justice of the English Church. So long as that frail and yet but venerable figure was seen moving in and out amongst us, so long as that keen bright eye looked out from beneath those kind yet solemn brows, there was a certainty of welcome to every fresh aspiration after life and knowledge; there was a pledge that the catastrophe which he so much dreaded, the severance of the thought of England from the religion of England, would not be wholly accomplished."

ART. II—THE WAGNER FESTIVAL AT BAYREUTH.

By GUSTAVE J. STOECKEL, MUS.D., YALE COLLEGE.

SINCE my return from Europe, whither I went for the purpose of attending the Bayreuth Festival, many of my friends have questioned me about the musical enterprise, in which Wagner intended to prove the correctness of his conceptions of dramatic music. Questions are easily asked, but when we consider that it took Wagner twenty years to compose the Tetralogy, which comprises the Ring of the Nibelungen; when we furthermore consider that the audience was composed chiefly of musicians and art-critics whose opinions about the merit or demerit of Wagner's music by no means agree; I say, when we take all this into consideration, you will easily understand the embarrassment I felt, when such questions were asked of me with the expectation of an answer in one sentence. It is for the purpose of giving a reply, which will be satisfactory to myself, and also I hope to my readers, that this Article has been prepared.

So much *pro* and *con* has been written about Wagner and his music, that I propose first to say a few words about the principles according to which all arts, and especially the fine arts, ought to be judged. I shall then compare Wagner's ideas with them, and in the description of the Tetralogy point out the peculiarities of his system with its excellences and defects.

Art, defined as a system of rules, by the observance of which the performance of actions is facilitated, includes the useful as well as the fine arts, but in connection with our subject we have only to deal with the latter. These rules form the technical part of art, and are an essential acquisition for the art student. Although one cannot be an artist without them, they are by no means sufficient to make one. Useful arts and the artisans may and ought to be satisfied with fulfilling the demands of an exact technique. Not so the fine arts and the artists. By them the technique is treated as a servant, by the labor of which an ideal conception is represented. The spiritual idea dictates to the artist the use of the forms, by means of which a true representation of that thought, which stands mother to the

artistic creation, can be obtained. The artist will subject his earning, his progress in conception and treatment—all the requirements which the most exacting technique could demand—to the *spiritual* idea. He will exclude everything which does not serve as an expression to that commanding thought, and every such expression, once adopted, he will treat as subordinate to that idea. He will never allow it to be more than a servant, nor to assume offending self-importance.

It is, however, not enough, in the fine arts, that an idea or sentiment be the source whence springs the artistic creation, but it must be in its expression (*viz.*, the material form which it assumes) a beauty, the natural result of a gifted artist's contemplating the workings of mind and soul. *Art is the expression of beauty, beautifully expressed.* What is beauty? Let me relate an incident out of my own experience to illustrate the answer—before I give it. When as a young man I studied music, my teacher, Mr. Joseph Krebs, a Catholic priest, requested me one day, to attend the rehearsal of a mass which was to be performed at his church. He instructed me to report to him my opinion of the composition. I did so, wrote out a lengthy criticism, and expected to hand it in at my next lesson. When I entered the recitation room, Mr. Krebs at once asked my opinion of the mass, before I had a chance to offer the argumentative document in my pocket. I replied, that it was a very pretty composition. "Pretty!" said he, "*pretty*, you say?" "I did think it pretty," was my response. "Then," said he, "it shall not be performed in my church, for only the beautiful shall enter the house of God." And then followed a lengthy discussion about the beautiful and the pretty, which may be stated shortly as defining pretty, all that touches our physical senses in an agreeable manner, and beautiful, that which touches our souls. I objected to his condemning the mass on my judgment, being so young and inexperienced, but his reply was, that he did not want nor need the opinion of an expert, or he should not have sent me. All he wanted to know was the impression the composition would leave upon a young mind. And as it was only pretty, it could not enter the sanctuary. "Take a seat," he concluded, "the mass will never be performed."

I have heard the testimony of many young people, who after the performance of comic opera, of negro minstrelsy, or even the more serious spectacular works, felt as if the evening was not properly concluded without some further indulgences. But after an opera by Gluck, Mozart, or Beethoven, after an oratorio by Handel, Haydn, or Mendelssohn, the wildest of them will go home silently and meditate on the impressions received.

In the one case only the senses were reached, and not a very desirable appetite created; in the other, the fibres of the heart were touched, and the vibrations of a responsive soul were listened to with elevating pleasure, opening the mind, as it were, to perceive a still greater work than that just witnessed. For every work of art will excite in us that curiosity, which after fancying it has exhausted all, feels at the very moment we turn away that it has seen or heard the smallest part only, and that a still greater work hovers invisibly above it. This attribute of a great work is an infallible touch-stone of its genuineness. In every one of the fine arts, in architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry, and music, we find works which fill the soul with a longing for something still greater than that which we behold,—a longing for beauty, of which the representation in art is but the angelic guide to a more heavenly one.

In the fine arts the faculties of mind and soul are called in requisition for the creation of works as well as for the contemplation of them. The center of the creating as well as contemplating power, however, lies in the heart. It is not enough to know what is good, true, moral, and holy, we must be made to feel it. And the province of all true art is to make us feel the beauty of what is good, true, moral, and holy. For that which subdues men most, is not conscious obedience, not forcibly repressed inclinations to evil, not the violent, self-guided persistency in one rigid line of even exemplary conduct, but the unconscious reception of a kindly example; the gentle compliance with what the good and beautiful alluringly offer, and the habitual turning to the divine—like a butterfly to the sunlight. These are the powers which lead men mysteriously, but surely on. The forces of the mind must be aided by the allies of the soul. The most severe dictates from the brain will be readily obeyed, when approved by the heart. Works

is easy when liked, but almost impossible when hated. Earthly wisdom flows from the head, but in the inmost chambers of the heart lie the treasures bestowed by heaven. There dwell the beauties of divine origin, and whatever be the degrees of thought and reflection, they must not be against the tribunal of feeling, which holds its court in the soul. For there is no good, no truth, no moral, no holy, without beauty; and *art, the fine arts* teach it and represent it.

Thus it will be seen that art performs an important task in the elevation of human nature. The fine sense of the Greeks, who in the fine arts are ever our masters and instructors, represented the first poet-musician, "Apollo," singing to immortal poetry immortal music. "Rocks and cliffs awakened, and the stony hearts dissolved; beasts of the forest were spell-bound, and the fierce instincts of man were tamed; birds listened in their song, brooks ceased their lullaby, and the coarse laugh of merrily shuddered at those sounds which proclaimed to humanity the sweet power of art, the brightness of her glory and her enlivening harmony."—*Liszt*.

So does the music of Beethoven subdue the instincts of ferocity, brutality, and sensuality. He, by the power of his art, softens the heart and ennobles it; he pours his harmonies over the contradictory elements in the soul of man, and awakens, encourages, and strengthens all that is noble in human nature; his melodies, like bright shining lights, lead upward and on to higher spheres, where low appetites and vulgar desires cannot be admitted.

There is a scene in the "Mutual friend," describing the end of a long journey to which Betty Higden came. The old woman, with her true and unfaltering adherence to her ideas of right and propriety, lies in the open field. Deadly sickness has spread its pale veil over the wrinkled features of a withered body, which still holds a noble soul. Hexham holds her in her arms and administers all the consolations in her power. The dying Betty Higden relates her life, every page of which records a suffering but always contented martyr. To the repeated anxious inquiry of Hexham, whether she should not lift her head higher, she replies, "Not yet." But when her tale is finished she says to Hexham: "Bless ye, now lift me, my love."

The hand of the artist is shown in the following sentence, with which Mr. Dickens finishes the scene. "Lizzie Hexham very softly raised the weather-stained gray head, and lifted her as high—as heaven." When we look at Raphael's Sistine Madonna, we do not feel as if the artist wished to awaken in us the feeling of a real form coming down through the frame, out of the real clouds. Nothing of the kind touches our heart. Perfectly certain that we have painted canvass before us, a dream nevertheless steals over the soul and we feel carried upward and transformed. It opens the heavens to which the whole group, mother, child, St. Sixtus, Santa Barbara, and the figures of the angels belong, and carries the beholder there. So does the Dome of the Sistine Chapel by the creations of Michael Angelo open into a heavenly mansion; so does Handel's Hallelujah lift the Dome, which is spread over our spirit's vision, and we see the angels in never-resting groups join in the eternal Hallelujah to the Lord Omnipotent.

Thus it will be seen, that art performs an important task in the elevation of human nature. Look at the imperishable monuments of architecture, and its frozen harmony carries every thought and feeling within you upward; examine the beauties of sculpture, and while in the act of doing so, you feel elevated and transformed; stand before a masterpiece of painting and a dream steals over you, that carries you to the heavens; listen to the poetry of a Milton, Shakspeare, Goethe, or Schiller, and you are changed for the moment almost into their equals; yield yourself up to the music of our glorious masters, and all profanity, all sensuality, all low appetites and vulgar desires are chased out of you. Every true work of art has invariably this tendency, and music, employed (perhaps unconsciously) for the very purpose in the home, the social circle, the church, and the state; music, greeting the infant with the sweet accents of maternal love and bidding in solemn strains the last farewell to life departed; music, joining innocent childhood in its mirth, cheering on ripened manhood in its activity; an encouraging friend in time of adversity, a relieving language to an over-burdened soul; music, more than any of its sister arts, has the power to lead us from the material to the ideal, to lift us from low desires to high aspirations, from the flesh to the spirit, from

earth to heaven. This is the spirit in which the great masters of art conceive their missions. Just so they thought and felt once, think and feel now, and will think and feel hereafter.

With this preface of general remarks on art, I will now proceed to Wagner and his mission. Wagner wants to unite all the branches of the fine arts in the production of the "Drama of the Future." Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Poetry, and Music, which were all united once, in the representations of the ancients, are now each going its own way to perfection. According to his view, such perfection cannot be reached, except by the coöperation of all of them in the Drama. Music without such coöperation, or absolute music as he calls it, is an error. It needs poetry, to explain it. It is only by the combined action of the singers, of paintings, decorations, and the architecture of the theater, that its greatest effect can be attained. With him, music is but an ornament, to embellish poetry, its object and subject. Examining the opera as existing, he found that it was an absurdity, when considered as a musical drama. It conveyed no ideas, simply because in its composition the composer had none. Poetry furnished not the leading thoughts, but the foundation for syllableizing highly elaborate vocalization. The Opera was treated as a vehicle in which the singer could show himself to his best advantage. It was like a statue, exhibited upon the stage for the purpose of allowing the different singers to paint it with the colors that suited them best. What the result would be, must be, he had no difficulty in showing by the productions of the most successful of operatic composers. All of them were under the command of the singer. The latter was the dictator; he had to be consulted and satisfied, or the Opera could never be brought out. Dramatic action, dramatic truth—the logical result of a play, well cast,—were minor considerations. The singer was the reigning power, and to him all art had to render obeisance. Wagner, who is of strong revolutionary tendencies, made short work of the singer. He deposed him, and as a consequence broke all the forms in which he was wont to express himself. Thus, Aria, Duo, Trio, the concerted ensemble, and the Chorus, had to share the singer's fate. Instead of singers, he employs actors who declaim musically. Instead of well phrased airs, he claims the

invention of an endless melodic flow, which adapts itself to every word and action of the play, thus giving to the poetry its highest expression. For every prominent situation and character he invents a leading musical motive, which accompanies it whenever it appears or reappears. As auxiliaries are used: 1. The music of the orchestra, which under his treatment is now the principal factor in the opera. 2. The grouping of actors into living tableaux. 3. The reproduction of the phenomena of nature. 4. The architecture of the theater, in building not only temples and palaces, but also subterranean caves, the habitations of the dwarfs, of the giants, and of the gods. 5. Paintings, representing beautiful landscapes, illuminated by ever-changing light. Thus in accordance with his views, he draws all the fine arts into his service. The musical drama of the future is therefore not simply a musical work. On the contrary, all the arts claim an equal share. It is the product of their union under the guidance of his hand.

As to the forms of poetry, Wagner has adopted alliteration. Iambics and trochees and all the measures in ancient and modern use were found unfit for the Nibelungen, except alliteration, which is used in the old Edda and the Volsungen and Nibelungen-Saga's, from which the theme for the ring of the Nibelungen is taken. He handled this material with the utmost freedom, for the purpose of employing all the fine arts as interpreters of his system. There is one reigning idea throughout the four dramas which comprise the Tetralogy, viz: the curse of the gold, which destroys all who are hunting for it, gods, giants, dwarfs, and men. The preliminary drama of the first night contains the genesis of the work and brings but gods, giants, and dwarfs upon the stage. These three are antagonistic forces. The gods, who dwell in Walhalla; the giants, who live upon high precipices and inaccessible mountains; and the dwarfs, who are busy in the bowels of the earth, strive for supremacy, obtainable through the gold, hidden in the waters of the river Rhine. This Rhinegold comes first into the possession of the dwarfs. The gods deprive them of it, but have to deliver it to the giants as ransom, from whom it is won by man. The curse of the gold, however, brings destruction to every one of its possessors and the drama ends by re-

it to the River Rhine, whence it was originally taken. The ring becomes the symbol of the whole Tetralogy; the drama goes back to the beginning.

None of Germany's opera houses would have the facilities or facilities for the representation of the Ring of the Nibel-

Wagner formed a joint stock company, the members of which, under the name of Patrons, were furnished with a *Platz-schein* (a ticket at the price of 900 marks=\$250 in which admitted them to a cycle of three performances, consisting of the whole drama of four nights. With funds raised, Wagner laid the corner-stone to the theater in Bayreuth in 1872. Its plan was conceived and carried out according to the principle of concentrating all the attention of the audience upon the stage. The auditorium is built in the form of an amphitheater. At its highest point is the King's box, extending just behind the last row of seats over the width of the auditorium. It accommodates 100 persons. Behind it a gallery for free admissions gives room for 205. From the King's gallery down to the stage the rows of seats hold 1000 persons. There are no aisles, no *Proscenium* boxes, nothing to distract the attention from the stage. The auditorium is conceived in the spirit of a free arena, in the antique style, framed on both sides with Corinthian columns, between which are arches, and on the sides of which are the chandeliers for lighting the house. The side walls reach without a break to the roof, which in form of a tent seems to stretch into the

length of the whole stage is 108 feet, width 113 feet, height 87 feet. The depth under the stage is 30 feet. It is so that the orchestra is seated, in a diminutive amphitheater-form, like the auditorium. At its highest point sits the conductor, facing all his performers. The lowest half is roofed in the shape of a prompter's box, its open face looking toward the conductor; its upper half is roofed over in a similar reversed way, so that its open space shows toward the stage. The sound from the lower portion is by the reflecting roof thrown upon the higher portion of the orchestral amphitheater, and from there upon the stage by the reversed roofing and wooden instruments are placed under the upper

roof, the brass and bass instruments under the lower. The so-called *Proscenium*, thus divided by the upper roof (which projects a little over the floor of the stage), leads by two passages into the auditorium, from which it is divided by a curtain, brown and gray in stripes, and hemmed in by a golden border. It is drawn aside and upwards so as to leave the impression that some unseen hands have moved it very gracefully out of sight. The whole house is held in the same colors as the curtain, and fills the beholder with a sober, expectant spirit, from which it is impossible to escape. The building in its outside appearance betrays its temporary character. Its framework is of wood, bricked in; and back of the stage is an additional building for the engine, for motors, and for machinery.

The following forces were employed for the performance of the Tetralogy in August last:

1. *The Orchestra*.—It consisted of 32 violins, 12 violas, 12 cellos, 8 basses, 4 flutes, 4 oboes, 1 English horn, 3 clarionets, 1 bass clarinet, 4 bassoons, 1 contra-bassoon, 7 French horns, 4 tubas, 1 contra-bass tuba, 3 trumpets, 1 bass trumpet, 4 trombones, 1 bass trombone, 3 pair of kettle-drums, 8 harps, a 32-foot organ-bass, and six supernumeraries, in all 120 men, under the direction of Hans Richter, the Vienna Capellmeister. Most of this force was composed of concert masters, professors, virtuosi, court-and-chamber musicians, who volunteered their services. Hence the performance in midsummer, when all those engaged at the principal opera houses have their vacation, during which they could respond to Wagner's call.

2. *The Singers*, numbering 23 solo and 37 chorus singers, 60 in all.

3. *The Mechanical Artists*, represented by 1 machinist, 2 decoration-painters, 1 stage-builder, 2 architects, 1 professor for costumes and requisites, 1 for chorography, and 1 engineer for illumination. Each of these had workmen at his disposal.

The active artistic force in the representation of the Ring was therefore 190 men. The rehearsals began June 3d, and ended August 9th. On the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th of the latter month the first performance took place; a week later the second, and the following week the third and last. I attended the second performance.

The Rhinegold.

the prologue to the Trilogy makes us acquainted with the persons which are to be employed in the following performances. It contains the germs out of which the dramatic characters are developed. The performance begins at 6 o'clock. From the middle of the afternoon until the drawing of the curtain, the persons walk or drive to the hill upon which the theater stands, a mile and a half outside of Bayreuth. They gather in groups upon the walks in open air, or in the restaurants erected on both sides of the slope, upon which the opera-house stands in the middle. These groups are formed largely according to nationality, crafts, social grades in society, and personal acquaintanceships. Scientific men, poets, musicians, artists, sculptors, and architects; journalists and bankers, kings and princes, were all represented, coming from almost every civilized country. It seemed as if the pictures of celebrated men, which we see in art stores, had suddenly stepped out of their frames, and stood right before you. One could not take three steps without giving elbow-room to some celebrity. Only the conversational hum in this babel of tongues is interrupted by the call of eight trumpeters, the signal to take

Everybody responds by going to that entrance, which leads him to his moveable cane seat, where he waits, standing or sitting until the signal is repeated within the house. From the moment until the curtain drops not a sound is heard from the audience. The lights are turned down, the seats lowered down, and all eyes fixed upon the curtain. The prelude begins. In the deepest bass an organ-point is intoned upon C, which lasts through the whole introduction. Horns enter one by one successively in the intervals of the Major triad in E flat, and a motive is created, which denotes the primitive condition of the world; innocent and happy, because undisturbed by passions and emotions, and the train of feelings engendered by them. The effect of this composition is a peculiar

The mind of the listener cannot but accept the fact that this is the eve of an event, in which primitive elements unfold themselves to its eye. No other composer has ever attempted the position of such length (136 measures) with the harmony upon one chord. Yet no monotony is felt. The gradation

from the lowest depths to the highest pitch, from the softest pp. to the loudest ff., from the lull and murmur of a few instruments to the talk and uproar of them all, is so well distributed, that by the time the curtain opens, you are well prepared for the picture which unfolds itself, only dimly visible out of mists and vapors. Under a dark green twilight the first scene presents itself. It is laid upon that portion of the bottom of the Rhine where rocks and cliffs abound. In its quietly flowing waters, which fill the whole space of the stage, swim the Rhine daughters in graceful movements. They watch over the pure Rhinegold resting upon one of the rocks. In monosyllable they chant their lovely *Wagalaweia*. Alberich, the dwarf king of the Nibelungen, deformed, homely, and full of mischief comes from a subterranean passage and watches the nymphs. He tries to make love and to catch first one and then another and becomes comically excited by his failures. Whilst he shakes his fist at the Rhine-daughters, a sunbeam penetrates the waters, and reveals the gold. It shines with radiant splendor. The whole river seems to be warmed up by the glittering sunbeam, which is reflected a thousandfold by the gold, now in dazzling light. The scenic effect is beautiful. One sits before the picture enchanted. Like as in a dream one looks at the fairy scene before him, which the nymphs, singing and swimming, enliven by their graceful movements and lively song. Alberich, astonished, bewildered, and still under the excitement of his unsuccessful attempts, asks for the meaning of the luster which sheds its magic through the waters. The nymphs laugh at him, and in their soliloquy reveal the fact that the power sleeping in the gold would make its possessor the master of the world. No one however could get the charm without abjuring love forever. They tease the dwarf, telling him that no danger could be anticipated from one who had chased them through the ordeal just passed. To their dismay, Alberich, overmastered by a demoniac determination, curses love, steals the gold, and disappears in the passage through which he entered. The nymphs dive after him, and amid cries of despair are swallowed up by the waters of the Rhine, which are disturbed, and move in heavy convulsions down into an endless abyss. By degrees the scene changes from a disturbed

iver into a misty region, behind which a twilight illumination onverts the fogs into light clouds. The gray dawn of approaching morn dissolves these into invisible æther, and recalls a beautiful landscape, with Wotan and Fricka sleeping pon flowery beds. In the background stands a castle, illuminated with growing splendor by the rising sun. To this, the cond scene, the orchestral interlude leads through descriptive usic into the incomparably beautiful Walhallmotiv, the appropriate interpreter of the scene.

The design of the first scene seems to be, to represent the rimary conditions of innocence by the pure gold, the primitive ement of the water, and the nymphs. Alberich disturbs the a of innocence by cursing love and stealing the gold ; eternal ight breaks over the guilty depth. The music to the entire xene is entrusted to the orchestra, with the exception of that ortion which is sung by the Rhine-daughters. The description f the sinking of the waters into the endless abyss, by the xhestral music, is a master piece of its kind. The musical lclamations of Alberich scarcely go beyond the bounds of rdinary speech.

Before proceeding with the second scene, I will explain the nature and office of the deities appearing in the drama.

Wotan and Fricka stand, according to the northern mythology, t the head of the Asen or columns, upon which the foundation f the world rests, as Jupiter and Juno stood at the head of the llympian gods.

Wotan is the spirit of nature, the sum of all creating forces, he father of all.

Fricka, the wife of Wotan, is the protectress of matrimony, and gives blessing to the family relations.

Donner (Thunder) is the mightiest of the Asen after Wotan. His attribute is the hammer, with which he gathers the clouds into the storm and defends Walhalla against the giants (just as Jupiter hurled the thunderbolts against the Cyclops, when they tried to storm Olympus).

Frya is the goddess of Spring, Love and Immortality.

Erda is the personification of mother earth.

Froh is the god of peace and commerce.

Loge, Loki, is the personification of fire in its destructive capacity. He is the bad principle, the Mephistopheles among the gods, distinguished by tricks, deceit, cunning (and the abilities of a modern prime minister).

Fafner and Fasolt are giants. The words imply watchmen of a treasure.

Walhalla is a compound of *wal* = the body of a fallen hero and *halla*, the equivalent for our word hall. It signifies the heavenly place where the bodies of fallen heroes are received by Wotan.

The second scene, with Wotan and Fricka sleeping upon flowery beds in a most enchanting landscape, with the palace of the gods towering up in the background, is a perfect wonder of stage effects. It captivates the eye of the beholder by its never dreamt-of splendor. Between the castle and the resting place of Wotan and Fricka flows the Rhine. Upon its borders one of subterranean regions grows the elm tree of the world. Its branches stretch into the heavens; the clouds are its leaves and the stars are its golden fruit. The castle was built by the giants for Wotan, who had promised them the goddess Frya as a recompense. He did so by the advice of Loge. Fricka also wanted the building. She is like Juno, jealous of her mighty spouse, and thinks he will like home better, when it is a splendid mansion.

As Wotan awakes he sees the castle, of which he was dreaming, in reality before him. While he expresses his satisfaction and delight, Fricka utters her sorrow over the expected loss of Frya. During their dialogue, Frya comes in great haste praying for protection against the giants, who follow and claim her. Fricka, Froh and Donner, coming from the opposite side intend to shelter her against the Cyclops, but Wotan is unwilling to break the contract, which is carved upon his spear. Finally Loge appears, and is appealed to by Wotan, to find a way out of the dilemma, into which they got by his advice. Loge, instead of applying himself to the case in question, relates the story of Alberich's theft of the Rhinegold, and tells them that a ring and tarn-helmet have already been made out of the gold; the first ensuring the reign over all the world, the second enabling its possessor to make himself invisible or to change into what

form he should wish. He embellishes his tale with ious descriptions of the immense treasures stored up by Ælbelungen. By this device he creates in gods and giants strongest desire for the possession of ring and helmet and res. The giants offer to release Frya in exchange for the ungenhort. Wotan also is determined to have it, but on dition will he part with it. (The whole controversy ds one of the story of the huntsmen who divided the hide before they had him.) The giants, getting impatient, take Frya by force, promising Wotan to give him time next day's eve, when he will have to produce the ungenhort for them, or part with the goddess forever. elpless gods stand by and suffer her to be dragged away e giants. Wotan, assisted by his adviser Loge, descends hrough a crevice in the rocks to Nibelheim, the home of warfs. Sulphurous vapors rise immediately upon their pearance, spreading over the whole stage and changing into clouds rising upwards. By degrees the clouds are trans- d into rocks and cliffs forming subterranean caves. The scene seems to sink deeper and deeper into the bowels e earth. A dark-red twilight dawns upon the ever chang- spect of the scene; from the farthest distance the tinkling f anvils reaches the ear, which first seems to come r and louder and then again is lost in the distance in the t echos and reverberations. At this point the scene nts a seemingly endless cave, with numberless shafts and t. The music wanders from the mysteriously busy motive, rating the character of Loge, through chromatic runs in ggio harmonies, into the characteristic forging motive, panied by the Fanfare of the Rhinegold. Into this sea nd, the tuned anvils behind the scene add their rhythmi- eauties. The symbolic meaning of this mixture of es is to tell the story, that the ring has already been made e Nibelungen.

ain it is the wonderful splendor of the scene, created ally before the beholder's eye, that keeps the audience bound. In the cave is seen Alberich, who drags the ant Mime (his brother, the smith, by whose skill ring and t were made) from one of the side chambers. He pays

the workman by kicks and cuffs. He pinches, slaps, and whips him, and when he departs for the forge, leaves him half dead upon the ground. In this condition Mime is found by Wotan and Loge, who descend through an opening in the top of the cavern. From him they learn all about ring and helmet. Alberich, however, returns very soon, driving with his whip the whole crowd of Nibelungen before him. They carry his accumulated treasures upon their backs and put them upon a heap. They perform their task silently, forming the most grotesque groups in peculiar and laughable movements, largely dictated by Alberich's whip. At the moment of noticing Wotan and Loge the Nibelungen are commanded by their king to depart with their treasure. Under cries of despair the strange crowd disappears. Alberich now wants to know the reason of the visit from such mighty guests. Loge assures him of their friendly design, tells him of the fabulous tales which they had heard of his wealth, and succeeds in exciting in the dwarf the desire to show his mighty rivals what he could do with the helmet. He changes first into a dragon and then into a toad, in which form they capture and bind him and return to the surface of the earth. The scene changes in the reverse order into a free landscape upon mountain heights overhung by mists and clouds. Wotan and Loge bring Alberich from a shaft and induce him to part with his treasures, for his freedom. He gives the curse to the gold into the bargain and returns to his home. The fogs clear away, from one side comes Donner, Froh, and Fricka, from the other the giants and Frya, the captive goddess, whose presence restores the youthful appearance of the gods which they had lost since her captivity. By the advice of Erda, who appears as a vision, Wotan finally yields to the demands of the giants, and Frya is liberated in exchange for the Nibelungen treasure. Fafner and Fasolt pack the ransom in sacks and get into a dispute about the division of the spoils. In the encounter which follows, Fasolt is killed, and Erda's prophecy that a curse clings to the gold, is fulfilled. Wotan commands Donner to clear the mists and fogs away. He, in obedience, ascends to the highest peak of the mountains in the background and commands the vapors to form themselves into thunder clouds. Lightning and thunder follow,

with all the uproar of enraged elements. When the calm is restored a rainbow appears over the river, forming a bridge to a castle standing in the clouds in splendor and light. Over this rainbow-bridge the gods walk into their new mansion, built by the giants and paid for by the dwarfs. For the first time the name of Walhalla is applied to the castle. This closing scene, although poetically conceived, was not executed as well as the former ones. Clouds, mists and vapors could no longer be employed to heighten the illusion. The sinking evening sun illuminated it rather too distinctly. The rainbow looked like a painted drawbridge, over which gods with very human faces strode with the customary abominable stage strides. But the music accompanying the scene was beautiful. The Walhalla motive developed itself into a splendid orchestral composition, which took the listener into higher regions. Whether or no, he was transformed, carried away with the gods to heavenly mansions.

As will be observed, Wagner has in this first of the dramas adhered very severely to his system. With the exception of the Rhine-daughters' charming song, all the dramatic characters had only musical declamation. Embellished, however, as it was, by the all-absorbing descriptive music of the orchestra, it could not be understood, and remained a sealed book to those who had not made themselves acquainted with the text beforehand. The same may be said of the music. Its leading motives, their applications and combinations, as a matter of necessity, had to address themselves more to the head than the heart, more to the understanding than the feeling. Wagner in deposing the singer has installed other despots in his place. The orchestra and the scenery are more domineering than the singer in his wildest excesses.

The vapors and clouds are not always a dramatic necessity. A god, upon his disappearance, should leave no sulphurous vapors behind, which are more in harmony with his Satanic majesty. In the Rhinegold they are made to appear for the purpose of changing the scene. Wagner himself has very severely and justly condemned such practices. He calls them effects, a word used in the German language for a result without a cause. He has been severely criticized by his opponents for

mishaps in the machinery and the consequent failure in the scenic representation. I think it unjust to Wagner the poet and composer, however well applied to Wagner the performer. On the whole, it must be admitted that *Rhinegold* is a drama well constructed for the display of scenery, and the peculiar musical talent of the composer. In descriptive music of the wonderful and exceptional he succeeds best, and *Rhinegold* presents a succession of such scenes.

The Walküre.

The word, a compound of *Wal*, already explained, and *küren*, to prepare, signifies the female attendants of the gods. The *Walküren*, clad in armor and mounted on spirited horses, decide the fate of heroes in battles, and prepare and bring the fallen ones to the heavenly mansions. These heroes are harvested, so to speak, in compliance with the wish and will of the *Wotan*, in order to gather a host of the noblest and strongest of the human race for the defence of *Walhalla* against the Giants. Symbolically the *Walküren* are the personification of the will and wish of *Wotan*.

Ring, helmet, and *Nibelungen* treasure are now in the possession of the Giant *Fafner*, who hides them in a large cavern in the midst of a wild forest. He changes himself into a dragon by means of the *Tarn* helmet and keeps watch over them. *Wotan*, in order not to lose the reign over the world, must regain the ring. Neither he, being bound by his contract, nor any other god, can do anything directly. *Wotan* must raise among men a hero, who will conquer the dragon so that he can repossess himself of the treasure.

With these explanations we will again go into the theater. The performance begins at four. Two hours are allowed for each of the three acts, of which each of the last three dramas consist. Between every act sufficient time (from a half to three-quarters of an hour) is allowed for a visit to the restaurants. After the audience is seated, called by the signal as on the first day, the orchestra represents in a wild and stormy prelude the last phases of a subsiding thunder storm. It has a few reminiscences of the last scene in *Rhinegold*, and of *Donner* with the hammer and the motive, by which he then and there gathered

the clouds into the storm. When the last echoes of the thunder reverberate through the house and the marked staccatos of the thunder-motive fall upon our ear like heavy straggling rain-drops, left behind the raging storm, then the curtain opens and the view presents a room in an ancient German mansion. A giant elm tree spreads its branches over the roof. Its trunk is in the middle of the room. Upon the walls hang household utensils and braided mats. To the right is a colossal fireplace, to the left and toward the back are doors, the latter leading into the open air. Through this door, enters Siegmund hastily, and nervously agitated. He sinks exhausted upon the floor and falls asleep. Thus finds him Sieglinde, the wife of Hunding, whose abode the room represents. Siegmund, aroused, asks for water. Sieglinde offers him refreshments, and makes him acquainted with the name of her husband. During their interview they become passionately attached to each other, so much so, that Sieglinde resolves to fly with Siegmund from the yoke of oppression, to which she was forced by Hunding. Hunding had conquered and killed her whole family of brothers and sisters (except a twin brother and her father) and then wedded her. The music, in extreme beauty, describes the agitation of both and the gradual growth of their attachment. The love motive, expressing the sentiment of just such lovers, is charming and enchanting beyond description, not—as giving expression to the radiant joy of innocent love in its first spotless dawn, but as the utterance of the rejoicing of a heart, held in chains by a mortal enemy, and anticipating the approaching morn of its release by the guidance of love. It is musically a justly celebrated scene, although the discovery of Siegmund as the twin brother of Sieglinde, dampens the otherwise magnificent treatment of the mightiest of human passions. Meanwhile Hunding returns from the forest and finds Siegmund, his mortal enemy, at his own hearth and home. The laws of ancient German hospitality forbid him to take advantage of Siegmund's helplessness. He is unmolested while under his roof. With an invitation to mortal combat on the next morning, he retires, asking Sieglinde to prepare him his night cup. In complying with his command, she mixes him a potion, which keeps him in the bonds of helpless sleep through the entire

night. She returns to Siegmund, who is in great distress because of his fate to be in the grasp of his enemy without a weapon of defense. But Sieglinde shows him the handle of a sword, sticking out of the trunk of the elm tree. She tells him that an old man (Wotan) once thrust it in there and said that the man who could draw it out, should not be conquered. Siegmund with strong effort frees the steel. In their excitement over the anticipated success of the next day's encounter, they are suddenly interrupted by the violent opening of the back door. Spring has burst it open, to come and woo Love, its sister. A lovely night, illuminated by the full moon, shines into the room; entreating Zephyrs fan coolingly the burning faces of the loving pair, who transfigured by the pale moonlight, hold themselves in each other's arms. In the introduction to Siegmund's love-song the flutes and violins sound like voices of sweetly-cooing nightingales and the thrilling chirp of the cricket. In the treatment of this song and in the whole scene to its end, art, as represented by Wagner, reaches its highest point of culmination. All the scene seems to tremble under the wild glow of sensual love. As the air of the spring night is penetrated through and through by the pale moonlight, so are the listeners' senses captivated by this scene. It is impossible to criticize, while hearing it. All aesthetics, theory, and morals, are chased out of one; one's breath is bated and the beating of the heart seems to stand still, the whole soul bewitched by an irresistible power. It is true, that after the intoxicating enjoyment is over, you perceive the ethical anarchy of the whole scene, which upsets all the holy emotions of a pure soul, defies the teachings of all morality and is in direct antagonism to established rules and customs. But during the performance, all that is sensual in human nature is wrought up to its wildest activity by the alluringly tempting music. The curtain closes upon a scene which offends Morality and Religion, wakes up those sleeping passions in human nature which a refined and cultivated taste must abhor and detest. The masterly treatment is all the more offensive, because of its influence upon a sensitive nature.

The second act, introduced by a prelude with the sword motive as a basis, upon which the love motive and the rhythm of the

ride of the Walküren play in ingeniously intermingled figures, shows upon the opening of the curtain a wild and rocky narrow mountain chain. A gorge leads from the background to the front, over which the rocks at their highest point form a natural bridge. Brunhilde (the Walküre) in full armor, and Wotan appear; the god instructs the former to give victory to Siegmund in his battle with Hunding. Amid joyful exclamations in one of the most difficult strains which ever the obstinacy of a musician could invent, but which is of striking characteristic originality, Brunhilde departs and climbing from cliff to cliff shouts her *Ho-jo-to-ho!* Her final disappearance beyond the highest peak of the mountain chain is followed by the arrival of Fricka in her chariot. The goddess comes to ask vengeance for the double violations of adultery and incest by Siegmund and Sieglinde. After a long dialogue Wotan yields to the persuasions of Fricka and instructs the returning Brunhilde to bring Siegmund to Walhalla; she, the offspring of Wotan and Erda and the favorite of the god, tries in vain to prevail upon him to keep to his first resolution, and finally departs to fulfill the parental command. The music to this scene is only palatable to the musician, who can trace the leading motives, skilfully introduced to support the most conflicting arguments. Even he must be satisfied with what reflection and thought can offer. The heart is not reached, the feelings not enlisted. Wotan in this scene is simply an absurdity. As a god he ought to reign, but lacks the talents of a ruler; he wants to shelter the world with his spear, but breaks laws whenever he finds it in his interest so to do; he wants to bring up a race of heroes, and is himself a slave. Of all the characters in the drama this god is the poorest, drawn with a total disregard of the qualities inherent in a deity. Brunhilde on the contrary is the best; her sympathy with the lovers, which brings her in conflict with her duties, is given in very touching language, supported by music which reaches the heart.

The third scene is opened by the appearance of Siegmund and Sieglinde, coming over the bridge in their flight. She urges him to farther flight; he entreats her to rest. Brunhilde joins them and informs Siegmund of his approaching death. He is willing to follow the Walküre if in company with Sieglinde.

This is denied, and in the deepest distress he draws his sword with the intention of putting an end to his and Sieglinde's existence. The music to this episode is very beautiful. The preparatory sounds from the orchestra steal into our hearts like the pangs of a death-struggle. The muffled kettle-drums present a rhythmical phrase of four measures as a symbol of the mysterious workings of Providence. The majestic Walhallamotive, with the song of fate and the dialogue of Siegmund and Brunhilde, form the ground-harmony to this part of the scene. When Siegmund is so strongly determined not to part from Sieglinde, Brunhilde takes compassion on the hero, and against the command of Wotan promises to shelter him. Hunding's approach is announced by the distant call of horns. Brunhilde mounts her horse and gallops away. Dark clouds rush over the scene; thunder and lightning issue forth; the mountains and rocks are obscured by the stormy elements. Nearer draws the enemy; louder call the horns and more impetuously. Siegmund prepares himself for battle. With a kiss he parts from the beloved one, who has fainted. The love-song of the first act sounds sweetly once more from the orchestra, like the last greeting of a dying one. Siegmund disappears in the darkness. Occasionally the battle-ground is illuminated by lightning. The combatants stand upon the rocky bridge confronted. Sieglinde, awakening from her swoon, comprehends the situation at once, and makes an effort to throw herself between husband and lover, but is blinded by a glaring light above Siegmund. In a fiery cloud in the air appears Brunhilde, protecting Siegmund with her shield. At the moment when Siegmund tries to thrust his sword through Hunding, a red fire breaks from the opposite side through the clouds and reveals Wotan above Hunding, whom he shelters with his shield. Siegmund's sword breaks in pieces and he is killed by his antagonist. Brunhilde falls back frightened, gathers the broken pieces of the sword and lifts Sieglinde upon her horse, flying before the enraged Wotan, who is in uncontrollable anger at her disobedience. Wotan disappears amid thunder and lightning, with which the scene closes. This whole scene does not fail to make its impression. Mountains, cliffs and rocks, thunder and lightning, do not seem simply an illusion. There they

in reality, and the wild and strange music carries the audience right into the very scenes. One lives there, acts with actors, fights with the antagonists, is enlisted for or against them, and hopes for the successful escape of Brunhilde with her husband. The different motives, interwoven to illustrate the action dramatically, finally yield to the preponderating overbearance of the motive of the ride of the Walküren, which at this point is worked into the well known concert piece. It opens the third

The galloping theme is intoned by brass instruments, the horns, subdivided, storm around it, in crying and wildly-tinged tone figures. One thinks himself in the midst of the wild ride of the flying Dutchman. Before, behind, around you, the rushing of horses galloping through the air, snapping of whips, the wild *Tally-ho!* of the huntsmen. The curtain rises, and the view presents the highest peak of a rocky mountain, under which is the entrance to a cave. Four of the Walküren are camped upon the peak. They are clad in armor, and sing their wild *ho-jo-to-ho!* Through the clouds come the other Walküren on horseback, with the bodies of slain heroes thrown over their saddles. Their conversation; their unearthly laugh in sixth-accords; their *ho-jo-to-ho*, shouted through speaking-tubes from the clouds toward the peak; their ejaculations, mingled in strange harmonies, make the scene one of the wild-imaginable. Untamed forces of nature seem to have gotten loose. The effect is magnificent, although it lacked the reality of a former performance in Munich, where young grooms performed the ride in the clouds upon trained horses. In Bayreuth the flying machines were used. Brunhilde with Sieglinde appears. The other Walküren shun her, when they learn of her disobedience. Brunhilde now entreats Sieglinde to continue her flight alone, toward the forest where Fafner dwells in his cave. Wotan would not dare to pursue her there. She gives the broken pieces of Siegmund's sword to her as her inheritance. Brunhilde has she left, when Wotan comes in a thunder-shower, and commands Brunhilde to give up Sieglinde. She, unable to do so, prays for mild punishment. The god banishes her from Walhalla, and condemns her to remain upon a rock in a deep sleep. She is to become the prize of the first passer-by, who will awaken her. All the other Walküren leave the scene

in the greatest distress on hearing Wotan's hard judgment Brunhilde, upon her knees and in the deepest anguish, prays for a milder sentence. Wotan makes the punishment lighter by encircling her with a burning fire, through which none but a hero would dare to penetrate. The heavens suddenly become clear, the sun in purple colors sinks below the horizon, and a beautiful twilight illuminates the farewell scene between Wotan and his favorite daughter. He kisses the godhead from her eyes. She sinks upon a hill of moss, under the branches of a fir tree. He closes her helmet and covers her with her shield. Then he marks with his spear a circle, upon which the flames burst forth, burning brighter and brighter until the whole is enclosed in fire, when the curtain drops upon the last scene of the *Walküre*.

It will be readily believed, that Wagner has improved the scenes in this drama by his undoubted ability as a composer and performer. I think of him as a performer, when I recall the picture, which represented Brunhilde in the last scene, carried out according to his dictates. It seemed a statue of exquisite beauty, in the midst of a beautiful landscape, illuminated by the ever-changing colors of the sunset. Every fold of the white satin dress, every bend of the arm and hand; the position of the whole body, the closed helmet and glittering shield; were so masterly arranged, that an artist might well take a lesson from such a picture. In my mind it lives with the best of statues which it has been my fortune to see. The rôle of Brunhilde is of extreme difficulty and was entrusted to Frau Materna, of Vienna, an artist of very superior gifts and attainments.

Wagner has been very severely criticised for the creations of Siegmund and Sieglinde as brother and sister. His friends point at the old Edda, where they are represented in that relation. This is true, but their union in the old drama was a dramatic necessity, logically developed, and such it is not in the *Walküre*. Why then has he nevertheless risked the shock, which this treatment must necessarily give to our conceptions of matrimonial relations? Undoubtedly—in my opinion—because of his thorough knowledge of himself. It is impossible for him to sing the song of innocence, the pure devotion of maternal love, the suffering of a martyr, who never perhaps

ed his threshold; or the praise of virtues which cling like
 ht shining lustre around a Christian home. He knows
 is peculiar gifts as a composer enable him particularly to
 xpression to feelings, emotions, and passions, aroused by
 s of exceptional occurrence, by the wonderful and the phe-
 al in nature. Hence the introduction of Siegmund and
 nde as blood relations. The logical development of their
 gs under such peculiar circumstances incite his musical
 re faculties to their highest pitch. It is so with the ride

Walküren and the enchantment of fire; he accompanies
 bulous horsemanship and the wonderful stage effects with
 al masterpieces. His so-called mission of reform in dra-
 music is largely the result of his exceptional talent for
 stral display. Upon the orchestra he is a virtuoso, and to
 astery of the many-tongued instrument must be ascribed
 of the changes which he introduced. If the secret birth
 st of the scenes could be revealed, it would probably show,
 is orchestral ability is the mother of the so-called drama
 future.

Siegfried.

etween Walküre and Siegfried, the drama of the third night,
 e of twenty years is supposed to have elapsed. Siegfried,
 fspiring of Siegmund and Sieglinde, has been brought up
 lberich's brother Mime, who found his mother dying in
 oods, and who entrusted him with the infant and the pieces
 s father's broken sword. The forging motive interwoven
 the motive of reflection is used as the material for a short
 de, preceding the drawing of the curtain.

e first scene represents a forge in the middle of a rocky

Mime sits before the anvil in deep thought, holding a
 d in his hand; he complains bitterly of Siegfried's giant
 gth, who, a mere boy yet, always has broken the sword,
 h he (Mime) had repeatedly mended out of the pieces re-
 d from Sieglinde. Leading a very large bear, Siegfried
 s suddenly into the cave, clothed in a wild looking forest
 with a silver horn hanging from a chain around his neck.
 ncourages the bear to attack Mime, who, in fear and alarm
 ; wild sport, crawls around and about, in order to escape

the beast. Siegfried is in joyful exhilaration at the capers, which the dwarf cuts, and finally yields to his entreaties and sends the bear back to the forest. He asks for his sword and breaks it into pieces as usual. Their dialogue fills the first scene. Siegfried is made acquainted for the first time by the reluctant but babbling Mime, with his parentage and the magic virtue of the sword made of the pieces bequeathed by his mother. With it a man becomes invincible. The news, that Mime the hateful dwarf is not his father, overjoys Siegfried so much, that he storms out into the forest and gives vent to his feelings in a song, which is one of the gems of the work.

The second scene introduces Wotan as a wanderer, stepping into the forge and taking a seat by the fire. Mime dislikes the stranger, who proposes that the dwarf should give him three riddles to solve. He is ready to pledge his head against Mime's hearth. Mime agrees, and to his astonishment, the wanderer answers every question. Now the wanderer proposes three questions to Mime for solution. Mime pledges his head and loses it by his inability to answer the third riddle, which is the wanderer tells him, that "only he, who knows no fear, shall forge the sword, so that it could not be broken." He also assures him, that the yet unknown, who would come, forge the sword, conquer the dragon, and gain the Nibelungen treasure, would kill him, saving him the trouble of taking his head, to which he was entitled. With this prophecy Mime is left alone, joined speedily by the returning Siegfried. He notices the anxiety and absent-mindedness of Mime, who, half crazy with fear, constantly repeats the sentence: "Only he, who knows no fear, shall finish *Nothung*" (the sword). He soon sees the drift of Mime's behavior, who tries to teach him fear by the description of the dragon. Siegfried now decides to forge the sword and gets to work with hammer and anvil. When he has finished the sword, he tries its strength upon the anvil, and splits it with one stroke,—upon which the curtain drops. The music to this scene is very appropriate. Entirely materialistic, it offered to Wagner's talent the very best material. He, in his orchestral accompaniment, created a symphonic poem, which for adaptation to scene and action can hardly be surpassed. What he does here with the orchestra, can scarcely be depicted

re description. Whether he wants the orchestral ex-
for the breaking of the sun through the clouds, for
le and noise of the blacksmith's shop, or the fear of
d the joy of Siegfried, he always commands it in char-
and peculiar combinations, which present to the listener
es and rhythms entirely new and original. More so than
parts of the Ring of the Nibelungen is in this scene the
entrusted to the orchestra. It draws the bellows of the
blows and hammers, and makes the sparks fly in every
.. The orchestra shapes, files, and polishes the sword,
e anvil and gives, in the slumber motive of Brunhilde,
to Siegfried of the time when he shall be taught fear.
formance of Mime, represented by Carl Schlosser of
was a masterpiece of histrionic art. His musical decla-
was exceptionally good, for almost every word could be
od. His playing and singing furnished the best, per-
only argument in favor of Wagner's system. In his
n, character, and action he was a dwarf, all the more
ive because of the handsome and gigantic proportions
ried, performed by Mr. Unger. If representative art
estow laurels, they were certainly earned by Schlosser,
ch.

pening of the curtain brings us into the first scene of
nd act. We are in the forest. It is night and only in
it outlines the aperture to a cave, before which Alberich
ears. The moon breaks suddenly through the dark
and reveals the wanderer, who informs Alberich of
l's approach. Their dialogue lasts through the night.
ern is Fafner's abode, and to him Wotan imparts Sieg-
esign. The dragon however prefers to sleep undisturbed.
e of those scenes of frequent occurrence in the Ring, in
Vagner gives a musical treatment to philosophy. It is
ious in the highest degree. With the appearance of
l in the morning's dawn, guided by Mime, the audience
p. Mime informs him that this place is the end of their

Here he will be taught fear and his teacher be Fafner.
Mime, Siegfried rests under a tree and tries to get more
formation of his poor parents from the language of the
he branches. In vain is his effort to play upon a reed

and establish a communication with the songster. In an attempt he sounds his horn, which however awakens Fafner who comes in the shape of a monstrous dragon toward the intruder. This dragon was represented by a large mask covered appropriately, which allowed a singer to utter through a speaking tube, whatever he had to say. It consisted chiefly of brawling, and declaring his determination to eat up Siegfried for breakfast. The hero however declines to be served in that way, draws his sword "*Nothung*" and kills him. In recompense the dying monster gives him an excellent seal and seems rather grateful for the finishing stroke from such an intrepid boy. In drawing his sword out of the dragon's mouth Siegfried's finger is bedaubed with blood, which he tastes quickly and finds himself suddenly able to understand the language in the branches. Its song instructs him of the ring, the treasure and treasure in the cave. He steps into it and disappears for the purpose of getting them. This ends the second scene. The singing of the bird, the atmosphere of the forest, the rays of the sun, and the fight with the dragon, were again truthfully illustrated by the orchestra, but the dragon was a mischievous failure. It needed no Siegfried to brave such a monster; a baby of ordinary courage would have thought it fun to attack and kill him.

The third scene brings Alberich and Mime upon the ground. They dispute about Fafner's spoils, to which they both assert their claims. In their controversy they are interrupted by Siegfried's reappearance from the cave with ring and helmet in his possession. The bird begins immediately his song of information, warning Siegfried of Mime's intention to poison him. Siegfried kills Mime, throws his corpse into the cave and closes its entrance with the carcass of the dragon. The bird in his song makes him acquainted with Brunhilde's enchantment, and the possibility of release by one who knows no fear. Upon learning this, he tells the bird that he himself is the dull boy who could not yet master the lesson of the bird. The feathery messenger then guides him to the place. The curtain drops upon the second act.

Two leading motives, viz: that of the ride of the Walküre and the sword motive, open the introduction to the third

is a scene at the foot of a rocky mountain. The dark night illuminated by lightning. Heavy thunder peals die gradually away, while the lightning crosses the clouds for some time. Wotan in his character as wanderer invokes Erda, who appears as a vision. He wants information about the fate of the gods; she replies that her knowledge has left her and refers him to Brunhilde, the child of their union. The scene intended to foreshadow the fall of the gods. The evening look of their final approaching fate pervades the whole dialogue, which only ends by the disappearance of Erda. The second scene begins with Siegfried's appearance, guided by the Rhine. Wotan tries to impede his search of Brunhilde. In their fight his spear is broken by Siegfried's sword. A lightning stroke issues from the broken spear, which takes its direction toward the rocky height, where flames begin to rise in the brightest of colors. Wotan vanishes, and Siegfried, playing on his horn his forest melody, breaks through the fire and appears. By degrees the flames and smoke change into white clouds which appear illuminated by morning twilight, representing the same scene as the farewell of Wotan and Brunhilde in the Walküre. Over the rocky precipice climbs Siegfried. He discovers Brunhilde, lifts shield and helmet, awakens her, and learns the lesson of fear and trembling for the first time. The drama is finished amid the most exalted exclamations of the lovers; the end of the gods is foreshadowed; ring and helmet are in the possession of Siegfried. A mortal holds the offspring of Wotan and Erda in his embrace. The music to most of the scenes is very trying to the nerves. He cannot but yield to the power which the composer wields. The encounter of Siegfried with the dragon in its action is undoubtedly ridiculous, but not so the music. As already pointed out, the composer needs such uncommon occurrences to excite his musical ability. A sober reflection and a criticising recapitulation may and must point out such defects, but at the moment of hearing, the composer holds his audience by his orchestra with an iron grasp. Whether they will or not, follow they must.

IV. *Götterdämmerung*. (Dusk of the Gods.)

Unlike the other dramas, this last one in its prelude employs not only the orchestra, but also three Nornes and Siegfried and Brunhilde. The Nornes are the sisters of fate, representing past, present, and future. They swing a golden rope fastened upon the Walküren rock. This suddenly breaks, their mission is ended and they are swallowed up by mother earth. Their talking and acting is tiresome almost beyond endurance. Of their philosophy, which they politely expound to each other for the benefit of the poor mortals in the auditorium, not one syllable could be understood; the language of the orchestra was much plainer. It related to the initiated the approaching fall of the celestials; it told of the dusk of the evening, to be followed soon by a dark endless night. After the disappearance of the Nornes, Siegfried and Brunhilde descend from the rocks, the first to depart for new adventures, the latter to bid him farewell. Siegfried gives to Brunhilde the enchanted ring as a token of his unfaltering love, she presents him with her war-horse, for whom she has no further use, because as the wife of a mortal she has lost her god-like attributes. The descriptions of Siegfried's departure and travel to the dwelling of the *Gibichungen* and Brunhilde's return to her own home are entrusted to the orchestra and fill up the time until the curtain is drawn for the drama of the *Götterdämmerung*. Its opening scene represents the hall in the castle of the *Gibichungen*. The background is open, leading to the borders of the Rhine. Günther, the head of the clan, Guthrune his sister, and Alberich's son Hagen, the half-brother of Günther, sit before a table. Hagen represents to Günther as well as to Guthrune the necessity of getting married, in order to increase the wealth and greatness of their tribe. He recommends Brunhilde as the spouse for Günther and Siegfried for Guthrune. While they are discoursing this theme, Siegfried comes down the Rhine in a boat and lands upon the open space in the background. By Hagen's advice Guthrune pledges her welcome to the hero in a cup mixed with a potion by which he becomes unconscious of the past. He weds Guthrune and promises to conquer Brunhilde for Günther. Accordingly he returns to his own home, assumes the shape of

Günther by means of the Tarnhelmet, overcomes by his strength the once powerful Walküre, robs her of the ring and brings her as a captive to his new brother-in-law. With this the first act closes.

The scene remains unchanged for the second act. Hagen sits before the entrance of the hall of the Gibichungen sleeping. Alberich's approach is seen by the light of the rising moon. He awakens his son and gives him advice, how to get ring and helmet. Hagen promises to obey the parental instructions, but declares his intention of keeping the treasures for himself. Their demoniac intercourse lasts through the night. Upon the rise of the sun, the dwarf-king departs and Siegfried suddenly appears from behind a bush. He relates his success with Brunhilde and announces her arrival in company with Günther, with whom he had exchanged places, whereupon Hagen blows his cow-horn as a signal for assembling the Gibichungen tribe, to attend the anticipated marriage festivals. For the first time a chorus appears. Neither polyphonic treatment nor any special excellence will ever be claimed for his composition, yet it had a marvellous effect of relief upon the audience, tired out with the seemingly endless monologues and dialogues. While Günther and Brunhilde arrive from the orders of the Rhine and are welcomed by the clan, Siegfried and Guthrune come from the mansion. Brunhilde, observing the ring on Siegfried's finger, charges him in presence of the whole tribe with treachery, which he however under the spell of the *elixir d'amour*, stoutly denies. The controversy is ended, by Siegfried's leaving the scene, accompanied by Guthrune, Brunhilde and Günther, largely influenced by Hagen's advice, to determine now the death of Siegfried. Hagen promises to kill him and Brunhilde tells him that the hero is only assailable in the back. As they separate they meet the bridal festival of Siegfried and Guthrune. Amid its music the curtain falls.

The third act begins with Siegfried's call upon horns on one side of the stage responded to by cow-horns from the other. The scene is in a wild picturesque valley in a thick forest near the Rhine. The river is in sight. In its waters swim the Rhine daughters. Siegfried appears, having lost his way by following game. The nymphs ask him for the ring; he refuses

it; they disappear with a warning of his approaching fate. To calls from horns in the distance, Siegfried responds upon his silver horn. This brings Günther, Hagen, and the hunters upon the ground. They all sit down and eat their lunch, after which Siegfried tells them the story of his life. When narrating of the enchanted fire and his success in reviving and winning Brunhilde, two ravens fly up from a bush near by. Hagen asks him of the meaning of this, and directs Siegfried's attention to the birds. Looking toward the flight of the birds, he presents his back toward Hagen, who kills him with his spear. While in his last moments, Siegfried recovers recollection and pledges himself again to Brunhilde, after which he expires. The members of the clan carry his body back to Günther's mansion; the orchestra accompanies the funeral procession in a march, which even the opponents of Wagner admit to be the greatest since Beethoven's in the 3d symphony. The scene is changed by the aid of mists and fogs into the place before the hall of the Gibichungen. Guthrune steps from the entrance expecting Siegfried's return. Hagen arrives and announces the arrival of welcome game for Brunhilde. The torchlights of the approaching funeral train illuminate the scene more and more. The corpse of Siegfried is placed in the middle of the open space. Guthrune falls into a swoon at the sight, and when restored to consciousness, cries for help while charging Hagen and her brother with the murder of her husband. Hagen boldly admits the deed and endeavors to get possession of the ring. Gunther, who tries to prevent him, falls in the encounter. But even now Hagen is thwarted in his design by the threatening attitude of arm and finger of the corpse. Brunhilde appears in the background and surmises the treachery practised by the *elixir d'amour*. She takes Siegfried's ring, promising to restore it to the river Rhine. With a burning torch she lights the funeral pile, upon which Siegfried's body has been placed by the members of the tribe, mounts her horse and spurs him into the fire. The Rhine becomes agitated and rolls its waters in heavy seas over the ruins of the fire. In its waters appear the nymphs, holding the ring triumphantly over their heads. As soon as Hagen sees them, he throws away shield and spear, thinking of wresting the treas-

from the Rhine daughters, who however entrap him and try him into the deep. A fire breaks through the clouds, coming clearer and clearer, until by its brightest glow Wälhalla and its deities are revealed. The flames seem finally to reach the habitation of the gods, and as it in turn disappears the fire and the smoke, the curtain drops upon the last scene of the Tetralogy.

In conclusion let me call your attention to Wagner, the theorist, who laid down new rules for the composition of dramatic music; and to Wagner, the composer, who tried to exemplify them in the Ring of the Nibelungen.

When Wagner attacked the old forms of the opera, he directed his polemic principally against the singer as the center of all opposition to the healthful development of the musical drama. It must be clear to every thoughtful mind, that as long as music and its forms dictated the poetry, and the opera donna and favorite tenors with their individual charms commanded music and its forms, just so long the opera was a servant instead of a master. A musical drama, depending for its value upon such caprices could never become a work of art. There is no doubt whatsoever of the correctness of Wagner's views, thus far. His mistake consists in directing the singer instead of correcting him, in chasing him from the dominion of the drama instead of confining him within his legitimate bounds. The best agency for dramatic utterance is after all, melody, which finds its intelligent and intelligent interpreter in the human voice. All others, such as musical declamation and elocution, acting, facial expression, mimicry, and gesticulations, scenic representation, and orchestral display must of necessity be subordinate in dramatic music according to the dictum of Wagner. But he simply transferred the tyranny of the vocalist to that of the instrumentalist. He has raised the orchestra to be a first class power; all other elements of dramatic music are secondary and some even subordinate. It, the orchestra, does everything, describes, imitates, suggests, and reflects, in stronger colors than the originals upon the stage boards. It is no longer a servant in the household of the musical drama, but the domineering master which employs musical declamation but as the interpreting guide. As a mat-

ter of necessity the cultivation of the art of singing received its highest point of culture under the old system, while under the Wagner *régime* the orchestral resources have been developed to a degree of perfection such as our old masters never could have attained with their ideas of dramatic music. The question would arise, whether the drama has gained anything by the changes introduced. If we compare characteristic portraiture in Mozart's operas with that in Wagner's, we shall very readily find, that the older master endowed the meager and often very insignificant outlines of his librettos with such pregnant and plastic attributes (even without the help of leading motives or an endless melodic flow) that we can readily believe in their immortality, while the modern master fails in the most essential of dramatic labors, viz: of creating dramatic persons and characters. All the melody, sung by Wotan or any other god in the Tetralogy, will not define the character of any of the ancient German deities, while the orchestral talk is very plain and not seldom of striking characteristics. The banishment of the chorus, or of any more than one performer at a time, is another of the grave mistakes, which Wagner's system tries to enforce. It is true, that no man can be more sincere in his convictions than Wagner is. He is fanatically convinced of their correctness. Every line in the Tetralogy seems to ask: "How can a dramatic character or scene or event be developed without the explaining word, and how can the value of the word come to its highest development except in musical declamation?" Against this may be held the fact that Wagner's declamation could not be understood, while the melody of the old masters aided greatly the enunciation of the text. The forms, which Wagner disregards and in which the classic masters have cast their creations, may and undoubtedly do not suit his talent, but they are the inheritance of all the talent and genius of our musical past, and are as imperishable as the human form, in which the best statues even of our modern times are still cast. We may call his musical leading motives very beautiful. So they are, as a hand, an eye, a head, may be beautiful. But they are only beautiful fragments, and it is only through that form which unites them as a complete whole, that they can become a work of art. Form and matter are supple-

menting each other now as much as ever. Colors may be the most beautiful, but they will never make a painting, until employed in a form; melody, musical declamation, acting, scenic representation, and orchestral coloring, each and every one may be excellent when considered alone, but only when brought into their proper relation as parts of a whole (the form of which dictates their use) can they become agents of beauty.

Wagner's failures in musical characteristic portraiture may be ascribed to his disregard of form; his innovations have their source in his idiosyncrasy, not in any particular wants of art.

The achievements which his system has brought into art may be stated under the following heads:

1st. The orchestra has been raised from a large guitar to an intelligent interpreter of the sentiments, feelings, and passions of the dramatic persons.

2d. The text, which formerly furnished simply the basis for brilliant vocalization, has been entrusted with giving the commanding influence, which it undoubtedly ought to give.

3d. The introduction of leading motives has bared the mysteries of the orchestral language.

4th. The endless melodic flow has rent in twain the fetters, by which the dramatic composer was formerly bound.

These improvements will in all probability be adopted for all times to come and will prove a lasting benefit to the art of music. But whatever the fanaticism of its author has cut away from or engrafted upon the inheritance of our old glorious masters, may and probably will live as long as the experimental gardener lives to attend to it, but will wither and die without his fostering hand, because foreign to true art and its healthy development.

Wagner, the composer, has been likened to Peter Paul Rubens, the painter, with whom he has a great deal in common. The same mastery in handling the material; the same gigantic proportions for even the smallest things; the almost entire absence of Idealism. Right, downright materialism, in both and not seldom in the grossest forms. Wagner has in other respects a great similarity with Victor Hugo. The French poet delights in characters, which we seek in vain among mankind, paints them with virtues and vices of such gross exaggeration, that

they appear as phantoms—frightful to behold—with emotions, passions, and feelings, which in mortal man can find no echo. It is so with Wagner. The tendency of his music is to excite the nerves of his hearers to an unhealthy degree, and then he presents his characters—overdrawn and unreal—to the intoxicated mind. Both Victor Hugo and Richard Wagner go back to the dead bones of antiquity, and pick them of their very substance, flesh and marrow being gone long ago. Both present in masterly portraiture that which is past, the ghost invoked from the grave, the bewitching but unhealthy sentiments of times that never existed but in the imagination of diseased minds. In both the same egotism. Victor Hugo, in his own opinion is the greatest poet, and he has left no stone unturned, to prove it to the French. Wagner is possessed of the same insanity, and woe to him who dares to deny it.

Now it cannot be denied that Rubens was a great painter, nor that Victor Hugo is a great poet, or Wagner a great musician. But in Rubens' and Victor Hugo's case, the sober judgment of afterthought has failed to put them upon the pedestal of the greatest men. What will posterity do with Wagner? Will it give him a place beside Bach, Händel, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven? It would be presumptuous to forestall it. It certainly will do him justice. Of one thing however we are sure, viz: that he is a genius. Casting aside the fanatical prescriptions, with which he doctored the school of arts, one cannot but acknowledge, that art in general and music in particular will be benefited by his influence. As a materialist, he has developed in the orchestra a power of description of the sensual perception of every-day life, of mythical and historical events and of the phenomena of nature, such as no older master before him ever has attempted. He may be said in a certain sense to complete Beethoven. This greatest of masters has endowed the orchestra with the power to speak the language of the soul; Wagner has developed its capacity as language of the senses; Beethoven's music is spiritual, Wagner's material; Beethoven always bespeaks in us the better man, Wagner the bad; Beethoven the heavenly, divine, and godlike in human nature, Wagner the earthly, worldly, and demoniac. The orchestra has derived a benefit from both these masters, for both capaci-

re indispensable qualities of a dramatist. Wagner has contradicted the doctrines, preached from the art centers of the old Grandpapas of musical criticism, who never allowed them other food, than that with which they had been nursed from infancy (a common fact with people in their second childhood). Wagner has destroyed the pernicious influence of those domineering, constituted judges, who, no matter how old they grow, will not learn anything new. He has done an immense service to every young aspiring artist, by showing him, that there are new ways open, where new discoveries may be made and laurels won.

I have been asked both in Germany and on my return, whether I was satisfied with my visit to Bayreuth. My answer is decidedly in the affirmative, for it was a great mind that spoke its inmost thoughts at the performances in the little Bavarian town. No, I was not disappointed, for I found my opinion of Wagner's music fully confirmed at the unexampled presentation of the Ring of the Nibelungen. As I have expressed them in this Article, you will, even if you do not agree with me, give me credit for impartiality. I hail with the brightest pleasures any rational development in our the most beautiful arts, while I cannot but with sorrow look upon even the sincere efforts that have a tendency to degrade it.

ARTICLE III.—EXPOSITORY PREACHING.*

EXPOSITORY preaching is—*expository preaching*. That would seem too simple a remark to make, were it not that many think of it as identical with exposition—differing from commentary or paraphrase only in this, that it is spoken to an audience rather than written in a book. The kind of discourse I am to speak of, on the contrary, is homiletical in structure and spirit, having for its aim to persuade as well as to instruct, and containing all the elements of oratory, such as argument, description, metaphor, expostulation, conclusion, and appeal. The pulpit expositor never forgets that he is a preacher, and, both in preparation and delivery, keeps his eye upon his audience as well as upon his text. His discourse, though not possessing as great unity as the topical, may have equal effectiveness; as a volley of shot, for ordinary game, will do as good execution as a rifle ball.

Prof. Shedd says: "It is necessary to select for exposition a passage or paragraph of Scripture that is somewhat complete in itself."† That he refers, not to a division of whole chapters into paragraphs of suitable length, but rather to passages taken here and there, is evident when he adds, "It is the duty of the preacher, occasionally, to lay out his best strength, in the production of an elaborate expository sermon, which shall not only do the ordinary work of a sermon, which shall not only instruct, awaken, and move, but which shall also serve as a sort of guide and model, for the teacher of the Sabbath-School and the Bible-Class."‡ I quote him simply to say that the preaching I have in mind is in no sense a normal-class exercise but an address for immediate effect; and it is not occasional, but regular and habitual. The preacher does not cull out passages at his pleasure; but he takes some one book, or extended portion of a book, and goes through it (which is the same as thorough it) from beginning to end. He may, if he please, take a series of related

* A paper read before the General Convention of Wisconsin, at Oshkosh, September 29, 1876.

† *Homiletics*, p. 154.

‡ *Homiletics*, p. 158.

sages, such as the parables; the main thing is that the work could be systematic and continuous, and known to be such, not only by himself, but also by his people.

The first expository sermon I ever heard,—and, I may add, the best one,—was by the late Rev. William Arnot, in the High Church, Edinburgh. The text was the six first verses with a part of the seventh, in the first Chapter of James, “Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for your miseries that shall come upon you, etc.” It was not what Prof. Phelps would call a promising text.” The introduction was simple, pointing out the logical connection of this lesson with the preceding one, and at the same time serving as a review of that. This rebuke, the preacher said, was more severe than the preceding one—this, like the great threshing instruments which remove the stalks and husks from the grain, that, like the fan which blows away from the fine dust. There was an indictment (he went on to say) with three counts, oppression, wantonness, and murder, but all of these crimes sprung from one bad root, the undue love of money for selfish ends. Such rich men as those described were admonished to weep for their coming miseries, being miserable often when seeming most happy; called misers, or miserable, when prosperous; or, when living in pomp and revelry, exhorting their servants to take their ease, eat, drink, and be merry, thus showing that their souls were not at ease; their very blessings were turned into curses; their gold and silver, precious things in themselves, were “cankered,” James being right in his moral philosophy, if not in his natural, when using that word: their treasures became dim and the “rust” was a “witness” against them, as, indeed, everything rises up to expose and convict the guilty; the cries of their victims had entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth; in keeping back the wages of their laborers they had “nourished their hearts as for a day of laughter,” and the retribution for which they had thus prepared themselves was sure to come, inexorable and awful,—witness the Sepoy mutiny in India, and the civil war in America. The Apostle speaks in plain, cutting language, yet gladly gets rough with it, and turns with evident relief to consolation and encouragement, “Be patient, therefore, brethren, unto the coming of the Lord.” Such is the barest possible outline of the

discourse which, if meager in promise, was magnificent in performance. There was unity throughout the whole, and yet a most delightful variety. Now the preacher would read a careful exegesis, and point out little niceties of the text; now he would illustrate by striking and felicitous similes, or incidents from history; then he would lean down over the pulpit, and talk with fatherly tenderness; again, he would straighten himself up to his full height (and he had a commanding presence), and burst out in a grand denunciation of oppression and fraud; and the ending was as bright and genial as the summer sky after a storm.* I glanced over the audience; all had their Bibles open, as well as their eyes and ears. There were many children and youth, and they, as well as the older people, looked pleased. For myself, the sermon was not only like that meat from heaven in the strength of which the fainting prophet walked for forty days, but it was also a new revelation of the power of the pulpit. I had discovered, for the first time, what expository preaching was, and how instructive and stimulating it might be made. I said to myself: "Now I know how it is done; when I go home, I will see if I can do it myself." Subsequently I heard two eloquent discourses after a similar pattern, though more cursory, by Dr. Joseph Parker, of London, and one by a Scotch preacher, Rev. Mr. Robertson, in Beirut; the latter surpassing the others in the expository, though not equaling them in the preaching element. Those four discourses—the only ones of the kind I have ever heard—have since remained in my mind as models.

After returning to my parish I attempted an exposition "occasionally." The parables of the rich fool and the importunate widow, the story of Zaccheus, and Hos. xiv, 4-7, were among the paragraphs selected, and the sermons, though from forty to fifty minutes in length, secured as good attention as one could wish. But had I not modified my plan, I should soon have given it up altogether. There was a want of continuity; it was difficult to select texts; and I was embarrassed by

* This sermon, preached July 6th, 1873, was repeated, a little later, in Brooklyn, while Mr. Arnot was attending the meetings of the Evangelical Alliance at New York. Possibly, the warm praise of two Americans at its first delivery may have induced him to select it for a second.

that the people, without their Bibles in hand, could such long passages in mind. To obviate these objections, after a protracted struggle between convictions on the one side, and fears of failure on the other, to course on the practical twelfth chapter of Romans, then to grapple with the hard, doctrinal discussions of the earlier chapters. The people were requested to bring Bibles; a very few did so. The request was repeated the next week, again, accompanied at one time with the reading of W. M. Taylor says of the inspiring rustle of the hundreds of Bibles in a Scottish congregation;* but not many. At last a responsive reading of the Psalms was introduced into the morning service, and since then the Bible has been in most of the pews. I have now been preaching in the expository way, Sabbath mornings, for eighteen months, and at the same time have gone through the last five chapters in the first epistle of Peter. It is not to group the verses according to the sense, sometimes including as many as fifteen and sometimes but a single verse, but to merely glance at some words, and to dwell upon them. We mingle lighter and heavier courses in a well-balanced dinner. The commentaries are consulted with care, and the discourse written out in full. I do not feel bound to do this every Sabbath; if I have not time for a full exposition, or if any question of the day demands a topical treatment, I turn to a topical sermon. I find that I have more new sermons than under the old method, and that the script which has accumulated during these eighteen months is worth more to me than that of any equal period in my ministry. Each week's study gives momentum for the next week; the people listen well, and when they expect the discovery of some unusually interesting passage, they watch for it. As has come to my knowledge where several persons have been saving town for the purpose of hearing a particular sermon. It is comparatively easy to throw out morsels here and there for the children. On the whole I am measurably, but not completely, satisfied.

* *The Ministry of the Word*, p. 228.

You will pardon this recital of personal experience. I have made it partly to define the theme as it lies in my own mind, and partly as suggesting that what I may have to say comes from actual practice rather than from any theorizing.

For the rest of this paper I wish to urge some of the advantages of expository preaching.

1. It brings both preacher and hearers to the word of God in a teachable spirit.

One of his chief offices is to feed the church. And this he is to do, not from his own stores, but from the supply already provided—like the apostles at the miracle of the loaves—himself receiving the bread of life at the divine hand, and then imparting it to the multitude. Taking this posture at the outset, he does not need to search far and wide for materials. He is now simply an interpreter of the mind and will of God. He comes with docility to the word, and says, "I will hear what God the Lord will speak," (Ps. lxxxv, 8). The people, in turn, come with docility to him, not to be flattered, amused, or thrilled, but saying with the centurion Cornelius, "Now are we all here present before God, to hear all the things that are commanded thee of God" (Acts x, 33).

Dr. Emmons records that he seldom preached textually, but chose his subject in the first place, and then chose a text adapted to the subject.* Ministers who follow his example, and some, too, who do not, have a facility in changing texts so that old sermons can be preached without being detected. Whenever a change can thus be made, it is evident that the sermon, though appended to the text, did not grow out of it, but is a thing by itself; and, very likely, the text may have been "preached from" by being evaded rather than discussed. In expository preaching, one's posture is less independent and personal. He is pledged to declare what he finds, to add nothing and take away nothing. He says with Paul, "We preach not ourselves but Christ Jesus the Lord" (1 Cor. iv, 5).

With this mental attitude he can speak with calm, forceful, convincing authority. The sanction of his message is, "Thus saith the Lord." He is a prophet, not in the sense of foretelling

* *Life* by Prof. Park, p. 274.

vents, but in the earlier sense of speaking for God; and the consciousness of his august mission clothes him with courage, earnestness, and power.

This mode of preaching relieves him from the painful responsibility of being impressive. A common bane of the clergyman's life is that he feels bound to put truth into its most startling forms. While not wishing to be sensational, he does wish to make a sensation. He would see tragic effects; would make men weep, and force them to their knees with overpowering convictions. He lacks confidence in truth, pure and simple; does not believe that if the word of God has its course it will be glorified. What exaggerations, and false colorings, and overstatements of doctrine come from this straining after impressiveness! When one becomes an interpreter, his mind is relieved of its heavy burden. He can now be plain and natural, uttering the message which is given him, and leaving results with God. He has faith in truth itself, allows it to enter him and take possession of him, and then speaks from the need of utterance. He no longer spends sleepless nights in devising how to be impressive; while, in being more genuine and less melodramatic, he becomes more impressive than ever before.

The people, on the other hand, are not pushed with stimulants, but fed with good, plain, wholesome food. And they grow thereby"—grow into sound and hearty character, and out of that nervous, spasmodic, unhappy energy which comes from being always goaded rather than fed. Look at the membership of the Scotch churches for an example.

2. By the expository method we come upon truth in its natural connections and Biblical proportions.

In the schools we study theology as a system. A creed is taught us to begin with, and the Scripture is cited to sustain it. The texts in *my* notebooks, at least, are always the closing arguments, and not the starting-point—"proof texts." In expository preaching we reverse this process, not pressing texts into the service of foregone conclusions, but questioning the divine words as candidly as we question natural facts. And the product we get from this personal investigation is as different from dogmatics as a landscape is from a map,—as the elements in the

manifold combinations of nature are from the same elements when separated, and classified, and labelled with the chemical names, and arranged in the cabinet.

A man may study glaciers at home for years—may know their mode of formation, extent, rate of progress, and geological effects, and may describe all these with confidence; but if he will creep cautiously down over the moraines at the side of the Gorner Glacier, and stand among the huge bowlders, the channeling streams, the crevasses and seracs, and look at the glistening peaks around, he will confess with awe and delight that he never before knew what a glacier was. So he may read all the masters of divinity and seem to understand them well; but if he will then come to the Scriptures and take the doctrines in their Biblical outlines, colorings, and relations, he will feel that while, before, he had heard of them by the hearing of the ear, now his eye seeth them (Job xlii, 5). He now obtains a Biblical theology,—learns what the doctrines are in place, and in life.

Much emphasis has been laid upon the honesty required of the student in natural science. A magazine article says of Faraday the philosopher, "The quality of truthfulness he possessed in an exalted degree. * * The scientific advocate lies when fearing to reveal some issue to his case adverse, he avoids the demonstrations out of which the truth may come. Of this sort of lying in science there is plenty. Faraday was utterly devoid of this. He accepted no brief but the one endorsed by nature. The pages of nature's own book he ever scanned to the fullest scope of his magnificent intellect. To whatever issue the evidence contained in that book might point, that would he attest, come weal, come woe."* Now this downright honesty the expository preacher must possess, or he is not likely to expound long. He is not retained as an advocate for Luther, or Calvin, or Wesley. The Bible is his religion, and he is not afraid to take it as a whole, and to take it in course. There are no dangerous parts, which, either for his own peace of mind or for his people's orthodoxy, must be torn from their connections or kept out of sight. If anything he

* *Eclectic Mag.*, Jan., 1868, p. 65.

is there upsets the traditions of the fathers, then the tradition must go. If Biblical criticism shows that some cherished use does not belong in the text, he does not fight for it with fanatic tenacity, or yield it up with regret, but rather rejoices that he has found the truth at last. He may have been educated in the most conservative theology, but when he comes to the charge, "Repent and be converted" (Acts iii, 19), he must admit that man has free-will. Or he may have been taught that there is no such thing as election; but as an honest interpreter he is bound to explain the passage which lies in his way, "According as He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world" (Eph. i, 4). He may have been assured by his teacher in theology that election must precede knowledge, since nothing can be known as sure until God has willed it; he must then show why St. Peter reverses the order, and says, "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God Father" (1 Pet. i, 2). As a Congregationalist it might be convenient for him to believe that baptism by sprinkling or pouring was the original mode; but he may be puzzled when he comes to the text, "Buried with Him in baptism" (Col. ii,

The verbal theory of inspiration may have been a part of his system; but in the effort to disentangle the twisted and dotted sentences and unaccountable logic of Peter, that article of his creed will be sorely shaken. Perhaps in his youthful days he may have come upon "temperance" commentaries, and they proved to his callow mind that the wine made at Nazareth was only dregs or unfermented grape-juice; what shall he do with St. Paul, when he speaks in the same breath of eating flesh and drinking wine, as if, in *his* age and country, they were regarded as things equally indifferent?

It will be a great gain for both preacher and hearers when they have agreed together not to thrust their heads into the sand in order to avoid any unwelcome sight. He will feel a glorious freedom when he places himself on the side of the people instead of expending his ingenuity to bring the Bible over to his side; and they, in turn, will submit to his teaching and trust him as we always trust capable honesty. Nor will they lose respect for him if now and then he comes to a hard case, and says frankly, "I do not understand it." Indeed, for

his permanent pastoral influence it is better that he should be too positive in doubtful matters. He must not say, as a commentator does when dealing with the most vexed passage in the Bible, "Words could not be selected to make this plainer than those [do] in which Peter has expressed it." This is the language of dogmatism; it shows petulance, fear, and by vehement assertion to convince one's self of the truth of what he suspects to be false. Far wiser as well as more honest is it to say with the old Scotch preacher, "Brethren, there is undoubtedly a great difficulty here, as all the commentators have allowed; but, brethren, let us look the difficulty in the face, and—pass on!"

3. Expository preaching will secure variety of topics in the pulpit.

Leave a man to himself, and, unless he be of an uncapacious mind and extensive culture, he will be content with recurring to favorite lines of thought. I suspect that if any, of us escape the weakness of superfluous repetition. Glancing over our Bibles for texts, we fix for weeks together upon verses which reflect back our prevailing mood. We take for one Sabbath, "Give us this day our daily bread," and for the next, "Take therefore no thought for the morrow," and for the next, "Casting all your care upon Him, for He careth for you,"—but the same leading idea is in them all. We are in the ruts, and struggle in vain to get out. In this position we cannot make ruts if we would. We are constrained to take what comes, and have no option in the matter. It is new aspects this will give to the old truths, how it will multiply one's topics, and keep him ever fresh and ever growing may be seen at a glance.

4. I may mention as a fourth advantage, economy of

Most ministers are at times puzzled to find texts. There will come seasons of mental barrenness and drought. The Bible is searched, but no inviting verses greet the eye. The book of texts is consulted, but it gives no relief. There are themes enough—good themes—but they do not agree with the preacher's mood. He has no relish for one more for another; and, what is worst, he has no relish for them. Choose a text toward which the mind spontaneously

moves, says Prof. Shedd.* Good counsel, the preacher knows; but the melancholy fact, just now, is, that his mind does not move at all. No sooner is the work of one Sunday over, than the terrible question seizes upon him, "What shall I preach about, next?" He spends Monday in a fret; tries one text and abandons it for another; loses the first part of the week in chafing; and perhaps, at last, either falls back upon old stock, or grasps a new text in sheer desperation, and talks against time.

The expository sermon relieves him of much of this trouble. The text is fixed for him, and he can begin upon it as soon as Sunday is over. Not a moment need be lost in deliberation. For weeks he has known what his theme was to be, and has been approaching it in mental preparation as well as on the printed page. He is already in a glow. He does not need to kindle up the fires anew every time he starts, or to lose time in switching, and backing about, and ringing of bells. After pausing a little at the close of each sermon,—just long enough to let off the passengers,—he lifts the brakes, and moves off on the same track for the next station.

The introduction is peculiarly the minister's cross. How much paper is scribbled over and torn up, and how many false starts are made! "Plunge into the middle of the subject" is the excellent advice of the rhetoricians; but the trouble is that we have not yet discovered just where the middle is; and, besides, we are very much like one in a nightmare, who wants nothing so much as to plunge, and is doing his best to plunge, but, somehow, finds himself rooted to the spot. Now the introduction is comparatively easy in an expository sermon, for it is simply taking up the theme of the preceding Sunday. You need not make out a tiresome explanation of the context; the people know what that is already, and only need to have their memory refreshed.

In one respect, it must be confessed, expository sermons in a consecutive course do not promote economy of time; they cannot be preached over to the same congregation. A topical sermon is what an old Greek called a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί*,† or what a

* *Homiletics*, p. 165.

† An everlasting possession.—Thucydides.

modern poet calls "a joy forever;"* you can bring it out two or three years, and (though the fact is creditable to the preacher nor to hearers) few, if any, will recognize it without an exposition. It makes me sad to think that my will hereafter look with suspicion upon any text from St Paul's first epistle. The only offset to this objection, which now to me, is found in the admitted fact that old sermons, while convenient, and very precious to the authors, do not possess considerable measure of converting power.

5. Expository preaching enables the preacher to treat many delicate and distasteful topics, with naturalness and freedom.

We find a popular prejudice existing against doctrinal preaching in general, and against some doctrines in particular. A formal defence of certain articles of the creed awakens suspicion at the outset. And yet the people need doctrine; not old dogmas as formulated in systems, but the same truths in fresh, vital, practical forms—water not drawn from cisterns, but gushing from living fountains. "Permanent preaching for a permanent pastorate," must discuss the great problems of life and destiny. Whatever passages the people must know about, the preacher must speak about. Now if he can bring these passages in the regular course of exposition, he takes them up without embarrassment. Such texts as, "Therefore will I have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will harden" (Rom. ix, 18); "Who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation" (1 Pet. i, 5); "These shall go away into everlasting punishment" (Matt. xxv, 46) need not be bound to explain because they are in his way. The people once perceive that he is not endeavoring to force upon them an unwelcome topic, but is only discharging the stewardship which has been intrusted to him; they look at the text in its proper position, acknowledge it as a part of revealed truth, and receive it with candor.

In administering rebuke the advantage of this method is more obvious. There are some sins and follies which you cannot name without seeming personal, bigoted, dyspeptic, and a scold; but if the text for the day requires you to u

* Keats.

gation, you will not hear a word of complaint. Your young people, for example, are engaged in those maudlin and demoralizing games of which the chief relish consists in forfeits. Meddle with them and you make yourself odious, and perhaps ridiculous; but if you must treat the text, "Salute one another with an holy kiss" (Rom. xvi, 16), you can safely and effectively free your mind in regard to this promiscuous and unholy osculation. You wish to address husbands and wives on their mutual duties, but you feel some delicacy if you are a single man, and, possibly, still more if you are married; but if you have before you St. Peter's injunctions, "Likewise, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands;" "Likewise, ye husbands, dwell with them according to knowledge" (1 Pet. iii), you do not even need to make an apology. It seems a most ungracious thing for a minister to strike at the fashionable extravagance of some of his fairest and most valued friends; but he can command alike their attention and respect if he takes up in a manly way, as part of his prescribed lesson, the caution, "whose adorning let it not be that outward adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, or of putting on of apparel" (1 Pet. iii, 3). His parishioners may be failing to pay their debts—the salary among the rest; they make compromises and go through bankruptcy because these are more profitable than legitimate business; what a joyful necessity is laid upon him, and what a "civil triumph" (to borrow a phrase from Sterne) what a civil triumph he obtains as he quietly remarks, "The passage which comes before us to-day in *course* is, 'Owe no man anything'" (Rom. xiii, 8). One could almost afford to go through some entire books for the sake of coming at certain lessons in this way. Screened behind a sacred barrier as he is, he can level his musket with steady nerves, and take leisurely aim.

Other advantages of this method are, that the minister keeps his Hebrew and Greek fresh, and acquires a critical knowledge of the text of the Bible; he is compelled to master the hard passages and to cut his way through the jungles; he gains those definite, lasting impressions which come from protracted, connected study; lays in large stores of new material for future use; finishes certain books and knows them in their completeness; accumulates a commentary which is worth more to him

than any other; keeps his people on the alert; gives them a grand education; and cultivates in them an ever-growing reverence and love for the Bible.

But while such benefits are apparent, some objections may arise, as, for example: How can a man feel any interest in a text which is remote from his ordinary thought? Suppose he comes upon the verse, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God" (Rom. xiii, 1). The origin and limits of civil government are among the things which he has never examined, and for which he has no taste; how then can he speak of them before a general audience, and especially before magistrates and jurists who have made them a lifelong study?

As a matter of fact these difficulties which loom up so vast in the distance, vanish as they are approached. The preacher knows when the dreaded topic is coming and has ample time to read up. However dry and repulsive it may be at first, it will gain interest from being kept before the mind. Turn the pale flame of a blow-pipe upon a lump of lime, and there will be a glow like a furnace. It is a good thing, too, for a minister to be compelled to grapple with such a subject. It wakes him up, puts him on his mettle, enlarges his thinking, gives him new points of contact with his people, gives them fresh confidence in him, and furnishes an opportunity for him to lead them from the acknowledged allegiance due to human authority to the allegiance due to the Lord of all.

Of course one must select, at the outset, an important book—one that has intrinsic interest and allows of popular treatment. Having once started upon the book he will find himself borne onward with an ever increasing momentum. Now and then he may have to work by sheer effort of will, producing only a dull sermon after all; but it may comfort him that he would do the same quite as frequently under the topical method. If, sometimes, there is a desert to cross, he may find a green oasis somewhere upon it. Then, too, he will be always looking forward to the grand passages, as one who is tramping in the Alps pushes on with springy step when approaching the Devil's Bridge, or as the pilgrim urges his horse over the barren hills of Judea, impatient to catch sight of the Holy City. Then,

oo, he makes most surprising discoveries in out-of-the-way places, and clauses and words flash out a most unexpected meaning. Sometimes when a little phrase in a long paragraph was revealed to me a new and delightful lesson, I have thought how three of us went to Cambridge to see the stately colleges; and, after wandering among them all day long, we heard in the evening, by mere chance, a nightingale's song, which was sweeter and more satisfying than all the rest.

Perhaps you will ask, If one takes what comes in course, how can he adapt his preaching to the hour? I reply (1.) That with his method the preacher has one service each Sunday, at which he may select his topic. (2.) In his expositions he will often find before him the very passage needed for the hour. There is something remarkable—providential—in regard to this. Many times the text which has come to me in course has seemed more opportune than I could have selected for myself. Thus, a season of quickened interest found me in the first chapter of 1 Peter with such topics before me as: "Begotten again unto a lively hope," the "incorruptible inheritance," the "tried faith more precious than gold that perisheth," "the salvation of your souls," "holy in all manner of conversation," "redeemed with the precious blood of Christ," "the glory of man as the flower of grass." When brethren were at strife and passed each other with averted faces, I could, without seeming to be personal, exhort them to "be kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly love," and to "overcome evil with good" (Rom. xii, 10, 21). On a Sunday when a collection was appointed for foreign missions, we chanced to be considering Paul's ambition to visit Spain that he might preach the gospel where Christ had not been named (Rom. xv, 20). When there were abuses in the municipal council, the passage was about governors being sent for the punishment of evil-doers and for the praise of them that do well (1 Pet. ii, 14); and, in ignorant simplicity, I struck some harder and more specific blows than I should have dared to strike of set purpose. No method could, in the long run, have more of timeliness than this.

One expository preacher testifies that he finds his work "very fascinating." Whether a congregation will find it so or not, can be determined only by trial. My own people seem to

me exceptionally good hearers—intelligent and wide-awake. They have the expository sermon in the morning—when they are at their best. The same sermon might be wasted upon the more miscellaneous and floating congregation of the evening. A dull, illiterate people might be restive. After Robert Hall had been for some years at Leicester, he complained to an old parishioner from Cambridge that he found great difficulty in fixing upon new subjects; and he was advised to take up expositions as he had formerly done, greatly to the edification of his Cambridge congregation. Mr. Hall replied: "My people in Leicester do not like expositions. I have frequently tried them, and it does not do to expound when the people are not interested. My congregation, Sir, is composed principally of plain people who are engaged in manufactories, and who have not enjoyed the advantages of education. They are by no means so intellectual as our friends in Cambridge; I am sorry that they do not like expositions, for I am convinced that more solid instruction can be derived from them than from sermons." Mr. Hall, however, made the experiment once more, but gave it up "owing to the unconquerable aversion of his people to the plan."

My own impression is that the expository sermon, if it have grip, will take hold almost anywhere. Let it be the strong sermon of the day. It must be no goodish dilution of the text, no compilation of opinions from the commentators, no summary of the processes of a pedantic scholarship. The people do not care what DeWette, or Meyer, or Alford may have thought, and if you should cite one of those venerated names, they might ask, as a mercantile acquaintance of mine did in a circle where the conversation turned on William Shakspeare, "What did that fellow do business?" Ellicott proclaimed in the preface to his first commentary that his only aim had been to determine the exact sense of Scripture on grammatical principles; but in subsequent prefaces he confessed that he had been obliged to modify his original design, that the dry bones of his grammatical skeleton needed to be clothed up with flesh, and endowed with spirit and life. The preacher who would expound with success must avoid Ellicott's m

Dr. Holland classes all preachers as poetical and non-poetical, and adds that the non poetical have no right to preach

* Expository sermonizing needs poetry as well as prosody. "The virtue of books is, to be readable,"† says Mr. Johnson. One virtue of sermons is to be hearable, and when we hear so, the people will hear.

As a matter of fact this kind of preaching, where faithfully has secured variety, freshness, and timeliness in the use of the pulpit, and has proved attractive and edifying to the people. Dr. W. M. Taylor and Dr. John Hall, who are among the best expositors in this country, never lack for success. Prof. Phelps expresses the opinion that his Biblical preaching "saved his pulpit." These are great preachers; we are doubtless, lag far behind them; but not farther, and not less, in this kind of preaching than in every other.

Where does the application come in?" asks a friend. One reply is, All the way through. Let the sermon be addressed to the whole man. If truth is self-evidencing, then as fast as it is uttered, it will find its way to the hearer's heart. The "rational, unadulterated milk" (1 Pet. ii. 2) is nourishing in every drop, the virtue of it being diffused through the whole and not all condensed in the last swallow. While the whole sermon should go home to the consciousness, there may be, with a long text as well as with a short one, a bringing up of all that has been said in a vigorous summary, and a true oratorical conclusion. Indeed, the homiletic habit suggests to the preacher (and rightly) that he can close nothing without an application; and mine, at this time, shall be this:

believe that expository preaching has the advantages that have been named, and so has claims upon your ministry, *try it!*

REV. WILLIAM CRAWFORD.

Letters to the Joneses.

† *Society and Solitude*, p. 62.

ARTICLE IV.—PRINCIPLES OF DOMESTIC TASTE.

A LECTURE DELIVERED IN THE YALE SCHOOL OF THE FINE ARTS.

BY PROFESSOR EDWARD E. SALISBURY.

THE subject I desire to bring before you is the Principles of Domestic Taste. Will it be objected, in advance, that there is no disputing about tastes—that, for each individual, whatever is to his or her taste is tasteful? and that, especially with respect to domestic arrangements, everyone is a law to himself? But, although I shall have to condemn some things which seem to me to violate good taste, my purpose is, mainly, to give expression to certain principles, which all must agree in recognizing as true and fundamental, as soon as put into words, yet which need to be brought out and emphasized, in order to their becoming more widely influential. Of course, I speak only as an amateur.

The first thing which it occurs to me to say on this subject, is that the idea of home lies at the foundation of all true domestic taste. There was a time, in the history of man, when the most primitive conception of a human habitation, as a place of shelter, was all that guided in the construction and furnishing of the house. We see traces of this in the rude huts, or moving tents, of certain barbarous tribes still existing, though even in the most primitive habitation it is a rare thing not to find some intimations of the sanctities of home, and some sense of beauty. Perhaps what first consecrated the house as a home may have been the religious instinct, bringing to the domestic hearth a reverence for higher powers, and a consequent spirit of self-control; for it is highly probable that the earliest temples of antiquity, set apart for abiding places of the gods, were modeled after human habitations. This could scarcely have been the case before the latter had begun to gather to themselves an atmosphere of sanctity.

But what riches of meaning invest the idea of home! No place for disguises, nor for mysteries of shame, it is at once sacred to retirement, and appropriate to an open frankness; not given for the indulgence of ignoble indolence, rest and repose

ver it; no lurking-place for the contrarieties and mean-
esses of human nature, wherever its true significance is
it subdues into a sweet harmony by the prevalence of
inspired love, and becomes a nursery of good cheer;
never to be rudely invaded, yet it invites and welcomes
ing guest; birth-place of the tenderest sympathies of
holds itself in constant communication, by many an
cord, of reverence, affection, memory and aspiration,
spiritual world. Such are some of those delights of
om appreciation of which all true domestic taste must
s rise. This leads to the further suggestion, that
partment of taste, in common, indeed, with all others
ed with art-culture, yet even more than any other,
its life and impulse from moral sources. I hold it to
rd to look for taste in a house where love does not
moral discord, or impurity, must blight every attempt
ze visible beauty. However fair the seeming, to a
ial observer, whatever richness of detail might be
l in a description, the aroma of genuine beauty can not
thed in an atmosphere morally pestilential, or wanting
hy vitality. Without moral life and purity, indeed,
reastic words of Swift will have their application:

"I find, by all you have been telling,
That 'tis a house, but not a dwelling."

an be no home!

, then, in respect to domestic taste, do the essential
s of home require? This question may be answered
ng, in the first place, that, as home is for retirement,
about it should be primarily designed to catch the eye
nger, but everything as if no strange eye were ever to
upon it. The style which prevailed, until lately, in
f middle-state city, under the influence of the followers
i, to give great plainness to the exterior of the house,
g its richness for the interior, seems to me to have
nsonant with good taste. In the interminglings of men
e another, appearances are to be regarded. Even in
mparatively trivial matters as dress, or outward

demeanor, something is due to the conventionalities of custom, and to what people have agreed to consider as becoming, or the contrary. But it is not so in one's home. Withdrawn into that sacred privacy, one should ignore the tyranny of fashion, and scorn to make up a show-picture for prying eyes to remark upon and praise. Too often, through oversight of this, what should be a home becomes nothing better than a museum. Not as being primarily for others to see, but by some impulse within one's own bosom, should all the appointments of one's home be determined. I would not be supposed to claim for the home any privilege of selfish isolation; and yet there is a true and very important sense, with reference to our subject, in which every household should dwell under such a roof, and amid such surroundings, as suit itself alone. Certain it is that, as light can not be hidden, so a home thus appointed will shine forth with an attractive radiance, all the more effective for being undesigned. True domestic taste, however, is, in its own nature, like virtue, a reward to itself.

But, while the home is to be ordered for retirement, it is not a place for disguises: an open frankness becomes it, and so it should itself be without any false pretences, either in materials used, or in construction, or in decoration. Truth should be written all over it in letters of light. Let me here refer, for a development of this thought, to Ruskin's well-known chapter on truth as one of the lamps of architecture—a reference always timely—which classifies architectural deceits under three heads: 1. the suggestion of a mode of structure, or support, other than the true one, as in pendants of late Gothic roofs, 2. the painting of surfaces to represent some other material than that of which they actually consist (as in marbling of wood), or the deceptive representation of sculptured ornament upon them, and 3. the use of cast, or machine-made, ornament.

Again, as home is for repose, nothing should find place in or about it which is suggestive of danger, or agitating to any sensibility, or fitted to let in, rather than to exclude, care—though of care must be said, as the poet says of another certain visitor:

"Pallida mors æquo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas
Regumque turres"

Many violations of this principle might be referred to, for illustration. In domestic architecture, how many towers do we see which, by their position or construction, rather threaten to crush and destroy than defend! how many garlands of ornery which seem made on purpose to conduct a consuming fire, some day, along the eaves of the house! how often are verandah-porches so built as to endanger the heads of those who venture under them! If one enters in safety, how little solid durability, or restfulness of aspect, meets one within! It is not unfrequently one finds door-openings without either proper pilasters or side-supports; walls and floors so unsubstantial that tremors are communicated over the whole house, and it shakes with every foot-fall. Then, if we turn to decorative features, why should Crucifixions, Martyrdoms of the Saints, Assassination-scenes, or other forms of human agony, appear under the same roof, where the spirit, wearied and jaded by the struggles and roughnesses of daily outdoor-life, may legitimately ask to find rest? The primitive Christian, who could live in safety only within a catacomb, made even that rough dwelling-place comfortable, by excluding all intimations of pain, all harrowing suggestions of even that great Sacrifice on which hung all his hopes. Many an abode of Christians in these days seems fitted up more as a penitential chapel than as a place for cheerful repose.

Neither is there repose in too crowded rooms. People fill their parlors with all kinds of curiosities, some so beautiful as to appeal to all tastes, some, having a meaning in their own countries, either sacred or jocose, which to us are simply monstrosities, ugly or grotesque. Amid the medley of "objets de vertu" and "bric-a-brac," as you turn to avoid upsetting a rich Japanese vase, you stumble upon a porcelain dog or Chinese idol, or you get entangled amid Turkish rugs and mats of Russian fur. With such a variety to examine, to study, to wonder at or admire, the eye and mind become weary, and cease to enjoy.

Think, too, of the disturbance caused to one's equanimity by those mirror-like floors of inlaid woods, however beautiful to the eye, on which one has need of parlor-skates, in order safely to pass from one side to another; and still more when pirouettes and courtesies have to be performed upon them!

How, again, should care be kept out, so far as human life allows of its exclusion? By such arrangements for convenience, such a liberal disposing of one's resources for comfort—however few and slender in themselves—and such unconstraint in the placing of every thing, that one is allowed to imagine all things to be at his command, and that they take care of themselves, and fall by their own sweet will into just the best places.

Another element of the idea of home, as it has been described, is loving harmony; and what is signified by this, in respect to matters of domestic taste? Rather might we ask what does this not signify; for is not harmony the blending of all notes of beauty? This, however, is far from being recognized, as it should be, either in the outward form or in the interior arrangements of houses. Indeed, they often seem to be built and furnished on a principle of discord, representing the diverse and discordant minds of their occupants. But good taste requires that, in such matters, the members of a family brought together in one house should, by mutual enlightenment and concession, bring out that harmony of one part with another, as to form, proportion, and color, which always pleases even the uneducated eye, beautifully symbolizes peace within, and contributes to cultivate, or even to create, an inward accord. Our architects and decorators are much to be blamed on this point. Their special studies and training should hold them back from ministering to caprice. If a man insists on making his house like a Grecian temple, or on combining the classic architecture of geometric lines with the romantic forms which came out of the wild, free woods of Germany, the architect should not coöperate with him. In regard to color, because our increasing intercourse with the East has made certain combinations of color fashionable, which only oriental limners and looms have as yet succeeded in bringing together without discord, we should not throw shades of blue and green and red together, rashly. Not less important is it to maintain harmony between structure and decoration. A glaring violation of this would be to show Gothic pendants and corbels either outside or inside of a building of moderate height, the walls of which rise evenly to a flat roof; another would be to fresco Gothic wall-surfaces with Moorish

and coloring. A frequently occurring example of want of harmony is the use of iron railings on a stone foundation, or a heavy stone wall, to enclose a simple wooden house. Harmony often appears, also, in the unsuitableness of the room to the house in which it is placed, as, for instance, a Gothic cottage is furnished in the style of the Renaissance; or when, in consequence of too large expenditure on the building, only a mean provision is left for furniture; or when there is a disproportion between the size of a room and the number of the pictures in it.

Light, the inseparable companion of harmony, should be a marked feature in the appointments of the home, for the young, the feeble, the aged, alike, of buoyant youth, the care-worn, invalids, the aged. But neither by day nor by night is any room useful which is not well lighted. Light, which is revealed to be the type of all good, even of Christ himself, the atmosphere of heaven, without which neither vegetable nor animal can exist, is as carefully shut out, from many houses, as if it were only an enemy and a destroyer; our ladies choosing darkness rather than light, and bringing up their families in rooms where no plant could ever grow, forgetting that the sun's sunlight alone can give health and bloom to their flowers, as to their flowers. Let us choose south rooms, and let the sun enter into them, through unshaded windows, glass-doors, or open doors, closing them only while they are unoccupied, or during the fiercest of summer-heats. As to color, it seems strange that in this country, and still more that in England, there have prevailed a fashion for subdued colors, till carpets and wall-papers are toned down to the shades of dust and the walls and only a choice of greys and dull browns is left us. The fashion does not come to us from the Orient, where lie the sun's most burning rays. There, rich and gorgeous colors, gleaming even with gold, to produce higher effects. In the tropic-lands come our most gorgeous-plumaged birds, the flowers of richest hues; the dress of men and women, there, even the trappings of their horses, are resplendent with the richest colors, brought out in vivid relief with gold. Why do we, who have, half the year, an Arctic climate, choose, for the whole year, an Arctic paleness in our lights and tints?

The new style seems to be a reaction from the old manner of using all colors promiscuously, as when tapestry-carpet, and sets of heavy, high-colored curtains and furniture made rooms look hot and oppressive. But, as the varied colors of the prism blend together perfectly, so it is possible, artificially, to unite high colors under such conditions of softness and unison that the same room may look warm, cheerful, and rich in winter, and in the summer seem only to have the hues of the summer-sunlight toned down within it, inviting to retreat and repose. If walls and floors are dull and leaden in hue, this cannot be. It is not possible for pictures, or any ornaments, to brighten and warm the atmosphere of such a room: from muddy-shaded carpets and dark-colored walls, only a feeble, murky light is reflected, by night or day. There may be gleams of light, but there cannot be perpetual sunshine, in such a room; whereas walls of soft, creamy tints almost make sunshine in the darkest days. Mirrors, which give vistas of perspective, reflecting and doubling the light, and all objects of beauty, also contribute to the cheerfulness of the house. I have said, before, that pictorial representations of a disturbing character are to be excluded; to this is to be added, here, that the principle of cheerfulness calls for pictures, or other works of art, of positively gladsome significance, which are fitted to enliven the spirit by humorous associations, or favor a playing of fancy amid the brighter aspects of life and scenes of nature.

We may next notice some of the requirements in respect to domestic taste which grow out of the idea of home as a place for hospitality. Among these may be specified a generous-looking entrance, suggestive of "salve" rather than of "cane canem," which shall seem to take the incomer into a warm embrace, and even in advance to wreath him with garlands of welcome, as well as illuminate his approach; an ample hall, making the visitor feel at once that there is room enough and to spare; guest-chambers not left in cheerless neglect, or made receptacles for rubbish, but, by their orderliness and finish of appointment, showing constant readiness for occupation; and a room for the hospitable board large in proportion to other rooms of the house—a point in which the ancient Greeks and Romans are an example for us, by their large "triclinia"; as are,

also, our English ancestors, by their banqueting-halls. All these things are requisite, but not less so is such a disposition of every thing about the house, within and without, in particulars too small, perhaps, to be enumerated, yet not insignificant, and readily occurring to one on hospitable thoughts intent—all involving a certain generous carefulness not to be over-careful—which shall show the house and what it contains to be, not merely for the retirement and rest of those whose home it is, but for the use of others also, who are to be received within it in a cheerful recognition of the principle, not more of Christianity than of good taste, that “no man liveth to himself.” Even one’s home is not a home to him, in the truest sense, but a burrow or a hermitage, except as he arranges it not for a hermit-life, but purposely to share it with others beside those of his own household.

In the last place, it is to be observed, that, as every home is, both by retrospect and anticipation, inseparably linked with the spiritual world, so domestic taste should recognize this bond. No home can properly be without its oratory (even if no particular room be reserved for the purpose), where the fire of the daily sacrifice and the aspiration of Christian hope shall unceasingly arise. A worship of ancestors, after the manner of the Confucian, is not to be commended; but some place of honor, under the domestic roof, should be appropriated to busts, canvas-portraits, or whatever humbler effigies may be possessed of one’s worthy forefathers. This is a feature of especial importance for the American home, which so seldom has in it the conservative atmosphere of antiquity, or is ruled by spirits of the departed. By similar memorials should the loved and lost, in nearer relationships, be brought down, as it were, from their heavenly spheres, to elevate and purify home affections.

Says a poet, describing a charming family-home :

“Painting had there the rooms made rich
With knights and dames, and loving eyes
Of heaven-gone kindred, sweet and wise;
Of bishops gentle as their lawn,
And sires whose talk was one May-dawn.”

Not to specify other particulars, I only add under this head that, notwithstanding time’s changes are sure, eventually, to

bring their own interruptions and marrings of the domestic scene, there should be throughout the earthly home a moderation, a reserve, even an intentional neglect of some thing in order that it may be true to itself as a place of meeting of what is past and gone, as well as of forecast of immortality. A lavish profusion, or an over-finely drawn study of ornament which vainly aims at leaving nothing deficient, in the end is at variance with its true idea.

Here I ask to have it noticed that nothing has been said which touches the question of relative costliness of material or elaboration of finish. The principles laid down are applicable alike to the most costly mansion and to the simplest habitation. However small one's resources, no one need neglect to perfect in the dwelling which is to be his home, for retirement, for disguise, for repose, harmony, cheerfulness, hospitality, recognition of the life beyond the borders of time. Indeed, one may sometimes see these principles far more charmingly exemplified out in humble abodes, pervaded by good taste, than in residences which have been built and furnished under the eye of architects and upholsterers, interested only to see a profuse expenditure, or guided solely by prevailing fashion.

We are thus led to consider as a regard to the distinctive features of character, and social position, of each single household, by itself, as another principle of domestic taste. A home must be for himself, not only in the sense of a stage show, but with reference to personal idiosyncracies, occupations, and social standing. What makes so charming the late home of our own Irving? Is it not that on the banks of a river in the neighborhood of glens and streamlets, over which his own pen had woven graceful wreaths of exquisite hunting pleasant historical reminiscences, he had the good fortune to find an old Dutch house, which was capable of receiving itself, in tiled gables, and sloping roofs crowned by the weather-cock, and in simple arrangements within compatible with the quaint exterior, such an impress of his own spirit even now, when he is no longer present, one almost expects to meet there, as inseparable from the spot, the inimitable creature.

of his fancy? Or shall I point you to our Edgewood, so fitted to be the home of one who well unites scholarly finish with practical wisdom and the freedom of nature? Similar correspondences should be found in all homes. If a man is a farmer, his dwelling should be a farm-house, to which he should bring whatever may complete and adorn it as such—not afraid of humble out-buildings, or ashamed to show his barn-yard, endeavoring to beautify, yet adapting every thing to the conditions of his own life. The artist's home should invite to the closest communion with nature, in aspects appealing to the imagination, at the same time that it provides for home familiarity with the works of art of past times, paintings, sculptures, engravings, bronzes, porcelains, and enamels, or, if he can command nothing more, then with reproductions in photograph or cast. It certainly befits the calling of a merchant, who is worthy of the name, that his home, by the variety of materials used in the building, or pictures of foreign scenery on his walls, or cabinet-specimens of art and nature in other places, according to his means, should show a wide range of commercial research. If a man has no taste for books, why should he encumber himself with blocks to represent them, or with volumes, however choice, supplied by "carte blanche" to a book-seller, only controlled by some such order as that said to have been once given in this city, in such a case, to furnish *every work of Mr. Shakespeare immediately on its publication?* An illustration of the direct opposite of such affectation as this, may allude to the case of a wealthy leather-dresser living, years ago, near Boston, who, having a literary taste, gathered about him some of the choicest editions of standard English authors, which he appropriately put into the best of leather bindings, with the daintiest tooling, to be the familiar companions of his leisure. These books were laid up, at last, among the treasures of the Massachusetts Historical Society, to which they had been bequeathed. How unhappy does a man sometimes appear, whose home is out of keeping with his own nature and circumstances, where he moves about like a wandering spirit, seeking rest and finding none! On the other hand, is it not in great measure due to such correspondences as we are now considering, that English homes of all classes, at least in the

country, where alone the Englishman is at home, are so home-like? Alas that the greater liberty to vary, which Americans enjoy, through freedom from traditional restraints, should be sacrificed to a dull sameness! whence come our insipid city blocks, even outside of cities; our private galleries of art, purchased on some conventional principle, not expressive of individual liking; and our furniture made all in one style, for which fickle fashion is the only authority, now forcing it everywhere, and anon condemning it to garrets and second-hand shops. While, however, such want of individuality is the general rule, I have heard of a beautiful instance of the reverse in the case of a young gentleman who adorned his home with wood-carvings from his own hand, working out his own thoughts and imaginations—an example for many others to imitate, if they would. So, too, might delicate allusions to family-history, or humorous hits at hereditary peculiarities, be fittingly painted on the door-panels of a home.

We come, now, to another phase of our subject. The principles thus far dwelt upon are applicable to all times and places; but domestic taste has much to do with the age and country in which one lives: whatever is characteristic of the country must enter into it as a distinctively modifying principle. It has it been with every development of it which is worthy of admiration, whether we consider the Roman villa, with its luxurious provisions for pleasures of the table, and for indolent repose, with little account made of domestic life; or the English homestead, in which attention seems to be divided between securing the fullest enjoyment of domesticity and providing for out-door sports, either in court-yard or manorial park. What gives its differing charm to each is, in large measure, its being the spontaneous outgrowth of a peculiar civilization, at a certain period; and without this, domestic taste necessarily becomes snobbish or flavorless. In all our arts, we need to realize more what is due to our own age and country. The right influence of our great Centennial will not be to stimulate to the doing of just the same things which we have seen and admired as the work of other countries, and in part of other times, but to awaken ambition among us to do as well in our own way, with

adaptation to our own age. An imperfect development in the right direction is always preferable to great achievements on a mistaken footing.

It is to my purpose, therefore, with special reference to matters of domestic taste, to mention here some of the characteristics which seem appropriate to distinguish all forms of American art. I have not the presumption to suppose it possible to instruct, on this point, our artists themselves: they know the history of their arts too well to expect to attain to true excellence by mere copying, or repeating what has been already as well or better done. If they originate nothing, their employers and patrons are most to be blamed, since the spirit which actuates these must be the main-spring of all their efforts. The Greek feeling for beauty, the Greek mind, so interpenetrated with the perception of natural forms, and motive powers, and so moulded and disciplined by patriotism and philosophic studies, called forth all the glories of Grecian art. Nor should I run the risk of the criticisms of those having more of art-culture than myself, except for the interest I feel in encouraging, among ourselves, a genuine—national and timely, growth of all forms of art, and so, in particular, of those with which domestic taste concerns itself.

The characteristic which first suggests itself as appropriate to American art, is freedom or freshness. To be genuine, our art must be fresh. The youth of the nation calls for this; conventionality is especially out of place among us. If the impulses of youth were followed, the beaten path would soon be forsaken. Let me not be understood to imply that the study of the antique and mediæval should be abandoned—far otherwise—but it should be pursued only with a view to achieving, by similar processes of invention and technical execution, the same perfection which we there admire. We should not desire to build Parthenons, nor to shade our dwellings with Grecian porticoes, nor to erect castles on our river-banks. But we ought to endeavor after the same exquisite proportions, scientific solidity, and gracious finish which distinguished the art of the Greeks in its prime, together with the same picturesqueness, and adaptation to chosen sites, which marked the castle-building of the Middle Ages. At the same time, the ideal of our dwellings should seem to be a

spontaneous outgrowth of our young and free national life. It was well said by the poet Wordsworth, that the color of a house should be such as to make it seem formed out of the soil on which it stands. But how can we accomplish this union of originality with the refinement of culture? We must, as a people, more deeply understand and respect ourselves, and use our call to liberty by giving new wings to imagination. Those restraints, from prejudice, general ignorance, traditional usage, and half-suppressed intellectual and emotional vitality, under which the artists of other times and countries were compelled to labor, should not narrow our scope. It is essential that we work out what is in us, freely, and then make rules to express our own liberties; and not go about studying the grammar of art as if it were a completed system, of which we can be only learners, not all revisers or finishers. Indeed, why should not our artists, with all the helps of modern science, invent new processes, far superior to those now so carefully handed down from the Old Masters?

A more specific principle, which should characterize American art, and especially art as applied to our domestic life, is modesty, in the sense of opposition to all assumption, as well as to work which is meretricious. This is requisite as a condition of future progress, for whatever is destined to a rich and varied expansion must have a broad and solid foundation in simple beginnings. It is also demanded by a due consideration of what becomes our Puritan ancestry. So much of our national life depends upon the primitive infusion of the Puritan element, that we can not ignore this, without destroying the germs of all independent art-culture among us. For instance, with special application to our subject, the typical American dwelling, architecturally considered, might be most appropriately derived from the simple forms of early New England days, even as the gambrel-roof rose out of the gable, and this out of the long, one-sided slant of earlier times. What additions or expansions would be suitable, I will not attempt to specify, only insisting on this, that, under all changes, the original modest simplicity should be present, though

“ . . . the spinning-wheel shall no longer
Hum in the house . . . and fill its chambers with music.”

That this is not impossible is proved by an example on one the Berkshire-hills, where is a very picturesque modern structure which looks like the outgrowth of an old-fashioned man-to." Perhaps in no country is there so wide a departure in this from primitive types of architecture; and yet what most admire in the domestic architecture of other countries, resulted from strict adherence to early forms as the basis of whatever cultivated genius in after-times has produced. Our domestic architecture, however, need not be limited to developments from the old New England type. As we have, by inheritance, a right to use the works of Chaucer and Spenser our own, so are American artists at liberty to go back to the formative period of English domestic architecture, in the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, for inspiration and guidance.

they may not, properly, use dwellings of that period as models to be copied outright, and still less adopt Elizabethan or other later English styles, which belonged to ages of decline and decay. In the same spirit of simplicity, with conformity to the prevailing habits of life, and under the same condition that we shall be no mere copying, may Dutch, German, French, Italian, or other styles of art be brought in to help to form our domestic architecture of the future. This opportunity for improvement will be further dwelt upon presently.

Within the house, also, let modesty extend its chastening control. Let there be no ornaments, no pictures, no marbles, no forms of furniture, which would have started a blush on the cheek of the Puritan maiden of the olden time. American domestic taste can not be too coy in this particular. It should steadfastly refuse to be catered for with the art-products of corrupted Rome (meretricious in the worst sense), or with the effluvia of the modern French school, redolent of Parisian coquetry. What is suitable and necessary in the galleries of a school of art, as respects exhibition of the nude, is not to be tolerated under the domestic roof. All colors employed should, also, be chaste and pure, not such as a poet of our own age humorously likened to the effect of an explosion of paints in wild confusion.

A third element to be looked for in all forms of American architecture is variety. The varieties in nature which our country

embraces, if allowed to work out their proper effects, could fail to suggest to our artists an infinite diversity of subjects, motives, and treatment. Our floral riches, and the variety of our fruits, from tropical to temperate, and our scenery, passing through all gradations, from the softest to the most rugged, from the most simply rural to the intensely sublime, are all full of meaning to the artist-eye, and protest against a tame uniformity. Not less so do the diversities of kindred composition in our nation. As in Europe the traveller sees successive variations of nationality in the same land, distinguished by architecture and other landmarks, so here, taking our original peculiarities of national character and circumstances as a common basis, around this there should be a simultaneous grouping of the art-characteristics belonging to the several peoples which compose our united nation. We have a great privilege, belonging to our history, in the harmonious intermingling of the characteristics of different nationalities in the spirit and forms of our art. Whenever full advantage shall have been taken of this, what new beauties may be expected to appear, for example, in our landscape painting, from the infusion into it of so rich a variety, through the differing ways of regarding nature characteristic of the English, the Germans, the Scotchmen, the Norwegians, or others! and what perfections may we expect to see formed, when, under the guidance of the general principles laid down, the varying natures varying according to national kinship, shall enter into aid and help to make out the finished result!

The last point to which I would call attention on this subject of our subject, is this, that all artistic treatment of natural objects, originating now, should be in a scientific spirit. It may be still allowable for older nations, from whose darkness of childhood have come down superstitions and fables respecting the powers of nature, that they should retain these as part of their art-material. For us, on the contrary, it is unsuitable to attempt to work over such myths and fancies. We have so much as a traditional interest in them, and the light of science shines too brightly around our artists, to let them except in a most untruthful and awkward way, with superstitions. The wood-carver now, indeed, as much as he must present natural objects ideally, not attempting to de-

the eye with exact imitation ; but the grotesque and chimerical are to be considered as forbidden to him. Nor will art really lose by the change ; for in proportion as science familiarizes us with forms of nature, and leads to tracing them from their germs and secret causes, the spirit which animates them, which is what the artist has to look for, will be more clearly seen and truthfully delineated. The most shadowy outline of the human form is best given by one who knows intimately every particular of its inner structure.

Perhaps I am set down by my kind hearers as an idealist. My intention has been, indeed, to present an ideal ; yet I would not disparage any endeavors, however inadequate, to put domestic taste in practice. The natural and commendable wish to improve one's home, which a sudden accession of wealth brings with it, where the refinement of education is wanting, must of course introduce many incongruities and blemishes into that enclosure sacred to harmony and truth ; and these must be temporarily tolerated, for the sake of the motive of improvement which prompts to them, even though they should be chargeable with vulgarity. Yet the purity of domestic taste in its principles must not be thereby impaired.

But, while in many houses there is an ill-regulated passion for change, bordering on vulgarity, others seem to have settled into a fossil condition, equally opposed to good taste. The furniture being purchased—perhaps many years ago, perhaps when the family-means were very small—the house-adornment is considered complete. There are all the beds, and tables, and sofas, and chairs, needed for use, but nothing is added. Money-investments may be growing, possibly heaping up, but there are no beauties added to the daily household-life, no new resources of comfort or taste, for home enjoyment, or for the purposes of higher education. The children of such homes are apt either to shrink to their narrow limits, to grow up tame and insipid in the dull atmosphere around them, or in strong reaction, with a wild sense of longing for change, to make the earliest possible escape. What makes this stagnation the more reprehensible is that, in the midst of it, large sums are constantly spent on useless articles of show, or mere

fashion, which perish with the using—sometimes lavishly dress; when the same money might have been adding to pictures, bronzes, porcelains, or other articles of beautiful curiosity, which minister to the highest tastes through owner's life, and are held more and more precious by succeeding generation.

Again, to obviate misunderstanding on a particular point I would say that my insisting on accord between the home and the character and position of those whose home it is, does not require that all the inmates should be equally cultivated even on the same social grade. Not unfrequently, especially among us, the wife's artistic culture may be superior to her husband's, or the husband's refinement superior to his wife's, or the children growing up around them may, by a higher education, come to have cravings after order, and beauty, and richness, which neither parent ever felt. Of course, it is the wants of the several natures in the family which should constitute the rule of congruity in matters of domestic taste; that, for example, a very illiterate man may properly have a library in his house, for the use of his children; and objects of art to educate their eyes and imaginations, although he himself fails to appreciate them. But, in all cases, culture ought to be first; home art must grow from within outward, into outward manifestation, not be superimposed. The simplest abode, by following this principle, is rendered more attractive than a very costly one arranged in violation of it. Indeed, the cultivation of more cultivated friends who may visit one's home can not be secured on any other condition; for, though one may chance to find single objects to admire, something which is sure to offend, or to excite merriment, as contrary to good taste where all the appointments of the home are not in keeping with the natures and characters domesticated in it.

A work entitled "*Hints on Household Taste*," by an author of a distinguished name, though not the late President of the Royal Academy, as I think many suppose, but his name has been very widely circulated, and has had a great influence over house-furnishing for some years past, both in England and America, giving rise, even, to forms of manufacture

from the author. I could, therefore, scarcely conclude this lecture without some notice of it, especially as it seems to call for both commendation and criticism.

In these days of sham, unquestioning subjection to fashion, and consequent sacrifice of principles of good taste, we can not so highly applaud Mr. Eastlake's frequent insisting upon truthfulness, constructive goodness, and adaptation to purpose and material, in all artistic design. Moreover, by showing how use and beauty are not only consistent but interdependent, he has done much towards a real beautifying of our homes. These words of his, for instance, are all-important: "In the sphere of what is called industrial art, use and beauty are, in theory at least, closely associated; for not only has the humblest article of manufacture, when honestly designed, a picturesque interest of its own, but no decorative feature can legitimately claim our admiration without revealing, by its very nature, the purpose of the object which it adorns."

On the other hand, his looking back to periods when, in some good degree at least, the artist and the artizan were one, for examples to be imitated, seems to have somewhat warped his judgment in favor of the precise models there found, although he does deny that he recommends "the readoption of any specific type of ancient furniture, which is unsuited, whether in detail or general design, to the habits of modern life." He takes his stand as an advocate and continuator of the "Gothic Revival," following in the steps of Pugin; and gives a decided preference, throughout his work, to what most nearly approaches the Gothic, both in architecture and in interior decoration and furnishing. This leads him astray. It necessarily involves a certain "rudeness of construction" and finishing, which Eastlake claims as a merit. It also causes incongruity between the house and its furniture, for, in these days, the house itself can have none of the frowning ruggedness of mediæval architecture; and this incongruity the author does not sitate to sanction, thus giving up what seems to me to be an essential principle of domestic taste. No one need live in such a house that the furnishing of it, if in good taste, must be congruous with the building itself.

As to intrinsic beauty, the old Greek and Roman furniture, than which nothing has ever been conceived beautiful, were gracefully curving, yet did not lack solid the curves giving, probably, greater strength, just as the of the columns of the Parthenon, by gently swelling out seem the better to sustain the superincumbent weight, the human form, without one straight line, is strong with spring of a strung bow. Straight posts and stiff outlines were left to the Middle Ages, when tools were rude, and crude, and splendor in living was a half barbaric splendor. The much talked of Elizabethan furniture stood on covered with rushes, into the midst of which were thrown bones and fragments from the table.

Another error into which Eastlake seems to have been by taking the Gothic style of the Middle Ages for his ideal, this, that he prefers colors which are neutral, or sombre, to clear and pure tone—an error, as has been pointed out only in view of his climate and ours, but also in respect call there is for whatever can contribute to the cheerful of a home.

But, though we freely criticize the deficiencies and errors of our domestic art, let us, after all, comfort and encourage ourselves, my friends. While we are constantly hearing of discoveries of wonderful and beautiful art-treasures of antiquity read in history and poetry of classic and mediæval art study, in Europe and the East, rare and precious relics exist, whose beauty and grace we can not rival, we would recall those times when art was for the few, and the multitude lived in the misery and squalor of serfdom. Since the world began was domestic art, in all nations generally enjoyed as in our time; and in no country world are tasteful, comfortable and happy homes so abundant as in our own.

ARTICLE V.—THE APOCRYPHAL PERIOD OF HEBREW HISTORY IN ITS RELATION TO CHRIST.*

THE period which we are to consider in this article, in its relations to the Messiah, is the period of about 450 years, between the return from captivity under Ezra and Nehemiah, and the advent of Christ.

During this time, the Jews who came back to Palestine or remained in exile, were under Persian rule for the first hundred years; then the Greek power prevailed for a hundred and fifty years; after this the Jews of Palestine became independent for a hundred years, under the Maccabees, and lastly were subject to the Romans for sixty years before the coming of the Saviour.† The whole period may be termed the Apocryphal era, because of the books that were written in it have not been admitted among the authoritative sacred scriptures of the Hebrews. The last book that has a place in the Old Testament canon, as all know, is the book of Malachi, written probably during the time that Nehemiah was governor at Jerusalem.‡

From this time onward, for more than four centuries, the inspired oracle is silent. God has spoken all that he chooses to speak to Israel, till the "Word" shall come in the flesh. Jehovah has revealed all that the chosen people need to know concerning the Messiah. Now begins a wonderful era of providential preparation, supplementary to the preceding centuries of direct guidance. It is a period of silence like that

Works consulted in the preparation of this article: Ewald, *History of Israel*, v; Hengstenberg, *Christology*, vol. i, 209 p. et al.; Book of Henoch, (Lauze), *Esp.*, xlviii, 3d Edn., Oxford; *Commentary on Apocrypha*, Arnald, vii, London, 1748; Westcott, *Introduction to Study of Gospels*, Chaps. I and II; Westcott, *Reference Bible—Summary, Views, etc.*; Smith's *Dicty.*, Arts. *Apoc.*, *Maccabees*, etc.; *Apocrypha*, 14 Books, Old Bible. Rawlinson's *Ancient Monarchies*.

The Persian rule was 445–334 B. C.; Greek rule, 334–169 B. C.; Independence, –65 B. C.; Roman rule, 65 to advent.

Until the date of "Daniel" is ascertained more clearly, we cannot class it among the books of the Apocryphal period. (See Ewald, v, 302.)

which occurred during the sojourn in Egypt; also like the silence before the time of Samuel the prophet. But this period yields to no other in its preparation of the Hebrew mind for the advent of the Messiah. Up to the beginning of this period, God has obviously and directly guided the Hebrew nation for a thousand years. He now withdraws His special direction, that under His general providence the results of the past may be worked out. He now leaves them for a time, that these germs of prophecy may quicken towards the fulfilment of His words. Or rather, after a careful study of this period, in which the Hebrew nation seems in a measure left to itself, we may say that God now institutes a new treatment of his chosen people, in order that they, and through them the world, may be better prepared for the appearance in the flesh of the Messiah. It is on this preparation for Christ, during this period, that our argument at this time will rest.

I. The beginning of this peculiar work of preparation for Christ, has already been made in the captivity at Babylon; God's providence, combined with prophecy, has done something towards this end during the time of the exile of the Hebrews.

Jerusalem was destroyed and Judah carried captive to Babylon nearly 600 years B. C., or about a hundred and fifty years before the time of Nehemiah. The kingdom of Israel was overthrown and the ten tribes carried into captivity by the Assyrians one hundred and thirty years earlier; but as these ten tribes do not reappear in history, and are considered "lost," our attention centers wholly upon the tribe of Judah in their Babylonian captivity, and it is of them alone that we can confidently speak. Undoubtedly members of the ten tribes continued to exist in Palestine and in various quarters of the earth; but henceforward the Hebrew nation is Judean, even as, from about this date, the people are called the Jews.

The compulsory term of the Jewish captivity in Babylon lasted only fifty years: for when the Persians conquered Babylon, Cyrus, king of Persia, immediately issued a decree that all the Jews who wished might go back and rebuild the temple and the walls at Jerusalem. About 40,000 returned

under Zerubbabel and Joshua, with Haggai and Zechariah for their prophets. A far greater number, however, stayed where they were, in exile, engaged in profitable occupations, in commerce, or holding places of importance under the Persian government.

During the hundred years that elapsed between this first return under Zerubbabel and the times of Ezra and Nehemiah, there was always more or less Jewish emigration to Jerusalem, from the countries whither the Jews had been dispersed. But after all, Jerusalem languished; and when Nehemiah visited it, he found the city lying waste, the walls broken down and the gates burned. Again the enthusiasm of the Jews was aroused, and a new interest created in the holy city and in the service of the Sanctuary, by Ezra the scribe and Nehemiah the governor, appointed by the Persian king.

It is at this point that we take up the thread of history, to trace out the process of the next four hundred and fifty years, by which the people were gradually prepared for the true Messiah. What then is the condition of the Jews at the opening of this period? Have they gained or lost by their captivity? We may say that they have both lost and gained.

1. They have lost their nationality, never to regain their position as one of the nations of the earth. They will always remain "Jews," and be in a measure distinct from other races; but they will never again become a nation, governing itself. They are dispersed everywhere. They acknowledge other rulers and kings, and prefer, by a large majority, to surrender their patriotism to worldly prosperity among the nations where they are scattered abroad. Even those who return, either with the first 40,000 from Babylon, or as scattering bands who from time to time seek again the city of their ancestors, never again become a nation. They are, and always remain, a mere colony, at first under the supremacy of Persia; then under the Greeks, after Alexander the Great had conquered Persia (325 B. C.), and finally sinking into a province of Rome, about 40 B. C., when Anthony made Herod, the Idumean, their tetrarch. Even during the one hundred

years preceding Herod's domination, a period of independence when the celebrated Maccabean rulers had established the religion once more in Judea, and had thrown off the yoke of the Assyrians and the Egyptians, the Jews could not be considered a nation. There was a constant dependence upon foreign aid or forbearance. Besides, the Jews in Judea and Galilee were ever after but a mere handful, compared with the Jews dispersed throughout all quarters of the known world. We may say then with confidence that at the time of Nehemiah (perhaps before) the Jews had lost their nationality, never regained.

2. They have also at this time, as a whole, given up the old ceremonial worship. As a system to be preserved intact, the Jews by their exile and dispersion have virtually rendered the Mosaic ritual. For a part of the time, they had no temple at Jerusalem to which, according to the law, the males of every tribe must go up to sacrifice every year. And when the temple-service was set up, at intervals with some degree of authority, it was impossible for the Jews of this requirement to be obeyed. It was also impossible to carry out a law like that of the release of servants and of every seventh year,—the Year of Jubilee. There was, moreover, no ark of the covenant to make the Holy of Holies a sacred place. The Urim and Thummim had been lost and could not be restored, except by divine revelation, which was never granted. So that the Mosaic law, being thus of necessity infringed upon, its power as a ceremonial service over the popular Jewish mind was broken, never again to be revived in its former strength. In the various countries where the Jews were dispersed, the synagogue took the place of the temple, and a partial observance of the old Mosaic rites stood far from the obedience required by the law of the Tabernacle.

The great feasts, which were so valuable in holding the people together (both in their political as well as in their religious unity), could never again be kept in one central place; moreover, although pilgrims came to Jerusalem to worship at the temple, although gifts were sent to the temple, yet as a great sanctuary inviolate and perpetual, the Mosaic law was virtually set aside, never more to be reinstated with its ancient authority.

(3.) The Jews have also, at the time of Nehemiah, begun to lose their Hebrew speech. It is not indeed wholly lost, but sufficiently impaired to destroy its power, and to lead at length to its decay.* The language in common use in the foreign countries to which the Jews were exiled was Aramaic. It was a highly developed literary tongue. The exiles naturally adopted it, and their children continued it. Even on returning, the colony kept their Aramaic speech, and local names in Palestine became Aramaic.

The Hebrew was still the language of the schools and the temple, but in time it yielded to foreign pressure. The Chaldaic names of the months, for example, took the place of the old Hebrew. The calculations of the years by the reigns of the Persian kings is an indication of the introduction of new forms of speech and new words. The book of Ecclesiastes was written in the modern dialect, and a part of the book of Ezra (written about this time) is composed of Aramaic sections. In Samaria, the language, composed of many foreign elements, was a mongrel tongue, Aramaic, Phenician, Old Canaanite, and other foreign materials; so that by degrees a corrupt form of Aramaic became the language of the Jews of Palestine, much like the form which we observe in the New Testament Greek. We find therefore, that during the one hundred and fifty years following the destruction of the temple, the Hebrews, in a measure, lost their nationality, their system of ritualism, and their native tongue.

(4.) But what has the Hebrew nation gained by their captivity and dispersion? First, we have strong proof that all the old tendency to idolatry has been obliterated, never to reappear. This seems strange, but can be satisfactorily accounted for. In coming to some extent among foreigners, the privilege and opportunity of the old Mosaic ceremonial service, the Hebrews, for the first time as a people, gained the consciousness of the superiority of their faith as a spiritual worship. The ritual had preserved the substance of true religion, under the Hebrew forms of worship: but now, in the absence of many of the old forms, the substance itself asserted its power. The prophets of

* Ewald v, 180.

the captivity, having no grand ritual by which to affect the popular mind, insisted more than ever on the inward worship of the heart. The promised glory of Israel teemed with new tokens of spiritual life. "A new spirit will I put within you," said Jehovah by the mouth of Ezekiel, the great prophet of the exile (Ezek. xi. 49). "And I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them a heart of flesh." The power of simple prayer was experienced in this period, as it was never realized before.

When Persia conquered Babylon, this spiritual element was still more remarkably assisted by the fact that Persia had no idol-worship. Its religion was simple and free from corrupt practices. It was serious and austere. Though it had nothing in common with the Hebrew worship of Jehovah, it grasped the spiritual idea of a good and evil principle with a lofty imagination, so that a horror of image-worship, which the Hebrews had not felt when surrounded with idolatrous heathen at home, was originated among non-idolatrous heathen abroad. For a century previous to the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, this influence had thoroughly eradicated the old tendency to lapse into idolatry at the slightest temptation.

(5.) Another gain in the captivity was Religious Unity. With the loss of the Hebrew nationality, the race as a whole, became more and more tenacious of the principles of their common faith. Thrown off from their common center of government, giving their allegiance to the many kings and rulers in whose territories they lived, serving as soldiers in various lands, even meeting each other in battle ranged under hostile banners, they still preserved their religion. This was the last thing a Hebrew would relinquish. He demanded the recognition of this when he yielded up every other privilege to a foreign authority. Losing their national unity, the Jews retained, as individual worshippers of the one true God, almost perfect religious oneness; and a Jew, wherever found, was known as a believer in Jehovah, rather than as a subject of the Jewish commonwealth. Like the Roman Catholic of to-day, naturalized in France or the United States, and in religion only an adherent of the Pope, so the Jew of the dispersion was a true subject of any monarch, but in faith always a son of the Most High. We shall see that

and, this was a great gain, as it destroyed the old Hebrew
veness, and made the Jews in every clime permanent
es of belief in the one true God.

The loss of their native language was also compensated,
at degree, by the fact that by this change of dialect the
of the Jewish faith were permanently established. The
religion was now embodied in books written in Hebrew.
athologies of the nations among whom the Jews might
ered, were in a thousand heathen dialects. To bridge
e chasm between them and the Hebrew faith, the ob-
of speech, as well as a general dissimilarity, must be
ne. Thus the value of the truly inspired books would
ntained by the ancient language in which they were
; and their number would remain unchanged because of
ious distinction between their idioms and any works of
heathen origin.

leads me to speak briefly of the apocryphal books be-
to the period in which the Jews were under the Per-
le—from 536 B. C. to the conquest of Alexander the
325 B. C. First let me say a word about the apocry-
books in general. Many well remember the time when
having the Apocrypha printed in them, between the
d New Testaments, were very common; and when the
of Tobit, Judith, Susannah, and the History of Bel and
agon were household tales. Now, however, the names
f the Apocryphal books are not familiar, and perhaps
our children have never heard of them. Let me then
their origin and importance, as they have much sig-
e in the Messianic argument drawn from the period
present.

word "apocryphal" means "secret" or "hidden;" but by
ond century of the Christian era the term came to bear
ning of "spurious," which it retains to this day. But
ooks are not "spurious" in the sense of being forgeries.
re so called only in the sense of not being considered
ed" like the canonical writings.

re are fourteen of these books in all. They bear
some of which are obviously not the names of their
s. The true authors of them are not known: neither

can the time when they were written be ascertained with any certainty. But they fall naturally into the period between the captivity of Judah and the Advent of Christ, because of marked peculiarities which show them to have been written later than the books of the Old Testament.*

In them there is an entire absence of the prophetic element; no one spoke because the word of the Lord had come unto him.

There is an almost total disappearance of the literary power which shows itself in the Old Testament. Some of these books show that they are but a feeble imitation of the more ancient Scriptures, as for example, the books of "The Wisdom of Solomon" (so-called) and "Ecclesiasticus."

There is also a legendary character to these books; they read like works of fiction founded on a basis of historical fact. They gave rise to many traditions which influenced the minds of the Jews even in the time of our Saviour and his disciples. Some of the facts they relate, however, were undoubtedly true. (Stephen's Speech, 2 Tim., iii, 8; Jude 9; 1 Cor., x, 4.)

There is in these books little of the simplicity and general historical accuracy which characterize the Old Testament writings. At the same time there is often a very elevated tone in the religious expressions of the Apocrypha. The general spirit of them is faithful to the Hebrew belief in Jehovah.

The book called "The Wisdom of Solomon" especially commends itself as a profitable study. It tells (xi, 23-26) of God's universal love; that his power is but the instrument of his righteousness (xii, 16); and that those heathen who seek God are less blameworthy than those who know and disobey Him (xiii, 6).

With this brief reference to the general character of the apocryphal literature of this period, we will leave the separate books for special notice as we need them in our explanation of the different changes that await the Hebrew mind, and we shall find that their testimony, though mainly negative, has a definite bearing on the testimony to Christ of the whole period under consideration. Just now, however, as we are showing the condition of the Jews in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, a few words are appropriate with regard to the books of Baruch

* *Smith's Dictionary*, Art. Apocrypha.

and Tobit, which Ewald places in this period—the first part of the Persian domination.

The little apocryphal book of Baruch, this writer calls “a worthy echo of the old prophetic voices.” It was written in Babylon and sent to the Jews at Jerusalem, at the time when it was feared that the community at Jerusalem might seek to revolt against the Persian authority. It counsels them, just as Jeremiah counselled the exiles at Babylon, to submit to the yoke of the conqueror until the Lord of Hosts should restore the ancient glory to Jerusalem.

The book of Tobit (aside from the story which serves to attract attention and give force to the exhortation) is in the same vein, and “contains an energetic summons to glorify the true God, before and among the heathen.” It is an exhibition under the most gentle and domestic details, of the most beautiful and profound elements in the Hebrew faith; and these two books confirm the opinion already expressed, that the Jews in exile, with a loss of their intense feeling of nationality, have gained a deeper consciousness of the spiritual element in their faith, and that while they remain and desire to remain loyal to whatever sovereign they happen to serve, they still glorify their religion, and cling to it with a new idea of its vital spirituality.

The book of Baruch glows with the Messianic expectations, such as in former times forecast the restoration and triumph of the chosen people. The old idea of some future deliverance of temporal sort is not yet destroyed; but above it, as the main reason for sending the letter to Jerusalem, is the prudent device it contains, showing that there is a tendency to exalt the spiritual element above the temporal. This is especially apparent in the book of “Tobit,” which says no less about building Jerusalem gloriously, but which hides under the imagery it uses (“the sapphire and emerald; the walls of precious stones and the towers and battlements of pure gold”) the spiritual meaning which no mere material restoration can fulfill.

All the light then which we can throw from contemporaneous literature and history on the period of the Persian supremacy over Israel, lasting till the time of Alexander the Great (300 years), confirms the fact, (1) that by a voluntary exile the

idea of the Hebrew nationality is weakened, although the heart of the people still clings to a restored kingdom of Israel—also (2) that the lack of ability in foreign lands to celebrate the old ritual in its fullness has brought out the spiritual vitality of the Hebrew religion, although of course the great mass of the people still remain on the lower plane of formal belief—and finally, (3) it is seen that the gradual change of language has settled the limits of the sacred Hebrew Scriptures—while (4) the cessation of prophecy has turned the Jewish mind towards interpretation and raised up rabbis and scribes, with schools of doctrine and a variety of sects. Whether the result is on the whole favorable to true religion, we may perhaps question; but we shall see as we go on, that the preparation of the world for just such a Messiah as Jesus Christ, has been greatly helped by the changes wrought out by the captivity and dispersion.

II. Before we come to the argument from these various changes in their relation to Christ, we must follow the Hebrew nation through the period which came immediately after the period of Persian supremacy which we have just sketched. It was the period of Greek supremacy in the East. From this time forth western enterprise takes the place of oriental sluggishness. In the year 334 B. C., Alexander the Great defeated the king of Persia at the Granicus, and speedily subdued all Asia Minor. The next year the Persian king was utterly routed, and Tyre on the Phenician coast besieged and destroyed. From Tyre to Jerusalem the distance is not great, and Alexander immediately marched (if the tradition may be believed) into Judea, to punish the Jews for the assistance they had rendered to unhappy Tyre. The High Priest (according to the legendary account),* encouraged and instructed by a vision in the temple, arrayed himself in all his splendor and calmly took his position on a neighboring eminence, over which the enraged conqueror must come to the Holy City. The High Priest was surrounded by priests in their white linen robes, and the people in white garments. As soon as Alexander approached the venerable Pontiff, he was struck with profound awe at the spectacle, and hastening forward saluted him with religious veneration. While all stood amazed

* Ewald v, 214.

such a procedure on the part of the haughty Macedonian who had just ordered 2,000 brave Tyrians to be crucified at Tyre). Alexander told his generals that in a vision in Macedonia he had seen this very personage, in this very dress, offering to him the Empire of Persia. The conqueror then entered Jerusalem, offered up sacrifice to Jehovah in the temple, and after being shown the prophecies of Daniel, which he interpreted in his own favor, departed, having granted to the Jews exemption from tribute every seventh year. Whether the story in its details is authentic or not, we know that Alexander soon took Egypt, and at his death divided the whole eastern world, which he had overrun with his army, among his Macedonian generals, thus inaugurating the era of Grecian supremacy, which continued till the Roman conquest.

The Hebrew people, both in Judea and scattered over all Asia, were involved by this change of dynasties in the great convulsions of the time. The Jews of Palestine had suffered during the latter part of the Persian rule, and had come to long for freedom from despotic authority. As we have seen, the letter of Baruch was written to counsel them against revolt under extreme provocation; but with the suffering they underwent, the Jews in Palestine had become corrupt. The High-priesthood had grown venal, and schools of Sadducees (skeptical and philosophical) had diminished the tone of religious life.

But now the Hebrew mind and heart were brought for the first time, not only in Judea but in all lands of the East, face to face with cultivated, philosophic, and luxurious Greece. Let us see what the result was, in relation to the peculiarities of Hebrew thought and faith.

The temporal condition of the Jews of Judea was made less endurable than ever by the change of rulers. They were, for at least the next one hundred and fifty years, between the upper and the nether millstones of the nations whose seats of empire were at Antioch in Syria, and at Alexandria in Egypt. Situated directly between these contending forces, their territory the nearest highway for attack or retreat, they were ground beneath the feet of armies, carried captive in both directions, and taxed to defray the expenses of the wars which ruined their industry.

The Seleucidæ in Antioch, and the Ptolemies in Egypt, gave them sometimes the protection that vultures give to lambs, covering and devouring them; and sometimes allowed them just respite enough from invasion to accumulate property that might be taxed, and treasures in the temple that might be seized.

(a) Thus the Greek revolution brought with it no freedom to Israel. The nation everywhere was obliged to accustom itself more and more to the idea of serving foreign kings. We shall see by and by, how this affected the Messianic ideas of the times. There crept in also a half-toleration of the heathen, in harmony with the necessities of the times. A third or outer court was added to the two older courts of the temple, the court of the Gentiles, where during this Greek period, kings and generals sometimes offered gifts "to the most great God."

(b) The Greek philosophy had more effect upon the Hebrew ideas than the Greek religion. There was no power in the refined polytheism of Grecian mythology to tempt the Hebrew from his grand old faith in one and only one Jehovah. The captivity had made them proof against such systems, but Greek philosophy and Greek art made an impression on the active intellect of the more cultivated of the Jews.

There was now no lofty prophecy to hold the Hebrew mind fast to old truths, and to feed it with new hopes. The cessation of prophecy was universally acknowledged among the Jews, and instead of prophets, doctors of the law and scribes had arisen with a great show of learning and authority. A great mass of interpretation (mostly oral) had sprung into existence. The Talmud was revered even as the law itself—much of it puerile, but all of it tending to destroy the spirit of the law in the elaboration of the letter of the law; and so the germs of the future influence of the Pharisees were already implanted. The scribes were getting to be more important than the priests.

It was at this juncture that Grecian philosophy was brought into contact with the Hebrew nation, scattered through the East. It had more than a century in which to do its work upon the Hebrew mind. For its centers, it had Jerusalem and Antioch, but especially Alexandria (to which 100,000 Jews had been carried away by the Ptolemy who received a part

the empire of Alexander). In Alexandria grew up a sect Hellenizing Jews, as they were called,--men who learned to read and study Plato, and who sought by the logic of Athenian Greece to defend the Mosaic precepts and ideas. They destroyed the literal meaning of the old Hebrew books by allegory. They objected to strong figures of God's nature, and the form in which Moses and the prophets had represented Him; and about 284 B. C. (the middle part of this Greek period) Ptolemy Philadelphus caused the Hebrew scriptures to be translated into Greek by learned Jews of his court. This "Septuagint" version of the Old Testament, which exerted a powerful effect upon the dispersed Hebrew race, is not a perfect translation of the Hebrew scriptures. Some of the prophecies are greatly obscured; and there are some passages which seem to show a studied variation from the Hebrew. (*Smith's Dict.*) It was wherever the Greek language prevailed and Jews were colonized, there was found this version, and we shall see that it had an important part to play in spreading over all the known world the knowledge of the God of the Hebrews, and a promised salvation to the world. It also "wedded Greek language to Hebrew thought, giving to the most spiritual religion of the world, the most exact form of expression." (*Festcott's Introduction.*)

But its immediate effect on the Hebrew mind was to bring the old Hebrew ideas into contact with Greek philosophy, resulting in a broader view of the meaning and purpose of the Law, and such a comprehension of the prophecies as led to a more confident expectation of a literal Zion.

(c) But a still greater power was exerted by the wider dispersion of the Jewish race. This was another result of the Greek conquest. It was both a political and commercial scattering. The Egyptian and Syrian kings placed the Jews as soldiers or colonists in disturbed districts, to secure their loyalty; even Bithynia was colonized by them; and with those that voluntarily emigrated for purposes of trade to Greek cities, the numbers of Jews everywhere must have been immense. We must not therefore think of the Hebrew people at this time, or at any following period, as having anything more than an imaginary centre at Jerusalem. Jerusalem ceased to be an important

place during this period. It was not thought much of, even by the nations that held the Jews in subjection (just as Salt Lake City by and by will be forgotten, by the generation that shall scatter the Mormons over the United States).

Herodotus the Greek, who about this time passed along the coast, from Egypt by Tyre to the North, a writer with his eyes wide open, and who came probably within a day's journey of Jerusalem, does not even allude to it. It was a forgotten relic of by-gone times to the nations, till the Romans took it under Pompey. The Hebrews remembered it and sometimes sent presents to the temple, but it exercised very little power even upon the Hebrew thought at this time.

What then are the prominent results of this Grecian supremacy as they affect the condition of the Jews?

(1) One result is an almost complete extinction of the national idea, which was weak enough at the end of the period of Persian rule. The wider dispersion under Grecian supremacy has planted the Jews all over the earth, and left Jerusalem but a name. But, as we shall see in due time, it is God's preparation for a great Messianic result.

(2) Another consequence of Grecian supremacy is the decline of that religious spirit which was so remarkable in the early part of the Persian domination. In the captivity, with the prophets to fan the flame of piety, the people, languishing and lamenting, clung to the principles of their faith with the tenacity of desperation; but now, Grecian philosophy has undermined that simple feeling, though they still hold the forms of the old belief. The schools and sects of interpreters of the law have added so many petty requirements that the spirit of the law seems for a time to have lost its power; and the expansion of mind, in some quarters, has only led the more learned away from the simplicity of the ancient word.

This will account for the lack, in the writings of this period, of all strong expressions concerning the Messiah. The sufferings of the Jews have caused a despondency to settle down upon them, and to weaken their hope for future deliverance. They look to a petty observance of the Rabbinical law for salvation, rather than to a Saviour to come. There is no elasticity of expectation, no strong demand for either temporal

spiritual fulfillment of the old Messianic promises. Hence the Septuagint translation of the Bible, the work of this date, does not bring out the Messiah's characteristics, even so fully as the old Hebrew text; and the book of Ecclesiasticus, "the relic of the Palestinian literature during the Greek supremacy, is marked by an anxious legalism; and life appears to be imprisoned in endless rules" of conduct.*

) The final and almost complete obliteration of the Hebrew language, as the dialect of the Jews, is another result of this period. The Septuagint version of the Scriptures in Greek effected on this transition, just as King James' version of our Bible has fixed permanently the idioms of the English tongue which stood in his day; and consequently as "Hebrews" the Jews were no longer known. Their ancient language became to their children a literary accomplishment, not a necessity, just as the Jews of to-day, in Spain, England, America, and elsewhere, seldom speak Hebrew, so in Europe and Asia at the close of the Greek period (about 170 B. C.), the dispersed Jews no longer heard the Hebrew Bible read in the synagogue, and sometimes even the Greek Septuagint was substituted. The loss of their old language was to the Jews a long stride towards the loss of the old standard of scriptural interpretation. They were therefore more easily under the control of the Rabbies. Evidently the Talmud (a puerile exposition of the law of Moses) gained a power over them greater than the original divine commands. We shall see in due time how these results of the period of Greek supremacy (combined with the results of the Persian period), form the framework of a strong argument in favor of the immediate coming of the Messiah, with which this article will conclude.

III. Before closing, however, we must briefly describe the struggling effort of the Jews living in Palestine, to revive the ancient theocracy of Israel. As the spark flares up just as it flickers and goes out, so Judaism flamed forth in a burst of the old spirit, and for a century vainly tried to kindle on the sacred altar the old national and ceremonial fire. The story of this period is told in the first book of the Maccabees, which I refer for interesting details. It is the only his-

* Westcott, 91.

torical portion of the Apocrypha to which any great credence can be given. It seems that the down-trodden Jews dwelling in Palestine, between the Egyptian and Antiochian millstones, were finally driven to desperation, by an inhuman and irrational persecution against their religion.

Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria, a madman (as he was called), having in a fit of rage destroyed Jerusalem, putting its inhabitants to the sword, (168 B. C.), on his return to Antioch his capital, issued a decree that all his subjects should conform to the religion of the Greeks. He sent a cruel Grecian idolater to punish all the Jews of Palestine who refused to obey. The story of the martyrdom of the Jews under this barbarous edict, is horrible. You will find on account in the second apocryphal book of the Maccabees (vii) where seven sons and their mother were put to death with dreadful torture, because they refused to eat swine's flesh at the king's commandment. The eldest son was maimed and burnt by slow fire, the rest looking on. The second was shockingly mangled, and so on to the youngest, the survivors exhorting one another to die bravely. "Think not," they cried to the tormentor, "that our nation is forsaken of God—think not that thou shalt escape unpunished." When the youngest son's turn came, the torturer offered him riches and honors to turn from the laws of his fathers; his mother also was commanded to urge him to obey; but she in the native tongue, laughed the tyrant to scorn, and exhorted her son to fear not. The son, while she was yet speaking, cried out to the tormentor, "Whom wait ye for? I will not obey the king's commandment"—and then follows a speech worthy of the days of the Apostles, and memorable as showing the feeling of the Jews at the time this book was written. "We suffer," were the martyr's words, "because of our sins; but though the living God be angry with us for a little while, yet will he be again 'at one' with his servants. We suffer under God's covenant of everlasting life—but thou, Oh tyrant, shalt receive through the judgment of God, just punishment of thy pride;" "and may the wrath of the Almighty, justly brought upon our nation, cease in me and in my brethren,"—and so he died and his mother also, in extreme torture, for the laws of their

In like manner Eliezar, one of the principal scribes, an aged man, was constrained to eat swine's flesh. He was urged to make as if he ate, that he might be saved from death; but he scorned to dissemble, preferring to leave a notable example for the honor of the law. Being scourged to death, he died heroically for his faith. And many similar atrocities, caused the Jews to forget their differences, (for the quarrels of the priests and the sects at this time divided the people into antagonistic parties), uniting together, under the leadership of Mattathias, Jonathan, Simon, and John of the great Maccabean line, the hated yoke of Greco-Syrian tyranny was thrown off, and the people once more united in common defense of their national life. Events outside the Judean territory favored the irrecognition of the Jews. Their great persecutor, Antiochus (104 B. C.), and the kingdom was left without a ruler, so that its internal convulsions operated to free it in a measure from aggressive attack. The Jews took the offensive side, and peace was finally agreed upon. This was soon broken (162 B. C.), and the fortunes of war rolled from side to side. But for one hundred years no master actually ruled in Judea; and though the Jews sometimes rested from anxiety and war during that century, they were obliged to solicit Rome to defend them, yet the city and temple were partly restored—the ceremonial rites were celebrated—and under Simon, Priest and Prince, (142 B. C.) the last great fortress occupied by heathen hands came into Jewish possession. (Ewald v, 325). No sooner, however, as the old hierarchy established with a measure of order at Jerusalem, than the old sects revived. The canker was at work at the heart of Israel, although the wise and able administration of John Hyrcanus, grandson of the first Maccabean ruler, who governed Israel from 135 B. C. to 104 B. C., served to give at least the appearance of tranquillity to the period.

Literature of this period, however, reveals the need of government to men whose very existence, to say nothing of the existence of the state, was in constant peril. The book of Daniel (128 B. C.?), was probably composed when a mad

successor of the persecutor Antiochus (Demetrius II), was ravaging the coast. It was written to give the Jews new courage to resist his impending onslaught. It is a fictitious account, without doubt, but conceived in true Hebraistic style of passion and revenge incident to this period.

In Alexandria, 160 to 140 B. C., writings called "Oracles of the Sibyl" were produced by the Alexandrian Jews, having for their aim the encouragement of the Jews by predictions of future blessings, drawn after the types of Deuteronomy. In these Sibylline utterances one can see some traces of Messianic expectation, but it remained for a later work (107 B. C.), the book of Enoch (an Ethiopic copy of which has been discovered in modern times), to dwell with greater consistency and clearness on the office and work of the Messiah. This book of Enoch is a curious production. Written by a number of authors, but compiled by one hand at some time in this Maccabean period, it assumes the ancient Enoch as the speaker who relates to Methuselah, among other things, the visions of heaven and the cosmical arrangements of the universe. But he is very explicit with regard to Messiah, whose name was invoked before the Lord of Spirits, before the stars were formed; whom the Lord of Spirits had chosen; whose name was "Son of Man," and by whom the wisdom of God shall be revealed. "Without adding any new element to the fulness of the old prophets, the scattered traits of the Messiah as a king are combined in this work into one image, showing his humanity (as son of man and woman), his divine gifts, his righteousness, the wars that precede his coming to earth, and the final blessedness of his reign." (Westcott, 120.) This book shows that the idea of a Messiah was still alive, but that it had not (at least in Palestine) assumed any very different shape from that which it had at the end of the period of prophecy.

From all that we can gather in the history of the Hebrew nation, in and out of Palestine, there is no sign of any general comprehension of the imperfection and incompleteness of its civil and religious system. There is now as there ever has been since the beginning of their sorrows at the division of the nation after Solomon, a longing for the restoration and

ation of the past on a more splendid scale. But though
ple as a whole are unconscious of the vast change that
wrought, that change has no less come upon them;
a desire, at the end of the period we are considering,
ly the Messiah foreshadowed throughout all their his-
m Abraham to Isaiah. We need follow the history of
s but a little further to get all the proof we need con-
this preparation for the true Messiah.

the death of John Hyrcanus in 107 B. C., the nation
ed without much external change, until in 65 B. C. an
t against the Pharisees, who had gained the upper hand
salem, was the occasion of calling in Roman aid to
the existing party in authority. The Roman general
elled this disturbance (B. C. 65), was the celebrated
, who at once made Judea tributary to the Romans.
th (40 B. C.), Herod the Great, an Idumean, by much
y and bloodshed, and with the assistance of Antony
man triumvir, obtained the regal dignity, which he
ned with the greatest cruelty till the birth of Christ.
effect, however, of Roman supremacy in Jerusalem is
significant as the effect of the Roman Conquest of the
last about this time. The Jews, increased in number to
and countless multitude, scattered from Jerusalem to
in every city and every clime, many of them rich
dly goods, were left without any dignity, national or
s, either in their own eyes, or in the eyes of the world.
re do kings of Tarshish bring presents, or queens of
nd of Seba offer gifts; the isles seem farther off than
m sending tribute, and there appears less probability
er that the nations of the earth will bow down and
before the despised Hebrew God.

ge, however, to say, the few Jewish writings which
e from this close of the old Hebrew history, are the
st and clearest of any uninspired books in relation to
ssiah to come. Of these writings the Targums of
and Jonathan, and a work entitled the "Wisdom of
n," are most remarkable for this peculiarity. These
s (Westcott, p. 135), are translations or paraphrases of
and the Prophets; and whatever their exact date, are

said by scholars to furnish the best contemporary evidence of the nature of the received view of the Messiah at this closing hour of the Hebraic history. In translating the well-known words of Jacob's blessing, "till Shiloh comes," the Targum Oukelos says, "till Messiah comes, whose is the kingdom, and to whom is the gathering of the nations." It also renders the prophecy of Balaam, "A king shall rise from Jacob, and Messiah shall be anointed from Israel."

The Messianic interpretations of the Targums of Jonathan are more numerous. For example, (Is. xvi, 1-5, and xxviii, 16) "The Messiah shall be established in goodness, and be seated on his throne in truth; and he shall be for a crown of joy." Again, the Messiah is spoken of as a "Servant, whom the Lord hath chosen," (Is. xliii, 52); and although there is seen in the Messiah's sufferings only the chastisements of the Jewish nation, yet this period of distress is connected with the coming of the Messiah. He is called One "in whom all the just shall trust, and under the shadow of whose kingdom all the humble shall dwell." (Ezek. xvii, 23, cf. Hosea xiv, 7.) He is to come forth from Bethlehem, and is destined to rule over all the kingdoms of the earth. The book of "Wisdom," (attributed to an author who uses the name of Solomon merely as a title of his book), is also full of the true Messianic spirit, though not directly declaring special views of the personal Christ. As one writer expresses it, (*Smith's Dict.*, Art. "Wisdom,") "it would not be easy to find elsewhere any pre-Christian view of religion equally wide, sustained, and definite." Writing some time towards the close of the latest century before Christ, the Alexandrian Jew "seems to have steeped his mind, by meditation on the inspired Hebrew books, in the eternal foundations of all true religion." (Ewald v, 479.) He seems to have beheld only the pure and ever-quickening truths, before which all lower and imperfect elements have vanished away. He has also invested (*Smith's Dict.*, Art. Wisdom) the ideas of the Old Testament with fresh brilliancy in the glow of Greek culture and wisdom, and the hollowness of temporal kingdom and thrones is apparent in all he writes. The Messianic idea of retribution and judgment stand forth boldly; but as one has said "In this work we have a premonition of St. John and

eparation for Paul—a warm rustle of spring ere its time is fully come.” (Ewald, v, 484.)

But not to rest too much upon these remarkable writings, the uses of which can after all be determined only by conjecture, but which could have been written only by learned Jews, we may affirm that the Jewish hope of a Deliverer was still vital; a hope modified by their history, and more like the true scriptural idea of the Messiah—a hope, transferred by at least some portion of the Jews scattered over the world, from a temporal to a righteous Saviour, who should cleanse from sin and establish in righteousness an everlasting throne.

Reluctantly, perhaps somewhat unconsciously, but more and more completely, this ancient race gave up the cherished idea being made by the power of Jehovah, under the rule of the Messiah, the dominant nation of the earth. A stigma was upon the people and they knew it. Their historical record as a captive race was against them. Their religion was a scorn to the polished Greek, and a laughing stock to the skeptical Roman. They were a lawful prey; their city, the holy city, the center of their religious yearnings, and the jewel of their expected crown glory, was held by hostile hands, and almost forgotten by the nations of the earth. More in number probably, than at any time since the days of Solomon, they had but a handful of their vast multitudes at Jerusalem. Jerusalem itself was torn by internal factions. The Pharisee and the Sadducee were at variance, and the Roman eagle perched above the door of the temple which Herod had restored. Humiliated, hopeless, haunted by the past and despondent as to the future, they naturally and necessarily receded from their proud expectation of a return to Palestine (which few now desired), and waited for Jehovah, in some marvelous way, they knew not what, to reveal His power in them.

Let me now sum up all these results. Having passed through the Persian era, when Eastern influences, the purest in the world, were upon them; and when the echo of the voices of the prophets was still ringing in their ears; they were left, at the close of that era, in a state of spiritual elevation and of temporal decay. They had no temple; no system of ceremonial laws; no national strength, and no dialect of their own in com-

mon use—but they had won a hatred of idolatry and a consciousness of the spiritual power in their religion; so that even as early as the end of the Persian period, when Alexander conquered Persia (333 B. C.) the Hebrew mind was unconsciously nearer the true Messianic idea than when David wrote his Messianic psalms, and Isaiah uttered his Messianic prophecies. The temporal kingdom of the Messiah was less insisted on in their hearts after the captivity. Scattered everywhere and speaking foreign tongues they desired less than ever a restoration to Jerusalem; and they were also more and more dependent, in the absence of a full ritual, on the pure and simple law as it was read in their synagogues. (We must forget Israel as a people of Palestine and keep the mind on the nation everywhere dispersed abroad, if we would estimate their true condition at this time.)

Then the Grecian period (including the century of their quasi independence under the Maccabean rulers), from 333 to 40 B. C., by degrees deepened all the above conditions of the Jewish thought concerning Christ, and the western life of speculation, cultivation, and universal empire completed the work. More widely dispersed by Greek rulers than ever, with less and less of a complete Mosaic ritual in use—carried further from the center and so less able to visit Jerusalem or send gifts to its shrine, the Jews became less and less attached to the old ceremonial, and more zealous for the law. The Rabbi soon usurped the place of the prophet. The Talmud stood for the old Hebrew testimony—and Pharisees and Sadducees contended in every country under heaven (with the philosophy of Greece and the logic of Asia Minor), for imaginary and puerile interpretations of the ancient books.

The favoring elements introduced by Greek supremacy in this period were an expansion of mind on general topics—a worldly wisdom which accepted present circumstances—and a general breaking down of the old Hebrew exclusiveness. With less spirituality than when under the Persians, there was more religious pride in the superiority of their belief in the one great God. With less presumption, there was more faith in the salvation of all nations by the power of the Hebrew Jehovah; and with more confusion as to the details of the

siah's work, there was a stronger expectation of his speedy coming, and a truer comprehension of the necessity of God's special interposition to fulfill his promises.

The Hebrew, therefore (not particularly at Jerusalem, but wherever he might be), at the time of Herod,—in Asia Minor, Babylon, Alexandria or Cyprus,—was made ready by his

history of national dispersion and disgrace, and by his present position of increased numbers and diminished pretensions, to receive a Saviour, under any conditions that would actually fulfill the promises of the sacred books.

And the Jews did receive Christ. Jews were his first disciples; Jews preached the gospel among all nations; Jews in synagogues of Asia and Persia and Rome received the Gospel; Jews were among the early martyrs; Alexandrian Jews were the supporters of Christianity in Egypt at the beginning of the Christian era. But had Christ come as a lowly monarch at the time of the captivity, how many of the Jews, even as we can see, would have been ready to receive him?

Had he come at the time of Alexander's conquest, as he did come at last, poor and lowly, how many Jews would have been prepared to listen to his words a moment? Had he appeared when the Maccabees seemed about to restore the kingdom to its pristine splendor, would he not have been hooted from the temple, with not a single Jew to follow his retreating footsteps as a disciple?

Neither would the heathen world, before this fulness of time, have given him a hearing. The dispersion and long exile of the Jews, prepared not only Jews but Gentiles for his mission. The Gentiles had learned something of the true God, and the need of salvation, from the pious Jews among whom, of whom the Lord always preserved a remnant in every land. The final overthrow of the Temple ritual made the Jewish faith less distasteful to the Gentiles, and the Jews were accessible to the preaching of Christ's sacrificial offering for all; and synagogues in every city offered convenient familiar outposts for preaching and explaining the new Gospel to Greeks and Jews, Arabians, and Medes. The Greek language, spoken by Jew and Gentile everywhere, offered all the opportunity to hear; and the final conquest by the Romans

left the known earth open to the message of redeeming grace. The settlement of the Jews under every civil government and among every race, established a basis for the new fruit of the old faith—and Jew and Gentile were thus made a field world-wide for the triumphs of the Cross.

An epistle is written to the Hebrews, and Hebrew synagogues are turned into Christian churches from the rising to the setting sun. Beginning with the Jews, the gospel spreads to the remotest bounds. The great mass of the Jews remain Jews, and are Jews in a modified sense to the present day; but by Jews and by them alone could Christianity have been promulgated at first. They alone had the principles of true religion in their history and their books; and the blessed "remnant" so often spoken of in prophecy, were the blessed few who believed on the Messiah and became the instruments of initiating his reign, by which all nations were to be blest in him. It may seem a long, long time for bringing this end about—a thousand years of schooling under Moses and the prophets; and five hundred sad and dreary years of discipline under Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome, without a single ray of inspiration to illumine the mysteries of the later Hebrew prophecies. Why not before? Why not save the chosen people so much sorrow, and give the nations Christ, ten centuries before? Why not, you might as well inquire, give Christ instead of Moses at the very first? Why have a course of training? Why have the stage of preparation for the glorious result? You forget that the human heart, in its ignorance and obstinacy, delayed the consummation. You forget that man, not God, kept back the blessed day of Christ, and you forget that although God was always ready, the race was never ready, till by long preparation it was made willing in the day of God's power! Not very willing then, ye Pharisees and Scribes! but just willing enough for God to say that the time had come! Rejoice then ye nations that God's mercy to a fallen race could no longer delay; and that to the remnant of Israel, Jesus at last could come a welcome Guest!

LE VI.—WOMAN'S RIGHT TO PUBLIC FORMS OF
USEFULNESS IN THE CHURCH.

The course of thought, pursued in this Article will cover the following points of special interest:

General views of the subject, sustaining the ultimate position reached.

A brief historical sketch of woman's slowly progressive, recognition, hitherto.

A general exegesis, historical and critical, of scriptural usage upon this subject, and especially of Paul's imaginary dictum upon the public, religious usefulness of women. Ever seeming existence there was of such a ban upon the same as a matter of mere temporary conformity to adverse usages, for the better security and progress of the new then just introduced among the Greeks.

The conformableness of the views expressed with the spirit of the Bible, and of practical Christianity, and with the genius of modern civilization, and of general human progress. It will be shown that the idea of putting woman under a social ban in church or state, is of oriental and heathenish origin, and that the whole spirit and teaching of the Bible are of an entirely contrary kind. Paul will be seen to have neither said nor done anything, as an ambassador from Christ to man, which can legitimately make a woman feel that she must turn back from the public service of God; or that she may not do so, as a prevailing habit, with any capabilities of personal usefulness that she may possess. The new means and measures that are needful for the world's speedy conquest of evil, lie far more largely, it is believed, than most members of the church seem to realize, in the keeping of the earnest wishes of the women of each and every community; and they lie sadly unemployed as yet to any great degree.

—For the suggestions made in this Article on 1 Cor. xiv, 34, 35, its authors, of course, alone responsible.—EDS. NEW ENGLANDER.

I.

What is truest and best is surely ascertainable upon this subject; and some of the greatest practical interests of the church in the future are involved in its right determination. It is one of the deepest convictions of the hour in many Christian hearts, that woman's full coöperative agency in some of the higher forms of public religious effort is absolutely necessary to the rapid furtherance of the world's redemption; and that the neglect of its earnest use has been one of the most signal mistakes of the church in the past. Woman's nature craves opportunities for generous helpfulness, in whatever way is possible, to those in need, and nowhere so profoundly, as in respect to the chief moral interests of life. The church of Christ on earth is the one spot where the freest possible vent "the freedom of the sons of God," is afforded for every noble aspiration and effort as such; and the question at once arises in the hearts of those who long for the speediest possible conquest of the world to truth and righteousness; can this then, possibly, be the one only and exact spot, where feminine excellence and energy are to be interdicted, for all time, by an unrelenting decree from above, or by perpetuated social prescription, from any large and free exercise for good. She who feels, when in her higher moods of Christian experience, that she must have unfettered opportunity to be faithful and fruitful in every good word and work for her Master, and to speak, if modestly yet also persuasively, to any who have ears to hear of the wonderful love of God in Christ—is she to be kept dumb against her will, fervid with zeal to serve God and man, by ecclesiastical or doctrinal enforcement, where all others, young or old, learned or unlearned, are, if only of the male sex, entirely untrammelled?

In reference to the question, what is woman's highest place, and what her highest work, in promoting the world's progressive evangelization, no ideas, gathered simply from the dead past, can be justly allowed to suppress free inquiry and independent judgment here. Is woman then doomed, or, is she not, as woman, by a true philosophy of social facts and forces, doomed by God her Maker, and therefore by man her equal, doomed both by her own nature within, and by the actual

combined needs in all directions of the world without, to be ever silent as a speaker in the public service of God? The mere statement of the question would seem sufficient to insure, once, the utter repudiation of such an idea. If she must sit mutely, however wishfully, in a corner, when full of desire to honor the Saviour of the world, and especially of her own sex, and if she must stand behind a veil and speak only in a whisper, as if by stealth:—the fact of the existence of so special and repressive a law against her, for her sex, from her Maker's daining hand, must be substantiated by the clearest and strongest of evidence. How different would such a state of things be from the expectations naturally suggested by the intellectual and moral resources of educated womanhood, especially when moved to speech and action by the inspirations of divine grace in the soul. The seal, which is to be put upon her lips in this holiest of all causes, must be put there, unmistakably, if at all, by the divine hand itself. Nothing but a moral compulsion of feeling, so ordered and executed, could be adequate to suppress worthy opposition to such a feeble conception of woman's proper vantage-ground, as an earnest worker for Christ.

Three-fourths of the membership of the church consist of females; and it seems to many to have been one of the chief master-strokes of satanic cunning, to have succeeded, by the force of false theories, and traditions, and social prejudices, in keeping them, hitherto, as a class, in a state of prescriptive silence and inaction. Female education has, until within a very recent period, been modeled entirely according to mere superficial and fashionable ideas. Dress and jewelry and an attractive mien and bearing, and an outward polish of manners, and education enough to spell, and read, and write, and converse fairly, well, with such random additions of moderate excellence in music, painting, and embroidery, as could be secured by a few years of hurried attention to them, in time ill-spaced from more important pursuits, have largely constituted, whenever they could be obtained by a favored few, the round of accomplishments most coveted by parents for their daughters, as their appropriate outfit for life. A young woman thus taught from the first, at home and in school, to give up

her whole time and soul to self-seeking, in forms of minor attractiveness, instead of to her best mental and moral development as an immortal being, would be little in the later years of her life to any work of high Christfulness, that one educationally accoutred for under such a system would be likely to regard as the joy of her earthly existence. What should have been treated as a mere incidental cultivation of a mind and a heart otherwise trained to a full sense of the worth of life, and of the imperishable dignity of human nature and destiny, has been falsely and cruelly made a mere plaything of days, and in many instances quite down to our own day. It fills the full orb of vision of a young female, when placed in the world herself best, as she thought, to act well her part in the world as it is. Thus has woman been, for the most part, systematically educated, even in Christendom, with the result of thoughtlessness, away from all the higher moral possibilities of her nature, so as not to be prepared in mental power to demand or expect their full possession.

And then, besides, woman is, in her constitutional characteristics and aptitudes, unaggressive and non-resistant, and the lower classes of mankind, of such a sort, has hitherto had her rights regularly overlooked, and often even ruthlessly borne. God set her, in the first morning of her creation, on a throne of equal honor with man, "to make of the tilled earth a new man," in his image, that they might forever "be together, perfect and complete in all the will of God." But under the sway of barbarian instincts, woman was early reduced to account of her smaller form and weaker muscles and spirit, to a state of very manifest and very conscious inferiority in all civil and domestic relations, to her larger and more useful companion. While she has quite notably conformed, with a contentment full of pleasure to herself, to the spirit of the scriptural injunction "to see to it that she reverences her husband;" the habit has not been conspicuously frequent, on man's part, of the fulfillment of the precept concerning his share in the mutual duties—"husbands, love your wives, even as I also loved the church and gave himself for it, that I might present it to himself, a glorious church, not having spot, wrinkle, or any such thing." The complete and c

nion of coöperative effort expected and required by Christ, as the result of the high marriage of heart existing between him and his church on earth, is a striking symbol and exemplar of the similar unity of thought, feeling, and effort, that should ever exist between man and woman, for the world's good, in the family, in the church, and in the state.

The church, and society at large, have greatly failed in reaping the full results, for good, of any apparent forms of general progress, wherever, during eighteen hundred years past, they have brought little or nothing to woman, but mere private and anescent forms of earthly good. Woman is, in the first years of her children's entrustment by God to her care, his vice-gerent in all matters of final authority to them; and for years much later, she may well be left, if herself educated, to train them mentally as well as morally, in the highest concerns of this life and of the next. And is one who is full of divine illumination of soul, and of holy ardor to guide her children onwards, unto the end, to glory and to God, to be told, as if according to his unquestionable fiat, as soon as her sons have arrived at their evening manhood, that she must at once lay her scepter of wisdom and grace, forever by, in reference to them, simply because she is a woman, and they are men? Can it be possibly true, that such an one is required, by the force of a divine law, to sit quietly down and gaze as an idle spectator upon the onward-moving courses of their destiny, lest she should be found merchance to be venturing to "teach theology in the church," and to "usurp authority over the man?" For what a woman may not do, as a religious teacher, in public, to men because men, she may not, by just inference, undertake for a similar reason to do for her own grown-up sons—no matter how great the strength of her intellect, or the riches of her religious experience.

The Bible was written, most of it, in the atmosphere of nonarchical institutions, and of polygamy, and of general social selfishness, and, when, at the best, human society was altogether rude, everywhere, and nowhere more than in classic Greece, in all high moral ideas. Many abnormal and even monstrous social facts and customs are quietly let alone, in both the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, because of the utter undesirableness

of attacking them openly, in the dim twilight of those days; with the certainty of their being surely dispersed forever, in the end, by the greater light of the days that were to come. As the world moves slowly on towards a state of perfect social development, at last, each added age of larger light and of greater moral privileges and power makes its own special demands of wider and nobler activity of those living in it, for the good of man and the glory of God. That "circumstances alter cases" is one of the most indubitable of truths. Homely as is the phrase, it is in itself one of the soundest and most widely applicable axioms of true historical and biographical and political criticism. As "a man is accepted" of God, "according to what he hath, and not according to what he hath not;" so must communities, possessing varying degrees of light, be judged of men, in order to be rightly understood, according to the moral quality of their times.

Most persons are, as a matter of moral habit, if not in many cases, also, of native mental constitution, so conservative in their moods of thought and feeling as to cling instinctively to the past, even if cold and dark and dead, rather than seize, at any considerable cost of personal effort, the living present, as it rises fresh and fair to view before them. "Their strength is to sit still," the strength of heavy, and, it may be, sullen, immobility. Paul's great heart was grandly conservative toward all that was good in the present or the past, and, therefore, as he himself declares, "he became all things to all men, that he might by all means save some." But he was, also, nobly progressive in his aims and efforts. New moral truths, or new views of old familiar truths, have always been at a great discount among men; and those who have borne them in the van of the world's onward movements have always had to pay dearly, and often even out of their very hearts' blood, for the privilege. It has been always a marked characteristic of the heathen, Mohammedan, and Papal divisions of the world, one and all, and also of large numbers in Protestant Christendom, and of entire religious denominations in it, and of powerful political parties in the State, to cling tenaciously to old ideas and old usages, and especially in matters involving moral interests and moral progress. It is always a foregone conclusion that what

ver the arguments may be, for or against any point of doctrinal, religious, or practical improvement suggested, large numbers of readers or listeners will fail to feel, or even to see any logical or scriptural force in them whatever, if they militate at all against their previous ideas of things. All new views of truth and duty must encounter in every community, however intelligent, a period of positive discredit, and usually, also, of direct and even violent rejection. Every truth adopted at last into the creed of popular feeling and action, has found its permanent lodgment there, because the passage to it has been fought strenuously thither for it by many earnest persevering hearts and hands.

II.

The history of woman's slow arrival at the present approximate social estimation, to which the divine charter of her sex entitles her, is easily traceable throughout the long past of the slowly maturing phases and forces of the world's social development. Woman was in the oriental world from the first, as a fact she still is, a mere nobody in her public relations—the abject, slave, and drudge of her lordly companion at home, and required to repress all personal manifestations of her ideas, wishes, and hopes, to the zero-point of exhibition. Even in Hebrew society, where so many grand religious ideas had permanent and powerful lodgment in the minds of the community at large, woman did not, under the pressure of all surrounding influences of a thoroughly depreciatory kind, ever arrive at any point of general social improvement until the Christian period of its history. Roman ideas of not only municipal but also of home life had then thoroughly permeated the ordinary Jewish habits of thought. In the gorgeous east, as it is often called, for the wealth embosomed in its hills and dales, the doctrine of fate has always towered in importance in men's thoughts over every other belief and sentiment. Under the baleful influence of so false and ruinous a conception, all thought of the intellectual and moral glory of womanhood, like every other exalted social idea, has perished from view in every age throughout all Asia. In Greece, which was directly colonized from Asia, and which bordered at so many vital

points of commercial consciousness upon it, the oriental idea of woman's social and personal inferiority, in every way to man, ruled all forms of private and public life. The real facts of the case will, to any one acquainted with their nature, make such a statement of them seem very mild. *The Grecian housewife* (Ephesian, Corinthian, Thessalonian, or Philippian) could not sit at her own table with her husband in the presence of a guest. She could not go into the street at any time without asking and obtaining his formal permission. So absolutely imperative was the demand of public feeling that woman should keep, at all times when alone, entirely out of the street, that, when after the battle of Chæronea, they stood in the doors of their houses and asked of the passers-by the fate, if they knew it, of their own husbands and sons, it was deemed a very discreditable act both to them and to the city of Athens. No wise men ever better represented Grecian civilization, while adorning it, at the same time, by their own individual greatness, than Plato and Aristotle. Said Plato, "a woman's excellence may be summed up in a few words—to manage the house well and to obey her husband." Said Aristotle, "the relation of man to woman is that of the governor to his subject."

It was in *the Roman matron*, who was the in-door head of the family and the honored entertainer of its guests at all times—in her equal dignity of station at home with her husband, and her fully recognized freedom of the streets at her own will—that the first real beginnings of the modern woman's social position became clearly defined, to be of the type that now, with many continually increasing additions, constitutes the true ideal of Christian womanhood. The second distinct phase of woman's social improvement was that of *the feudal lady*. The very genius of the institution of chivalry was the spirit of honor to bravery and to woman. For the meed of a lady's well-earned praise, the truest and noblest men of the times gladly toiled and bled and died. She became the queen of manners and the honored umpire of the greatest strifes of wit and valor; and her fiat suggested and decided alike the most venturesome outlays of effort in arts and arms. In *the modern Christian lady*, viewed, as not only possessing all the

arms that real personal religion can bestow, but those also the broadest and best individual culture of her mind and art and manners, we see for style, although as yet in but an perfect degree, the combined product of the composite elements that have been united together in the past for good from sources, so as to form the true and final type of the mostalted womanhood.

In this enlightened age and favored land, society has reached a point where it willingly accepts and applauds woman for what, at any time, she may show herself thoroughly capable of doing and doing, that is noble and commanding. Full freedom is thus accorded to her to act and to excel, on the stage, the opera, in the world of literature, in the plastic arts, and the realm of poetry and of song. She may act, play, sing, write for crowds of admiring listeners, what is amusing or sinuating, and not a fault-finding word is heard anywhere; but let her only undertake to instruct and profit others, in any direct and earnest way in public, and, even at this late day, a strong front of opposition is at once raised by many to any free and whole-souled enactment of such an idea by her. They claim that it is in itself unworthy of her nature, and that it is undesirable that the community at large should favor or even indulge her in such masculine freaks of feeling. A wise man honors his mother to the end of his days as the source of his best thoughts and aims in life; and more and more, as he grows in wisdom and in grace, he delights to show her his grateful reverence, and to speak aloud her praise to others. The discreet husband often finds, in the cautious counsel of his thoughtful wife, the best of guidance in his hours of financial uncertainty. With decisive effect for good, however unobserved in its processes of determinate influence upon final results, woman touches at myriad points the vital elements of law, and liberty, and general prosperity in the land, of social feeling in the parlor, of public spirit in the town, and of moral sentiment throughout the whole community. Even the church of our day, still so reluctant in many parts of the land to avail itself of her full moral power for good, finds it greatly to its own advantage to summon her aid eagerly to the work of Sunday-school and Bible-class instruction. Her mingled gentleness,

affectionateness, and great sensibility to the power of religious truths and influences, with the superior didactic equipments of her nature for a life of moral usefulness, make her services in such a way invaluable. In the magazine literature of the day and in our leading religious newspapers, she is already largely, and with steady increase, vindicating her equal right with the best thinkers of the other sex, to intellectual and moral leadership, in the high work of forming and expressing the better thoughts of the hour.

Woman's power has been steadily rising in the world's affairs, and especially during the present century, and most of all in America, "the land of the free and the home of the brave," and just because it is such a land and such a home. The exaltation of woman's social influence is always one of the first and most lasting fruits of practical Christianity, wherever it spreads its presence and power among the nations. The true significance of such words as father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, and child, is altogether of her fashioning; and not of these words alone, but also of those other grand words, home, life, nature, and love, hope, peace, and heaven. It is woman's familiar presence in our streets that makes them the abode of purity and social order. The so recent fact that she has become a large, if not indeed the largest, reader of our current literature, has served beyond any other one influence to make it like a well of sweet living water, ever-flowing, clear and pure, instead of being any longer the reservoir of low wit that it was but a little while ago, even among the most civilized nations of the world. And it is her special sympathetic presence and power in song and in prayer, and in some instances, in fervid speech for Christ, that give an unction not otherwise to be obtained to modern revivals. The most effective revival-hymns of recent origin, full of holy feeling, made up of prayers and praises directly to Christ, are the large majority of them the joyous expression of woman's gratitude for the light and grace already given to her from above, and her earnest entreaty for still more "grace upon grace." Thus are the church and the world at large, wherever civilized, always moving if slowly yet steadily, and now with rapidly growing momentum, towards a complete recognition of woman's full equality with man, in

as, privileges, and honors as a servant of God, in private or public.

We owe much of all that we love to call American, to the character, activity, influence, and prayers of earnest Christians. It seems strange indeed, that any should take pleasure in seeking to suppress their spontaneous zeal to promote the real good of the community. A pitiful sight, indeed, it is to see them standing spell-bound by false theories, in speechless inaction, as if in corners and bye-places, and that, while the contest between Michael and his angels and the devil and his angels is waxing high and strong in their very presence. Those who are active in it are "compassed about with a great multitude of witnesses" from on high, "all ministering spirits" to the heroes which are busy in the contest. But woman, whose heaven for this world, is involved in the issue of the great struggle between the powers of light and of darkness, owes it to her Maker, as some would have us believe, to stand still as if stoned, nor to utter a word in public, as if dumb, that shall hinder her hopes for victory to the right, and for triumph to the good of humanity and of Christ. The Chinese by a purposed permanent enfeeblement of woman's power to walk freely in the street, exclude her from much participation in matters of out-of-door life, and so from any considerable exertion of her proper influence, as woman, upon its ordinary affairs. But even hermeneutical theory may suffice just as effectually if in a more impalpable way, to prevent her, with equal certainty, from doing what she otherwise might and would for God and for the world in a world perishing in its sins. Potent is the thrill of the tender entreaties, anywhere, to the erring to turn and live; full of power upon any heart is the awakening influence of her aspirations heavenward. By one looking at the subject of woman's possible public usefulness in promoting the cause of human redemption, having no favorite theory concerning it to support or defend, nothing can be found in her nature or circumstances, or in her worth or work as woman, that would justify inference require her resolute, if painful, withdrawal from its higher forms of personal service to the great cause. Only the oriental view of woman's relations to society that demands or suggests any such sacrifice of her faculties and opportunities of active service in the cause of Christ.

The equality of the sexes in intellectual acumen is one of the uniform teachings of thorough genealogical research, which establishes the fact, as one of the clearest sociological axioms, that "mind is from the mother." That equality is manifest enough to any careful observer in the passing age. The manifestations of its manifestation differ, indeed, in the two cases, as the male is characteristically ratiocinative, executive, and practical, from what is intuitional, sentimental, and æsthetic; or the male is bold, and strong, and rough differs from what is delicate, tender, and true to its own nature and to every right influence breathed upon it from without. The fact of the mutual equality of the two sexes was beautifully made, from the very matter of direct instruction to our race by its Maker, touching symbol used for impressing it upon all hearts, ever rude in knowledge, that Eve was formed from a rib taken out of Adam's side, and so was literally "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh." To the oriental mind such a picture description would give a sense of the fact denoted, that mere dry abstract words could furnish. So, in the record of woman's creation (Gen. i, 27), the account given is purposely wrapped up in that of man, as being one and the same with his in its highest aspects—the main point of statement being twice repeated. "So God created man in his own image; *in the image of God*, created he him; male and female made he them." That Christianity does not dissent in any of its principles of thought or rules of action from the idea of the mutual oneness of the sexes in their mental and moral faculties, privileges, and responsibilities, is manifestly manifest by the formal declaration of Paul (Gal. i) that in Christ "there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free, *neither male nor female*; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus."

In the quiet of in-door life, and withdrawn from the temptations of place and power, with the Bible in her hands and a spirit of prayer and praise in her heart, woman has the best facilities for calm reflection upon religious truths and relations to public interests of all kinds, of which most even of the better class, know little or nothing in their world of outward stir and strife. She tends to look up

in her instincts and impulses; while he, as if by some well-nigh irresistible bent, keeps his eyes and thoughts fastened upon the ground, to see if he cannot, by greater toil or skill, or better luck, obtain for himself a still larger modicum of good from its hidden riches. Man represents business; woman, sentiment. The very word man expresses etymologically a thinker; the word woman denotes, practically to every ear, one who abounds in gentle, tender, generous feeling. Man naturally thinks of work; woman of matters of taste and of all possible forms of noble helpfulness to those around her. He longs ever for outward scope and energy of action, and for accumulations of power and gain and honor; she revels in sweet thoughts of nature, home, and heaven. The ages of spiritual tyranny, and of religious persecution, and also of bitter theological controversy that succeeded them, occurred when woman's recognized influence, in both civil and ecclesiastical affairs, was of almost no account. Now that the genius of modern progress has brought her to the front of the moving age, in so many forms and ways, the previously abnormal aspects of general society have been, in many striking particulars, greatly meliorated.

The contrasts of woman's social condition, under the sway of Brahminic, Buddhist, Mohammedan, Egyptian, and Chinese ideas of her nature and destiny, and those, although as yet sadly incomplete, which are beginning to prevail in the best parts of Christendom, are indeed immense. No wonder that in those darker lands, through all the ages of their history to the present hour, polygamy and infanticide have abounded—daughters being killed by their own mothers, as if with hearts of stone, because they have learned by most bitter experience to think of life as accursed and intolerable to a female. Is it any wonder that mothers, robbed of all true happiness from generation to generation, by utterly false and base conceptions of their nature and destiny, in the public mind, should rejoice to teach their children, in unbroken succession, to find some relief for themselves in their thoughts of a future life, in the hope of final annihilation? How different is the spectacle seen of woman in Christian America, in multiplied abundance, teaching her children, with life-long delight, to count duty a

pleasure, and to move joyfully on through every day's
 ence, singing as they go, to the land of unending bliss
 How different from any dream possible to the thoughts
 oriental mind, in its native habits of thought, is woman
 aspect, as she appears, standing with a radiant face
 class of youthful listeners, in the Sabbath school, that
 catch every word of truth and love that she utters, an
 ing them with prayerful earnestness to a life of joy
 here and forever. The Sunday school is one of the
 breakwaters that human wisdom has ever devised, in a
 ipative way, against the power of human depravity in the
 And it is quite as largely the product, in its best
 woman's genius for usefulness, as man's. In respect
 tender interest there shown in the highest welfare
 young, and the cheerful songs of praise there sung wi
 and for them, it is characteristically feminine in the ty
 resources and influences for good. Here, modern
 accords to her, willingly, full opportunity, and oft
 admiration of her success in improving it, to give le
 well as tender instruction to large Bible-classes of you
 or older ones, and thus to become a formal "teacher
 church (1 Tim. ii, 12). Women's Boards and Young
 Christian Associations, sometimes female, but oftener c
 membership, masculine and feminine, have come in
 recent existence, and recommended themselves in ev
 to general favor for their great usefulness. Similar
 in other forms of public service will accrue in cumula
 cession to society, as a larger lease to woman's power fo
 action, in directions now closed to her approach, is incr
 accorded by the church in any community.

After more than eighteen centuries of continual sel
 tation, and often with much "pomp of circumstance
 divinely commissioned witness for God in the world,
 executor among the nations of Christ's last will to his
 the church has made but little impression upon man
 large, compared with the possibilities lying within the
 her power, and of the charge given to her from on high
 earnest use. The world still lieth in wickedness;
 whole creation is everywhere weary and groaning st

days gone by. If any new work is to be done for the regeneration of the human race, it must be done, first and chiefest, within the church; and whatever new measure of the Spirit is to be poured out anywhere, must be first poured through all the channels of its various forms of influence upon the world for good. Is it any wonder that the triumphs of the church hitherto have been so few and scanty, to one who recollects that the great majority of its members, the pious women of the world, have been kept for ages under the ban of social, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal prescription, and even in most of the evangelical churches of our land until this present time. They have been required, under the penalty of social ostracism, to keep silence, and to think it one of woman's first duties and highest virtues to do so, in all the assemblies of the saints. It is the common idea, in most of the churches of our country, at this hour, that women then most serve God when they serve him least in public.

III.

The general survey already taken of the facts and principles pertaining to our subject will prepare the reader all the better to decide intelligently, where, among conflicting opinions, the path of truth really lies. What then is the scriptural basis of woman's right to speak and pray in public, as a servant of God? Has she, or has she not, permission from her Maker to open her mouth in behalf of her race and its Redeemer in the hearing of others, whether many or few? Look at the question on general grounds.

All the precepts and promises of the Bible are for woman as fully and as fully as for man. This fact lies everywhere apparent upon the surface of that holy book. It is at least one manifest sense of the declaration by Paul, that "in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female." The same repentance and faith are prescribed as being needful for her, and the same daily self-devotion to God and duty, as to others. She can with the same right as any apostle appropriate to herself all Christ's tender words of love, and bring to him with equal welcome the frankincense and myrrh of a grateful heart. If it be not so, and if there is anywhere a formal "statute of limitations" to

woman's spiritual privileges, as such, it must be clearly proved to exist, and to be of universal application to the sex at large, and both absolute and final. If such a statute of divine origin can be found, what disparagement will it cast upon the whole female sex? There are the strongest possible reasons for believing in advance, that no such systematic depreciation of woman can be found with the sanction of God's ordaining hand upon it. Her moral influence proves to be of such priceless value, in all forms of social experience and progress, that its fullest and freest action everywhere is a great desideratum. He who believes that the religion of Christ, which brings such glorious freedom of heart to all else, imposes on woman a crushing load of special disabilities, must take up with a will the heavy burden of proof that lies upon his hands. For saith Paul to each believer, "All things are yours, whether things present, or things to come: all are yours; and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's."

The Bible is representative, successively, in an incidental way, of the ideas, feelings, and usages of the three great nations, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman, in the bosom of whose languages and of whose special elements of separate historical manifestation, its portraiture of character and pictures of truth and duty are to be found. Just as the poetry, music, architecture, and arts of all kinds that exist among any people, however they may exhibit, in their higher aspects, conformity to the general principles of excellence in those arts everywhere, have yet in them a special expression of the habits of thought and feeling peculiar to the particular nations among which they appear; so is it with the varied characteristics of the several presentations made to mankind of Bible-truth, in the different tongues and times of the ancient world. Its marvellous "unity in variety" was slowly wrought out by the Divine Artist that made it in its wondrous strength and beauty, through nearly two thousand years of ever-changing social conditions among the three leading nations of the world for intelligence and moral activity during all that long period. In every part of the fabric of revealed truth presented in its pages, the style of the nation, in which the bearers of divine truth appear at the time, and the particular culture and spirit of the times in each sev-

eral land and age, plainly show themselves to view. Their very habits of life are easy to be seen, and even the natural scenery amid which they live and move. The outward surroundings of Bible-presentations of truth are thus everywhere clearly mirrored in its pages, like the ever-changing landscape that skirts the surface of a smoothly flowing stream.

The history of the world begins with an ominous resemblance in miniature to what in larger proportions of sin and sorrow it has continued to be until now, the murderous overthrow of brother by brother to the ground. From that first hour of crime and terror, enacted under the idea that "might makes right," there has been, with whatever wavering continuity of advancement at any time, a steady progress after all towards the enthronement of the true sentiment in all forms of social life, that "right makes might." The parlor rules the world now more than the palæstra, and the pen instead of the club or the sword. Everywhere in the Bible, as in the history of the civilized world itself, there is evident progress, if tardy, from first to last, in scope and freedom of action for women. Such women as surrounded Christ, "last at his cross and first at his sepulchre," never had before appeared on the world's stage, nor could have ever appeared, until Hebrew, Greek, and Roman ideas, and especially Roman with Hebrew, had met in one producing such a result, in combination, of Christian heroism and refinement, full of heavenly grace and holy love. Christ, "the Wonderful One," in every way, was remarkable for the honor that he put, for the first time in the world's history, on womanhood. So also upon childhood, and any and every neglected class in the community, he set the manifest seal of his own loving notice and care. His bearing towards all, but formalists and hypocrites, was full of the spirit of those words of loving kindness quoted by Paul (2 Cor. vi, 16-18): "I will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters." Yes! *the daughters* of the Lord Almighty. There are no masculine rights of primogeniture in his kingdom, and nothing there, on earth or in heaven, more sacred to male than female. Else how can Christ's last prayer be ever answered (John xvii, 21-4) concerning his disciples each and all, "that they *all* may be one, as thou Father art in me and I in thee, that they may be made perfect in one."

God declared through his prophet Joel, some eight hundred years before Christ (Joel ii, 28): "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy. And upon my servants and my handmaidens I will pour out of my Spirit and they shall prophesy." "When the Pentecost was fully come and they were *all* filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance," that is, with other ideas and than ever before; Peter said (Acts ii, 15-16): "These were drunken, as ye suppose, but this is that which is spoken by the prophet Joel"—quoting the words already given. It is evident enough what occurred at this time, and what is the view which the apostle Peter teaches us, under divine authority, to take of it. "They were *all* with one accord in one voice," the record says, "men and women, a great company," all in the presence and power of the Spirit "filled all the house where they were sitting, and they were *all* filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak as the Spirit gave them utterance." They spoke so earnestly and continuously, men and women of the whole company of believers, and perhaps also some of another, some of the time, in different parts of the assembly, that lookers-on thought that "they were full of new wine."

Our question now comes, in a very simple form, before us for consideration, and it is this:—is it right, seemingly, and in every way, that women, wishing to testify their love to Christ and his cause, should be entirely free to do so in any assemblies of the saints, whether small or large, *where one of either sex has full freedom of speech*. If likewise they are moved to pray, in any such case, shall they be at liberty to gratify so divine an impulse. Or must they contrarily suppress always every thought and desire of public usefulness, although born of the Spirit as truly as was ever any such desire in a masculine heart, in cold abeyance and suppressed, because they are women, with a Pauline interdict hanging over their heads, and unremovable until the very day of doom? The words quoted from Joel and reaffirmed and explained by Peter, in each case according to the mind of God, and by the inspiration from him, declares unmistakably the equality of the two sexes before God in religious privileges and

This great fact becomes, therefore, by having had such direct and open honor put upon it by God himself, one of the chief guiding principles of right action and true growth in the church of Christ on earth everywhere. The Bible is nowhere self-contradictory; and whatever its divine author directly commands, or commends, can not be afterwards displaced from its own inherent claims to our reverent regard by any human traditions or social customs of an antagonistic bearing. In the case of Anna the prophetess, an instance is furnished of the Pentecostal form of feminine usefulness; and that in an age and among a people, where women were always expected to stand as much as possible out of sight and to look and speak behind a veil. "Coming in, at that instant (Luke ii, 38), "she gave thanks, likewise," (that is, aloud) "to the Lord, and spoke of him to all those that looked for redemption in Jerusalem." She did freely and fully the same thing to the various companies that gathered about her, little or large, that Aquila and Priscilla did to Apollos, when he first began to preach and did not show to those older and better instructed disciples all the knowledge of Christian truth which they desired him to possess. "They took him unto them" (Acts xviii, 26), accordingly, "and expounded the way of God more perfectly." She and they were *teachers in the church*, fearful as the fact may seem to some. *The Bible therefore lays no restriction upon any woman's right of speech for Christ, simply because she is a woman, in any gathering of the church, however large, for conference and prayer.*

As for women's preaching, it may be said in truth, that there are quite enough men trained to the service to meet present facilities for their adequate support. If not formally and carefully prepared for undertaking all its duties, it is evident that no woman should be inducted into the holy office of the ministry. If adequately trained for them, the uncertainties of her health far beyond those of the other sex, and possible if not probable offers of marriage to which, if of an eligible kind, she would naturally be disposed to accede, with the accompanying restraints of wifehood and maternity upon her means of public usefulness, would quite unfit her, as a rule, for both pulpit and pastoral effort. She would lack also the experience, and with it the requisite qualifications for best instructing those belonging

to the busy outer world of action, with which she is not at all conversant.

But if any woman has at any time an all-mastering conviction that she is called of God to preach the gospel, she has the right in herself, as his child, to put an idea so determinative of all her future history fully to the proof. Everyone, man or woman, is called of God to be true and noble in himself, and to be an earnest worker in all things for God and his race. One man is just as truly called of him, in his nature and circumstances, to be a merchant, or a mechanic, or an artist, or even a day-laborer as is another to preach the gospel. It may be "a flattering unction to one's soul," to believe that some special magic pertains to "a call to the ministry," and that "special providences" flutter always about every such event. The two factors that practically determine any such question are the strength of the idea in the mind of the party concerned, and the ratification of it, as acceptable, by those to whom the offer of spiritual guidance in such a way is made known. If a woman feels, like Paul, "woe is unto me if I preach not the gospel," let her, if she will, put God's providence fully to the proof, and find whether the impulse in her heart is or is not divine. Society has always full control of any foolish ventures in such directions. No formal veto is requisite at any time, but only quiet inaction, on its part.

The question of having an inherent right is one thing, and that of the expediency of using it is quite another. An abstract principle of duty or privilege often looms up in importance, on account of its just inferences and issues, far above any mere question of immediate practical significance. Woman is not disfranchised by the Bible, but enfranchised; her rights and liberties are not contracted, but enlarged. The religion of Christ gives her everywhere full equality of nature and rank and power, in being good and doing good, with man.

When Paul began to preach Christ to the Greeks, it seemed to them "foolishness" (1 Cor. i, 23). The gospel was both preceptively and practically foreign, in its requisitions, to all their previous ideas. Woman was, it has been seen, in complete social bondage among them, even at home. When Christianity really began to work, with its emancipating influences of all

s, upon various Greek communities, giving sight to the
 l, ears to the deaf, feet to the lame, and liberty to all other
 of spiritual captives (Luke iv, 18-19). Greek women nat-
 y felt the stimulation of the new religious atmosphere in
 h they found themselves, and felt it powerfully. But if
 rose to speak for Christ, in public, or acted distinctly for
 before others' eyes, it would seem at once, to all spectators,
 the wisest and best, like Socrates and Plato, had they been
 g then, a wonderful offense against good manners. A
 en Greek would in fact deem it the height of wantonness,
 beyond what the low women of the day dared to practice.
 fact that woman was everywhere in Greece a social and
 domestic cipher, greatly abridged at first Paul's means of
 mediate effectiveness, as a missionary preacher, in the few
 ipal cities of that classic land. In setting for the first time,
 acts and privileges of Christianity, like tender plants, in so
 endly a soil, he could not deem it wise to expose them, all
 ce, to violent and long-continued assaults from old, time-
 , social prejudices, and those universal in their kind. In
 circumstances his custom was to let wheat and tares grow
 season, rather than, by pulling up the tares at the outset,
 t up at once all the wheat also. Rude storms will quickly
 down young trees, however well set, if they have not had
 to twine their roots around the bosom of their mother-
 . He accordingly held himself to be always "a debtor
 to the Greeks and barbarians, both to the wise and the
 se." (Rom. i, 14). To the Jew he became a Jew and to the
 as weak, that he might gain the weak, and made himself
 ings to all men, that he might by all means save some
 or. ix, 20). If any seemingly suppressive action on his
 in reference to woman's public freedom in the service of
 it can be found by any one, or be imagined to be found,
 acts here stated furnish a full explanation of it. He became,
 he time being, upon this subject, a Greek to the Greeks.
 r did he write one word to any others than Greeks, that
 l by any possibility be accounted as in the least disparag-
 o women, as women. And if he seems to some to do so,
 i writing to the Corinthians, Ephesians, or Thessalonians,
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Woman's Right to public action in the Church. [A]

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of temporary expediency in his mind through the ideas of a different community and a different age. In his work of holy propagandism in the heathen communities of that day he had quite as much to do, to shut off evil influences all the time, that would delay success in it, as to introduce the better ideas themselves of the new and true faith from above. He never forgot that "new wine could not be safely put into old bottles;" and he always "fed those with milk that could not bear meat." He acted as Moses did about divorces, and as the Hebrew prophets generally did in reference to polygamy. He was so desirous of doing them good, in some way, and so flexible to their peculiar and ever varying moods of feeling, that he told them once (2 Cor. xii, 16), in sportive earnestness, that, "being crafty he had caught them with guile."

The danger among the Greeks was, that the women would forget, most unwisely on their part, the tremendous power of social prejudice against their sex. - Among the Romans the immediate centrifugal tendency showed itself, in the recent converts, in respect to points where Roman feeling was in itself strongest—those of absolute obedience in all cases to civil law. Here then was soon found to be need of earnest caution not to bring reproach upon the new movement, by making it strike anywhere, needlessly, against the greatest obstacle, in prevalent social feeling, against which, in that community, it could impinge. Hence came that striking passage (Rom. xiii, 1-10) about careful obedience to the civil authorities, on which point one would think no Roman, especially no Christian Roman, would need any hint whatever: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers," he says, with much more of like import; which let the reader ponder. Among the Cretans, he saw similar evil tendencies showing themselves, as at Rome, and bade Titus (i, 1-4): "Put them in mind to be subject unto principalities and powers." In Ephesus, he saw influences of a divergent kind at work in home-life, and therefore (Eph. vi, 1-4), cautioned children "to obey their parents, and fathers not to provoke their children to wrath." A like tendency to break over the bounds of old social feelings, under a false sense of their new freedom of thought in Christ, showed itself sometimes in reference to servants and masters. Hence came that beauti-

letter of Paul to Philemon, full of tender Christian persuasiveness, in which he adjusts so skilfully the relation of master and slave to the new ideas.

Wherever the great apostle went he told his hearers as he told the Corinthians, "If any man be in Christ he is a new creature; behold all things are become new." The tendencies of the religion of Christ were all utterly revolutionary, in their immediate effects, of every heathen idea and institution. The practical problem, which, in every new community, was at once laid freshly upon his hands, was, how to introduce effectually the heaven of the Christian doctrines that he brought with him, to the minds and manners of men, who had entirely other long-established sentiments and customs. Wonderful skill and wisdom were needed so to introduce the new to the old, that the old would not at once arise in its ancient strength, and, like a lion devouring a lamb, put violently the new forever out of sight.

It is difficult for those of one nation to estimate properly the power of other nation's prejudices. One community is very weak where another is very strong. A Chinaman's sense of propriety in art does not allow any part of the human figure but the face and hands to be made visible in a picture. A missionary would therefore greatly contravene their natural feelings, and so spoil all further chance of usefulness among them, who should scatter Bibles, by sale or by gift, in China, as he had, like many of our Bibles, Adam and Eve presented their undraped nakedness, as a frontispiece to the Old Testament, or the Saviour of the world hanging nude upon the cross, as a frontispiece to the New Testament. If he had only a few copies of the Scriptures to distribute, he might as well withdraw from the field at once, as linger there a single day for any purposes of Christian evangelization. So, also, the feeling in modern Europe is very different from that prevailing among us, respecting the degree of freedom to be accorded to young women in the street; and American girls traveling there are often greatly misjudged, under the influence of standards of criticism which are unknown to their thoughts. The Bible is, indeed, in purpose and spirit, one book; as it is one, in its original, divine authorship from beginning to end.

But, in its elementary composition, it is but a congeries of many tracts, prepared by many writers, through the long range of sixteen hundred years. The New Testament, especially, is a collection of several historical sketches of Christ's birth, life, and death, and of the first beginnings of his church on earth together with various doctrinal treatises by different apostles in an epistolary form. What was written as a letter of special interest and instruction, to meet directly the wants of some one of the new Christian communities in their particular circumstances, did not become, until after the lapse of several years subsequently, the common property of all the church, which was effected, when accomplished, by a general system of mutual exchanges. All general truths and principles pertaining to right moral action, as such, belong in and of themselves, to every age and nation. Wherever they are found stated in the Scriptures they have the added authority of a direct divine statute, or sanction, in their favor. But the local and limited applications to special circumstances, which specific ordinances of a regulative or restrictive kind are sometimes made to cover are without any inherent worth or force, in themselves, when the conditions which they were meant to meet are wanting.

It is apparent that Paul had many active female helpers in his itinerant labors, as a missionary to the Gentiles. To the Romans he speaks gratefully of the aid, that Priscilla (and Aquila) had rendered him; and Mary, "who bestowed much labor on him;" and Urbane, "his helper in Christ;" and Tryphena and Tryphosa, "who labored in the Lord;" and "the beloved Persis, who labored much in the Lord;" and others, (Rom. xvi, 1-15). In Rome, we see therefore, that female helpers abounded, and that "chief" among them were Julia and "some of Cæsar's household" (Philip. iv, 22). In Corinth he does not seem to have had one such native helper; but in writing to the Corinthians, from Phillipi, he says (1 Cor. xvi, 19), "Aquila and Priscilla" (husband and wife) "salute you *much* in the Lord, with the church that is in their house." They seem to have been traveling missionary companions of Paul, from place to place. At the close of the second epistle to the Corinthians, no allusion is made to any woman, or at the close of those to the Ephesians, the Phillipians, and the

ssians and Thessalonians. He carefully abstained from
ing the Greek eye of that day towards woman, even though
ring a new spiritual face. When writing from Rome to
othy, "his own son" in Christ, he sends his personal salu-
ons to Prisca (and Aquila), then at Ephesus, and a greeting
Claudia to Timothy and his church. In Titus and Phile-
no salutation occurs from any Christian sister, or to any

So is it in Hebrews. There was no reverence for woman
the Greek heart. That noble and exalting sentiment could
fashioned and fixed there only by the religion of Christ,
ch would surely produce that desirable result in the end,
must have, without disturbance, time enough for its accom-
ishment. Paul was therefore, when writing or speaking to
eks, silent, by rule with himself, concerning the Christian
r of woman's public rights and duties in the service of God ;
re yet, as is manifest in his letter to the Romans, he would
have given utterance to a high appreciation of their inter-
and efforts in the great cause of human salvation.

The theology of the Bible is certainly quite as much feminine
as masculine. Wisdom and power are no more glorified in its
as from beginning to end than love ; law and justice no
e than loving-kindness and mercy. Christ's wonderful
acter and life were equally masculine and feminine in their
e. Tender, gentle, patient, and forgiving, he declared him-
the Lord and Master of mankind, and the Judge of quick
dead.

The symbolism of the Bible used to image to the mind what
precious and good is remarkably feminine. The church is
ed "the Lamb's wife," and her oneness of heart with Christ
er everlasting espousal to him. So in the Song of Solomon,
autiful oriental picture is presented to view, of the church,
a fond bride searching for her absent lover, if she might but
d him somewhere upon the mountains, or in some garden or
eyard of the world, or even in the desert. In Isaiah, and in
book of Revelation, God's people upon earth, called some-
as familiarly "the daughter of Zion," are often likened to
woman bright with honor, and beauty, and queenly jewels.
liv, 1-8, and also lxii, 4-12, and lxvi, 5-15. See also Rev.
, 1-17 and xxii, 17.) In that fine passage in Ephesians

(v, 23-33) in which Paul presents the Christian ideal of conjugal virtue and felicity, he declares that he means to express in it also the higher mystery "concerning Christ and the Church."

The more enlightened nations of antiquity, and of modern times also, have not hesitated, when women came by natural inheritance to the throne, or seemed specially fitted for the work of wise administration, to honor them in such high civil relations. So the Jews honored Deborah as a judge; and the Persians Zenobia as a queen; and so England has greeted with loyal deference her two queens, Elizabeth and Victoria; and in them the Church of England, has, in each of their reigns, recognized its own earthly head, as completely as if they had been kings instead of queens. In the worship likewise of the Episcopal Church, the same freedom is accorded to woman's voice in liturgical recitations or responses as to man's. All are one there in Christ Jesus in the public service of God, in speaking as in singing.

But a few words on the specific exegesis of what Paul says in Corinthians and Ephesians, about the female converts of his day, will be here needful. It appears (1 Cor. xi, 3-17), that one of the disorderly tendencies manifested early among the Corinthian Christians took the form of an entire reversal of the usual habits of both sexes as to covering their heads in their public assemblies. Some of the men put a covering on their heads, and the women, ready to match them in ignoring the customs of society, laid their veils aside. It would be no greater shock to social feeling now, if a congregation of religious worshippers were to be found anywhere, all the gentlemen in which had on ladies' bonnets, and all the ladies, gentlemen's hats. Paul told them plainly, that "they came together not for the better, but for the worse" (v. 17). In this *outré* manner both sexes seem to have prophesied (or spoken freely in open meeting), women as well as men (verses 5 and 13). *He found no fault with the women for praying or prophesying.* How could he consistently, when remembering what God himself had said on that subject in Joel, and what had happened at Pentecost under the glorious baptism of the church at that time by the Holy Spirit. How could he, while under the power of his constant sense of the fact, that, "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty"

[2 Cor. iii, 17, and Gal. v, 1-13); and that every child of God, son or daughter, is made of God as such the possessor of "all things, things present and things to come" (1 Cor. iii, 21-23). With all his natural Greek feeling, and his cautiousness not to hock it unnecessarily in others, he rejoiced at heart in woman's active service in every form possible to the great cause that absorbed his whole soul in its promotion. He was a man who was so eager to have everybody, man or woman, talk and act for Christ and perishing sinners in every way possible, he who when at Ephesus, "for three years ceased not to warn everyone, night and day with tears" (Acts xx, 31), that he "*rejoiced* Christ was preached at all, even if of contention, and in presence" (Phil. i, 15-19). What says Paul here of the public praying, in the case, by the women? "Judge in yourselves: *is it comely* that a woman pray unto God" (that is, in public) *uncovered*. It was not the praying to which he objected, but the unmeet manner of the act. They were full, as recently converted heathen and surrounded everywhere still by heathen in their own families, of "divisions and heresies" (verses 18 and 19). Their manners at the communion-table were shockingly barbarian. One was hungry and another was drunken (v. 21.) See also what he says elsewhere of their awful licentiousness (1 Cor. ch. v.).

They fell sometimes, it appears, into a *general babble* in their public gatherings, and therefore said Paul (1 Cor. xiv, 23): "If the whole church be come together, and *all* speak with tongues" (that is, at one time) "and there come in those that are unbelievers, will they not say that ye are *mad*?" But of *prophesying* (or earnest individual discourse in proper time and order) *by man or woman*, how differently does he speak? "If *all* prophesy" (v. 24), that is, in an orderly and proper way, "and there come in one that believeth not, he is convinced of all; he is judged of all; and thus are the secrets of his heart made manifest, and falling down on his face he will worship God," etc. They sometimes *interrupted one another when speaking*. Therefore said he to them (1 Cor. xiv, 31-36): "Ye may *all* prophesy, one by one—that all may learn and all may be comforted. The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. God is not the author of confusion, but of peace. Let your

women keep silence in the churches" (i. e., instead of interrupting those who are speaking) "for it is not permitted unto them to speak" (in such a disorderly way); "and if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home" (i. e., instead of asking them, or anyone else when in church); "for it is as becometh the church, that ye should all one mind, and one voice, as ye are united to the church." The context shows, in each several case, that the cautionary rules here given were respectively misapplied. There were three special faults that he charged upon the female converts at Corinth, viz: 1. That they prophesied *with their heads uncovered* (which was contrary to universal Greek feeling). 2. That *they interrupted one another* by speaking two or more of them at the same time, instead of separately in succession. 3. That *they asked questions in an orderly way of those who were speaking*. He bids them to refrain from doing so to ask their husbands, when at home about things they wished to understand more fully of whatsoever they had heard said by any one in their public assemblies. These relative requisitions were all made, and only made, in the interest of good order in the house of God. The chapter closes accordingly with this summary direction, "let all things be done decently and in good order!" Not the least thought had been at this time of defining, for all subsequent ages, woman's rights and status in the Christian church. Scripture has often been violently distorted to a special theological use and falsely made to yield support to some mere personal or popular tradition, instead of putting the Bible first and drawing all doctrines and dogmas by fair inferences from its precepts. In 1 Tim. ii, 11-12, Paul says again, "Let them learn in silence with all subjection: I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence. That there was *something unseemly in their conduct* is plainly manifest from his charge to them in the same immediate text, "to adorn themselves with shamefacedness and sobriety. And instead of hearing in a meditative and prayerful way from Timothy their pastor, or Aquila, or others of his fellow-labourers, who undertook to present to them as the truth of God, they *have been of a disputatious spirit and of trifling behavior*. they were bidden, as a duty to Christ and to each other, to

at once all such forwardness and frowardness of conduct. If anything in the passages quoted seems at all unexplained by the special notice here taken of them, it will certainly be fully covered by the general historical view, previously furnished of woman's social status in ancient Greece.

How indifferent at heart Paul felt about any questions of mere formal propriety, in public worship, is evident from his statement (1 Cor. xi, 16) "If any man seem to be contentious," on these points, "we have no such custom, neither the churches of God." Their growth in grace and in the knowledge of God was always the one great point of interest to him.

IV.

The most sad fact that has specially marked the history of Christ's church on earth, in all ages, has been the terrific waste continually of its moral power for good. Silence, inaction, and indifference abound, where energy of speech and effort should be witnessed to the full at all times. A policy of enforced silence on the part of any of the host of God's elect, and especially of an entire class, as such, and that the largest and best of all, is a policy of systematic self-destruction.

Many will often yield readily to a shallow misconception, that the most elaborate reasoning, from well-founded principles, could not suffice at all to persuade them to admit. That charming phrase, "a womanly sense of propriety," is made to do sometimes great service in darkening the thoughts of people upon this subject. Publicity of action is never desirable in itself for any one, man or woman, but only in any case as the necessary means of larger usefulness. Self-guarded reserve is, in many things, one of woman's highest duties to herself, and one of the most effective charms that she can present to the eyes of others. Modest self-respect is an ornament of great price to any one of either sex. Towards moral evil of all kinds, or any the least danger of its successful appeal to inward thought, or outward sense, the right and only right attitude of soul in man or woman, and especially in woman, is that of holy self-protective distance of feeling and scornful silence, except in those instances where an open, loud-voiced, indignant protest would be a still truer mode of opposition to its approach.

Is there any luxury of earth, next after the consciousness of love to God in one's heart, and the sense of his answering love in return, so priceless in value, as the enjoyment of full personal freedom to think, speak, and act, at any time, as may seem wisest and best to one's self? And if this is one of the highest charms of life to a man, is it not equally so to a woman? No limitations can ever be justly put on statutory requisitions, which are in themselves of universal applicability, that are not, as the lawyers phrase it, "of the matter of the law itself." Human traditions, or interpretations, or special manipulations of revealed doctrine or duty, cannot be rightly overlaid with the least really qualifying influence, upon the pure text of God's word.

And, as to standards of propriety, they are, so far as social customs and feelings are concerned, in different lands, often very variable. One nation allows what another condemns; and one feels that there is essential wrong where another does not see it to exist at all. He who bows down his soul to the idol of propriety is one of the weakest possible specimens of all false worshippers in the world.

It may be true, and doubtless will be, that when women generally feel entirely enfranchised from old restrictive ideas in the church, and exercise at will their right to speak for Christ before his own people, they will, some of them, fail to speak or pray to general edification. If so, they will be only like many of their dull and lifeless brethren, who despoil now the ordinary prayer-meeting of very much of the delightsomeness that it might have. Any such objection pertains only to the profitlessness of narrow-thinking, in either sex, and to the intellectual and spiritual poverty of feeble-minded people everywhere. God never calls any one of shallow habits of religious thoughtfulness, or of mere worldly tastes and habits, to bear the ark of his covenant before the eyes of their fellow-men.

The question is sometimes asked, what is the ideal woman of the future? "To the law and the testimony" we must go for the answer to this, as to all other unresolved moral questions. She must be, according to the Bible standard, a cultivated, earnest, happy Christian worker, in-doors and out of doors, from first to last, for the good of all mankind and to the

praise of God. Nowhere is the progress of the age more manifest, in reference to its higher ideas and aims, than in respect to the public rights and privileges of women. Not a few noble specimens of superior womanliness, of the modern type, have appeared within a very recent date, in England and America. Mary Somerville, Caroline Fry, Miss Burdett Coutts, Florence Nightingale, Lucretia Mott, Miss Dix, Clara Barton, Sarah Smiley, and Miss Rankin, will naturally suggest themselves to most readers, and that too as representatives of a large class of like benefactresses to suffering humanity. It is delightful to feel sure, that they are a few bright forerunners of a great procession of similar feminine worthies, that in every succeeding age, will increasingly contribute, and with far larger intellectual preparations for high usefulness, than any of their sex have hitherto been able to obtain, to the world's advancement in knowledge, excellence, and happiness. Fanny Kemble, the actress and fine literary reader, niece herself to Mrs. Siddons, the greatest of English actresses, has indeed, recently said, in the evening of her days, that "a business which requires public exhibition is unworthy of a woman, and that the personal exhibition which she herself had made upon the stage in acting had always been odious to her." The spirit of personal exhibition in any form for purposes of praise, or of pecuniary gain, has no really satisfying results or influences to offer to its possessor. Feminine self-display in a theater, however studiously artistic, has nothing in common with earnest, self-forgetful zeal, "instant in season and out of season," if need be, anywhere and everywhere, to lead others to Christ—such as led the woman of Samaria to go busily among her friends and neighbors to inform them of him who told her, at "Jacob's well," of "the well of water springing up into everlasting life." To sing in public, or to give select readings and narrations to a group of eager listeners in a parlor, if done to gratify personal pride, is wholly different in moral quality from seeking to "do good as one has opportunity, especially to the household of faith." No scriptural vindicator of woman's right to public forms of Christian usefulness would think for a moment of ministering in any way to feminine vanity, or of withdrawing a spirit of maidenly excellence, to the least degree whatever, from behind its selectest defenses of

safety and honor. Any true woman will become all the more tender in spirit, and gentle in voice and manner, for pleading with others, anywhere, to "come and see Jesus," instead of more bold and free and brazen. Let women shout where they can, like Miriam and her troop, the victories of the Lord over his foes, or "speak" freely like Anna, "of Christ to all those that wait for redemption in Israel." There has always been "a multitude of publishers" (Ps. lxviii, 11) among the women of the church in all ages, ready and waiting to declare to any who had ears to hear the praises of the Lord, that yet the false customs and weak fancies of God's own people have served to keep, with fatal uniformity, in chains of inactive silence. The spirit of earnest evangelical propagandism is, as strange as it may seem, of very recent birth in the Christian church. The same minds, and they have been always the large majority, which have maintained that it was even an offense against the faith of Christ, to say or even to think, that theology is in itself, like any of the other sciences, and all the more, as the crown and summit of them all, capable in itself of great improvement and growth, have likewise felt that the ideas and ideals, the forms and the ceremonies, the ends, aims, and attainments of church-life must be held spell-bound, in all time, to the unripe conceptions of the ancient and immature past—cribbed and confined in their natural tendencies to a free and full enlargement, by the narrow constraints of times and circumstances belonging often to the monarchical and semi-heathen experiences of the early years of church history.

Our Methodist, Baptist, and Quaker brethren have, for many years past, put the matter of public female coöperativeness, in efforts for church advancement, to the proof, and with no evil results to themselves or to others. The elements of civil order and of social progress are, in their own nature, open to the broadest and best use possible of any new light discoverable, at any time, in every department of science and of truth. And, so much more, by necessary inference, must the sources of moral prosperity and power be capable, in themselves, of receiving into their bosom the modifying influence, for good, of any and all new ideas, that practically summon the minds of men to a truer and nobler life.

The advance in public thought all over the civilized world concerning woman's desirable mental culture is one of the great marvels of modern times. Few have any adequate conception of the breadth and greatness of the changes that have been very recently wrought on the Continent, and in England, and America, concerning woman's larger education for a broader sphere of usefulness than ever before in the world's history. In the new circumstances thus prepared for her by the general interest of society in her higher intellectual culture, she will become both qualified and disposed, and that at a date close at hand, to speak, write, and act in various directions of public usefulness, as she has had but little opportunity of doing hitherto. She will not be able to satisfy herself, ere long, with mere elegant quiet in a well-adorned home, or to feel that her own private personal enjoyment, in any form however refined, is the great charm of life to her. She must and will, or the millennium will never come, throw her whole heart into the work of conquering this world to Christ, and not only march on to final triumph with her brethren in the Lord, but animate them continually anew to fresh ardor, all the way, by her inspiring presence and her abounding words of good cheer. Nor will she dim any of her former charms, but only enhance them greatly, in conforming her ideas and efforts, as a woman, to any and every plan of action that affords her the largest means of Christian usefulness within her reach. Woman is never so attractive in any grace or virtue, as when thoroughly and energetically religious.

The command addressed to believers by their ascending Lord, to "go and disciple all nations, teaching them to observe whatsoever he had commanded them," was addressed (Mat. xxviii, 20) to the whole company of them, men and women, when gathered before him. All commands of faith and repentance, of Christian watchfulness and of personal faithfulness and fruitfulness to Christ are laid as completely upon her as upon any of the other sex. If on any single passage some just doubt could be shown to lie, concerning the real voice of Scripture upon the subject, the many clear passages that abound on the general grounds upon which it rests ought to suffice to give it its determinate interpretation. Much luminousness

should serve to enlighten a little obscurity, rather than a little obscurity to darken much luminousness. To the beautiful invitation of the gospel to all men "to come" and partake of the feast of divine love ("the Spirit and the bride say, come!" or God on high, and the church on earth and in heaven thus say), it is added with no less impressive beauty, "let him that heareth say, come!" Who shall forbid any woman from echoing the glad tidings with her voice, and with all her heart, wherever any one else could rightly think of doing so! (Cf. Ps. cxlviii, 11-14.)

Most of the piety of the world hitherto has come, it is believed, in the line of God's covenant-mercies and so has been chiefly the product of faithful maternal training, as in Timothy's case. Paul speaks (2 Tim. i, 3-6), affectionately of the unfeigned faith of his grandmother Eunice and his mother Lois, and also of his own religious ancestry. Woman's worth and work, as a religious home-trainer, has been hitherto the great motor-force, of an earthly kind, that has borne on the church, with its many rich benedictions to mankind, from one generation to another; while her cheerful spirit of song, and ardor of faith, and hope have been always the joy of its worship. And what this age now needs as much as any other one super-added force of an earthly kind, and beyond any other, is the free introduction everywhere into all the congregations of the saints gathered for conference and prayer, of the free and earnest expression of woman's love to Christ. That, outside of our evangelical churches, there is no strong all-mastering objection in the natural sentiments of mankind to woman's equal public honor with man, is manifest in several striking ways. Over much the larger part of Christendom to this day, throughout the bounds of the Roman Catholic and Greek churches, the worship of the Virgin Mary prevails in full force, making the great Saviour, who is Lord of all, entirely secondary in authority and importance to his mere human mother. A mere glorified woman, according to their enthusiastic admiration, rules this whole world, and even heaven and earth together, and she is far more an object of worship to them, than was to the ancients the "mother of the gods." Among the Greeks and Romans, similar proofs of natural reverence for the female

abound. Their theology was the theology of fate; but the
 tes who spun out to mortals their little lease of life, were all
 idesses. The Furies also, who pursued and punished crim-
 ls after death, were female ministers of vengeance. And who
 sided over their fields of husbandry, but Ceres the goddess
 corn? Who, over the chase and health, but Diana? Who,
 r the domestic hearth and the perpetual keeping of that
 red fire, on whose unbroken maintenance the continued
 ty of Rome depended, but Vesta and the Vestal Virgins?
 o, over wisdom itself, but Minerva? Who, over the shades
 ow, but Proserpina? The very ministers of religion in
 ient Greece were as much the priestesses who gave the
 wers of the oracles, as the priests who performed the coarser
 rk of killing the appointed animals for sacrifice. Woman's
 ver was plainly shown in these and other ways to be an
 ment of state-life that no one failed to see, or feel, or accept.
 n the same connection in which man is declared by Paul to
 "the image and glory of God" in the capabilities of his
 ure and destiny (male and female), "woman is," he tells us,
 e glory of the man" (1 Cor. xi, 7). Does not every true
 n who has any religion in his character, or even any poetry
 his nature and any sentiment of reverence for woman, rejoice
 acknowledge that woman is on the average greatly superior
 man in moral excellence; and that in her heart is to be
 und the treasure-house of the moral riches of the world, and
 all its highest and best hopes for the future. It was women
 id not men?) that when Christ was on earth and had not,
 etimes, where to lay his head, "ministered unto him of
 ir substance" (Luke viii, 3). And it was to the women that
 e angel found at the sepulchre, the elect spirits of the church
 en as now, that he said "go quickly and tell the disciples,
 at he is risen from the dead;" a message the greatest in itself
 d in its consequences that any company of mortals were ever
 mmissioned to bear to the rest of mankind.

All honor to the fact of woman's growing emancipation from
 social restrictions that confine her chances of public useful-
 ss as a servant of Christ within narrow bounds. The world's
 story hitherto has been distressfully disappointing in its
 aracter and results to any one who has undertaken to reason

from first principles what it might have been and ought to have been. No part of it has been more sad than that of the church of Christ itself; and whenever and wherever its history has been most forlorn, there woman's active service in the cause has been most repressed, or at least undesired.

The hosts of evil and of good are plainly marshalling themselves, as never before over all the civilized world, for a strife with each other unto the death. There must be everywhere, by necessity, a conflict between all that is right and all that is wrong, until one or the other finally prevails and forever. It is a grand advantage to the lovers of truth and of God, that he, knowing the end from the beginning, has assured them that the right will have the victory at the last, and that evil is doomed, in itself and by his fiat also, to perish in the earth. But for the achievement of such a triumph in the end, the church must gird herself with more and more determined energy until it is accomplished. Woman, with her mighty moral power for good, can not be justly or safely left to look idly on upon any part of the great struggle. Much less can she be wisely or rightly smitten in the face, as if by divine authority, and told to see to it that she keeps quiet and dumb, while everything else around her and above her, and even the very air itself, is astir with the spirit of the great battle, that is being waged for God, or against him.

ARTICLE VII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN.*—Principal Tullock is already favorably known from his works on *Leaders of the Reformation*, and *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the seventeenth century*, and this volume of Lectures (as they appear to have been from the "prefatory note," where alone we find any date—June 1, 1876) on a very different theme, will command attention as from the same pen. It will be read the more widely as being less extended and more popular in its tone than Müller's great work on the same subject. The treatment, too, is different. Instead of first examining "the individual consciousness in its inner fitness to the fact," and then "the conclusions thus reached in the light of Scripture," which was Müller's method, Dr. Tullock prefers to trace the idea of evil in its historical development from the beginning to the latest stages, as in what is called natural religion and in revelation. The several lectures treat of "the position of sin in relation to modern schools of thought;" the "idea of evil, outside of revelation;" the "Old Testament Doctrine of Sin;" the "doctrine of sin as in the Gospels;" the "doctrine of St. Paul's epistles;" "Original Sin." The last forty pages are made up of supplementary notes. We wish the writer had enlarged this volume, as he tells us in the preface he had intended, so as to include a discussion of Augustinianism, and also of "the Optimism of Leibnitz," and the later "Pessimism," which however he reserves for future consideration. He is evidently at home in the literature of his subject, and writes with perspicuity and candor. The work, though brief, is here and there somewhat diffuse, yet not therefore less adapted to popular use.

REASON, FAITH, AND DUTY.†—If orthodox preaching, in vindicating the distinguishing doctrines of revelation, has not always given to natural religion and ethics their due place, on the other

* *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*. By JOHN TULLOCK, D.D., Principal of St. Mary's College in the University of St. Andrews; one of her Majesty's Chaplains in Scotland. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 12mo, 243 pp.

† *Reason, Faith, and Duty*. Sermons preached chiefly in the College Chapel, by JAMES WALKER, D.D., LL.D., late President of Harvard College. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1877. 12mo, 454 pages.

hand where those doctrines have been denied or ignored these latter themes have received almost necessarily a fuller treatment. Particularly by the better class of Unitarian divines a high ethical tone has been maintained, and earnestness and ability, as well as culture, have been employed in discussing and urging the duties of common life. No doubt their sermons in this department may be studied with advantage by other preachers. They add breadth and delicacy to the culture desirable for the pulpit. And among these divines none can be more deservedly esteemed or more profitably read than the late Dr. Walker. First as a pastor, and then as the President and Preacher at Harvard College, he commanded high respect and wrought valuable service. The volume before us is a welcome addition to other works from the same pen. It contains twenty-six sermons, some of them baccalaureate addresses, and most of them in their subjects and modes of treatment well adapted to young men generally as well as specially intended for college life. They were selected, from such as he had not given to the flames, by a friend to whose urgent request he had reluctantly consented. One of them, "Upon the sin of being led astray," has the more interest as "the only one hitherto unpublished, which he designated." For their high standards of judgment, devout and kindly spirit, clear statements and reasonings, and purity and simplicity of style, they are admirable discourses. A pleasing portrait is prefixed, with an introduction giving a sketch of his useful and honored life.

THREE WORKS FROM MARTINEAU.*—We gladly invite attention here to these three books, which must win attention and render service far beyond the circle of the author's own religious denomination. The first is a reprint from the sixth edition, the earliest of the prefaces being dated June, 1843, and has already taken its high place in the public esteem. The American Unitarian Association have done well to issue it, in this tasteful form, at the low price of one dollar.

* 1. *Endeavors after the Christian Life: Discourses* by JAMES MARTINEAU. Reprinted from the sixth English edition. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1876. 12mo, 449 pp.

2. *Modern Materialism in its relations to Religion and Theology*. By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., with an introduction by Henry W. Bellows, D.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1877. 211 pp.

3. *Hours of Thought on Sacred Things*. By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1876. 344 pp.

comprises forty-three sermons, and we cannot forbear quoting what the writer says (page 11 of preface) of this form as prepared for the pulpit: "I have always felt indignant with those preachers, who, when they resort to the press, seem ashamed of their position, and disguise, under new shapes and names, the materials naturally embodied in sermons. I should as soon think of turning a sonnet into an epistle, a ballad into a review, or a dirge into an obituary. It must be a bad sermon that can be made into a good treatise or even a good 'oration.'"

The second volume, on "Modern Materialism," is a reprint of an admirable address before the author's "College," issued in October, 1874, and noticed in the *NEW ENGLANDER* for April, 1875,—which occupies the first sixty-eight pages; to which are added the author's two papers from the *Contemporary Review*, in defence of his position against attacks from Professor Hall and others. We renew our former testimony. We know where to find, within the same compass, a more able argument for theism, and indeed for a spiritual philosophy as against the infidelity of the day. Unitarian though he is, the author may be acknowledged one of the foremost adroit champions of truth, if not of "the whole truth."

The third,—"Hours of Thought,"—published in England only in autumn, is a series of twenty-five discourses, very similar in practical and devout quality, and their literary excellences, to those in the "Endeavors after the Christian Life." They are marked by a thoughtful and refined spirit, high aspirations, richness and delicacy of imagery, and exquisite grace of expression.

For a single specimen of the author's *curiosa felicitas*, we refer to what he says (page 120 of the first volume) of "the great elements of a nation's mind" as necessary to its growth: these should dry up in any Arctic chill of doubt; or be smothered by any Epicurean rot of indulgence, it would silently wither within the soil, and leave the fairest tree of history, first a sickening foliage and soon with a perished life."

It is unnecessary to say that we miss, even in so excellent a work, some of the distinctive doctrines and cogent motives of Christianity. His subjects and methods, however, in these discourses, are such that, while not concealing his convictions, he does not obtrude his dissent from the standards of orthodoxy; and his reverence and charity, as well as fine culture, in dealing with common truths on which he prefers to dwell, cannot fail to

charm evangelical readers. The first sermon in *Hours of Thought*, on the Tides of the Spirit, will lead the student to a further acquaintance with a mind so gifted and devout.

Even in a literary view we might take exception to an excessive elaboration in Dr. Martineau's style, and sometimes the thought is too subtle and the language too fine for the advantage of most readers, for which reason we are not surprised if, as we have somewhere learned, his congregations were not large while he had a pastoral charge—a fact to which local causes may have contributed also. As a writer, however, he must be generally welcomed, by thoughtful readers, through these sermons and addresses, in defence of great truths and for the maintenance of Christian morals.

SELECTIONS FROM THE THOUGHTS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.*—An elegant little volume that may be carried in one's pocket, and deserving, we need not say, such companionship by reason of its contents. The selections are from Mr. George Long's translation, "with a few verbal changes." Such a Roman emperor as Marcus Aurelius, born A. D. 121, in his unique position, illustrious for every virtue, and the ornament of the Stoic philosophy, will be ever regarded, as he has been, with thoughtful wonder, especially when we think of the degeneracy that had already brought the empire into its "decline," and which even such a sovereign could not arrest,—and of Christianity and the Church, that were then ripening for the ages to come. The time has gone by for any jealous disparagement of so splendid a character among pagans. It is one of the reliefs needed in studying the history of mankind that such men have lived in heathendom, and a blessing that Christians now may read their "thoughts."

THE ANTI-PELAGIAN WORKS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE.† Vol. III.—This is the xvth volume of Augustine's writings which are now in the process of publication in English, Dr. Marcus Dods being the Editor, and the Messrs. Clark the Publishers. The portion of these writings to which the present volume belongs, presents the distinctive principles of the theological system of the great Latin

* *Selections from the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Emperor of Rome.* Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1876. 90 pp.

† *The Anti-Pelagian Works of St. Augustine.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. (New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.) Price \$3.00

ther—those doctrines which give to the epithet “Augustinian” accepted meaning. Here the Pelagian conception of human nature and character, and of the import and operations of the grace of Redemption, are opposed with arguments from Scripture and Christian experience and philosophy, with a genius and a force which have seldom been equaled in polemical theology.

POEMS EARLY AND LATE.—The beauty of Dr. Powers’ conceptions, and the rich and often tender grace of his expressions in verse, will make this little but thoughtful volume very welcome to many who do not know the fine nature that produced it. To those of delicate and fervent sensibility, to those whom the loveliness of nature and the sorrowfulness of life in turn affect deeply, whose in whom thought has been deepened, mellowed, sweetened by wide experience, it will be specially valuable. It utters, with exquisite refinement and truth, much to which true and ripened souls will respond, much that will seem a charming echo of what has passed in the heart. It is a book to be enjoyed by one’s self, rather than to be subject to the coarse test of public elocution, or even to the somewhat uncertain one of social reading. Largely it is a rare domestic book, though there are noble strains in it on great events, and great public interests—peals of the trumpet as well as delicious tones of the harp. Such are the pieces entitled “The New Epoch,” “A Hymn for 1861,” “Memorial Day;” while “A Hymn of the Mothers of the Patriot Soldiers,” and the opening and closing poems,—“Saints,” and “Ecclesia,”—blend somewhat with characters. The tender pathos that springs from spiritual thoughts of death marks many of Dr. Powers’ verses, such as “Fosses,” “A Winter Reverie,” “The Forest Grave,” and “In the Grass,” and most of those between “The Angels’ Bridge,” p. 15, and “Months After,” p. 31, which were evidently prompted by the loss of children. A still subtler strain of thought and sorrow runs through “A Vision,” pp. 58–60. Sometimes the rhythm is very musical, as in “Peevankèe,” and “A Murmur of May.” One or two are defective in this respect, and through irregularity, “The Argosy,” and there are single lines which ought not to mar so fair a book, here and there. For example, the very prosaic one in one of the poems on Bryant,

“A Library free to all the country round,” p. 38,

and

“A silver cascade slides down to the floor,” p. 45,

which should read "Down slides a silver cascade" etc., and

"Th' Errors nursed in Ignorance's dominions," p. 49,

which requires an ictus on the last syllable of "Ignorance," and

"There Love folds on his bloodless breast," p. 64,

where the little word "on" has far too much laid upon it (compare "Where *she* saw," p. 101) and "Each cloud," p. 63, and the two lines,

"Runs to a field of luminous em'rald,

Broidered with more 'long fringe of crimson fire," p. 68.

There are some obvious typographical errors, as on p. 42, "wild sweet nectar," p. 70 "*the* musings sweet," and p. 94 "It is" (*Is it?*). We ought not to notice the blemishes of a book of so much merit, without an instance or two of its beauties:

"From one great oak a mighty vine

Leaps to yon ledge of frosted ferns;

Below, beside a whispering pine,

A maple's scarlet turret burns." p. 115, "Autumn Picture."

"Like silvered raven-down, the dark

Kept floating through the hawthorn lane,

And still the fire-fly's lustrous spark

Fell on the dusk like amber rain." p. 92, "In the Lane."

The pure and reverent religious feeling throughout the book cropping out in exquisite passages of description, is beyond all praise. There are allusions which indicate that the author has resided in the West as well as at the East. He has been a rector of Episcopal churches at Davenport, Iowa, and Chicago, and is now in the ministry of his denomination at Bridgeport, Conn.

THE MEDEA OF EURIPIDES.*—Although profounder students of Greek tragedy recognize in the dramas of Æschylus and Sophocles, a grander, loftier character than can be claimed by those which bear the name of Euripides, so that the latter is always mentioned the last, *et magno intervallo*, in the great trio; yet there are respects in which the younger poet far surpasses his great rivals. The pathetic quality which distinguishes Euripides is wholly wanting in Æschylus and Sophocles, and it is this very pathos, so familiar a motive in all modern literature, which has always made Euripides a favorite. This quality brings him near to our modern

* *The Medea of Euripides, with Notes and an Introduction*; by FREDERIC D. ALLEN, Ph.D., Professor in the University of Cincinnati. Boston: Ginn & Heath. Printed at the Riverside Press. 1877.

indeed, you hardly feel at times, in reading Euripides, as if you have in your hands an ancient writer—while the simplicity of his style makes his tragedies especially suitable to serve as an introduction for the young student to the study of Greek literature in general. Heretofore the only play of Euripides specially prepared for our students has been President Woolsey's *Medea*; hence the appearance, at this time, of the *Medea*, by the consent Euripides' masterpiece, is most timely. Professor H. G. Loomis, the editor, is recognized by all who know him as one of the most competent Greek scholars in the country. His Introduction, and Appendices supply everything which is needed for the study of this great tragedy, and the conciseness and clearness of his work is as commendable as its learning and accuracy. Nowhere is there any evading of difficult passages, and difficulties are clearly stated, and receive, where explanation is possible, a masterly explanation. The mechanical execution of the book calls for special mention. There has been much improvement in our country during the last few years a great improvement in the get-up of classical text-books, and this volume will bear comparison with the best specimens of books of a similar class from the Clarendon Press. We have never seen, in a text-book, a more beautiful printed page.

LAUN'S HISTORY OF FRENCH LITERATURE.*—We have the pleasure at command to give any adequate account of this important work of Mr. Van Laun. We hope to do so at some future time. For the present, we can only transfer to our pages a single paragraph, as an illustration of the graphic and forcible style which characterizes his generalizations on the different periods of French literature. He thus introduces the period of the Renaissance.

fine that you exist upon a platform in space, supported you know not how; that you know not where; that round about you in the firmament of heaven are whirled the sun and moon, the innumerable stars; that somewhere your feet burn the *malebolge* of the wicked, and somewhere above your heads the paradise of the saints.

You have taken all this for granted upon the faith of your father's words; you have seen it confirmed from the pulpit, and in the lecture room; you have found it all in the Bible. You no more think of questioning it than of doubting

History of French Literature. By HENRI VAN LAUN. Vol. I. From its origin to the Renaissance. Vol. II. From the Classical Renaissance until the end of the reign of Louis XIV. New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1877. 8vo. pp. 392.

those other irrefragable facts, that the blood rests in your veins like the wine in a bottle, that the winds blow 'where they list,' without law or explanation, that every weight falls 'downward,' and that to question any of these unquestionable facts would be a grievous offense against the God who made you. And now suppose that you are suddenly made aware, by incontestable proofs and confirmations, that the belief of your life has been false; that from your youth upwards you have been living in gross darkness, and accepting 'a vain thing fondly imagined.' Suppose that a new teacher—a dozen new teachers—arise, who convince you by an altogether novel process of argument, by an appeal to faculties which you had scarcely yet ventured to exercise, and which you now exercise almost against your will, that the world whereon you live is not flat but round; not fixed but moving, and moving with a double motion round an axis, and round a point; moving at a pace which makes you giddy to contemplate it, and which can never be appreciated or illustrated by any process within our mental grasp. Suppose yourself forced to admit that the unquestionableness of these new and stupendous facts is of an entirely different kind from the unquestionableness of your previous faith, no more absolute in its degree, but beyond the reach of uncertainty in its character. Suppose, again, that you are informed of other worlds of men existing on the earth which you had imagined to be parcelled out between yourself and your neighbors; that you speak with travellers who have been there, and who describe to you these new discovered races—their manners, their appearance, their civilizations—and that, in short, you begin to realize how different are the maps of heaven and earth from those which you had been wont to keep before your eyes. And finally, suppose that, contemplating all these, and a score of facts besides, foremost amongst them the discovery of a process by which the copies of a book may be multiplied indefinitely, thus assuring at once the preservation and wider dissemination of sacred and profane knowledge—you are astounded at the grandeur, the richness, the promise of the vista opened before you; you perceive your duty to God, to the Church, to humanity in a new light; you rebel against your former ignorance, and against those to whom you conceive it to have been due. A vast change comes over you, for which you are at a loss to account; but presently the explanation is discovered, you have ceased to be content with deductions from the mind to the senses, but require your mind to interpret your senses. You are no longer before all things a votary of faith, but admit yourself to be a convert of reason.

Enter into the spirit of this contrast between your first and your last condition, perceive the full nature and extent of your advance, and then tell us the result. Is it not a revolution, a reconception, a *renaissance*? In the sixteenth century men found themselves in this predicament."

DANIEL DERONDA.*—The great work which, after the publication of *Middlemarch* it was predicted George Eliot would give to the world within a few years and for which the reading public of two countries waited with a keenness of anticipation second only to the interest excited by the famous "Waverly" novels in their

* *Daniel Deronda*; by GEORGE ELIOT. 2 volumes, 12mo. Cloth, \$3.00. Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square, New York.

y, has, it must be confessed, fallen considerably short of the pes entertained, and defeated the expectations of those who ked to see in it a work of the highest genius.

We cannot but feel that even the most partial critic, and one o judged the novel from what is perhaps the author's own ndpoint, would be forced to acknowledge it a disappointment, least, if not a failure.

Of what consists the design of the work; the *animus*, so to ak, of the whole plot? There is an evident attempt to paint a o of romance round the prosaic head of the modernized Jew, l clothe him with attributes supposed to be the outgrowth of titutions and influences peculiar to the Israelitish race. aracteristics which are presented for our study in the person an idealized watch-maker, with a hacking cough, much given didactic forms of discourse.

so far as our limited experience enables us to judge, the Jew of lay encounters at the hands of his fellow members of society etty much the same sort of treatment as that which meets the linary Christian. In the best Gentile circles, at least, the good l custom of dipping in molten lead the recalcitrant Hebrew, or lling out his nails by the roots, no longer obtains; while even e prejudice of regarding him as one of the forever to-be-damned, e we are inclined to believe, obsolescent if not obsolete. It is, leed, no uncommon thing for him to marry and give in marriage th his Christian friends; so that an attempt to arouse in his half sympathy for an imaginary social ostracism runs a risk of ding in flatness.

As regards our novel, where finally does all our interest and mpathy centre? With Deronda in his projected plan for the rganization of Jewry on a new basis; or with poor neglected wendolen, so childlike in her submissiveness to awakening onscience, so charming for the very faults which at first incline s to detest? As for Deronda—out upon him!—he approaches erilously near to the prig, and when he sets sail with his Mirah e reader's interest in his prospects grows lukewarm and turns ack to linger fondly with the once willful but now neglected eauty, caring but little whether Daniel turns prophet or peddler, artles Jewry or starts a junk-shop.

Gwendolen's selfishness, the feature in her disposition at first so ominently displayed, carries with it all the excuse accorded to petted child's naïve egotism and quite charms one by its inno-

cent naturalness. The portrayal of this ascendant trait of our heroine's youth is simply delicious. We know of one man, who, reading that passage in which the lazy beauty is described as declining to stir from her warm bed to get the medicine for her sick mother, grew enthusiastic over the naturalness of Gwendolen's refusal and fairly exulted in what he termed her "glorious selfishness."

We recollect a book notice, which appeared in the *Nation* a few weeks after the story began to be published in this country, likening the heroine to Rosamond Vincy, one of the famous *Middlemarch* characters. But as the plot was carried out Gwendolen's nature bore far more resemblance to the innocent egotism of Esther, in "Felix Holt," than to the heartless obstinacy of Rosamond. Indeed, between these two the likeness was much more striking, and even under the influences which are made to effect radical changes in their characters the two follow out parallel lines of development. Both Esther and Gwendolen display at first a sort of selfishness coming from no inherent meanness of disposition, but arising more from force of circumstances. Always yielded to and provided for, they have become used to thinking for none but themselves, and the world of their maiden thoughts and aspirations grows more and more warped and self-centering till the mighty love for a stronger, nobler, but perhaps not potentially better nature than theirs, has shattered this wall of selfishness and given rise to motives and aspirations the very existence of which they never dreamed of while yet the nobler instincts lay dormant.

Of these two Gwendolen appears at the last the more charming, perhaps for the very reason that at first we see this egotism to predominate to such a degree that the change, when the spirit of thoughtfulness for others comes over her, is the more captivating and complete. Nor, indeed, is she wholly to blame for having fallen into this habit of thinking solely for herself. The attendant circumstances of her position as the only brilliant and attractive one of a family of unattractive daughters has naturally induced this result. "Always she was the princess in exile, who in time of famine was to have her breakfast-roll made of the finest bolted flour from the seven thin ears of wheat, and in a general decampment was to have her silver fork kept out of the baggage." And this active though thoughtless selfishness is apparently what our heroine most prides herself on. If people are miserable it is she who ought to complain of the sombre reflections which their

does cast upon the wonted cheerfulness of her spirit. "Now, mamma!", she says to Mrs. Davilow, when the latter begins to show signs of a relapse into that depression which was so distasteful to her daughter, "Don't begin to be melancholy here. It spoils all my pleasure." If she can manage to neutralize the effects of this lugubriousness on their part by a laugh at their misfortunes, so much the better, for this she counts as a noteworthy and estimable characteristic of her disposition, "valuing herself on her superior freedom in laughing when others might only see matter for seriousness."

Her girlish notion of happiness, too, which conveyed to her mind the idea of a purely personal preëminence, however complete its truth to nature, never sinks to the commonplace. All her coquetry however daring is always lofty. There are no sentimental day-dreams of a love-sick or romantic maid in her; on the contrary, this very coquetry, though scarcely harmless, is always imbued with a queenly graciousness which couples well with her amazonian aversion to anything like love making. And exactly here is shown Mrs. Lewes's originality of conception. For quietude as she seems there is about as much difference between Wendolen and an ordinary belle as can easily be imagined.

That ready acquiescence with which she has been accustomed to meet has bred in her a desire for homage only of the most respectful and graceful sort; wherein lay Grandcourt's chief personal attraction for her.

This Henleigh Grandcourt, by the way, is to our mind the most original in conception and artistic in execution of all the characters in the drama. Cold, calm and dignified; well bred, and detesting a *faux pas* as a crime, Chesterfield himself would have seemed clothed with the finikin graces of a dancing master, compared with this pale-handed Grandcourt in whom the national antipathy to being "bored" has developed an insolence all the more galling for its never offering a handle for reproach. A sort of one-sided development, the direct antithesis of that "honest or well-intended halfness" which Emerson calls the essence of humor, as exercised to an abnormal extent one set of his faculties, and so paralyzed the growth of others as to leave him utterly destitute of anything like moral perception while possessed of a power of physical observation "which could be surpassed by no sleep-eyed animal on the watch for prey."

So admirably, in the portrayal of his character, is the distinction

drawn between this wonderful acuteness of perception and his moral obtuseness, that while thoroughly detesting him for the latter trait, the reader is surprised to find himself stirred by an undoubted feeling of admiration for this power of silent observation which Grandcourt, in spite of his outward semblance of lassitude, and in strange contrast with his seeming indifference, is everywhere exerting. Henleigh Malingier Grandcourt, in short, is a character the study of which would be infinitely instructive to the English lady novelists of the Mrs. Alexander type with their insatiable itching for ennuied heroes with languid, or, as we believe they call it, "*trainant*" voices.

In spite, however, of the wonderful skill shown in the delineation of this character and that of the eccentric musician Klesmer, the work is, to our mind, inferior as a whole to at least three of its predecessors. As a story it lacks the interest and sweetness of *The Mill on the Floss*, while as a work of art, we are inclined to believe that most critics would pronounce it inferior to either *Romola* or *Middlemarch*, in both of which George Eliot reaches her height in the exercise of that capacity for searching analysis which is the most striking feature of her genius.

In "Daniel Deronda," her favorite method of introducing a chapter by an intricate sort of word-puzzle is practiced to excess. Take for example the heading to the first book commencing, "Man can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning—," which, instead of affording a clue to what is to follow, gives to the uninitiated the confused idea of a paraphrased quotation. Moreover her great power of analyzation seems to have been employed in this work to such an extent that the mind of the average reader, at least, is likely to weary of the incessant examination of motive-play which he is called upon to follow in the study of each of the prominent characters of the plot. Take, for instance, the delineation of Mordecai's aspirations, or the searching self-scrutiny which Deronda forces himself to undergo before venturing to yield to an apparently natural desire to accord Gwendolen the advice she asks for.

In almost all the scenes between these two the reader is apt to grow bewildered in an attempt to calculate the relative force of a multiplicity of influences which seem to be at work in the mind of each; so that one is apt to conclude that it will be impossible for Deronda to raise his hat without going into an interminable ratiocination to satisfy himself as to the propriety of the impulses which result in this apparently insignificant act.

is, then, upon the strength of her other works, we think, that George Eliot's name will go down to posterity as a great writer of fiction. For "Daniel Deronda," while it cannot be said to finish her reputation, will hardly be able to add anything to distinction she has already won of being the greatest living novelist of the day.

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXL.

JULY, 1877.

ARTICLE I.—RELATION OF THE STUDENT-LIFE TO
HEALTH AND LONGEVITY.

It is certainly a popular notion, if not an error, that study is not conducive to health and longevity.

This notion prevails no doubt because very often ambitious young men or women abuse themselves by over-study, and are either blighted, or blotted out of existence; and then a profound impression falls upon the community, and the unfair inference is made that the normal and ordinary mental work is the dangerous element. And the fact that the teacher and the clergyman, the typical scholars of the past, are so generally out of active service before they become old, leads to the hasty generalization that brain work does not allow men to live to old age.

But in this day of accurate analysis, when the results of social and moral as well as physical science must be arrived at by the tests of facts and figures, this method of research shows that hard and normal brain-work as much promotes bodily health and long life as do the other more generally accepted factors of health.

The design of this paper is to show not only that intellectual labor is favorable to good health and a long life in a general way, but that the greatest thinkers generally lead the longest lives. Some of the reasons why this fact is true, will be noticed.

"A paper was read several years ago before the members of a society in London, in which the author maintained that mental labor was never injurious to a perfectly healthy organization, and that the numerous cases of break-down which are commonly attributed to excessive brain-work, are due, in reality, to the previous operation of disease."

When a child is born among us we know not how many will be the days and years of *its* life. But when we group together a large number of births we are able to say what will be the probable duration of their lives, if born at the same stated period. Thus, for the year 1875, in Massachusetts, this period was 30 (29.81) years. For the whole United States during the decennial period ending with 1870 the probability of life from birth was 39.25 years. In England the expectation of life from birth is nearly 41 (40.86) years; and in Sweden it is 43 years.

These statements, however, apply mostly to the early period of life; to that time when the multitudinous perils of infancy, helplessness, inexperience, and disease have full sway; to that portion of existence when one half of the race pass away. For at this period the wants of the individual are purely vegetative; to eat, sleep, develop, and mature the physical powers, are the occupations of childhood and youth. Mental labor hence should not come in prominently as a factor in the problem under discussion at *this stage*; but we should rather find out the length of life *after* this vegetative period; we should seek to know the length of life as affected by various causes *after* the physical condition has been essentially established.

A somewhat general idea pervades the community that *after* a person has lived twenty years, the chances are that he will live to be fifty years old.

Dr. William Farr says, in 1876: "The mean lifetime in the healthiest districts of England, and in the healthiest ranks, is forty-nine years; and we have no evidence that under the most favorable conditions it exceeds fifty years."

In the State of Massachusetts for thirty years past a careful record has been kept of the length of life of the different occupations; of the ages at which all the members of these occupations died, and it is found that this age was nearly fifty-one (50.81) years. Of these occupations the farmer lived decidedly the longest. He who in the ordinary pursuit of his occupation is nearest to a complete obedience of the laws of nature: who is much in the open air, eats plain and well-cooked food, is not exposed to the dangers of machinery, travel, intemperance from alcohol and tobacco, and the undue calls upon his nerve-force; he it is who certainly ought to have the blessings of a long and healthy life. He it is of whom the poet says: "*Optumatos nimium, sua si bona noruit agricolas.*"

The next occupation in length of life is that of "active mechanics abroad," that limited class of civil engineers, machinists, who set up and place in order and exhibition the most perfect kinds of machinery; who are the superior minds among machinists and artificers, and are not greatly occupied in manual labor; who travel considerably; enjoy the benefits and luxuries of a change of scene and life, are well fed and in such positions as to be able well to take care of themselves. Their average years of life were fifty-two (52.49).

The third occupation, and that very near in longevity to the one just mentioned, is the professional, embracing the clergyman, lawyer, physician, editor, and teacher. The number of years of life given to this occupation is nearly fifty-one (50.93).

Thus out of the ten occupations as classified by the Massachusetts authorities, we find the brain worker to stand only the third in the list, and with the exception of the "cultivators of the earth," standing within about two per cent. of the second class in long life.

Dr. Amariah Brigham, in the year 1833, gathered together the ages at death of 327 of the most distinguished literary men who had then lived, and found their average age to be a little more than 57 (57.35) years. Dr. S. M. Beard, in 1873, forty years later, gathered a similar list numbering 500 and found the age increased to sixty-four (64.28) years, almost to that of the New England farmer. In Madden's *Infirmities of Genius*, the names of 246 illustrious persons are given who at their

death gave an average of sixty-six years. Dr. Toner has that 2,000 physicians in the United States gave an average length of life of 58.39 years. 850 members of the Massachusetts Medical Society averaged 58.50 years at death.

Dr. Beard says: "The average age of lawyers in Massachusetts was found to be 56.11 years; in Rhode Island they do not stand so high on the list as clergymen, as they are healthier as well as longer-lived than most mechanics and laborers."

Dr. B. W. Richardson says of the legal profession: "In the branches of their profession they attain more than the ordinary share of life." And of the clerical profession: "As the clergymen generally are from the first provided for, poorly enough, yet with sufficient to meet their simple necessities, as the temperately, have few temptations for ambition and display, and have no urgent reasons for breaking their rest, they continue long-lived, and remain at their avocations often to the end of their days."

Dr. Tuttle, President of Wabash College, collated the death of 2,442 clergymen of different denominations, and set the average age to be "a little over 61 years." He also set the ages of 408 individuals, who died above twenty-one years of age and were not clergymen, to be a little over fifty years.

Dr. Quint says the average age of Congregational ministers of Massachusetts for twenty consecutive ('54 to '74) years has been sixty-two years, six months, and twenty-two days. Congregational ministers who died in Massachusetts in 1874 were sixty-nine years old, on the average.

Dr. Beard says: "Of 417 clergymen whose names are recorded in Allen's *Biographical Dictionary*, their average age was 65.70, and of these thirteen lived to be over 90. Of 840 clerical graduates of Harvard College the average was 68.62 years. From statistics gathered at the same time and place as above, it appears that mechanics and laborers of all classes die before they are fifty, while those engaged in printing, painting, and those who labor in unnatural positions, in over-heated rooms, do not attain an average of fifty-five. A vast difference surely, and one that can be explained.

on no theory but that of the preëminent healthfulness of intellectual toil."

Dr. Guy, an English writer, says, "Men in the learned professions seem to have a longer lease of life than tradesmen and laborers: the medical man living 74.50 years, the clergyman living 70.25, lawyers and judges 67.00.

The investigations of a Berlin physician give an average life of clergymen sixty-five years, merchants sixty-two, clerks and farmers sixty-one, military men fifty-nine, lawyers fifty-eight, artists fifty-seven, and medical men fifty-six.

The *Art of prolonging Life*, written nearly a century ago, says: "An extraordinary number of instances (of longevity) may be found among the hermits and monks;" also deep thinking philosophers have at all times been distinguished by their great age, especially when their philosophy was occupied in the study of nature. Even in modern times philosophers seem to have obtained this preëminence and the deepest thinkers appear in that respect to have enjoyed in a higher degree the fruits of their mental tranquillity."

A few years ago, Dr. Guy, of London, ascertained the age at death of 9,500 Englishmen above fifteen years of age, and their employments. These he grouped together in ten-year periods, and found that the largest number of tradesmen died in the ten year periods of forty to fifty, and fifty to sixty, while the group of professional people did not show the largest number of deaths until the ten-year periods of sixty to seventy, and seventy to eighty, thus giving greater longevity to the classes that used the brain more and the body less.

A similar table of Dr. Guy compares the ages of these three classes, professional men (59·81) sixty years, tradesmen (48·84) forty-nine years, and the artisan (48·06) forty-eight years.

Dr. B. W. Richardson says: "The diseases which affect the professional classes vary rather in degree than in character, and are exceedingly limited; for when the labor of the brain is carried on with evenness, and order, and generalization, brain work is healthy work. The brain is the most enduring of organs; the organ that admits of the most change; the organ that requires the most change; the organ that can rest in its jaded parts and work in parts that are not jaded at one and the

same time. Mental work, and even hard mental work, is therefore conducive to health, of life, and length of days."

Speaking of the "higher class men of letters," he says: "The labor they follow never need be injurious to the physical organism, and the length of life that has favored some of the most laborious original writers and thinkers, is proof direct that danger does not of itself lie in the work."

"I have come to the conclusion," says Hamerton, "that literary work acts simply as a strong stimulant. In moderate quantities it is not only innocent, but decidedly beneficial; in excess it acts like poison on the nervous system. What constitutes excess, every man has to find out by his own experience."

A comparison of the time lost from work on account of sickness by the community at large, and by the students of Amherst college, illustrates this subject. Dr. Jarvis says, that in Europe among the ages and classes of working people, each individual annually loses nineteen to twenty days by sickness. The Massachusetts Board of Health state that within its commonwealth for the year 1872 each productive person lost thirteen days by sickness. To the student of Amherst College for the past fifteen years, during term time, the average loss of time on account of sickness to each man has been less than three days, (2·60). And if we add the vacations, calling them one-fourth of the year, and average the amount of time over the whole year, we shall then have for the Amherst student less than (3·50) days of sickness, to contrast with his English brothers of nineteen days, and his fellow citizen of thirteen days.

Let us now consider some of the causes affecting the health of the scholar. It is one of the axioms in Hygiene that the whole body and every organ in it must be put to its *normal, harmonious, and legitimate use*. If any organ is not given its proper use it diminishes in size and power, of course does not properly perform its functions, and hence disturbs the harmony of function in the whole body and renders it somewhere liable to disease. And if any portions are overworked, the blood and nerve force needlessly expended deprive other portions of their normal supply, and disease will probably be the result. Man's brain weighs forty-nine and one-half ounces, and receives from one-fifth to one-eighth of all the blood in the body in the course

ulation. Hence we can easily believe that disturbance of circulation of the brain must create disorder somewhere in the organism. A few serious accidents have from time to time happened to men, where a portion of the skull has been opened and the more apparent actions of the brain could be observed by an observer. In these cases it was found that during mental inactivity the brain did not receive so large a supply of blood as when in the waking or active state. On the other hand during emotional or mental excitement the brain seemed engorged with blood, and tended to protrude from the bony orifice. Again the headaches aggravated by mental or mental exertion show us that an excess of blood in the brain produces pain, one of the symptoms of disease, just as a swelling, throbbing felon, or boil, shows the same thing. A blow on the other side is in a severe blow upon the body, a bodily fall or bruise, which so affects the heart that an abundant supply of blood is furnished to the nerve centers, and causes fainting, or unconsciousness of the brain. A hemorrhage of blood from an open wound shows the same thing. This physiological fact then seems perfectly plain that every part of the body must have its proper amount of blood, that the work in every organ will give this supply, and without this we all expect a general or partial disturbance in the body. Hence we are compelled to believe that the brain is the organ which controls, and, though we may not be able to prove it. So that when we think or study we call for the proper supply of blood to the brain, since thought is the function, or, as some would say, the action of the brain. If the blood is thus normally supplied then we may expect better thinking, and better bodily health than if blood goes elsewhere than to the

brain. Kindred thought is better expressed by another, who says, "Functional activity within limits tends to the vigor and preservation of an organ, and of the body to which the organ belongs." Dr. Farr of England in speaking of occupation and the health of his country people, says, "All would be better if the higher parts of the brain had their due activity. The point then to be made here, is, that vigour is healthful because it gives a full supply of blood

to the brain, and hence a generous activity to this most important organ.

The *temperament* of the scholar tends to health and longevity. No matter of what temperament a person may be born, there is no question that habits of study tend to develop what must be termed—for want of a better name—nervous tendencies in the individual. For however prudent and careful of general health the student may be, the predominating use of the brain must have a tendency to increase the functional activity of all the nerve organs. And are not the ideals of the poet, painter, and sculptor molded in the nervous phase of organization when he wishes to represent the higher intellectual, or the spiritual type of human or divine nature? And are not our living scholars, literary men, and thinkers generally, of a nervous caste of temperament, or at least blended with the sanguine? Should however the nervous habit preponderate in the scholar, are not the sanguine and phlegmatic colorings of character equally valuable to certainly the normal man?

To persons mainly employed in the out door and muscular work of life, the vegetative force must somewhat exceed the nervous and spiritual. He who breathes the most and fastest, who sweats the most, whose muscles are renewed the oftenest, must have more nourishing food, air, and water, than he who with the body more at rest uses up the delicate tissues and organs at rapid rates. To the thinker a preponderance of brain tissues, or function at least, is as much to be expected, as are condensed and trained muscles of the athlete and strong laboring man.

The arrangement of man's diseases is in general that of five classes; first, the *Zymotic*, those induced by a poisonous influence from without; second, the *Constitutional*, those dependent upon imperfect physical organization; third, the *Local*, the result of disease affecting one or more organs; fourth, the *Developmental*, and fifth, the *Violent*.

In Massachusetts for the past thirty-two years, the first class, including the fevers, scarlatina, small pox, diphtheria, dysentery, cholera and similar diseases has destroyed more than twenty-eight (28 27) per cent of the population. The second class including rheumatism, dropsy, cancer, syphilis, scrofula, and

lung consumption, has removed nearly twenty-eight (27·39) per cent, while the third class including diseases of the heart and lungs as well as of the nervous system claims not quite twenty-four (23·80) per cent. Or if we group together our diseases a little differently, we find that the miasmatic, which includes the most common inflammatory and acute diseases, has during this same period carried off nearly twenty-eight (27·75) per cent, while diseases of the strictly nervous system have taken but nine (8·69) per cent of the population.

By the last United States census we find that during the year 1870, 492,263 persons died. And while 188,684, or forty per cent of these were taken away by the zymotic and constitutional diseases, only 60,455 or twelve per cent were removed by nervous diseases.

The point then to be made from this heavy array of facts and figures, is, that even if brain work does tend to produce more highly colored phases of the nervous temperament, yet the diseases which follow this temperament in the adult period of life carry off but a small part of the population. It is also a fact that diseases, like plants, can only thrive on their own peculiar soil. The thin wiry person of skin and bone, is not likely to die of apoplexy; and the beef-eating, beer-guzzling loafer need have no fear of wasting lung consumption. It is one of the compensations of nature, that while marked temperaments are afflicted with their peculiar diseases they are generally sure not to be harrassed with those peculiar to diverse temperaments. Nervous invalids escape plague, pestilence, and fevers, which would kill at first contact a full fed, robust, and hearty man. So that while a scholar's life may render him more susceptible to the rare forms of diseases of a nervous nature, this same life is almost an assurance against the more common, inflammatory, and apparently powerful destroyers of human life. "Strength is often weakness, and weakness becomes strength; we are saved through debility."

Scholars live more in accordance with hygienic and sanitary laws than do other people. The common usages and requirements of society place them in use of better food, give them warmer houses and better ventilated, keep them from unhealthy and poisonous exhalations, and afford them a relaxation, vaca-

tion, and variety in life, both mental and physical, which greatly tends to insure their health. To tradespeople, mechanics, farmers, and workers generally, there is a greater monotony and tedium of daily work than to the scholar. The proportion of these who are ill fed, poorly clothed, improperly housed, exposed to vice, passion, and intemperance, is far greater than those who at the office or study table commune with the best work of the minds of all ages of the world. The scholar does not live in a crowd, and thus become exposed to accidents and temptations; he is much by himself; he is led to more calm reflections and to a better self-preservation.

And whether it seems invidious or no, society most certainly does regard the literary man—the scholar—with more tenderness, more desire to keep him aloof from the rough usage of the world, than it does her other classes. Every body does seem to care for the so-called educated persons, be they men or women; very much as the hive of bees treat their queen, or as civilized man everywhere carefully provides for and attends to woman. The world will hold an umbrella over a scholar, when it says to every body else hold your own. Dr. Farr says, "The clergy lead a comfortable, domestic, moral, and temperate life, in healthy parsonages, and their lives are good in the insurance sense."

The scholar has a better chance of long life because he has a larger liberty. After the rudimentary work of education is over, when school and college bells and rules can be ignored, the scholar has a great control over the time, place, and manner of his work. His hardest work may be done when and where he will. If not in the mood for work to-day, he can do more when he is in the mood for it. If sickness or social duties claim him now, he can supplement this work when health and friends do not demand. The scholar can economise his time, employ his resources, make his demands on others with a far greater degree of freedom, than can the man who is cramped within the hours, methods, and etiquette of business, and common toil. Hence the great relief from worry, waiting the movements of others, the red tape and restrictions that ever hinder the muscle worker. Scholars when fairly embarked in the business of life, need not so much mental urging to their

work, as does the man who follows the factory bell, or the rain and sunshine of seed time and harvest. And while without doubt man is by nature a lazy animal, and ever needs a healthy stimulus for his work, yet the effect of this upon his physical and mental health is far different from the goad, the lash, the anxious beating, the need of shelter, food, and warmth which the laboring man must have and only have by doing, unsympathetic, and often unsatisfactory work.

Another reason why scholars are longer lived and in better health than other people, is, that they have a *better proportion controlling religious faith*. By this is not meant that they all agree upon the form and doctrines of saving faith; far from it, no class differs more from the true standard. But the most highly educated people are those who in large measure have no settled form of belief. Who if not in full accord and communion with some prescribed church form, have a settledness of religious opinion and belief that gives them great stability, calmness, and peace of mind upon this all important topic. We can hardly find a daily paper which does not tell us of one or more poor mortals who are insane, or have committed suicide because of troubles concerning property, friends, prospects or hopes about the common events of life. And our insane asylums make a sad showing in the same direction. In their words men and women are often worried to death because they do not possess the sound mind in the sound body; because they have not the all potent controlling religious faith!

But the scholar, the person who knows how to study causes and effects; to reflect on the past, to freshen his daily experience with facts, has a safe-guard in this respect which may be wanting in him who has employed life for the most part in muscular, machine work. And the true student, who draws deeply from the fundamental source of knowledge, who fills his cup from the divine fountain, has a support and an assurance which should never fail him though everything but God seems to hide their faces from him.

The classes of people among whom *insanity most prevails* illustrates this subject. In the Northampton Lunatic Hospital Massachusetts, of five hundred and seventy-two men who were patients, but forty-six were classified as "literary" in

their occupations, while the "farmers" were one hundred and twenty six, and the "laborers" were one hundred and t

Dr. Jarvis says: "Education causes but little insanity. table of one thousand seven hundred and forty-one cases, causes are given, from sixteen hospitals, only two hundred five are from excess of study, two hundred and six from struggles and anxiety, and sixty-one from excitement; thousand one hundred and thirty four were from business and disappointments. For if we understand the generally approved theory of insanity, we can see from the statistics just made, that the normal student is less liable to insanity than are most other occupations in life. We have so meager an idea of what mind—or spirit—is, that we do not know how it can be disordered, diseased, or impaired in itself."

"Reason cannot be unreason," says Dr. Hickok. The mind, however, through which alone the mind must act, may be disordered, that mental action will be distorted, imperfect, irregular. But how the spiritual element, about the nature of which we know absolutely nothing, can be diseased, it is impossible to form any conception.

Water may hold in suspension or solution impurities and foreign substances. But the filter and chemical reagents remove these without in the least affecting the water. The mind—for the most part the director and source of power in the body—may be seriously disturbed in its action by the disease or disarrangement of a single organ in the body, and yet when hygiene and medicine shall have restored this organ to its healthy state, the mind clear and unclouded will hold it again. And the scholar, who of all men can the best understand the laws of the healthy body, and has at his command the ready means to keep his bodily health perfect, who by his temperament least liable to common and sweeping diseases, who possesses the greatest liberty of men, who holds the guiding element within him of a religious faith, he is the one who certainly never should fear or allow within himself the potential elements of that great scourge of modern civilization.

ARTICLE II.—BIBLE HYGIENE.

THE advantages and general superiority of preventive over curative measures in disease, and the now generally acknowledged importance of the science and art of Hygiene, doubtless destined to be the main element in the medicine of the future, impel us to examine the philosophy of health preservation from every point of view and to seek for sanitary information from every available source.

The Old and New Testaments may appear a strange source from which to seek for information of this kind; a curious mine from which to dig for health hints. Still there is no apparent reason why this wonderful compendium, in which so many kinds of knowledge are incidentally imparted, should not also contain medical instruction. Nay, more, if the Bible is of divine origin, is not this revelation the most natural authority to which we could resort, and the likeliest to contain sanitary laws for the body as well as for the soul?

Investigation shows that the Bible does contain matter of this nature, and that its hygienic maxims are not only numerous and varied, but also accurate and profound. They are not crowded into one chapter or even book, but are scattered all over both testaments, generally in the form of pithy sentences imbedded in other matters, like precious gems in a setting of gold. Almost every one of the sixty-six books contains something of this nature, couched either in the form of a direct hint, or an indirect warning or promise which may be turned to practical account, and made of hygienic value. In some places they are numerous, especially in the Pentateuch, which contains the general and special laws promulgated by Moses for the guidance of the Israelites in their wanderings in the wilderness. And they embrace suggestions not only for individual or *private* hygiene, but also for the wider and more important subject of *public* sanitation. So that, though apt to be overlooked or slighted, as they have long been, amid the mass of general information which everywhere crowds the

pages of the Bible, in a collected form they constitute a code of health laws which claim our best attention, as being not only the most ancient but also the most complete that can anywhere be found, even in modern times, and that has no parallel in the sayings and writings of any of the great sages and teachers of antiquity.

The great minuteness with which the subject is treated, the strong language in which the health-hints are couched, the strictness with which they were enforced, and the rarity of rules for the *cure* of disease as compared with those given for its prevention; all prove how much more important *hygienic* were considered by Moses than *therapeutic* measures.

The Bible makes many valuable remarks regarding the most important objects of individual or *personal* hygiene. Thus hints are found respecting the food, drink, and air we consume, as well as about clothing, rest, exercise, cleanliness, mental, moral, and spiritual culture; and in fact, almost every subject embraced under the title of hygiene. And so ample are these, that out of them a complete hygienic decalogue might be constructed. Health depends largely on the care with which these several indications are followed in private life, and therefore the value of the scriptural maxims can scarcely be overestimated.

But it is chiefly to the *public* hygiene of the Bible that we wish meanwhile to call attention, because it illustrates more completely than do the hints regarding personal hygiene now spoken of, how far-seeing and complete the medical science of the Scriptures are. Private individuals can usually control matters that influence their own hygiene. But it not unfrequently happens that they are powerless regarding those of the community to which they belong. For example, a citizen can regulate his own food and drink, the ventilation and cleanliness of his house or room; but not so easily, if at all, those of the community in which he dwells. This is a matter of importance, for while a mistake or omission in private hygiene involves the health of one individual, a blunder or negligence in public sanitation may implicate the health and life of thousands; nay, in extreme cases those of nations. Public sanitation therefore is as important and as necessary for the

welfare of the masses, as private hygiene is for that of individuals; and is a matter of comfort or misery, health or sickness, in every community and country. And experience proves what theory suggests, that the highest standard of health is attained under that public hygiene which is most carefully regulated.

The effects of a defective public hygiene vary according to the matter in fault. Thus, for instance, the health and strength of a whole community, or even an entire nation have deteriorated under scanty or improper food, or a lax morality. The inhabitants of an entire village, town or city, may be slowly poisoned, and become sallow, emaciated, weak, and on the orderland of disease, by defective drainage, badly ventilated dwellings, and so forth. And, just as by persistent want of cleanliness of the person, clothing, or household, the seeds of some of those loathsome infectious diseases,—small-pox, scarlatina, typhus, and so forth, may thereby find a suitable soil in which to become developed in a family; so these very ailments may spread over an entire community by imperfect public sanitation and a careless quarantine.

The most numerous and important sanitary rules given the Israelites by Moses, were mainly of the public kind. A brief summary will show how cogent and comprehensive these are. Those regarding disinfection—disease-prevention—and cleanliness are detailed with marked emphasis and minuteness, mainly because of their importance in the prevention and restriction of the infectious and contagious diseases now spoken of, some of which afflicted them as others still trouble us. A very large proportion of the sickness and mortality which has occurred among mankind from the earliest ages to the present day, has arisen from disease of this kind. And hence the best means of preventing them or staying their progress, was and still is a matter of the greatest moment.

The nature of these specific diseases has not yet been positively ascertained. They are supposed to arise either from inconceivably minute particles of septic, that is, decaying animal or vegetable matter, or more probably of living animal or vegetable embryos which are carried about in the air we breathe or the water we drink, till they find a suitable person

in whom to settle and develop indefinitely. One great measure, therefore, when a contagious or infectious disease arises amidst, is evidently to prevent the air or the water vicinity from being contaminated by its germs. Or, if impossible, to lessen or altogether destroy the contagion which either or both of these have been charged, and prevent its spread to other individuals. The former is evidently the more important aim, and often the most accomplished.

The most prominent hygienic rules of the Bible are of this class, and were devised to prevent or limit the chief disease which the Scriptures speak of, namely, leprosy, sometimes called the plague; a peculiar and as some think a distinct skin disease to which the Israelites of that day appear to have been especially liable. The disease was very contagious and transmissible from person to person by touch, garments, wood, and other things. It is not known what originated it, but cases were continually occurring, and if not checked, they would soon have overrun the camp and become unmanageable.

This leprosy was of several kinds; namely, that of the skin, of garments, and of houses. The nature and phenomena of garment and house leprosy are not only unknown, but are unintelligible at the present day; proving that this, like other diseases of ancient times, has become extinct. Several varieties of human leprosy or *Berat* are mentioned in the Bible, namely, *Boak*, which did not render the afflicted person unclean; *Berat Lebena*, or bright white Berat; and *Berat Oecha*, or Berat, spreading in the skin. Of these only the second and third were what Moses calls *Isorat*, that is, venomous or contagious; and of these again, one is at first undistinguishable from a harmless eruption.

Strict rules were laid down in the Pentateuch for its treatment, both when the disease was doubtful, and when it was to be real leprosy. Frequent and careful inspection was necessary when it prevailed. If suspected, the patient was to be brought before the High Priest or Priest, whose intelligence and observation decided whether the case was one of true leprosy or not. If this was doubtful, the patient was put in quarantine outside the camp for seven days. And then, if the disease was not

leprosy he was discharged, after washing—that is, purifying—himself and his clothes.

But if the disease proved to be true leprosy, his isolation was continued for other seven days, and so on, alternated with weekly inspections, till the disease was cured. This law of separation was strict. Even Miriam and King Uzziah were not exempt. Leprous Priests were also forbidden, under penalty of being cut off from God's presence, to minister in holy things, or to eat the show-bread, or to sacrifice; and were deemed unclean like other Israelites. The rule that made everything which a leper touched unclean, and subject to similar treatment; and so in turn everything and person which these touched, made the company of an infected individual doubly undesirable, and his isolation all the more necessary, and likely to be strictly enforced by the people.

To still further lessen the chance of fresh infection, the leper's clothing, and also other garments which had become leprosy, and likewise to be inspected by the priest and put in quarantine, unless decidedly infected, in which case they had to be burnt. Leprosy and house leprosy were evidently contagious and communicable to the human body. Otherwise, rules for crushing out the disease would have been unnecessary. When the matter was discovered, the house had to be inspected and shut up for seven days, at the end of which period leprosy stones and mortar had to be replaced by fresh material. If the edifice was considered incurably leprosy, the entire structure had to be broken down and the stones, timber, and mortar, carried into an unclean place out of the city. Even those who slept or ate in, or helped to clean a leprosy house were deemed unclean and put for a time in quarantine. For still greater security, the cured person, after release from quarantine and reinspection by the priest, was not allowed to enter the camp till after he had washed his clothes and body, and shaved his hair. On the seventh day he had again to shave his head, beard, and eyebrows, and wash his body and clothing. After these processes of purification and disinfection he was considered clean, and might enter his tent. No violation or evasion of this law before again mixing with his fellow creatures was permitted.

Again, to still further lessen the chance of the spread of con-

tagion, the dead bodies of lepers were buried apart from the living. Even leprous kings, like Uzziah, were not permitted to be buried in the royal sepulchres.

Regarded as a whole, these health laws, framed for the purpose of extinguishing or at least restricting the scourge of leprosy, are most complete, and included, first, perfect isolation of the sick person as well as his clothing, bedding, dwellings, and all belonging to him, from his family, friends, and the general public, until the disease had disappeared; second, thorough purification of the infected individual before re-entering the camp, and even then a second minor quarantine of several days; and third, disinfection by washing and otherwise purifying his infected clothes and dwelling before again making use of them, and if necessary the destruction of the former.

A more complete or effective method of separation from the healthy community, of infected persons and things, and every person and article which became infected by contact with the proximity to these, could not be devised to prevent the spread of contagion. Modern hygiene may in some minor respects be more theoretically perfect, but certainly it is not practically in advance of this ancient Israelitish code, primitive in time but not in principle. And if our present systems of quarantine by land and sea, and of isolation of infected or suspected persons, and of purification or destruction of their clothing, effects, dwellings, and so forth, were as perfect as this; the infectious and contagious class of diseases that so often decimate communities at the present day, would soon be completely *stamped out*. For example, every case of small-pox were at once and thoroughly isolated, and kept thus till all chance of infection had passed away, while the clothes, bedding, effects, dwelling, and the room were also efficiently washed, cleansed, disinfected, and if necessary destroyed by fire, the disease would have no chance of spreading, and thus would soon disappear, or at least become so rare as to be a curiosity. And so with scarlatina, measles, and other epidemic diseases.

The equally minute and stringent rules laid down in the Pentateuch to ensure cleanliness of the Israelitish camps, and subsequently of their cities, a matter of first importance for the prevention or diminution of leprosy and other contagious

cases, are equally comprehensive and judicious. Dirt was not allowed to accumulate in their tents, but was deposited well *beyond the camp*, and there decomposed and *destroyed* by being covered with earth, one of the best of disinfectants and deodorants. So also after making burnt offerings, the Priests had to put off their official garments, put on others, and then carry the ashes of the sacrifice and also the unburnt flesh, hide, and refuse of the animal outside the camp, and there *burn* them. No surer method could have been devised to effect the main objects in view, namely, the prevention of air-pollution and the spread of disease thereby, than the immediate and complete removal and destruction of offensive matter of this kind.

The high standard of health attained by the Israelites in the wilderness was doubtless in great measure due to their admirable public hygiene. Were our modern systems as perfect and as strictly enforced, a similar comparative immunity from disease would necessarily be enjoyed by ourselves. Hygienic science, after emerging from the dark ages, has not yet advanced to the high perfection it had attained in the days of Moses. Compared with that of modern times, the completeness and efficiency of the Hebrew Code are remarkable. Had a physician of the last century planned a sanitary code like this, so simple yet ample, far-seeing, and efficacious, he would have been immortalized and deemed a leader of men, a giant intellect far in advance of his age. What therefore is to be thought of Moses, who dictated such masterly laws in a profession to which he did not belong, more than three thousand years ago, when the rudimentary science of Egypt, doubtless the cradle of medicine and the source from whence the Jews, Greeks, Romans and other early nations derived their knowledge, was founded on incantations and astrology, the body being divided into thirty-six parts, each of which was entrusted to a demon whose aid it was the duty of the physician to invoke?

Surrounded by, and therefore apt to be imbued with theories so absurd and a practice so illogical and uncertain as those which then prevailed; whence did this pioneer Hygiest derive the acumen or procure the information to devise a sanitary

system so practical, complete, and not only so much in advance of the medical science of that early period, but even in respects so superior to that of modern times, that the light from this lofty beacon coming from the midst of the comparative darkness of the past, illuminates and helps to confirm and even promote the knowledge of the present; so that modern *savants* may still sit with advantage at the feet of Moses and learn not only the great base facts, but even many of the details of the art and science which they study? How is the advanced thinking of the great Jewish lawgiver to be accounted for? Was it of human or divine origin?

We shall not enter for the present into this question. It is certainly, leaving other sciences to look after themselves, cannot be denied that in this instance at least, Scripture and science harmonize; that recent research, instead of refuting, only establishes the medical philosophy of the Bible; and that our modern is materially indebted to the ancient hygiene of the Israelites, seeing that both the private and the public sanitation of the present day has been and might have been further advanced and more perfect than they now are, had our ancestors studied the rules that have lain unused for centuries though doubtless meant as much for mankind as for the people to whom we owe not only their preservation, but an abundant proof of their efficacy.

ARTICLE III.—JOHN STUART MILL.*

II.

the table at which we are writing lies a small piece of marble which serves for a paper-weight. It is about two square inches at each surface, white in color, weighs five or six ounces, yields readily to a push, but not to compression, or to a pull, not to torsion, and emits a dull sound when struck. The obvious phenomena scientific tests would add others not perceptible to ordinary sensation, electrical and magnetic forces and antipathies, reactions upon chemical agents and vibrations of the æthereal medium. If we had other senses and endeavored to widen the range of them by other scientific artifices, doubtless other more recondite phenomena would emerge along with all these. An area of indefinite, perhaps of infinite extent, surrounds the paper-weight. It is a center visited by the forces of nature and with an articulate answer ready to any signal nature knows how to make it. The only limit assigned to its susceptibilities is the unknown limit to the extent of the universe. Clearly to call the thing a paper-weight is not to give a name descriptive of real character, but a name suggested by the paltry single use we put it to. Listing the particulars enumerated, and letting x stand for unknown particulars, we get the statement that the weight, which we will call A , is extended, colored, impenetrable, cohesive, heavy, mobile, resonant, and x .

Is this statement an identical or a synthetical proposition? The physicist is shut up in this question like the cloudy fisherman's casket. Do we affirm that the paper-weight consists of the phenomena enumerated and unenumerated, limited by them and by nothing beyond them? This is what we seem to say. The form is unmistakably the form of an identical proposition; it is down in black and white that A is extended . . . and x , that is that these particular appearances—extension, solidity, resonance, and the rest make A what

continued from January Number. To be completed in a third paper.

it is. The complete enumeration of the phenomena exhausts A—A is the total of the phenomena. Or is there a *sous-entendre*, a verbally undeveloped meaning in the copula *is*, a synthesis affirmed under the apparent of affirmation of identity? That is, do we say that A is one thing and the phenomena another, that the particulars extension, resistance, resonance, α , are only the various manifestations of A which, in its interior real self, *an sich*, is an entity equally distinct from each of them and from all of them together? There is no doubt that this is what we meant to say before we got into, or the moment we got out of the *champ-clos* of metaphysics. The consciousness of every man is so constituted (no matter how), whether by creation, survival of the fittest, concurrence of atoms, or association of ideas, that prior to metaphysical reconsideration the paper-weight A is universally conceived as having an unmanifested being and nature of its own, proclaimed in the apparent fact that it gives distinctness and unity to the phenomena observed, separating them from all contiguous phenomena and holding them together as one, so that the very thing which seems to be extended seems to be the thing which is impenetrable, heavy, resonant, and α . This unsophisticated consciousness is so inveterate and inviolable that it determines all the feeling, thinking, and acting of practical life in the individual and in the community. Society from its rudest to its most refined and intricate forms, in its institutions, its industries, its languages and arts of expression, its mythologies and religions, is incorporate realism, the assumption of a substantial reality behind and distinct from every perfectly defined group of phenomena. It is in this way alone that men hitherto have been able to represent to themselves and to express the differences, the orderly interactions, and the durability of the universe.

So what we mean to say in practical life is not what we seem to say. It is now to be added that what we seem to say, metaphysics in its latest conclusions distinctly says and means. Realism is the assumption, the synthetical proposition, the formula, of the primitive uncorrected consciousness of men, broadly expressed in the life of the individual, and the history of the race; from the fading twilight of his cave the metaphysician replies with phenomalism or idealism, and the identical

proposition. Nor is this in the least a random or captious reply, but one which equally with the original assertion has the excuse or it that it had to be made. For if there are conditions which have determined the off-hand cast of thinking out of doors none the less are there conditions which determine the thinking of the metaphysician within, a necessity of solitary speculation more intractable if possible than the other. It is open to any man to be a metaphysician or not as he pleases, but not to leave himself in the choice of his metaphysics; nothing (to keep up the figure) forces him into the cave if he prefers life outside, but being entered he must submit to the constraint of the place. His business is no longer to make use of the world, that is the affair of the practical man, but to explain it; and to explain it not as well as he would, but as well as the diminished resources of the cave permit. For many have gone in before him and have used up the stores of the whole stock of *idola* which the first comers found, the most part have turned out vain images or apparitions, "abstractions" which it is impossible any longer to "realize."* There is a quite peculiar hardship in this. The man of science in our day is by comparison opulent and confident person because exploring particular provinces of nature he is no less able than the farmer or the politician or the poet to keep out of doors and to find plenty to do. But the metaphysician deals with those alternatives which hem in our theories of the universe, mental and material,

* It is perhaps an impertinence to use a phrase so celebrated in any but the exact meaning of its author. In the 42d Aphorism of the *Novum Organum*, the *Idols of the Cave* are distinguished from *Idols of the Tribe* (those due to man's nature in general) as the refractions and corruptions of the light of nature caused by the peculiar nature of the individual, whether in its original form or as modified by intercourse with others. See, however, the beautiful passage in the *De Augmentis* where the contrast between solitary thought and intercourse with nature dwelt upon. (Lib. V, ch. 4.)

Idols in general are all our defective and false representations of realities however they have arisen. The antithesis is between the human *idolon* or bad copy of the reality and the divine *idea* exactly expressed in the reality. We are then cautioned not to confound "idolon" with the "idol" of common speech; it is probable that the double allusion is what recommended the word to Bacon, a very object of his attack being the idolatries of human thinking, the superstitious veneration paid to old "false appearances" which obstruct our vision of true ideas and works.

in its integrity, and which lying behind the phenomena are not to be found out of doors, and being fixed in number admit no repair when they begin to waste away. Three hundred years ago he was realist and dualist, that is, he began where everybody else leaves off with the great assumptions of practical life. To-day he is phenomenalist and unitarian with the supreme justification that at last he must be that or nothing, having no greater sin to answer for than this, that without any farther *raison d'être* he shrinks from suicide, that having one alternative still left he has not chosen—not to be.

Let us consider. (I.) We say the phenomena of the paper-weight exclude or are separated from the surrounding phenomena and are held together, as belonging to or inhering in, as being modes and manifestations of, a something common to them all yet not they. As this additional and different something does not appear among the phenomena we think of it as lying behind or under them and call it the "substance." As the individuality and identity of the whole resides not in the modes or manifestations but in the thing modified and manifested, and as the manifestations are subject to change while the thing itself abides, we call the substance "the thing in itself," "the real thing," or "the real." As the substance or reality lies not only beyond the phenomena but beyond the relations among the phenomena which are the only ones known to us, and as we imagine nothing lying still farther away, we call it "the ultimate reality" and "the absolute." In this way we fancy for the moment (the earlier stages of metaphysics are nothing but the fancy) that we have defined and described the substance. But we have not defined substance itself, we have only defined its functions. And we have only done that in terms of the phenomena. For exclusion of one phenomenon by another or separation of one from another (for example, of the extension of the paper-weight from that of the paper) is only the observed fact that one phenomenon limits another: modification and manifestation are only the observed fact that the phenomena appear and that they differ: belonging to or inhering in, totality, individuality, identity, are only the observed fact that the phenomena are grouped or integrated: and abiding or enduring is only the observed fact that the

if subject to change is also persistent. As for the epistemic substance, real, ultimate, non-phenomenal, non-relative, indeterminate, they are all figurative or negative, assertions that substance is not the phenomena but not telling what it is. From first to last we have been paying ourselves with phrases, as the French say, heaping up verbiage which never carries us to the phenomena but invariably brings us back to them in a language borrowed from them. Nor is this a mere inaptitude of language; it is an impotence of thought. The more carefully we concentrate attention upon the phenomena the more helpless are we to conceive anything among or beyond them arising from them, and more real, efficient, and enduring than

Substance is inexpressible because it is unthinkable. But now what happens when we go on to affirm the inconceivable and inexpressible? Fatal conflict with the phenomena in those terms the affirmation is necessarily made. We are the substance out of all known relation calling it indeterminate; and straightway bring it into every relation known to us by clothing it with the phenomena. It has an unconceived unmanifested nature of its own we say; but we say that the phenomena are its modes and manifestations. In what? it is not extension (for if in its very self it is extension, can it resist?)—yet two inches square: not resistance (for if resistance, how can it be extended?)—yet impenetrable: not color; yet white: not sound, yet resonant. It must be no one of all these things, otherwise how can it give them a common ground and constitution, how segregate, integrate, individuate, identify them? it must be all of them at once, for—there they are. So the affirmation of substance in terms of phenomena—the only one possible, turns out an affirmation of the substance which denies the phenomena, or an affirmation of phenomena which denies the substance. Now the phenomena are undeniable. (III.) Here a suspicion which has been strengthening all along becomes irresistible. From first to last the phenomena have been omnipresent forcing their way into our most vigorous and subtle endeavors to realize a substance which is non-phenomenal. If substance cannot be conceived save under concepts supplied by the phenomena, if it cannot be expressed save in terms of the phenomena, if it

cannot be affirmed save by denying the phenomena, and if the phenomena are undeniable, what is the use of it? What service does it render as an offset for all these vexations? Clearly the only service rendered is to discriminate and emphasize the important fact that certain phenomena appear to have a repugnance for the contiguous phenomena and an affinity for one another. But clearly too, the direct and simple recognition of the fact itself is a finer discrimination and a heartier emphasis than the contradictory circumlocution to which we have resorted. So the conception of substance adds to its other offences this quite unpardonable one that it is not wanted. The true character of a process which is typical of what we have called the off-hand cast of thinking in practical life, which has determined the automatic, that is, the unreasoning development of human intelligence in the individual and the race, is now apparent. Certain peculiarities in the phenomena of the paper-weight and in their relations to one another and to the surrounding phenomena have betrayed us into a precipitate inference of an entity beyond them which turns out upon careful reconsideration to be inconceivable, contradictory, and superfluous. What is true of the paper-weight is true of the table on which it lies, of the objects about it, of the earth, the sun, the stars. At no point in the co-existences of space or in the sequences of time is anything more substantial or real to be admitted than the co-existences and sequences themselves. The universe is simply the persisting aggregate of phenomena. Thus we have provided phenomenalism, or nihilism as it is often improperly named, with a rational basis and a philosophical expression.

Suppressing then the stupendous non-sequitur, what remains is the phenomena. How do they remain? Evidently in space, for there lies the phenomenal paper-weight on the phenomenal table, and in time, for they are not only there now but were there a moment ago. But here and there, then and now, space and time, are terms of practical life, express concepts of that automatic unreasoning intelligence which has just been convicted of blundering precipitation. Coming from out of doors they cannot be admitted into the cave of considerate and circumspect metaphysics until they are purged of the presumption against them and their titles verified. There, we say, in

off-hand fashion, lie the phenomena of the paper-weight definitely located outside of us among the surrounding phenomena. We know they are there because we perceive them there by looking, touching, and listening. But perceptions of eye, ear, and hand are modifications of us, not modifications of the paper-weight; there are therefore two sets of modifications, our perceptions integrated into a notion or idea and the corresponding phenomena integrated into a paper-weight, the two sets standing to each other in this relation that the former disclose the latter, the presence of the perceptions being the only assurance we have of the existence of the phenomena, the idea our only assurance of the paper-weight. In other words, the phenomena which we took to be undeniable are not known at all; they are inferred. A moment ago, to account for the integration of certain phenomena we inferred the existence of a substance beyond them: now to account for the integration of certain perceptions we infer the existence of phenomena beyond *them*. The first inference was sacrificed because found to be inconceivable, contradictory, and superfluous; the second can be saved only by being shown to be intelligible, consistent, and necessary. (I.) Is it intelligible? One of the modifications we say which go to make up the whole paper-weight is that it is two inches square at each surface, our reason for saying so being that we have a perception that it is so. But the perception itself is not two inches square, is in fact not square at all; if it were it might be a mode of the paper-weight but not of us who, whatever we are, are certainly not square. We may subject the perception to the torture of analysis or the cajolery of synthesis, tear it into its ultimate elements or rebuild the elements into an improved whole, we shall never get from it the confession that it is two inches square. As it stands, in its *disjecta membra*, or in reconstituted integrity, it denies extension of itself by the very fact of being an affirmation of extension in the paper-weight. The duality and antithesis are irreducible so long as we persist in saying that we perceive that the *paper-weight* is two inches square. Equally of our perception, that it is colored, or that it is resonant, or that it is α . The perception and the corresponding phenomenon, the paper-weight and the corresponding idea, are numerically

two and simply unlike. But substance was found to be inconceivable because it could not be identified with or assimilated to the phenomena: we have no choice now but to find the phenomena inconceivable because they cannot be identified with or assimilated to the perceptions. (II.) Again as before, the affirmation of the inconceivable phenomena brings conflict with the perceptions in whose terms the affirmation has to be made, with this difference that this affirmation being more precise than the other the conflict is more ruinous. We spoke of substance in a loose way as the background or basis of the phenomena, that to which they belong or in which they inhere, but of the phenomena we say precisely that they are the causes of the perceptions, the one relation being vaguely indicated the other exactly defined. Thus a particular tract of extension produces in us a particular impression, feeling, sensation, or perception. The phenomenon therefore is not only itself; it is also the power of producing that which is not itself. But if one of these, it cannot also be the other. "Squareness" and "power of producing an impression" are the two things which can in no wise be identified or assimilated, and to affirm one of them of the phenomenon is to deny the other: if squareness it cannot be the power of producing, and *a fortiori*, not the power of producing what is not itself. Equally of each of the phenomena of resistance, cohesion, resonance, and α ; and of the integrated phenomena of the paper-weight. To affirm the phenomena is to deny causation, to affirm causation is to deny the phenomena. The contradiction here is so flagrant and formidable that psychology in despair has called in physical science to its aid—and has been ruined by its ally. The phenomena are found to be not the causes of the perceptions, but if of anything then remote causes of certain molecular disturbances of the brain which the perceptions never suspected until physiology found them out; and the problem now is to show that cerebral disturbances can produce mental modifications, which is no more soluble than the other and whose solution could only serve to usher in the new contradiction that the immediate causes of perception are not the phenomena immediately perceived. (III.) The phenomena therefore do not serve the purposes for which they have been invented; their only use clearly is to lay stress on the fact

that certain mental modifications of our own have been associated into an idea, and the outcome of the whole criticism is that they must vanish after substance as inconceivable, contradictory, and superfluous. What is true of the supposed paper-weight is true of every other object supposed to be external to ourselves. Space ceases and the contents of space. What remains is a form of sensibility impressed upon all sensations. The universe has not been annihilated in this way; it has simply been re-interpreted, that is, it has been identified as various modifications of Me.

Having suppressed the second non-sequitur, I find remaining my own sensations, the several modifications of me. They have been cured of their inconsiderate propensity to parade as space-relations and external phenomena, but they still claim to be a series and to succeed one another in time. I not only have the feelings which trick me into the belief of the external paper-weight, but I had them a moment ago and yesterday and last week, my authority for saying so being that I distinctly remember to have had them. This remembering, however, takes place now, is a present and not a past modification of me. I do not therefore know the past modifications; I infer them from the present ones exactly as I inferred phenomena from perceptions and substance from phenomena; and I do this in the same off-hand, unreasoning, automatic way. So the question revives whether the last inference keeping such bad company can save its reputation. Here we abandon the criticism to the reader. If he will be at the pains to familiarize himself with the atmosphere and lights of the cave he will be speedily satisfied that the past modifications assumed to account for the present rememberings are inconceivable, contradictory and superfluous. Memory like perception is a misinterpreted modification of consciousness; time with its sequences follows space and its coexistences, and what survives is the assemblage of feelings which constitute me in the instant that now is. We reserve to ourselves, however, whom certainly it most concerns, the finishing stroke of criticism. I am still conscious that I am, that this instant is occupied by the feelings that make up me. But how am I thus conscious of me? Only as differing from that which is not me and as iden-

tical with that which was me ; my consciousness of myself is vitiated by memory and perception, whose reputation for hasty blundering and deliberate falsification was fixed some time ago. It is inconceivable, contradictory, and we fear, superfluous, for me any longer to pretend to be ; all that remains for us as honest critics is to put out the last light and vanish with the other idola of the cave.

Thus the syntheses of sense and reason out of which the whole fabric of practical life is built, have reappeared as the abstractions of metaphysics, and one by one have crumbled away until not so much as their dust remains to tell the tale. Step by step the substantial universe past and present, far and near, has been identified as modes of a consciousness which is itself effaced in the identification : realism has merged in phenomenalism ; phenomenalism in idealism ; idealism in pure and perfect nihilism, that is, in *nil* or nothing at all. The reasoning which has done all this, or at any rate the better reasoning it ought to be, admits no answer. The only imperfection it can be convicted of is the accidental one that being ours it has failed to develop the perfect argument. Behind any omission or flaw found in it there lies not a refutation but a surer proof ; the process can be invalidated only to fortify the conclusion, which is not ours but the common however unacknowledged possession of metaphysics. In the hands of the accomplished troglodyte the criticism which turns substance out of phenomena cannot be withstood when it turns phenomena out of perception and experience out of memory, and when it pronounces consciousness exhausted in doing so. From the first discredited synthesis to the final identification, from the innumerable realities which are the assumptions of practical life to the zero in which they disappear, there is no halting-place from which the pressure of his proofs does not force the metaphysician. We dwell upon this for the sake of emphasizing the converse of it. No man can issue from nihilism by asking help of metaphysics, for metaphysics has not a light to show or a clue to give him. He cannot take the first step outwards, may not even confess to himself the plight he is in, without entrusting himself to some one of the assumptions which it is the sole business of metaphysics to discredit.

he begin with the simple-seeming certitude with which Descartes began modern philosophy, the *cogito ergo sum*; or the diffident proclamation, *I think?* But he cannot say he knows until he recollects that he thought, or that he is until he recollects that he was, and he cannot say he is a thinking thing (*une chose pensante*) until he perceives that there are other things which do not think or do not think his thoughts. Caution has not saved him from an audacity which justifies only but involves all the others; to admit the bare consciousness of being is to admit along with it memory and emotion, space and time, self and not-self, substance and phenomena. If there is no restraint which can withhold speculation from nihilism, neither is there any which can withhold action from realism.

It results from this exposition that there are four courses open to the thinker. (I.) He may frankly accept without further question the realities which are assumed in the common sophisticated consciousness of men, (subject and object, space and time, phenomena and substance) as the basis and data of his thinking, building upon them and according to them the partial generalizations of science, mental, moral, or physical, and the universal generalizations of philosophy: or, (II) discriminating between the realities thus assumed and the abstract concepts by which he represents the realities to himself, he may submit the abstractions to criticism until criticism is fulfilled and expires in nihilism: or, (III) in obedience to the practical and speculative urgencies which divide the consciousness of every man, he may do both of these things at once, seeing to it however, that the practical urgency which is fulfilled in realism does not come into collision with the speculative urgency which is fulfilled in nihilism, but that the two are kept on separate lines and each permitted to work itself out unchecked by the other: or, (IV) he may permit this encounter to take place, and build his theories of things out of the wreck of the collision. There is no thinker who has made his choice between these alternatives with perfect precision and consistency, the reason that all thinkers are more or less under the influence of all motives which urge to thinking, but as a specimen of the first class we may take Bacon, of the second Hume, and

of the third Kant. Most of our contemporaries are to be looked for in the fourth for the reason that the complication of motives has grown with the development of thought. Expelled from realism by one urgency only to be repelled from nihilism by another recent speculation, has pitched its tents upon the no-man's land between the two. Starting from the belief that our mental abstractions so involve the realities they represent that the criticism which is valid for the former disposes of the latter;* it has perforce arrested criticism at that particular abstraction which represents some inexpugnable reality, not seeing that the criticism which is good so far is good to the very end, and that the reality admitted in spite of criticism brings in all the others along with it. Of these thinkers there is perhaps no better sample than Mr. Mill. Unable to accept unreservedly the hearty naturalism of the Baconian synthesis because so expert a critic, or the dissolving artifices of Hume's analysis because so earnest a man, much more unable to improve or even imitate Kant's accommodation of the two, Mr. Mill permitted them to meet in a theory of the universe in which fatal sacrifices of one were matched by fatal admissions of the other. What we have to say upon this theory is not a refutation of it by appealing to any intuitions of reason or to any facts of experience beyond itself, but simply an attempt to unmask the antagonisms which ensure its dissolution from within.

It is necessary to notice here an evident apprehensiveness and hesitation which interfered with Mr. Mill's exposition of the theory, to the embarrassment alike of the historian and the critic. This is an old affliction of philosophy, from the suppression of the *Traité du Monde* by Descartes (not to go farther back) to the conservative ambiguities of Mr. Herbert Spencer. One of the famous controversies of the seventeenth century was whether the Monadology of Leibnitz was a mere *jeu d'esprit* or a sincere faith, and it is still an open question how far the transcendental idealism of the *Kritik* affected the realism of Kant's practical philosophy. An unsuspected source of confusion in our thinking to-day is this intrusion of histori-

* *Assensum constringit, et res.*

l forms of doctrine which were left by the timidity or ectation or malice or incompetence of their authors in an uivocal form. Had the discussion of the alternatives sub- tuted by practical life to speculation proceeded from the first perfect good faith and openness we believe the atmosphere ould have cleared long ago, or begun to clear, and the hapless array of contemporary philosophy would have been averted. e of the surprises of Mr. Mill's Autobiography is the reap- urance of the old malady in Mr. James Mill, who carefully ulcated upon his son the wisdom of concealing opinions ely to offend popular prejudices. The latter, who was not y a perfectly honorable man but constitutionally indifferent, nybody ever was, to the consequences which alarmed the er Mill, repudiated the teaching when he came to be a cher himself. His reserve was not a misgiving, at least not onscious misgiving, upon his theory itself but upon its reme liability to misconstruction. He did not fear the ults of it could be made intelligible, but he apparently did y much fear that any attempt to make it intelligible would ve it looking absurd. The development of human intelli- ce, he complained, has issued in the conceptions and liefs of realism; consciousness has crystallized around them til at last all thinking is cast in their forms and all speech propriated as their expression. It is therefore a matter of ceeding difficulty and delicacy to get a doctrine of idealism o language that is not vitiated by realistic implications; d still greater to overcome the intractability of language hout doing violence to the acquired structure of conscious- ss. Accordingly the peculiar doctrine which we must sup- se to have determined Mr. Mill's life was not distinctly owed by it. Perhaps it could not have been, but neither as it permitted to appear in any of his abundant writings on actical subjects, nor even where we should have confidently oked for it in the treatise on Logic. A student consulting r. Mill on political or social economy would never suspect not cautioned beforehand that money or rent or the balance trade mean certain possibilities of sensation or that the bjection of women means the coercion of certain aggregates

of sensation by certain others.* It is possible that we should never have heard of the doctrine at all if it had not slipped out in the heat of Mr. Mill's polemic on Sir William Hamilton. That we owe a disclosure of this kind to the mere contingencies of a debate is a misfortune every way; it is a special misfortune that Sir Wm. Hamilton should have been the man to create the contingency. For Hamilton was an eclectic who having conceived the scheme of doctoring Scotch intuitions with the German criterion of certitude contrived to becloud the whole circuit of objective realities by referring our belief in them to subjective necessities. We wanted Mr. Mill's theory elaborately worked out as a substitute for the native errors of that

* This recalls the famous invective against Mansell's "agnostic" theology, which bears quotation better than any other single passage of Mr. Mill's.

"Here then I take my stand on the acknowledged principle of logic and morality, that when we mean different things we have no right to call them by the same name. Language has no meaning for the words Just, Merciful, Benevolent, save that in which we predicate them of our fellow-creatures. If in affirming them of God we do not mean to affirm these very qualities, differing only as greater in degree, we are neither philosophically nor morally entitled to affirm them at all. . . . If I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply the epithet to my fellow creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." (*Exam. Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, 4th ed., p. 127).

This is magnificent, but it is not war. Mr. Mill did no doubt maintain identity of meaning in his own use of ethical terms, but surely that only aggravates the fact that all his life long he was attaching one meaning to them, while his auditors were receiving them in another. If I permit the public whom I am addressing to attach to the words I use a meaning different from my own, if when I say Justice, or Mercy, or Benevolence, I am thinking of one thing and they of another, am I not in fact giving the same name to different things? It is scarcely necessary to add that we do not notice this inconsistency for the purpose of questioning Mr. Mill's sincerity, which is quite beyond reach of the *tu quoque* argument to which he so freely exposed himself; but as an illustration of the disaccord there is between metaphysical abstracts and the conceptions of practical life. In the solitude of his own meditations a man may invent a speech of his own; but when he goes out of doors he must revert to the vernacular.

consciousness he himself had inherited, of that human life to which he himself had to conform. We have got it in four chapters as a substitute for the errors of a thinker whom Mr. Mill was accusing of habitual inconsequence of thought.

The theory begins by recognizing sensations as the sole constituents of consciousness. Each sensation is an individual or at any rate a distinguishable thing by itself, and is a constituent of consciousness only upon condition of being so, but this individuality is checked by an aptitude for entering into various combinations with adjacent sensations. The several processes in which this combining takes place are known as the *Laws of Association*, and the complete interpretation of these laws is the highest science or philosophy possible for us. If there are any forms of being other than sensations or any laws of the forms other than the laws of association, such forms and their laws are unrepresented in consciousness and therefore not to be known. The only method we have of instructing ourselves is the "psychological method," or the observation of sensations; the only theory of things within range of our intelligence is the "psychological theory," or the theory of consciousness as organized under the laws of association.

It is of no particular consequence where the application of the psychological method begins, for every sensation enters into some one or more of each of the several classes of multiples which together make up consciousness, and its demeanor in these different relations will disclose the several processes of combining or laws of association. I have, for example, at this instant a sensation which is distinguishable as the sensation of a particular figure or tract of extension, say a surface two inches square. The first thing striking me is that in the very act of so distinguishing itself the sensation brings in along with it a number of others exactly like it except that they are fainter, each of which announces itself as the reminiscence or idea of a previous sensation of this same surface. Moreover, along with these faint duplicates come a number of other faint feelings not exactly similar yet of the same kind, each of which announces itself as the idea of other previous sensations of extension. All these ideas or faint feelings have poured into consciousness at the call of the sensation I have of the figure

two inches square, and the explanation of the fact that they have done so is that they all in differing degrees resemble it. We assure ourselves of this by taking notice that the power to summon on the one hand and the promptness to appear on the other are exactly proportioned to the degree of resemblance. In this way by simply noting the play of feelings we have got a process of combining or first law of association, which may be expressed thus: *The ideas of similar phenomena tend to present themselves in consciousness together.* The importance of this law is manifest. Any particular sensation will carry with it into all future combinations the associations derived from the whole class to which it belongs; we are now able to say of it wherever we find it not only that it is, but definitely that it is, for instance, a sensation of extension.

Meanwhile it has become manifest that the power of calling in faint sensations or ideas is not entirely covered by the law of likeness, for among the multitude answering the call are a number of individuals wholly unlike any sensation of figure whatsoever. At first we are inclined to find here a second law, namely, that ideas of *differing* phenomena tend to present themselves together, but we are at once corrected on taking notice that the power to call and the readiness to come are not proportioned to the degree of difference. Reconsidering the matter we come to the conclusion that the sensation of figure evokes the ideas of the differing sensations because these have been associated with it heretofore, a conclusion attested directly by the fact that the power to call and the readiness to come are exactly proportioned to the frequency with which the previous grouping has occurred. Particular sensations of color, hardness, and heaviness have occurred along with this sensation of figure far more frequently than any others of the same kind, and now their ideas insist upon coming with it whenever it appears. Written out in full the second law stands thus: *When phenomena have been experienced or conceived SIMULTANEOUSLY in intimate contiguity, their ideas tend to present themselves in consciousness together.* This law serves as a check and counterpoise upon the other. That would be a sorry consciousness which was wholly organized by the tendency of ideas to present themselves along with the sensation they resemble,

but this new tendency provides an abundant supply of complex multiples for the organization of a wide and diversified consciousness.

Once more, it is manifest that the power a sensation has of evoking ideas is not yet exhausted, for along with the ideas of sensations which have been grouped together simultaneously heretofore, come ideas of sensations which are external to the group but intimately related to it in the order of succession or following after; for example with the idea of weight in the first group comes the idea of compression which has followed in another, and with the idea of motion in the first comes that of a subsequent motion in the second. Reapplying the test we get the third law of association which stands thus: *Whenever phenomena have been experienced or conceived in intimate contiguity one after another their ideas tend to present themselves in consciousness together.* This law, the last in the order of statement, is perhaps the first in importance. It recognizes the fact that every sensation, and every group, however persistent, is subject to change, and that all changes are in the order of regular succession, so that those which go before are the conditions of those which come after.

It will be observed that these three laws are the expression of three several tendencies; tendencies of ideas not now actually in consciousness to present themselves there upon occasion of some sensation (or idea) which is. In these tendencies resides the accumulated wealth of consciousness and by them is determined the conduct of life. There is no act which is not a reliance upon some one or all of them; an expectation of the impending reappearance of associations which memory declares to have appeared before. The sensations which I have or can have at any given moment are few in number and life would be a poor affair if they were the whole capital upon which it traded, but each of them is a blank draft upon the funds of consciousness, or going back to the old figure, is the point at which associations effected in the past tend to present themselves anew, and life is the ample thing it is because it counts upon these tendencies and upon the permanence of the associations which they imply. The sensation of figure I have at this moment is nothing in itself but the ideas of the sensa-

tions which have been grouped with it heretofore follow it into consciousness bringing with them the assurance that the old group is ready to reappear. Trusting the predictions of the ideas I have but to stretch out my hand, or otherwise provide the previous conditions, to realize the waiting sensations of hardness, heaviness, resonance, and α . Let me give the group a name or a nickname and the thing is done. Hereafter the paper-weight exists for me a group (not of actual but of) possible sensations. Wherever I am or whatever the actual contents of my consciousness this possibility will endure. I may admit into consciousness the previous conditions of different sensations, for example as men say, I may go into the next room or out of doors; I have but to replace the previous conditions of the paper-weight, that is, I have but to come back again, and it reappears. It is not only a possibility but a *permanent* possibility of sensation. So of any other group to which I have given a name. I have only one of the constituent sensations; perhaps only an idea of one of them; yet I know that if the conditions recur the group will appear. Thus the table at which I write is a permanent possibility of sensation: so are the other contents of the room: so is the world out of doors; I have but to effect the necessary change of antecedents, that is, I have but to throw open my window to the evening air and there lies the sea murmuring in its sleep along the shore beneath the tranquil splendors of the stars. The material universe is the aggregate of permanent possibilities of sensation; or generalizing the statement, Matter is a Permanent Possibility of Sensation; and it is nothing more. I myself am a nucleus or cluster of a dozen sensations more or less bearing witness to permanent possibilities of sensation. And I am nothing more.

Unfortunately, for the philosopher if not for mankind, for metaphysics if not for life, the laws of association which preside over ideas bring with them not only the organization of consciousness but the suggestion of being and organization beyond the ideas; and this suggestion is made so promptly and positively that it ends in looking like an intuition and in overpowering consciousness. The paper-weight is in fact nothing but the possibility of reinstating certain sensations which have

gone together heretofore, but the possibility has been trusted and verified so often that at last it has assumed the guise of a real being, an entity apart from and independent of me; and now the ideas of the group never rise without suggesting, instead of the sensations themselves, certain correspondent phenomena belonging to a reality of their own. I look upon the paper-weight as having existed before I knew it and as likely to exist when I am no more. So upon the natural organization brought by the association of ideas there is superposed an artificial and illusory one which has quite usurped the place of the other and appropriated all consciousness to itself. On the one hand, along with the entire aggregate of my sensations and my ideas of actual sensations in the past and possible sensations in the future I receive what seems to be the direct intuition of an enduring unchanging substance, or soul within, constituting my real self, from which they issue as its momentary manifestations, about which they gather as its apperrelling and decoration. On the other, along with each particular group of these sensations and ideas I receive what seems to be the intuition of another substance which is not myself. One set of sensations and ideas, which tend to present themselves in advance of all others and which thus suggest possibilities of sensation which are the antecedents or conditions of all other possibilities, detaches itself to become the marvellous apparition known as the organism of the body. Around this illusory projection into unreal space are distributed the rarer and remoter possibilities which appear as the furniture and walls of the room in which I am sitting; farther away are the appearances of objects out of doors; encompassing all the illuminated atmosphere bounded by the blue dome of the sky. This whole environment of the material universe widening out forever into illimitable space is nothing but my sensations and ideas which the laws of association have thrown into magnificent but unreal perspectives; the play of its forces near and far, minute or mighty, from the hypothetical collisions of atoms up to the impressive flight of planets round their suns and systems round their centres, is but the orderly vicissitudes of my sensations, what I feel now and what I expect to feel by virtue of having felt before. There may be, as will appear

farther on, I have good reasons for believing that there are, other consciousnesses like my own, each lighted by the reflex splendors of its own projections; but their sensations, and consequently their permanent possibilities of sensation, however coincident with mine are not identical with them and so cannot guarantee an objective reality common to us all and which survives when we cease to be. No two of us ever trod the same soil or saw the same sun. The apocalypse which awaits *me* when I open my eyes, and which I know awaits me, collapses when I close them and passes away forever when I die.*

Such is the solitary essay of perhaps the greatest critic of our times in metaphysical construction. Whatever its defects it is a distinctly original contribution to philosophy and as such was surely entitled to introduction in some more ample and dignified form than could be given to any device for getting the better of Sir William Hamilton. We repeat that it is a lasting misfortune that Mr. Mill did not give more of the power spent in the exposure of other systems to the exposition of his own. Had he done so he might have left a work great enough to rank with the *New Theory of Vision* and the *Recherche de la Vérité*; and frank enough to make criticism superfluous.

* To complete the exposition it is to be remarked that the order of succession or antecedence and consequence expressed in the third law has provided the intuition of Time, and the constancy of the order the intuition of Force or Cause; as the order of co-existence expressed in the second law provides the intuition of Space and its constancy that of Substance. Having ascertained the general fact of succession we think events as occurring in time, and time we think as having an absolute existence independent of the whole series of events. Having ascertained the constant order of succession we think all antecedents as necessitating or causing their invariable consequents—the succession always having been cannot, we fancy, but be. Another important point to notice is that the constant succession is not often between single sensations, but almost always between groups or permanent possibilities of sensation, so that the conception of force or cause comes to be referred to the conception of substance which stands for the permanent possibility of sensation. In this way substance once admitted gains in apparent reality; we think it not only as holding together the phenomena grouped as in its own modifications but as causing the modifications which follow in other groups. Substances become the sources of all actions and changes in the universe.

THE IV.—THE SOURCE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION
—POPULAR AND RELIGIOUS.

long as the establishment of colleges by the State was
ed by their special promoters as but one of two or three
can methods of sustaining the higher education—such
s asking simply to be recognized by the side of estab-
religious ones, denominational and undenominational—
admitted that college education in this country was orig-
due to private benevolence. Our oldest colleges were
and honored as the offspring of voluntary Christian
rise. State universities were looked upon as a recent
ment. But along with the theory of higher education
State exclusively has arisen the notion that this was the
uritan theory of New England! and that her colleges
from the first State institutions! This new reading of
ts has its interest as a question of history simply: it has
reater interest as a blended question of history and pub-
ity. The claim quietly made in the exclusive interest of
universities has attracted no attention; those best con-
t with the facts have apparently deemed it of no conse-
; it is quite likely to be quoted, not without additions,
; had been proven, or possessed a firm historical founda-
-until from reiteration the truth of history is quite re-
.* It is proposed in this paper to examine the facts,
scover whether they warrant the new reading.

r the materials of this Article were collected, the *Report of the U. S. Com-
tion for 1875* came to hand, containing, opposite p. cxliv, a "Synopsis of
posed centennial history of American education—1776-1876," in which
ary is divided into three periods, "the colonial period," "the homogeneous
1776-1840," and "the heterogeneous period—1840-1876." Under the
ied are placed "the rise of State universities, and of colleges of agricul-
l the mechanic arts; rise of colleges for women," etc. Under the first
re placed "early colonial colleges, their foundation by colonial and indi-
tion . . . connection of religious denominations with the colleges, etc."
t historical distinction is here recognized, without apparent complication
y late-born theories about the proper basis and management of college
n. But on p. xxiii "the introduction of State colleges or universities" is

Three sentences from an article in the *North American Review* for October, 1875, will give the new claim in its most moderate form. The writer is an instructor in one of the State universities, Professor Charles Kendall Adams of Michigan.

"An important change has taken place in public opinion concerning the manner in which our colleges and universities ought to be supported." "The fact is obvious that throughout the country the opinion prevails to a great extent that our colleges and universities, and even our academies, ought to be supported largely, if not indeed exclusively, not at the expense of the public, but by private munificence." There is no question that this is the opinion, nor that in many quarters it is growing; the only question is whether this or the opposite opinion is the recent one. "The present method of supporting our colleges and universities," adds Prof. Adams, "is quite at variance with that pursued in the early history of the country," "up to the time of the Revolution."*

Now, up to that time eleven colleges had been founded in this country, viz: Harvard, William and Mary, Yale, New Jersey, Pennsylvania (U.), Washington (and Lee), Columbia, Brown, Dartmouth, Rutgers, and Hampden Sidney. The first of these dates, according to its own catalogue and the United States Commissioner of Education † from 1638; the last from 1775. Professor Adams, however, does not attempt to make

noted as a new thing, yet is also asserted in the same sentence to be "only a return to the method adopted by Massachusetts in the establishment of Harvard." Here the new claim for State universities seems to have crept in, and it is difficult to reconcile it with itself, or with the Synopsis, or with the statement on p. xviii, that in "the establishment of Harvard . . . the element of private benefactions appeared." It is hardly necessary to say that this element does not appear in State university foundations.

*The questions of origin and control are blended with that of support in the Article here quoted, and also the questions of secondary and primary education. This paper will therefore cover the whole ground of public and private historical basis for the three. It will be noticed that the names "college" and "university" are used in the quotations as synonymes, and though they are not such, in their proper and historic meaning, yet as many institutions in this country bearing the one name are precisely like others bearing the other, and as so many bearing the more pretentious title are inferior to some bearing the more modest one, no attempt will here be made to maintain a distinction between them.

† *Report* for 1875, pp. xx, 721. Cf. p. 451 of this Article. It was not Massachusetts that acted in 1638, but John Harvard.

his point by any facts save in respect to the first three; contenting himself for the remaining colleges, with the assertion, "the methods of support which we have seen to prevail at Harvard, William and Mary, and Yale, were in no respect exceptional." If his claim then in respect to these three falls to the ground, it confessedly does so in respect to the rest.

The "Centennial" Article in the succeeding number of the *10th American*, January, 1876, on "Education in America, 176-1876,"* throws out William and Mary, as a "denominational" college. The writer says: "When the sectarian or denominational colleges plead the example of the nine (other?) revolutionary institutions as favorable to this plan of organization, the advocates of State universities point to Harvard and Yale Colleges, which were aided and controlled in all their earlier years by the colonial legislatures."

This narrows the issue before us to two of the eleven. William and Mary," says President Gilman, "was emphatically a child of the Church of England." Even Prof. Adams admits that it "was an establishment purely of the Church of England;" but he also maintains that it had a State parentage, and was born of the bounty of the crown and the colonial assembly, instancing the grants of the monarchs whose names it bears as the true *fons et origo* of its existence. The facts have been since given in *Scribner's Monthly* (Nov., 1875), and are clearly these: Some thirty years before the foundation, the Virginia burgesses attempted just such a State institution for the benefit of "the Church of England by Law Established" as William and Mary is imagined to

*By President D. C. Gilman, of the new Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. Five others he says: "Princeton was founded by the Presbyterians, and New Brunswick (Butgers) by the Dutch Reformed; and Kings, or Columbia College, is chiefly, but not exclusively, governed by the Episcopalians; while Rhode Island College (now Brown University), was under the patronage of the Baptists," and Dartmouth was "controlled by Congregationalists." Between Yale (1701) and New Jersey (Princeton, 1746) comes the predecessor of the latter, the "Log College" of Tennent (1726) at Neshaminy, Penn. "Just as the Log College existed, the college of New Jersey sprang into existence. The friends and patrons of the former became the principal supporters and trustees of the latter. Thus the Log College was the germ," &c.—*Biog. Sketches*, by Dr. A. Alexander, 1845. "It was never chartered, and never claimed as a State institution, yet the students were not only taught the classics, but studied divinity also."

have been, and they failed; and more than forty years earlier Sir Edwin Sandys attempted by voluntary subscription a university at Henrico, and failed. In 1688 the first subscription of £2,500 which entered into the establishment of a college in Virginia, was made by Virginians and Englishmen, whereupon the Assembly sent Rev. James Blair, recognized as the true founder, to England for a charter, and in 1693 he had secured this with colony lands, gifts of the king and queen from their income of quit rents on manors in the colony, taxes on tobacco exports, and fees of the Surveyor General's office. These with £2,000 from certain "well-disposed, charitable persons,* colonial duties on hides, skins and furs exported, another personal gift of £1,000 quit rents from the Queen and the bequest of Hon. Robert Boyle were all in aid of an institution not created by law as a part of a State system in Virginia, but chartered by the crown as separate therefrom. "A power was given to certain gentlemen and their successors to build the college," says Salmon's *Geographical and Historical Grammar*, London, 1700 (p. 616). "By its charter," says Morse's *Geography*, 5th Boston ed. 1805 (p. 639), "it was to be under the government of twenty visitors who were to be its legislators, and to have a president and six professors who were incorporated." Vacancies were to be filled by election of the rector and visitors, i. e., William and Mary by charter was a close corporation. But a State institution is not a close corporation, is not a private corporation at all, whether under a special charter or under a general incorporation law, but is created by statute directly. It is held responsible to the legislature by annual reports as private charities are not. It is stated in the *North American* that in William and Mary "one of its fundamental objects *came to be* 'to raise up ministers for the Church.'" The statement shares in the general inaccuracy of the representation. This was always its fundamental object. President Blair so declared when he went to England, and *Scribner's* gives the coarse and profane rebuff of the Attorney-General, Seymour, on that account. The

* Not until some three thousand pounds had been offered, nine hundred and fifty of this from a person unknown, who signed his letters, "DUST AND ASHES." The Virginia Co. made a land grant, but this was a private landed corporation. See Neill's *English Colonization*, etc.

so declares: "That the Church of Virginia may be
ed with a Seminary of Ministers of the Gospel, and that
th may be piously educated . . . and that the Christian
y be propagated." Considering the relations of Church
ite in Virginia as in all the half dozen colonies which
yal or Provincial Governments before the Revolution, it
tainly possible for the crown, or Parliament, or both, to
State institution for the State church at the suggestion
colonial assembly, or the Episcopal clergy, or the com-
of the Bishop of London,—if one was then under
ment,—or the Archbishop of Canterbury; but what
came into existence was a chartered private charity
l by private gifts, by something less in addition from
ome of the king and queen, and by colonial lands and
nd governed absolutely by its own corporation (which
her the State in its limited, or its larger sense, nor its
itative). President Gilman is therefore plainly accu-
reducing the test cases of the new claim for State
ties to historical precedence in this country from three

e we enter, now, upon the examination of the cases of
l and Yale, it is in place here to say that in order to
a this claim three points must be covered. (1) The
f the institution must be shown to be absolutely in the
not a mere authorization of other parties to create it,
actual creation by enactment. (2) It must be controlled
State as its creature and subject, the State exercising
the Legislature itself and its appointees complete
over its operations. (3) It must be supported by the
that created and controls it. Of a State university or
cultural college belonging to the State each and all of
oints holds true. Of other colleges they do not. The
nt—pecuniary support—is the least essential, for public
le institutions might be largely endowed, or provided
by year, by private gifts, and still remain to all intents
roposes public charities.* A State college is a public

Smithsonian foundation for the institution of that name at Washington,
ft of Edmund Dwight, of Massachusetts, which induced the Legislature
ate to establish Normal Schools, are examples of the creation of such
y private gifts.

charity, as much so as an asylum or an orphans' home,—if a denominational one is a private charity as the courts hold; and the latter, on the other hand, might have large subsidies from the treasury or property of the State, and still, its origin and control being private, remain a private charity. But manifestly there might be such changes in respect to the other points as would constitute an institution which is properly and entirely of neither class, but mixed in character. If, for example, the State and private persons should share equally (1) in creating, (2) in governing, and (3) in meeting the expenses and providing the endowments and other funds of a college. Or a private charity *might* be created outright by statute and endowed, to be forever thereafter separate from the control and support of the State, by provisions of the statute: but there is nothing to choose between this and a charter. Or the State might wholly endow such an institution as the "College of the Holy Cross," Worcester, Mass., or the "College of St. Francis Xavier," New York City, both created and exclusively governed by Roman Catholics—which, so long as Americans are opposed to union of Church and State, is not likely to happen. Or it might establish "State Absolutism in Education" by getting somehow into its hands and control all colleges founded and endowed by Christian people, which is even less probable. Proceedings somewhat mixed may be found in the history of the earlier colleges, before conflicting theories were sharply defined as now; and it may be a little perplexing, on account of anomalies, to decide at once on sight whether this or that is, or always was, of the one class or the other; but the great majority are perfectly clear cases, and some sort of mixture of elements may go quite far, and yet the character of an institution in this respect be clear. It will be noticed, also, that the control is the most essential of the three points, for an institution of public creation passing into private hands, or one of private creation into public hands, changes its character. As a permanent thing, too, whoever controls one would be obliged to assume its support, while whoever supports one would claim its control.

Now, no one will pretend that "the University at Cambridge," or "the University at New Haven," each including the

nal college with more recent scientific and professional
ols, is at present a State university in any sense whatever.
question for investigation is, whether Harvard College or
College ever was such? If this shall prove to be the
unsuspected history in respect to the three points named
e, many of us who were trained in New England will be
iently astonished. We are not prepared for this excess
w light.

to Harvard, Professor Adams cites the vote of the Gen-
court of Massachusetts Bay in 1636, giving £400 "toward
ection of a college," and adds "this was two years before
Harvard gave to the college his name by leaving it half
estate and the whole of his library. There is an im-
t sense, therefore, in which Harvard College was a 'State
tion.'" Whether it was so in any sense which this
currently bears, or in which it would be now understood,
all see presently. It is to be noticed that this gift of the
was simply for a building and did not create the institu-
The terms even imply that it would not. The vote was
se words: "The Court agrees to give Four Hundred
is *towards* a School or College, whereof Two Hundred
is shall be paid next year, and Two Hundred Pounds
the work is finished, and the next Court to appoint where
that building." A mixed contribution partly private was
anticipated, even for the erection of the edifice. The
al Court appointed a sort of committee of twelve "to take
for a college at Newtown" in 1637, and between this and
the building seems to have been erected there. There
et, however, no college. In 1638 John Harvard died
ade his bequest. "The value of this," says the College
gue, "was more than double the entire sum voted by the
and it was resolved to open the College at once and
e it the name of Harvard. The first class was formed
same year."* If the State was the first founder because

her says, in his *Magnalia*: "A General Court advanced a small sum by
easy towards something to begin a College." Quite as much, and that
definite, as the facts warranted him to say. Dr. Barnard says, in his
Journal of Education (vol. i, p. 204), that Harvard's early bequest "con-
Grammar School of precarious prospects into the first permanent College

it contributed first, then it must be admitted that individuals were the first founders of William and Mary for the same reason. Or if the question, who founded Harvard College? is to be decided by the amount given, John Harvard was twice as much the founder as the State. Mather styles his will "the most significant stone in the foundation." The late Professor Kingsley once termed him "the greatest benefactor of letters this country has known," considering the time, comparative amount, and circumstances. What the colonial assembly did was "equivalent to the colony tax for a year," and "a million of dollars would at the present day inadequately represent it" Then two millions would more inadequately represent what Harvard gave.

All that is made out, then, by the advocates of the theory of State origin is a mixed contribution before the college existed, partly public, but chiefly private. What use was made of this—whether to create a charity to be controlled by the State, or one given into the hands of a corporation, will go much farther to settle the question before us. In 1642 the committee of twelve who had hitherto managed the mixed fund was superseded by a board of Overseers, impressing upon the college still more explicitly the character of a private charity. Prof. Adams says: "By the charter of 1642 the entire control of the college is vested in a board," &c. In 1650 a corporation was created consisting of the President, five Fellows, and a Treasurer, to which in 1657 the powers of the overseers substantially were transferred. Thus the process of organization ran through twenty years, and when complete was entirely that of a private charity. It never was distinctively anything else. Let President Elliot state the result.*

"1. Harvard was never a State institution in the sense in which the University of Michigan is a State institution, or in any proper sense. Since 1650 Harvard has been managed by a close corporation whose action has been supervised by a Board of Overseers. In this Board of Overseers the State

of America." The meaning must of course be, as the bequest was before the first class, that the Court's "small sum by way of essay" would have resulted in nothing more than such a Grammar School.

* *MS. letter to the writer, March 4, 1876.*

some representation by official† or elected persons until . Since 1865 there has been no official relation whatever between the State of Massachusetts and Harvard University, though the good will of the State towards the university was so great. The close "Corporation" has all the initiative, the overseers "consent to" the action of the Corporation if it see fit. *The Legislature has never had any direct control over Harvard.* In the sense in which the term "State college" or "State University" is used in the West, there is and has never been, a State college or university in New England."

to the support of the college, Mather says that while the townships were in the hands of the committee of twelve, the other colonies sent some small help, and several particular gentlemen did more than whole colonies to support and defend it." Some of these were persons unknown. The charter of 1650 began in these words: "Whereas, through the hand of God many well devoted persons have been, and are, moved and stirred up to give and bestow sundry legacies, lands, and revenues for the advancement of all

† Governor and Deputy-Governor, 1642-1780; the remainder of the governing town magistrates and church officers,—from 1780 to 1810 the Governor, Council, and Senate with the College President and the lay ministers of Cambridge, Watertown, Charlestown, Boston, Roxbury and Dorchester; from 1810 to 1812 the Senate gave place to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, and the ministers of the towns to fifteen ministers and fifteen laymen, elected; from 1812 the same as in 1810; from 1814 as in 1810 with the restoring of the Senate; from 1843 ministers of any denomination eligible (to the number of fifteen); from 1851, the officials before mentioned with the College President, and Treasurer, and the members of the Board of Education, and "thirty other persons,"—and from 1865, the Governor, Lieut.-Governor, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, Secretary of the Board of Education excluded from *ex officio* membership. President and Fellows—"one body politic and corporate in law"—in which the State has never had representation, has held all the property since 1650. The constitution of Massachusetts, 1780, Chap. V, Sec. 1, does nothing whatever towards making or recognizing "The University at Cambridge" as a State institution expressly re-establishes and perpetuates the President and Fellows "in corporate capacity" as holding all powers and rights, etc., etc., and all property "divers persons, gifts, grants, leases of houses, lands, tenements, goods, legacies, and conveyances," and the Overseers as a separate body holding these.

good literature, arts, and sciences in Harvard College . . . and to the maintenance of the President and Fellows, and for all accommodations of buildings and other necessary provisions," etc. President Quincy declares that during its first seventy years "its officers were dependent for daily bread upon the bounty of the General Court." But I cannot reconcile the use that is made of this in the *North American* with Mather's statement, near the close of the same period, that "the number of benefactors did increase to such a degree that although the Presidents were supported still by a salary from the treasury of the Colony, yet the treasury of the College itself was able to pay many of its expenses,"—which must include other salaries,—nor with the Hon. Alden Bradford's large list of private gifts and givers "for fifty or sixty years,"—nor with the statement on the other hand of "a correct and candid writer of the last century" that "the College suffered from the niggardness of the General Court, and the magistrates might have given a better support to President Dunster and President Chauncy, his successor, than they did,"—nor with the fact that President Dunster "frequently applied to the General Court for pecuniary assistance, and sometimes complained that his family was actually in want." The facts seem to show that the institution was more dependent on private relief. President Elliot adds on this point :*

"The Colony or Province gave Harvard College the equivalent of \$116,000 by direct grants in small sums between 1636 and 1786, being an average grant of \$773 a year.† To this extent Harvard 'depended upon the bounty of the General Court' during its first century and a half. In those times of poverty the President and tutors were glad enough to get even such slight aid, though friends of the feeble institution did (as you say) complain that the aid was grudgingly given, and that 'the College suffered from the niggardliness of the General Court.' A public treasury was not so easily filled then as now, nor so easily emptied. In 1814 the Legislature gave Harvard \$10,000 a year for ten years; and since that time no public grant has been received by the University. From the beginning the students have paid a very fair tuition

* *MS. letter.*

† Was this half its annual expenses?

It was reserved for the present generation in our Western States to insidiously teach communism under the guise of freedom in State colleges, universities, and agricultural schools." It will be remembered that the property of Harvard now amounts altogether to something like \$8,000,000; that most of this has been accumulated since the last public grant in 1744; and that nearly, if not quite, the sum of \$100,000 is now annually expended for salaries alone. Looking at its present condition and its history,—grants, gifts, management, and origin,—any one can see how wide of the facts is the assertion of its having been in any (present) "important sense" a State institution. It will be seen hereafter in how important a sense it was the contrary from its beginning.

As to Yale, the assertion rests upon a statement in *President Dwight's Travels*, embodying a vote of the General Court of the Haven Colony, 1652, and certain statements about legislative appropriations. No attempt is made to prove that Yale has ever been governed by the Legislature, the most essential point necessary to establish the assertion.

After quoting the vote—or rather resolution—President Dwight remarks: "Whether the foundation mentioned above should be considered as such in a legal sense, may be doubted; but it was the beginning of this seminary is certain." How certain the words of the resolution will show. (At Guilford, page 28.) "The matter about a college is thought to be too great a charge for us of this jurisdiction to undergo alone . . . but if Connecticut* do join, the planters are generally willing to bear their just proportions for erecting and maintaining a college there. However they desire thanks to Mr. Goodyear for his proffer to the setting forward of such a work."

Several things are here to be noticed.

1. Instead of being or contemplating action by the Court, the resolution expressly declined action. Not a word here of funds even "*towards* a college," as in Massachusetts in 1636, or towards erecting a building.

2. It recognizes voluntary action on the part of a private individual which the colony did not and would not take, and never

The two colonies being distinct till 1665. Dr. Dwight's quotation differs verbatim from that of Mr. Hoadly's Col. Records, but not in meaning.

was then suggested by something earlier and more negative resolved at Guilford.

3. March 23, 1647, in the tenth year of the colony mittee of the town had been chosen "to consider and what lott they shall see meete and most commodious f ledg which they desire may be sett vp as soon as thei will reach therevnto."* The resolution five years late by President Dwight was clearly no foundation, but even other sense whatever no "beginning" of Yale or anyth

4. So far as the resolution of 1652 looked to the futur no promise of colonial action. "The *planters* are genering to bear their *proportions*" points to individual action. Dwight himself says: "from this period the *inhabitants* description embarked in the design." In 1654 "the informed that there is some motion again on foot con the setting up of a college," clearly by individuals, and the Governor says in town meeting that the project is "r whereupon a subscription committee is appointed a Haven people subscribe £300. and other towns £240 addition £60 "out of the Town Treasury" of New E voted for salary of President—which evidently wa paid or needed! In 1658 Governor Eaton by will left intended for the use of a college." In 1660 Re Davenport made over to the General Court the

request (London, 1657) for a college about which Davenport had written him before 1656, another private act which eventually enured to the benefit of another institution.

5. Earlier than the negative resolution of 1652 there were private movements, the beginning of the beginning. When the interesting papers prepared by the present Secretary of the college and W. L. Kingsley, Esq., shall be made public the evidence of this in detail will be available. Mr. Dexter says:* While we are deeply indebted to the colonial government for material aid, the impulse for founding this college was entirely independent of the State." "I have no doubt that a college was in the original plans of John Davenport, but the first reference on record is ten years after the settlement here.† In general, the movements for a collegiate school did not take definite shape (so far as any remaining documents now show) until the year 1701. To that year is to be referred the letter of John Elliot, and also, I think, all the other ante-charter documents which we know of." Mr. Kingsley's paper goes to show (1) "that a college was a part of the original plan of Mr. Davenport in leading the New Haven colony from London" (1637), and he "prepared the soil for the college which now stands" at New Haven. (2) "That Mr. Pierpont and others built on his foundation and carried out his idea."

6. The Hopkins Grammar School is the real result of the public movements beginning in 1647. "A small collegd (such as the day of small things will permit)," as Mr. Davenport phrased it, "compelled to descend to a lower grade," Mr. Bacon says. But he adds of Davenport—"from another scion of the stock which he had planted, there has shot up such a noble tree as he had never even hoped to look upon." To the former the "lott" selected by town committee—the "oyster-shell field"—was made over in 1677. Yale College no more grew out of the various public attempts recited above, than did the "Colony Grammar School." The ten ministers nominated by the people, and organizing themselves in 1700, and incorporated in 1701, according to a popular petition—and neither the town nor the colony—founded Yale. At the first

* *MS. letter to the writer, March 3, 1876.*

† i. e. the first historically connected with Yale.

meeting of the "Trustees, Partners, or Undertakers," Nov. 11, 1701, it was ordered and appointed, says Dr. Bacon (in the forthcoming YALE BOOK), "that there shall be and hereby is erected and formed a collegiate school," etc. The charter was obtained by a popular petition widely signed, and it gives "full liberty, right, and privilege" to create a college. "The State," says the historian of the corporation, just named, "has never had the rights of a Founder." The institution is still—as it always has been—a private charity. Before the charter was granted, but after the Assembly had met, "the Hon. James Fitch, of Norwich, one of the Council, made a formal donation," says Professor Kingsley, "of a tract of land of about six hundred acres, and the glass and nails necessary to erect a college hall," because—this was eighteen years before the gifts of Governor Yale—"of the great pains and charge which the *ministry* had been at in setting up a collegiate school." But this did not make Mr. Fitch founder, or affect the charter, as the vote in Massachusetts in 1636 did not affect the charter of Harvard or make the State its founder. The Assembly of 1716 did not treat Yale College as its creature by attempting a removal to Hartford, though petitioned so to do. The president and the ten fellows are the direct and legal successors of the ten ministers. Mr. Hillhouse's plan of 1792—adding eight new ones out of the State officials—did not make Yale a State University; nor did the Act of 1838, declaring a majority of all a quorum (*provided*, a majority of the "successors of the original" body were present); nor has the new representation of Alumni. The governor and lieutenant governor, still *ex-officio* fellows, do not make the college other than it began to be in November, 1701, non-political in government as in origin—a private charity.

One point remains: Has the pecuniary aid of the State ever made Yale a State institution? Professor Adams cites the annual grant of £50 sterling from 1701 to 1755, the money furnished in 1750 to build "Connecticut Hall" in part,* and the grant of arrearages of taxes in 1792, "the largest gift of the

* Proceeds of a French prize captured by a Connecticut frigate; in part the building was erected with the proceeds of a lottery.—*Scribner's Monthly*, April, 1876.

state," to show that it has, at least for a time. But these grants were all made to a close corporation, and the addition to it of official representatives of the State in the year last named, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and six senior members of the Council, did not alter its character or that of the charity. I have gathered from sources which I cannot now verify that up to 1816 Harvard received from the commonwealth about as much as Yale did up to 1814; but in neither case did the aid, less or more, decide the nature of the institution. A few years since about \$100,000, contributed by Christian benevolence to establish the College of California, passed to the State University of California, but it was not a whit the less a State institution in consequence. President Gilman says of all the colleges before the Revolution, that they found "the churches and ministers their constant, sometimes their only efficient supporters," which was quite as true of Yale as of Harvard and the other nine. He adds: "Harvard and Yale were to some extent controlled by the colonial governments, and were for a long time nurtured by appropriations from the public chest as Michigan, California, and other western universities are now." But the comparison does not hold, for there never was any such predominant—not to say entire—governmental control at Yale (and none at all for over ninety years), as there is none such now. In the year 1763 it was attempted by memorial to the Legislature to secure such a visitation on the part of the State as all our State Universities are subject to, annually or biennially during the session of the Legislature, which was effectually defeated by the argument of President Clap, establishing the position that the right of visitation resided in the trustees or chartered corporation alone and altogether. The western universities, too, rest entirely upon bestowments of the State and Nation and taxation, and no one of them ever had furtherance as a private charity, which is the entire history of Harvard and Yale. They do not follow "the method adopted by Massachusetts" at all. Professor Adams cautiously excludes the very period in which Yale, like Harvard, has gathered most of its resources, when he asserts that "down to the beginning of the present century Yale was chiefly indebted to the State Legislature for the

means of its prosperity." There is no ground for this arbitrary division of its history—though it is convenient to avoid bringing into comparison with that debt Mr. Sheffield's foundation of \$350,000 for one department, Mr. Street's of \$280,000 for another, and Mr. Peabody's to another. In lieu of specific details of comparison a statement of the article on Yale College in *Scribner's Monthly** for April, 1876, may here be placed over against that of Professor Adams:

"It is worthy of note that Yale owes nearly all that she has to private liberality. The gifts of the commonwealth do not, all told, exceed \$100,000, if we except \$135,000, the product of the sale of public lands granted to the Scientific School, as the State Agricultural Institute. The productive property of the University, according to the last Treasury Exhibit, is about \$1,500,000. If to this be added the value of the land, and the amount that has been spent in books, apparatus, etc., the University may be roughly estimated as worth five millions of dollars."

We might here rest the case, and declare that from the evidence it has not been made out, and cannot be, that in respect to the three points here covered,—origin, control, and support,—our two oldest New England colleges were ever creatures of the State.† But there is another side to the subject. We have said nothing as yet of the relation of the churches and of religion to them. Professor Adams does not hesitate to allege of Harvard without qualification that it is not correct "to suppose that it was founded by the Church. The Church and State were, it is true, united, but the Church as such, it should be dis-

* By Professor Henry A. Beers.

† No allusion has been made to the claim set up for Harvard in 1762, of being "properly the college of the government;" in order to prevent the charter of another college in the county of Hampshire. (See Hon. Alden Bradford's *Historical Sketch*, pp. 356-9), as this claim was effectually silenced by the subsequent charter of Amherst College. No one would now in behalf of Harvard so represent it, as can be seen from President Eliot's letter quoted above,—its friends would hardly be more unlikely to aver that the founding of Amherst has been "prejudicial to the common interests of learning and religion in the country!" as the Committee of the Overseers at that time protested it would be. No allusion has been made to a plan for a college in Connecticut by a general synod, 1698, as the proof of the non-political and religious origin of Yale is complete without it. Professor Kingsley refers to it as having failed, (*Am. Qu. Obs.*, viii, 14), which would place it in the same category with the legislative vote of 1652, as having nothing to do with the actual history of Yale, but Mr. Dexter says (*MS. letter*), "There is not a particle of evidence of a synod in 1698, or in any subsequent year until 1708."

inctly understood, had nothing whatever to do with the College." Of Yale in this respect he does not affirm.

Now this averment can be brought to the test very quickly. The language is very un-Congregational. Translate "*the Church*,"—which had no existence in Massachusetts or New Haven colony,—into *the churches*, and it will be seen at once whether its meaning is anything more than specious and in the form of words. Let us set over against it the facts so admirably brought together in two articles on "Disestablishment in New England" in the *British Quarterly Review* for January and April, 1876, by Dr. Henry M. Dexter. Some six years before the General Court of Massachusetts voted "a small sum towards a college," it had been "ordered and agreed that for me to come noe man shal be admitted to the freedome of *this* *only* *politike*, but such as are members of some of the churches within the lymitts of the same." This was in 1631, and this was the first "General Court" in America. A few years after the same body saw fit to "regulate that Church-membership out of which citizen-ship was to grow." It was "further ordered that noe person, being a member of any Church which shall hereafter be gathered without the approbation of the magistrates, and the greater parte of the said Churches, shal be admitted to the freedome of this Commonwealthe." All this was before the founding of Harvard, and all this restricted suffrage and office holding in the colony not only to church members, but to Congregational church members. That General Court, then, which voted the first £400 was a Congregational body "pure and simple." Dr. Dexter says, in his "*Congregationalism*" (pp. 108, 9), "none but church members were citizens, so that the town-meetings were just church meetings in another form, and the 'General Court,' but a delegated mass meeting of the churches." The historian of New England says, referring to the town government: "The persons exercising ecclesiastical functions were officers of the same community, elected by the same constituents; for not only was there a church wherever there was a town, but the church was the nucleus about which the neighborhood constituting the town was gathered . . . Down to the present century in most of the towns of Massachusetts, the proceedings and

records of the municipality and of the religious congregation continued to be the same."* The charter of Massachusetts gave the original freemen power to "expulse all such person or persons as should at any time attempt or enterprise detriment or annoyance.† Judge Story says:‡ "The attempt to level all religions and to make it a matter of State policy to hold all in utter indifference, would"—as late as the framing of the United States Constitution—"have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation." About three hundred and fifty freemen, distributed through some thirty towns, elected the deputies to the General Court of Massachusetts—two for each town in 1642. And these as well as the Governor, Deputy-Governor, Assistants and Magistrates were and must be all church members. The entire State organization, therefore, was simply the left arm of religion: the right arm was the church organization. The same power precisely moved both. The same persons controlled both and for the same ends. The State was just the churches acting in a civil way. They made themselves for certain purposes a State. If, on the contrary, the State had become a church, the claim of political origin for Harvard might better seem to stand. The fact was just the reverse. Instead, then, of the churches having nothing to do with the college, it would be more correct to say that in their "delegated mass-meeting," composed of church members exclusively, they had everything to do with it. They needed to have to do with its funds nowhere else. Calling it State action does not make it at all like State action to-day. When that £400 was voted it was simply their secular way the churches took—and the only way they could take together—to assess upon themselves and others a common and, as it seemed to them, an equitable contribution "towards a college." So of all similar action afterwards. One need not approve this in principle in showing from history just what it was. For one, I would accept no such State subsidy to a Christian college to-day, for it would come from other Protestants as well as its founders,—from Catholics, Jews, Quakers, Infidels, and persons of no religious connections—through taxation. They thought it right for the churches thus to do "in a civil way"

* Palfrey, ii, 14, 15.

† Ibid. i, 388.

‡ On Const. U. S., 261.

If as much as John Harvard did "in a free way of contribution." This identity of Church and State—long before Dr. Arnold's and Dean Stanley's day!—continued through the early period when the organization and character of Harvard were taking shape, and after; it was in force when the committee of twelve was constituted, when the General Court abolished the Overseers, when the charter of 1650 made the President and Fellows a close corporation. All these were congregational church members, of necessity. They were put in their places in the college by men who believed with John Cotton that "none are so fit to be trusted . . . as church members." A religious qualification for suffrage and all that followed it continued till 1664, fourteen years after Harvard had been made a close corporation, by express statutory provision, and virtually through the whole period when President Palfrey says its officers were dependent upon the General Court; for, when the old law was at the request of King Charles, superseded, the new one was "ingeniously contrived to evade the royal displeasure without putting out of the hands of the churches, through their ministers, some decisive power over the determination of the quality of those who should be voting members of the State." They were obliged to present a minister's certificate that they were "orthodox in religion and not dissolute in their lives." * Whenever therefore, in addition to private voluntary contributions a legislative appropriation was made to Harvard, instead of the State taxing the members of the churches—as in the case of a legislative appropriation to a Western State university now-a-days,—it was just the opposite, the members of the churches taxing the State. If the latter had been the purely secular affair it is now, no one who knows the

* Dexter in *Brit. Qu. Rev.*, p. 65. All this would make it sure that any legislation on the subject of education in any form would be Christian, and in accordance with the free principles of Congregationalism,—that the administration of Harvard could be such had been made sure by its becoming a close corporation and by the action of the Congregational General Court before the incorporation. The relation of those days was minute enough and strict enough on subjects of Christian doctrine and practice to satisfy a theoretical advocate of union of church and State or of the identity of the two; but that *some* freedom in respect to *mas* was allowed at Harvard is clear from the history of the first two Presidents, Dunster and Chauncy, 1640–1672, cf. Palfrey, ii, 397, 8, *note*.

history and character of those Christians will imagine that they would have left any part of the support of their college to a levy by law in place of providing for it by benefactions, or have employed the arm of the State at all in promoting the higher education.

Prof. Adams attempts to make a point of the fact that in the "Act Establishing the Overseers," "'the teaching elders' (not the clergymen)" of the six towns were made members of the board. Perhaps this is to deny Mather's statement in *Magn.* ii, 8, that eight years later "the ministers of the six next towns" were Overseers. So far from proving that the churches "had nothing whatever to do with the college" it establishes the contrary, though perhaps the writer was unaware that teaching elders, just as much as "clergymen," were church officers! It is to be observed too, that six ministers were on the committee of twelve; but the seven magistrates were all church members too.* He attempts to make another point of the mention of "good literature, arts, and sciences," omitting religion, in the charter of 1650; but the earlier Act had already fixed "piety, morality, and learning," as the objects of the college.

Turning now to Yale it is not necessary, in view of its founding by the ten ministers, to show anything about suffrage in the colony. But the fifth of Mr. Davenport's fundamental articles proposed to the "free planters," June, 1639, had been "that church members only should be free burgesses, and that they only should choose magistrates and officers among themselves,† and the colony enacted at the outset that "noe man of what degree or qualitie soever shall at any time be admitted to be a free burges within this plantation, but such planters as are members of some or other of the approved Churches of New England, nor shall any but such free burgesses have any vote in any election."‡ But this as a formal provision passed away when New Haven was united to Connecticut in 1666, though "church membership was also in Connecticut much regarded as a qualification for citizenship." To this we shall recur when we reach the origin of the early grammar and common schools. It is more in point here to quote the lan-

* Palfrey, i, 549, and Mass. Col. Rec.

Palfrey, Dexter in *Brit. Qu. Rev.*, 201, 202.

† Palfrey, i, 531, 602, ii, 8.

age of the petition for the Yale charter in 1701: "from a sincere regard to, and zeal for upholding the Protestant religion by a succession of learned and orthodox men they had proposed that a collegiate school should be erected in this colony."

Our showing in regard to these two test cases of colleges before the Revolution will be complete if we state now the eternal relations of the colleges to religion. We have shown that the State was what the State is not now nor can be, and now we show that the colleges were what State universities are not now nor can be. So far from these being their lineal descendants, only the religious colleges are or can be, for Harvard and Yale were like the University colleges of England and the English Dissenting colleges of to day—institutions for theological as well as secular education. At Harvard, Hebrew, Chaldee, and Syriac, as well as the Greek of the New Testament, were taught with catechetical theology (to which in 1765 Samaritan, Syriac, and Arabic were added), and to instruct the Greek Testament was a requirement for admission of Freshman. At Yale from the first the Hebrew of the Old Testament was translated into Greek, and the *Latin* New Testament into Greek at the beginning of every recitation; the Assembly's Catechism in Latin was recited every Saturday evening; Ames's *Medulla Theologiæ* Saturday mornings, and his *Cases of Conscience* Sunday mornings. Thirty years after Wollébius's Theology was taught. Every student was required to study these things. There were also from an early day college lectures in ecclesiastical history and a professorship of divinity. Harvard had the latter twenty-five years earlier. At Harvard, if any scholar transgressed the laws of God or of the school, he was to be corrected, or publicly admonished;* one must be able "to render the originals of the Old and New Testaments into Latin and resolve them logically, withal being of godly life and conversation," in order to receive the first degree.† Since the separation of theological studies from

* And it might be by boxing or whipping, down to 1750!

† The statement in Johnson's *Wonder-Working Providence* that the location at Newton was fixed in order that the students might enjoy "the orthodox and soul-nourishing ministry of Mr. Thomas Shepheard," is given by Palfrey in a note, i, 49. President Gilman, in support of his statement that "there was a civil as well

collegiate in this country, it requires a college and a school of theology *taken together* to be the successor of our primitive Harvard or Yale. They are in this respect their own successors,—and no State institution lacking a theological department, or such theological instruction on the college foundation as precedes existing theological departments at Cambridge and at New Haven, could be such in the nature of the case.

But it is not to be understood from this that these old Christian colleges were, in the sense of the word to-day, *sectarian*. They were certainly Protestant, but in this country Protestant is not a name for a sect, as Roman Catholic is, but for the general position of *many sects versus* the Roman Catholic. A college which teaches, not the tenets of some one of these as against others which are also Protestant, but only our common Protestant Christianity, is distinctively non-sectarian,—as much so as any institution of the State is or possibly can be. For this last must also, in this country, be Protestant. That a single denomination supports a college thus non-sectarian—and that this bears its name, in common nomenclature (it should hardly need to be said), *by no means makes it sectarian*. Such are the Congregational colleges of our new States, as unsectarian as those bearing the names of two denominations,—for instance, “Congregational and Presbyterian,”—or those labeled “Non-sect.” in the reports of the United States Commissioner of Education. Yale and Harvard are very properly so labeled by that officer, yet the “Divinity school” of the one and the “Theological seminary” of the other, devoted exclusively to ministerial education, unquestionably teach some things distinctive, in doctrine or polity, or both, which the colleges of old time did not. William and

as an ecclesiastical element” in the colleges, and that religious and theological instruction was not established “in an exclusive or narrow sense,” says that original supporters desired to train up men for the service of the State “not less distinctly and emphatically.” This was not a desire of the State as such, but of the churches and of their individual members. It was the Christian conscience that led to giving the selectmen in Massachusetts authority to see that parents and masters secured to children “ability to read and understand the principles of religion and the capital laws of the country,” and it was far in advance of the spirit of secular education of to-day. The same conscience dictated the course of college study both religious and political.

lary is also styled by that officer, in his tables, "Non-sect.,"* though its chapel worship was from the first according to Episcopal forms; bishops of that sect in Virginia were often its presidents after the Revolution, and before it, bishops of London chancellors and their commissaries, presidents, or rectors; and though the charter made it a "perpetual college of divinity" (which, in the circumstances meant Church divinity or Episcopalianism), and the professor of divinity was not only an Episcopal clergyman always, but undoubtedly taught before the Revolution State-Churchism. How far any particular instructor's teachings at the other two colleges might lean towards Congregationalism it is now impossible with precision to decide; but the doctrines held by them were always tenets common also to Presbyterianism in England; and even the disputes in polity involved the colleges only *versus* Episcopacy. The Saybrook Platform, for example, nearly cotemporaneous with Yale, was in this respect, "in some sort, and to some extent, a compromise with Presbyterian principles;"† the consent of the president, fellows, professor of divinity and tutors," to such a confession of faith "according to the original design of the founding of the college" had the same "extent, no more;" and it is as clear that the vote against "Arminian or prelatrical principles" by the Trustees in 1722, after debate in the library some time before on Presbyterian ordination, simply protected the college against Episcopacy, as it is that President Clap's argument in 1768 proved that it was not a State institution, or that the failure of its enemies in 1784 prevented alterations of its charter to make it one, and saved Connecticut from the creation of a rival "State" college. The formal binding of the instructors in 1722 and again in 1753 to the Christian religion in the Saybrook summary, as "established" by the General Court, more than makes up for any imaginary lack of a church element in the Court itself on account of less rigid religious qualifications for suffrage than then obtained in Massachusetts.‡ It reads somewhat oddly now in the history of Yale that those who urged the Assembly to subject the college to itself as a

* Report for 1875, p. 726. Nothing need be said here of the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge, holding a certain connection with the University and recognized in the Catalogue, since it has a distinct board of Trustees.

† Dr. Bacon, *Hist. Disc.* in Cent. Eccl. Hist. Conn., p. 37.

State institution,—and failed,—represented that the appointment of visitors by the State was necessary “to *preserve orthodoxy in the governors of the college!*” But by “orthodoxy” was not meant sectarianism.

It would be interesting now to see how the vague statement in the *North American Review* that “Harvard, William and Mary, and Yale were in no respect exceptional” in being “in an important sense state institutions,” or in respect to methods of State support, could be attempted to be made out in respect to others of the eleven colleges founded before the Revolution. For instance, Hampden Sidney in Virginia classified even by General Eaton as Presbyterian, and as clearly of that character as the Theological Seminary near by. Or Washington—now Washington and Lee—in the same State, classified as “Non-sect.,” (and its foundation dated from 1749) which was first Augusta and then Liberty Hall Academy till 1782, and under the control of Hanover Presbytery which secured subscriptions and appointed trustees; attracting to it the gift of General Washington for whom it was subsequently named. Or New Jersey, founded by the Synod of New York “about 1738,”* supported by private subscription, its first aid from the State being permission to raise money by a lottery in 1762,† and its Trustees from the first Presbyterian ministers and laymen. Dr. Morse mentions it in 1805 as “founded on private liberality and zeal, and not yet taken under the patronage of the State. Dr. Maclain, late President, in his college discourse before the Presbytery of New Brunswick a few months since, said “it is in the hands of citizens.” It always has been. Or Rutgers, of which Dr. Morse says, “Its funds, raised wholly by free donations,” &c., which never had any relation to the State. Or Columbia, “principally founded by the voluntary contributions of the inhabitants of the province, assisted by the General Assembly, and the corporation of Trinity Church,”‡ chartered in 1754, its worship Episcopal,

* Morse's *Geog.*, p. 524, the charter of 1747 was the second.

† Amount raised £2,200, much less than was subscribed.

‡ Morse, 497, cf. Ten Brook “*American State Universities*,” pp. 4, 5. The colonial appropriation, “looking toward a college,” (1747) has nothing to do with the history of Kings, or Columbia, and the action of the Lords of Trade about a grant of 20,000 acres of land, after the charter, was in aid of what Ten Brook styles “an Episcopal Seminary.”

and governed by a close corporation, the president of which must always be an Episcopalian. Or Brown, projected by the Philadelphia Association of Baptists, who sent James Manning to Newport, R. I., to start it, its charter of 1764 requiring that the President and a majority of the Fellows and Trustees shall be Baptists, of which it was true down to 1784 that its endowment came "solely from the beneficence and contributions of individuals, the government* not being sufficiently impressed with the importance of literature to lend it any further assistance than that of granting it a charter." It will be noticed that this charter made the college something more than Christian in its controlling element, viz: denominational, the first example of a denominational college in this respect in New England. Herein this and other institutions founded by Baptists are "sectarian," and all those founded by Congregationalists, East and West, are "non-sectarian,"—to use the phraseology of the United States Commissioner's reports,—for the charter or articles of incorporation of no college founded and endowed by us requires the majority of its Trustees to be always or at any time Congregationalists. It will occur to readers familiar with such subjects that this apparent illiberality was the natural child, in the case of earnest religious men, of the greater liberality of the Rhode Island constitution, so much boasted of,—in other words, that "the College of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,"—beginning not as Harvard did where suffrage was religious, or even as Yale did in this respect, but as a close corporation in a colony where no religious qualification for suffrage save Protestantism was regarded,—protected itself and the Baptist charities on which it was built, by making sure that the control of the corporation should always be Christian and something more, viz: Baptist. It would be particularly instructive, if the champions of State universities would show how Brown University—as free from even so free a State as it could possibly be—was "in an important sense a State institution," as to control or as to "methods of support, or in any

* *i. e.* Of Rhode Island. The quotation is from the letter of the Corporation to Dr. Franklin in London, given in the *History of Brown University* by R. A. Wild, Librarian, p. 244. Providence raised £4,280, and other towns £4,000 in 70. p. 13.

sense whatever. Or, these nine pre-Revolutionary colleges all failing them, an attempt at demonstrating that Dartmouth was such in any sense would be of interest. No New England man will be likely to attempt it as long as Daniel Webster's famous demonstration that it was not, endures! Mr. Crosby, in his "First Half Century of Dartmouth" (read before the Alumni in 1875) gives a graphic picture of the toils, travels, and collections of that extraordinary man, the first President, Wheelock, founder of the college and Moor's Charity School. On him and his family both rested in their first years, as private ventures of his; with the *college*, when he went into the wilderness at "Dresden" to plant it, even the Trustees had almost nothing to do; he was named President in the charter with power to appoint his successor. Of any original legislative aid to it the evidence is slight,—£100-110 at one time,* £500 for a building at another, two land grants, \$32,000 to the Agricultural Department, which is under a separate board of trust.† The Convention of Congregational Ministers, 1758-1762, concurred in Dr. Wheelock's foundation after the failure of their own. John Phillips of Exeter gave in 1770 the sum of \$3,333, and later the theological endowment. Four years after Phillips' first gift, Dr. Wheelock himself testified that the private munificence of Mr. John Thornton of England had been "the principal means of his support since he left Connecticut."‡ The

* Allen says one sum, Crosby the other (Allen in *Am. Qu. Reg.*, x, 26. The land grants are, I suppose, what Dr. Allen refers to as "a liberal endowment from the government and from individuals," p. 21. But on p. 20, he says 40,000 acres were given "partly by Governor Wentworth and partly by private individuals." No other lands given by Governor John Wentworth appear; though Governor Benning Wentworth gave five hundred acres, his personal share of a royal grant, and until it is clear whether it was Governor John Wentworth's personal share of a like character which entered into the 40,000 acre grant, it is impossible for readers to judge which of its two friends is meant when Dr. Allen says: "Governor Wentworth was the chief benefactor and patron." John Wentworth was "royal Governor, Dec. 13, 1769," the date of the charter (Crosby, pp. 5, 23). Mr. Webster said, "a number of the proprietors of lands" "had promised large tracts." *Speeches*, i, 111.

† The Corporation has twelve members; eight others are "*ex-officio*, in relation to funds given by the State" only,—a purely nominal representation. The State built the Medical College, and repaired it a year or two since at an expense of \$5,000, but the title is not in the college, the condition having been that the land on which it stands should be deeded to the State. *M.S. letter of Professor A. S. Hardy*, Apr. 2, 1876. Dartmouth is clearly the creation of private benevolence.

‡ *Am. Qu. Reg.*, x, 27.

legislature has never had any control over Dartmouth, and is never represented in its board. Mr. Webster showed before the United States Supreme Court in 1818, that the institution is a private charity; its charter good in law against the king, his heirs and successors forever,—the king not being in any sense the founder or having any power over it (e. g., such as that of visitation)—that the State of New Hampshire acquired no more than the king possessed; that there had been no *re-user* or *non-user* of the college franchises; and that the charter was not repealable by the legislature. The grant of lands in 1789,* he showed, was made “to a charity already existing,” and “the donation follows the nature of the charity.” “All eleemosynary corporations are private bodies. They are founded by private persons and on private property. The public cannot be charitable in these institutions. It is not the money of the public, but of private persons which is dispensed. It may be public, that is, general, in its uses and advantages; and the State may very laudably *add contributions of its own to the funds*; but it is still *private* in the tenure of the property, and in the right of administering the funds.” [Mr. Webster incidentally showed that in the case of Harvard, notwithstanding the claim now set up that the General Court of 1636 made the first donation “prior to the charter,” and notwithstanding the “small variation” from usage in giving the Overseers some power of inspection, the power of visitation was still in the Fellows and corporation.]† Moreover, the very issue in his celebrated case was whether the legislature could treat Dartmouth College as a State institution! It had attempted to enlarge the corporation and amend the charter, creating a new institution under the name of “Dartmouth University.” Mr. Webster showed that the twelve Trustees of the charter could not be made more without their consent, that they had exclusive legal rights and immunities, that the attempted addition of nine new Trustees and twenty-five Overseers would create a new corporation and transfer all property and franchises to it, which the State could not do, that no legislative power was competent thereto, that “whether all this be not in the highest

* Principally, it would seem, in Vermont.

† *Speeches*, i, 120, 121.

degree an indefensible and arbitrary proceeding, is a question of which there would seem to be but one side fit for a lawyer or a scholar to espouse." In his closing remarks Mr. Webster said, "*This, Sir, is my case.* It is the case, not merely of the humble institution, it is the case of every college in our land."[†] Thirteen years later it became, in principle, the case of Bowdoin College, chartered after the Revolution, 1794. The first property of Bowdoin was of mixed origin,—from the town of Brunswick from Governor James Bowdoin (the Governor's son), and from a grant of five townships of land,—from which last, junior to the others, nothing was derived till a site and buildings beside the charter had been secured.† But the charter conferred upon the Trustees and Overseers complete and exclusive power. When then, the Maine Legislature of 1831, attempted to legislate the Presidents of Bowdoin and Waterville colleges out of office the Circuit Court of the United States decided that the college at Brunswick was a private charity, had never surrendered any vested right, never had been under the control of the Legislature, and that the contract between the Boards (exercising sole and exclusive rights under the charter)—and the President could in no way be dissolved by the State. This re-affirms the principle sustained at Washington in the Dartmouth case affirmed by President Clap in 1763 in defence of Yale, and asserted by Magdalen College, Oxford, nearly two hundred years before Bowdoin, against James II. when he attempted to force the Puritan Fellows to recede from their election of Hough as President and substitute Parker, Bishop of Oxford.

* Professor Goodrich's report, Crosby, p. 52.

† The petitions for the incorporation were also mixed (1788), one from the Cumberland Association of Congregational Ministers and one from the County Court *Am. Quart. Reg.*, viii, 105. The sketch in *Scribner's Monthly* for May, 1876, gives the Ministers' petition the precedence, p. 47.

‡ "Of all the attempts of James II. to overturn the law and the rights of his subjects," says Mr. Webster (p. 128), "none was esteemed more arbitrary or tyrannical. And yet, that attempt was nothing but to put out one president and put in another." "When the charter of London was restored, . . . the expelled president and fellows of Magdalen were permitted to resume their rights." Mr. Webster draws from Burnet and Hume; a more graphic account of the great college struggle is in Macaulay, ii, 266-281. "The sentence of deprivation fulminated against the fellows dissolved those ties, once so close and dear, which had bound the Church of England to the house of Stuart." p. 281 (*Harper's Ed.*, 1849.)

Or, if Dartmouth and all the rest are unavailable to prove the precedence of State colleges in our history, one institution out of the pre-Revolutionary eleven yet remains, now known as the University of Pennsylvania. It received its present charter in 1791. "Since that period," says Dr. Charles J. Stillé, the Provost, "it has received nothing from the State except a contribution of \$200,000 towards the erection of the Hospital of its Medical Department. The Legislature has no control over its operations, makes no appropriation, and appoints no officers, although by our charter the Governor of the State is *ex-officio* the President of the Board of Trustees. Very large gifts have been made to the University, especially recently, but they all come from private persons, with the exception already stated."* This exception, of course, takes its place under Mr. Webster's description, "donations made by the legislature to a charity already existing; the donation follows the nature of the charity." But we have to do with this institution at an earlier day. General Eaton gives the date of its foundation as 1747, organization, 1748, charter, 1755. From this last date to 1779 it had been known as the College of Pennsylvania.† It had its Trustees with the usual powers, and had gathered its resources by subscription in England, South Carolina, Jamaica, and Philadelphia. "Thomas Penn, one of the Proprietaries, was by far the largest contributor to the funds"‡ Not a trace of State agency, even auxiliary, attaches to its origin or endowment. In 1779 its charter was declared void, its Faculty dissolved, and its charitable prop-

The history of the English Universities affords "no countenance to the view that they are the creatures of the State." "Their property was not derived from the State, but has been the gift of munificent individuals." "They have been independent and self-governed." "English ideas revolt at the notion of State-governed and State-nursed Universities." Their "ecclesiastical character has attracted men from their earliest foundation."—*Constitutional Progress*, by Professor Monagu Burrows, pp. 237, 240, 252, cf. later on p. 240.

* MS. letter, March 9, 1876.

† *Memoir* of Rev. Wm. Smith, D.D., (first Provost), by Provost Stillé, pp. 6, 51.

‡ *Memoir*, pp. 17, 24. Thomas Penn gave nearly £4,500, "and great reliance was placed upon his influence with his friends in England." The last generous gift to this institution is that of the friends of Mr. Welsh the present year, for a 'Welsh Professorship.'

erty given by law to a new Board of Trustees, "composed of certain State officials, of the senior clergyman of each of the principal religious denominations in the city, and of such other persons who were conspicuous members of the party which at that time controlled the State."* A new name was given to the new institution, "The University of the State of Pennsylvania." From the confiscated estates £1,500 a year was pledged. The act was in contravention of the State constitution of 1776, which contained general provisions protecting "the privileges, immunities, and estates" of the college like the particular one respecting Harvard in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. These were drawn up by Provost Franklin himself for the Convention, and moved by Dr. Franklin. The reason given for the outrage was that the college had asked any aid of the State!† After ten years of State tuition in 1789 it was repealed, the Assembly confessing it was "repugnant to justice, a violation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and dangerous in its precedent to all incorporated bodies and to the rights and franchises thereof."‡ and a half year later the two institutions were, on petition both, united in one. Plainly, any advocate of higher education by the State who should rely upon this case to prove aid in proving—its precedence in this country, would be upon a broken reed.

But clear as it is that State universities cannot be originating where this vain attempt is made to find the less clear is it where their origin is to be found. Always foreign to New England, they still are so. They are not native to the soil that first produced common schools, whose natural relation to voluntary Christian education needs no remark. An incorporated unsectarian college is a New England idea. A State university is a Southern idea. As a mere unrealized project it was older than the Revolution—appearing first in the South Carolina legislation of 1766 then in the North Carolina legislation of 1776, but in both

* *Memoir*, p. 51.

† *Ib.*, p. 54.

‡ Chap. ii, Secs. 44, 45, *Memoir*, p.

§ *Ib.*, p. 57.

without result,—reappearing in the more imposing form of Mr. Jefferson's scheme of 1779 in Virginia,* and in Maryland in two short-lived colleges—a third and fourth time to fail, again in Georgia and South Carolina in 1785—to be partially realized in the latter (in three colleges which quickly sunk to grammar schools) and in both only realized, according to the plan, in 1801.† Mr. Jefferson's Virginia plan re-appeared under a charter in 1819, under an actual organization in 1825, but is not yet fully realized. With whom the State idea originated it is impossible now to say,—probably *not* with Mr. Jefferson, who wrought it into more symmetry than any other, and with whom, perhaps, the un-religious features of his plan found favor not only from his personal free-thinking, but also from the difficulties he encountered in vainly striving to make over 'so sectarian a college'‡ as William and Mary into a State university. *Perhaps in this matter, as in political doctrine and practice, Massachusetts and South Carolina are the original representatives in our history of two diverse theories of the higher education.* The most munificent foundation for a college independent of the State was laid in Massachusetts; the most imposing outfit in its time for a State university was provided in South Caro-

* "Mr. Jefferson, for the first time in America, threw open the doors of a University, in the true sense of the name, providing for thorough instruction in *independent schools*, in all the chief branches of learning, allowing students to select for themselves the departments to which they were led by their special tastes and proposed pursuits in life," etc. *Catalogue*, 1876-7, p. 23. How different, therefore, the pre-Revolutionary College and the State university in more respects than those named heretofore, origin, endowment, control, religious relations, any one can see. And Mr. Jefferson's plan only reached organization a hundred years and more after Yale, nearly two hundred after Harvard.

† All but Georgia university plan two years later than peace with Great Britain, may be set opposite the eleven colleges before the Revolution, as founded on the rival, Southern plan. Mr. Ten Brook mentions a grant of Virginia to Kentucky Company of confiscated British property, 8,000 acres of land, but is not able to state whether Transylvania University at Lexington, now merged in Kentucky University, was founded on the grant. So even Professor Adams characterizes it.

‡ The writer by no means denies that a State institution can be at the same time sectarian—if Prelacy is the State religion—(nor that William and Mary was sectarian, though never a State university); his contention simply is, it will be borne in mind, in behalf of the contemporary "Congregational" colleges, that they were neither State institutions *nor* sectarian, as was the Episcopal College in Virginia.

lina—the Legislature giving it, at that early day, in twenty years \$286,000. As none of this was from national land-grants—the offer of which might make any people seem more favorable to the junior, or political, theory of the higher education than they really are—it places South Carolina, in its capacity as a government, at the head of the Southern movement, as the lovers of learning in Massachusetts are still at the head of the Northern one. Four Southern States followed South Carolina, and the people of the Northern and Middle States followed Massachusetts.

The idea of universities originally started in the old Northwestern Territory was somewhat different from the Southern idea: it was that of a foundation by grants of national land, not by State taxation, though the latter plan soon followed it from the South, and has been combined with it in the later universities and agricultural colleges. The new Northwestern university idea was that of a New England man, Rev. Manasses Cutler, LL.D., of Ipswich, Mass., a graduate of Yale in 1765, and honored by both Yale and Harvard,—the man who inserted in the Northwestern Ordinance of 1787 the provisions of the (then new) Constitution of Massachusetts* against slavery, and in favor of religion, morality, knowledge, and schools. The Ordinance in these respects contains “a condensed abstract of the Massachusetts Constitution.” “The Ordinance and the Ohio Purchase were parts of one and the same transaction.” Dr. Cutler was shaping them at New York with Congress in 1787, as agent of the “Ohio Company,” two years after university action failed in the five Southern States. These failures probably influenced him. “Religion, knowledge, and morality,” says the Ordinance, “being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind; schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.” This is a condensation of Amendment XI. to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, and of Sect. II, Chap. v, in respect to “the interests of literature and the sciences and all seminaries of them.” In the Ohio Purchase for the first time in this country a section

* Art. on “*Dr. Cutler and the Ordinance of 1787*” in *North Amer. Review*, Apr. 1876. *MS. Letter* of Hon. W. P. Cutler, Feb. 17, 1877. *Massachusetts was then the only State that had abolished slavery.*

in each township or fractional township was reserved "for religion," i. e., for the support of an educated ministry, and two townships for a university.* From this came the earliest college in the Northwest, at Athens, O., and all the university grants made since to Southern and Western and Pacific States have followed Dr. Cutler's idea. The Ohio University Act, the course of study and the first selection of instructors were all Dr. Cutler's work, yet the project has never flourished. "The very movers" in it, "long ago discouraged, established a college at their beloved Marietta,"† on the opposite, the voluntary New England plan, which has had a history of noble and growing usefulness; and it was fitting—when the Western College Society closed its first quarter of a century of help to this and others farther West—that its Jubilee was held at Marietta.

Passing now to the popular and religious source of our early grammar and common schools, it will be convenient to treat them together—indeed difficult to do otherwise—and to take the points disclosed in the historical facts in the order opposite to that thus far pursued.

1. Both these classes of schools were from the first thoroughly religious in character, as much so as the early colleges. It needs no proof that the place of the Bible and prayer in them in our own day is a survival—it came down to us from more religious times. What then has it survived? What has passed away? *The Catechism*,—with such explanations of it as the old time teachers were able to give. The Catechism was for formal school and college religious instruction, the Bible for devotion; and generations preceding ours judged that prayer and the devotional use of the Bible were fittest to survive. It was a rational survival, not under some imagined natural law, but from judgment and choice.

* In a letter to his son, Judge Ephraim Cutler of Ohio, Aug. 7, 1818, this historic New Englander wrote, "the establishment of a university was a first object, and lay with great weight on my mind." The reservation of two townships is mentioned in the report of the Committee of Congress (Carrington, chairman, who held the same place on Committee on the Ordinance), July 23, 1787, in the Ohio Company's letter to the Treasury, July 26,—in the contract between them, Oct. 27,—in the patent for 750,000 acres executed by George Washington, May 10, 1792,—and in the University Act, Jan. 9, 1802. *MS. Letter* of Hon. W. P. Cutler.

† Ten Brook, *State Univ.*, p. 33.

2. It is quite as clear that, when they began to be controlled by town votes,—or municipal ordinances as we should call them, and by colony statutes, the religious character of all the schools was a matter of requirement, and was the paramount consideration. The Massachusetts legislation (in force until 1824) made "the principles of piety" the first subject of instruction, and provided for supervision by the local officers; that of 1768 named "the Promotion of Religious Good Morals;" in 1654 soundness in the faith was required along with a good conversation, as in all the school laws. The preamble of the famous law of 1647, (commonly known from part of its provisions "the grammar school law") is by Bancroft thus: * "To the end that learning may be buried in the graves of our forefathers," and by Prof. Johnson in nearly the same words. This fragmentary quotation betrays the hand of the churches in it. It actually ran thus:

"It being one chiefe project of y^tould deluder, Satan, to keepe men from the *knowledge of y^e Scriptures*, as in former times by keeping y^m in an unknown tongue, so in these latter times by perswading from y^e use of tongues, y^t so at least the sense and meaning of y^e originall might be clouded by the glosses of saint seeming deceivers, y^t learning may be buried in y^e grave of o^r fath^{rs} in y^e church and commonwealth, the Lord assisting our endeavors." Ordered, etc.

The order of 1642 requiring the selectmen of every town to "have a vigilant eye over their neighbors to see, that none of them shall suffer so much Barbarism in any of their *families* as not to teach, *by themselves or others*, their Children and Apprentices so much learning," etc., was coupled with "that all masters of families do once a week (at the least) chuse their children and servants in the grounds and principles of religion." Mr. Mann † finds in the first part only the idea of "barbarism" two centuries (and more) ago; he overlooks the connected idea that to be unevangelized was barbarism. Mr. Bancroft in his first edition and last (1874) calls this the law of all "New England, 1642," and has since have followed him headlong; but it was not Connecticut

* *Hist.*, i, 369. Cf. 29th Rep. Mass. Bd. of Ed., p. 72. *Mass. Coll. Rec.*

† 10th *Mass. Rep.* (revised), pp. 8, 9.

till 1650. Bancroft adds that grammar schools were "in 1647 ordered in *all* the Puritan colonies," which also was not copied in Ludlow's code, re-enacting the Massachusetts preamble, till years after.* In this, catechising or learning "some short orthodox catechism" was also required. So Governor Eaton's New Haven Code of 1655 gave the deputies or constable the charge of seeing that children and apprentices learn "the main grounds and principles of Christian religion necessary to salvation." Later laws in 1690, 1715,† made this binding till after the Revolution.

But earlier than any of this continuous and uniform legislation—earlier than the date of *any school law whatever*, and absolute proof of the religious source of the schools—was a "request" of the General Court of Massachusetts, June 2, 1641, *just a year earlier than the order about "Barbarism,"* etc., "that the elders would make a catechism for the instruction of youth in the grounds of religion." This was,‡ says Palfrey, "*the first step taken by the central government* in respect to education." With this the churches must have had something to do.

3. The voluntary principle was just as distinctly recognized in the first schools as the religious principle. Both had been always recognized in raising college appropriations. In 1652 the General Court *requested* that for raising up suitable Rulers and Elders subscriptions be *solicited* in all the towns to assist charity scholars at Cambridge.§ This was not taxation. In 1677 the Court asked for a subscription for the new brick col-

* Roger Ludlow, Esq., of Fairfield, "had lived sometime before coming to Conn. in Mass." and the Mass. Code "was adopted there a year and a half after Mr. Ludlow had been appointed by the Conn. colony to prepare a code." *MS. Letter of Rev. Jno. G. Baird*, Mar. 22, 1876. See Bancroft, *Hist.* i, 369 (Cent. Ed.) where the old clauses about the Gen. Court and Mr. Harvard are now omitted. (First Ed. 458.)

† For the supply of families with Bibles and catechisms, among other things.

‡ ii, 46. He is speaking of general education. So the Patroon system in New York, placed the support of schoolmaster and clergyman side by side, and Maryland placed her schools, later, under the instruction of churchmen only. Eliot, *History*, xliii, 138. Hon. H. Barnard, in Stebbins' *Cent. Nat. Existence*, p. 346.

§ Rev. J. B. Felt, *Hist. Ipswich*, etc., p. 92. The same, *Annals of Salem*, pp. 174, 175, 187. Rev. E. Pratt, *Hist. Eastham*, etc., p. 36. At a Quarterly Court, Boston, 1639, "a voluntary contribution was ordered each quarter for the ministry." Felt, *Annals of Salem*, p. 125.

lege building, begun in 1675. This was no more like t for the "universitie" than its *recommendation* in 1646, t church having but one minister should employ some Cambridge student, for his good, if not for its own. Connecticut law of 1650 "confirmed" the suggestion Commissioners of the United Colonies in 1644, about these "poor scholars," i. e., that "every family able and should send in "yearly the fourth part of a bushel of something equivalent;" and this was simply "comm and "left to the freedom" of the people, "that as no m feel any grievance thereby, so it would be a blessed n comfortable provision for the diet of divers such stud may stand in need."† So the Massachusetts law of 1 given the people not public schools, as it is often q show, but a choice between family instruction "*by them others.*" (See ante, p. 477.) With the same deference voluntary, popular action, room was always made for gifts to schools of both grades,—for sites, for buildings, the support of teachers. The town annals abound in n proprietors and citizens who gave them. The hire of a was raised "in various ways" at Dedham, Massachu 1644, a Latin school fund created in 1684, and other 1744.‡ In 1650, 1652, 1683, 1794, at Ipswich, in Salem, in 1636 at Boston, in 1673 at New London, in 1 1751 at Providence, and in other towns in other yea records occur. These are only a few notices among mu The cases of support by tuition in part along with publi priations are too numerous even to be sampled. The chusetts law of 1647 and the Connecticut copy of it both provided that the master's wages "shall be paid, e the parents or masters of such children, or by the inh in general, by way of supply, as the major part of the order the prudentials of the town shall appoint." V vindicating this old mixed method, it is sufficient to sh it was the early way, and that neither High nor c schools resting upon taxation alone are lineal descen those of the colonists of New England. In 1644 the

* Felt's *Salem*, p. 175, cf. 174, Mr. Endecott's recommendation.

† Barnard, *Jour. Ed.*, iv, 661.

‡ Worthington's *Hist. Ded.*

magistrates ordered notice to be given on Lecture day that all should hand in the names of their children who were fit for school, "and what they will give for one whole year." In 1705 children at Plymouth who were one mile from school, and their parents not subscribers to the school fund, were to pay 4*d.* per week for being taught Latin, writing and ciphering; those who lived farther away half as much.

4. Both classes of schools arose when the churches controlled everything secular,—when, in the words of one of our latest histories,—“the elders of the church, clerical and lay, were as much magistrates as the magistrates themselves.”* “When the General Court,” says Palfrey,† “took cognizance of ecclesiastical affairs, it was but the whole body of the Church legislating for its parts;” and when it took cognizance of college or school it was but legislating for a part of the whole method by which religion was maintained and advanced. That a grand jury, then, should present the selectmen of four towns in Maine in 1675 for “not taking care that their children and youth be taught their catechism according to law” (in Massachusetts), was perfectly legitimate;‡ as much so as that Salem should direct that “Mr. Cotton’s catechism be used in families,” or Ipswich Dr. Watts’s in schools, or the Governor and Council advise the clergy to catechise from house to house. Our fathers have long been under reproach for the character of *some* laws passed when Church and State were one. Let us turn the tables a moment. If the churches are to be robbed of the credit of *anything* done for education, in college or school, then must they logically be relieved of the discredit of any of the laws! Congregationalism made American education at the first; though it did not make it the State education of to-day. As well pretend that the Established Church of England had “nothing to do” any way with the present Education Act, because it was passed by Parliament, of which part only of one House is composed of ecclesiastical officers, and many members, at least, of the Commons,—as pre-

* Eliot, *Hist.*, p. 31. In 1632 Boston asked Plymouth and Salem whether one could hold both offices at the same time. Felt, *Salem*, p. 57.

† *Hist.*, ii, 40.

‡ Maine Hist. Coll., i, 285, cf. Virg. Law, 1631.

tend that anything but Congregationalism made our first education.* It wrought its own free, voluntary element into its beginnings, even when Church and State were one. No other body of Christians ever did that, as no other ever voluntarily gave up the entire handling of the education of a people. The only wonder is that they did *not* put all into the hands of their Church-State from the outset. They created such legislatures as no constituency would now elect; and these aided in establishing such schools and colleges as no legislature would now establish. Because they did this through public bodies entirely under church control, it does not logically follow that the State now,—so contradistinguished from the churches,—is walking in their footsteps in establishing those of so different a character, any more than it follows because a Republican House of Congress filled its offices with loyal Republicans, that a Democratic "House" did the same thing in filling them with ex-Confederates.

5. Both classes of schools existed before the State acted at all. After setting forth the voluntary, unpolitical, private character of our colleges as "eleemosynary" institutions, Mr. Webster adds: "The numerous academies in New England have been established substantially in the same manner. They hold their property by the same tenure *and no other.*"† In the case of those aided by the State, the Massachusetts Academy Act of Feb. 27, 1797, provided (2dly) that every part of the State should be equally entitled to grants "*in aid of private donations*"; and (3dly) that *no* State lands ought to be granted to any academy, but in aid of permanent funds, secured by towns and individual donors," &c.‡ Thus, Groton Academy (1793) received a land grant in 1797. Seven or more in all, incorporated before that year, received such grants. Leicester Academy, founded by Ebenezer Crafts and Jacob Davis in 1784, received one in 1793 which produced \$9,200; but this was in aid of private gifts, and three gifts amount to \$25,100.

* "It was the old school orthodoxy that fled from England in times of the icy breath of persecution, and that planted the common school system in the rocky soil of New England." Rev. Joseph Cook, *Monday Lecture*, Boston, May 7, 1877. But it planted the "school" before the "system."

† *Speeches*, i, 121.

‡ Barnard, *Jour. Ed.*, xvi, 481, ib. ii, 50.

constituting the Waters, Waldo, and Smith Funds. Phillips Academy, Andover (1778), realized about \$2,000, "while nearly every thing which has made it what it is, so far as money goes, has been the outright gift of its founder and friends."* The State has no more supported such institutions than it founded or governed them. Phillips Exeter (1781) had no State aid but exemption from taxation. Dr. John Phillips gave it \$65,000,† and other gifts have about equaled this sum. The annual New York grants to academies, through the (misnamed) Regents of the University (1787), are also on the principle of aid to existing corporations. Academies farther south were often unincorporated, and purely private.

Let us ascend nearer the sources. At the close of the Revolution only three States, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, had town schools, while Maryland had county schools.‡ No beginnings of primary and secondary education that existed elsewhere had anything to do of course with the State. Maryland had Charlotte Hall, without any grammar school law, while the law in the other States was a failure. "It is not certain that any locality save Boston has constantly complied with the ancient statutes."§ Secondary education depended on the academies. Besides those which preceded or grew into colleges,—Moor's Charity School, Liberty Hall, Pennsylvania, Prince Edward, University Grammar School (R. I.),—there were Kingston (1774), Rutgers Grammar (1770, coëval with the College), Columbia and Dummer (1763), Ger-

* *MS. letter of Dr. John L. Taylor, April 4, 1876. Washburn's Hist. Leic. Acad.* Other academies thus aided have passed away, returning large funds to the public for high schools. The policy of the State has multiplied inferior institutions, as the denominational policy has, "doling out a few hundred dollars now and then or a few acres of land to starve them upon."—*Rep. St. Sup. Me.* (Hon. E. P. Weston), 1862, p. 97. Bradford, the oldest seminary for girls in the land, was refused aid, though Mt. Holyoke, as an exception to female seminaries, received \$40,000 out of its \$300,000.—*Hist. Sketch*, p. 6. Vassar, Smith, Wellesley, &c., are like Williston, monuments of private munificence entirely. It may seem hardly credible to New England readers, but a professor in a Western State University has actually asserted of Congregationalists that their "best academies and colleges of to-day grew out of public treasuries."

† *Catalogue*, 1869, p. ix, *MS. letter of Prin. A. C. Perkins, April 11, 1876.*

‡ *Hildreth, Hist.*, iii, 386.

§ *Rev. Charles Hammond in Barnard's Jour. Educ.*, xvi, 419.

mantown (1760), Hopewell (1756), the three Hopkins Schools, at New Haven, Hartford, and Hadley (1660, 1665, 1669), and the Boston Latin (1635),—all before the Revolution. But there were private Latin schools earlier than these; and it was common for clergymen to take academic pupils. Mr. Chauncey did so at Scituate. Before Manning and Stelle in Warren and Providence, Roger Williams did so (1654). No public school then existed in Rhode Island, an attempt at Newport in 1640 having failed.* Dorchester had a Latin school, mixed in its support, in 1639, and Hartford in 1638. The year before this Ezekiel Cheever had arrived at New Haven, and his school there for twelve years,—preparing students for Harvard,—was of the same mixed character. That of Daniel Maude at Boston two years earlier still (1636) seems to have been altogether private, supported by contributions of Winthrop, Vane, and Bellingham.† This brings us to the origin of the Boston Public Latin School (and of classical preparatory education in this country), either in the subscription of that year, or in the request of the townsmen the year before, of “brother Philemon Pormont” that he “be *entreated* to become schoolmaster,—but, in either case, a popular and not a State or public origin. Even Mr. Mann says,‡ “Doubtless he received fees from parents.” All this throws light upon the remark of the careful historian of New England§ upon the “grammar school” law of 1647, “the measure was all the more impressive for having originated in a general voluntary movement of the people.” Voluntary schools had prepared its way.

And this is equally true of common schools. Though the distinction was made from the first between the two grades of

* Palfrey, ii, 48, cf. 237, note 1. Deane's *Scituate*, p. 92. “I suppose that there was no formal authority by which the towns could tax themselves till the State Act of 1647. But I do not think they cared much for such authority. As early as 1645 there is a vote providing for the mending of the school fence.” *MS. letter* of Rev. Edward E. Hale, March 23, 1877. The New England ministers and magistrates acted “in advance of any legislation on the subject.” Hon. H. Barnard in Stebbins's “*First Cent. of Nat. Existence*,” p. 347.

† Palfrey, ii, 47.

‡ 10th Report, p. 7.

§ ii, 262, note 2. Mr. Barnard thinks that Mr. Pormont's school was “elementary” and that of Mr. Maude, who was an educated clergyman, “an endowed school of the higher grade” for the children of the “richer inhabitants.” If so, both were on the voluntary basis. Stebbins' “*First Cent.*,” p. 347.

struction, there were not everywhere two separate schools. The very first schools, being voluntary, were,—even oftener than the later ones under law,—of a double character. There were private schoolmasters who were not at all classical scholars. The Latinity of Boston and New Haven even could always be provided for. Not only did the towns act for the State, but the people moved for primary instruction rather than the towns. Family schools came into existence. Laws requiring instruction by “parents or others” recognize

Southward Church schools. The first common school in Pennsylvania (1688) was private,—tuition eight shillings *annum*.^{*} New York had competition among private schools in 1670, when Jan Jaurians Beecker was “allowed schoolmaster at Albany,” and they sprang up on every side alone where there was no system by law.[†] The children of Plymouth were “catechised and taught to read” in 1623, though they had “no common school, or means to maintain” and in 1635,—the same year the voluntary foundation was laid for classical learning at Boston, three years before the Harvard class,—they had one, though “it was many years before public schools were established in Plymouth colony by”[‡] The people looked after both elementary and advanced instruction before they “thought upon a College,” and neither of the three was the child of governmental power.

Thus topples to the ground the absurd claim of precedence for higher State institutions in this country, and with it the unchallenged assumption that all lower schools had their source in certain early laws, which have been quoted and cited, aside from the history of the people, till the impression has been made that there was nothing else, or, at least, nothing earlier. Both higher and lower, doubtless, *wherever simply rest on taxation*, have their source in law; but this is so much like an identical proposition for comment. The source, however, of their beginnings belongs not to the State, but to that which is attempted to be robbed of it—the voluntary philanthropic spirit of our fathers—“the love of freedom,

arnes's *Cent. Hist.*, p. 88.

† Ibid, p. 89.

‡ Palfrey, ii, 46.

knowledge, and virtue, which formed part of the original stock of Puritan character." Gradually primary schools passed into public hands entirely; secondary schools never but in part; the New England colleges never at all. Christian benevolence, the mother of all three, to this day claims the last, and more munificently than State power can, provides for them.

The student of history sees at once and clearly how the tide has run. The State university movement is not an ancient but a later one, "a reaction,"* against which the tide is now turning, and in favor of the methods of our fathers. The reasons why they adopted a different policy for that education which should and can be for the whole people, and for that which cannot be obvious to the scholar, the patriot, and the Christian. To discuss the validity of those reasons is no part of the object of this historical inquiry.

* *New Englander*, July, 1873.

**ARTICLE V.—ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
A SOCIETY IN CONNECTION WITH A CHURCH.***

THE "church" is a voluntary spiritual association, having no civil rights or powers, and not known, at all, in civil law. The "Society," or "Parish," is a civil corporation which holds the property and manages the temporalities of the community congregation of people who associate together for the employment of a pastor, and the maintenance of religious worship. It usually includes the adult males of the congregation, whether or not they are members of the church.

The necessity for the existence of the Society, and its utility to the church, are just now coming into prominent discussion. Does the church need any helping Society? Is the Society really helpful to the church? Is this co-partnership of the spiritual and the temporal right? Ought the church to manage its own temporal concerns? The inquiry is equally pertinent to all denominations whose financial affairs are managed by "vestrymen" or "trustees," however named. The Episcopalians are discussing the question, and in some dioceses, only communicants of the church are eligible to the office of vestryman. The Baptists have some churches without Societies. Conflicts or friction between the church and the Society are frequent and sometimes deplorably harmful. Many churches in the Western States have no allied Society, and think that they manage their finances more successfully without it, than they could with it. The acknowledged importance of the subject led the National Congregational Council of 1874, to appoint a committee of seven to report upon it at the Council of 1877.

An inquiry into the subject includes four points, viz: as to

- I. The origin and history of the Society ;—
- II. Its advantages ;—
- III. Its disadvantages ;—
- IV. The desirableness of the church's assuming the whole management of the temporalities.

* Prepared by appointment as a report to the General Association of New York, and presented at the annual meeting in Norwich, N. Y., Oct. 25, 1875.

I. When, where, and why did the Society originate?

Our Lord Jesus found the church associated with the civil government, and sustained by it. But in His reconstruction of His church, He practically took it out of this connection with the civil government, as to control and material support, and placed it on a spiritual and voluntary basis. In the admirable description and picture of the Apostolic church, Acts ii, 44-47; iv, 32-37, no form of a co-operative secular Society is discernible. "Neither was there any among them that lacked." The church, a voluntary spiritual association, was complete and sufficient in itself for all the purposes of its existence. Thus starting out, it was immediately successful. For three centuries, the primitive churches, without the aid of secular societies, but in the face of hostility and persecution from the civil authority, grew and multiplied and managed their temporalities with success and rapidity of increase, which, if repeated in this nineteenth century, would fill God's people with joy unspeakable.

By the beginning of the fourth century, Christianity was acknowledged by the Roman empire, and the hitherto independent spiritual churches became incorporated with the civil government in a union of Church and State for thirteen hundred years. Of course this period of history furnishes nothing pertinent to our inquiry concerning churches as voluntary spiritual bodies. We come down to the settlement of America, and the planting of churches here, in the seventeenth century.

Historically the churches of all denominations in our country have inherited their church and society system as a relic from the union of church and State in the countries in Europe from which the first colonists to America came. Here, as in their native countries, they held the obligation of the civil government, or of all the inhabitants, in some manner to support or help to support the church. Every nation in Europe considered the church essential to its life, and a part of itself. The idea of a complete, formal separation of church and State had not then dawned upon the human mind. This result we have reached only step by step, through the slow progress of more than two centuries of discussion and struggling in England and the United States. The Puritans had it as the first step in their mission to develop and establish the congregational or

democratic polity of the church. The entire separation of the church from the dictation, control, and support of the State was an after growth. The General Court of Massachusetts, in every grant of a new township organization, stipulated as one condition that the town should set apart a lot for a meeting-house, build the house, and support a minister. It was recommended that "every man voluntarily set down what he is willing to allow to that end and use." This voluntary method was successfully acted upon by many churches, though not by all, prior to the year 1654. In other towns church support was by legal taxation and appropriation. The chief current financial business of a church is the raising of the pastor's salary. On each Sabbath, in Puritan Massachusetts, the people brought their voluntary offerings, in money, or goods, or pledges, to the sanctuary, and delivered them to the deacons for the minister's support. Thus the towns, as civil corporations, voted to support the preaching of the gospel, but left the method of its doing to individual free action.

The parish and the town were territorially the same. Only church members were voting citizens, until 1665. But when dissenters from "the standing order" grew up among them, or immigrants of a different creed, or of no creed, came in, and refused to pay toward the minister's support, the civil government, in accordance with the spirit of the age, assessed and collected an equitable rate from the dissenters' property. Still later, after the desolating French and Indian wars, the State granted special pecuniary aid to many impoverished churches,—still on the ground of the necessity of the church to the prosperity of the State. As we follow down the current of history, we find that dissension and changing legislation continued, until, in the year 1833, it was thought that the State was completely divorced from the churches. Unhappily this separation was not allowed to remain complete.

For the sentiment yet lingered, the inheritance of time-honored education and habit, that the churches needed and had right to some sort of civil support, though not direct and formal, or support from citizens not communicants in the church. The church was as fully as ever before, the benefactor of the State. "Societies," or "Parishes," were therefore volun-

tarily organized, to own and control the meeting-house and other church property, to employ and pay the pastor, and in all financial matters to have a separate or a co ordinate power with the church,—the churches not then suspecting that in seeking a servant, or helper, they were getting a master. Practically the separation of church and State thus gained, for the protection of the church from contamination by secular power, was the putting of the church outside of law and civil recognition, making it incapable of managing its pecuniary affairs, like a mad idiot, a minor, or a convict,—and so making it need a civil guardian.

In Connecticut, after the abolition of compulsory support of churches of "the standing order," in 1784, and of all churches, in 1821, the Society was still maintained, on the ground that all persons who contributed, even voluntarily, to the support of the church, ought to have a voice in the expenditure of the church money. In that state, the Society has legal power to tax the property of its members, though this method is not usually practiced.

These traditions from the early colonists, prevailing in all denominations, and the general tenor of civil legislation to control property, have carried the society or parish system in to all the States.

II. What advantages accrue to the church from the "Society," or "Parish,"—or from a board of "Trustees," or "Vestrymen," chosen by the congregation?

1. Since the civil government ignores churches, as spiritual associations, having a creed and covenant and ordinances, it is supposed that a civil society is a legal necessity, as a body corporate, to hold property, to make contracts, to sue and be sued, and to authoritatively transact any financial business. Thus, a minister can collect his salary of the Society, or Trustees, but not of the church, by process of law. The general statute of this state, New York, provides that any male citizen, who has stately attended any church services, and paid toward their support, and whose name has been in possession of the clerk of the church, during one year, may vote in the election of trustees, or vestrymen. This statute at once creates a "Society,"—makes the congregation a civil society for every church,

whether or not the church wish it, to the extent of the power stated, viz: to hold the real estate and to manage the finances of the church and congregation. It is a question worthy of consideration whether the State does not thus transcend its rights and oppress the church. Be this as it may, it certainly is equally within the prerogative of the State to recognize each church as a Society, or to create the church a Society, for temporal purposes,—as is done in Iowa. (See III, 2, below). In the opinion of an able attorney, consulted by the committee, new legislation would be required, in this state, to enable churches to simply and safely to assume the management of their financial affairs; though even now the church might organize as a joint stock company, and manage its own temporalities. Or, an individual might legally hold the church property in trust for the church.

But it is the policy of the civil government to recognize the custom of every order of churches, in the exercise of their own freedom. And therefore if it be the custom of any order of churches to manage their own financial affairs, without the agency of a Society, the State will supply all needed legislation to give full validity to their action, *in this respect*,—but not, of course, in any matter of creed, or discipline, or taxation of individual property. The requirement that a man must be a member of the church before he can be eligible to membership in the Society, or to the office of Committee-man of the Society, or Trustee or Vestryman of the congregation), might be adopted as an adroit device, but it would be disingenuous on the part of the church, and really a delusion and fraud upon the Society. Not many high-minded men would wish to belong to a Society that was thus hampered and restricted. Special acts of the Legislature of this State* (New York), concerning

*The Legislature of N. Y. State, May 18, 1876, enacted a law, at the request of the Southern N. Y. Baptist Association, to enable "any Baptist Church . . . to secure the benefits of incorporation." §2. "The members of any such church, of full age, and every person of full age who shall, for one year preceding, have been a paying pew-holder, or seat-holder, in the place of worship of said church, shall have been during said year a yearly paying subscriber for the support of said church, may"—vote in the election of Trustees,—and the Trustees so elected shall be a body corporate," to (§6) "transact all business relating to the renting of pews, the payment of the pastor's salary, and all the other temporalities of said

the Reformed Dutch churches, constitute the *minister, elders, and deacons* the trustees of the church, to administer its temporalities; and concerning Presbyterian churches, constitute a Presbytery, or its officers, a body corporate, to hold the property of individual churches and to convey it. Special legislation may as readily be had by Congregational churches if they wish it and ask for it.

2. It is thought that the Society interests non-church-members in the pecuniary support of the church, and then, by their pecuniary investment, makes them attendants upon the meetings of the church, for public worship, and the preaching of the word, and to some degree upon all the social and prayer meetings also. Thus money is gained to the Lord's treasury, which would not otherwise be gained, and men are brought to hear the gospel and under active Christian influences, who would otherwise be absent.

There is great force in the argument. Its full validity should be acknowledged. Yet it may be strongly met, or fully offset, by opposing facts. Well-meaning and intelligent men, not members of the church, will pay as cheerfully and largely, or nearly so, when the custom and habit are established, and will attend as constantly and profitably upon the preaching, without a Society, as with one. This is the honorable character of the great majority of men in our Societies. Many of them are strong pillars in the pecuniary support of the church, and in the interest which they manifest in the prosperity of every enterprise of the church. Like Miles Standish they would defend the church with their swords, if there were occasion. But, with few exceptions, we think, they will concur with the churches in the methods of financial administration which the

church; but such trustees shall have no right to divert the property of said church from uses appointed by the church, or to settle or remove any pastor or minister of said church, or to change or determine his salary or compensation; or to fix or change the times, nature or order of the public or social worship of said church; or to alienate, sell or encumber the property of said church, or to incur debts beyond what may be necessary for the proper care, repairs and preservation of the property of said church, unless such authority is specially conferred by said church upon such trustees," and also "approved by a majority present at a meeting of the persons qualified to vote for trustees." §7. If any "elected trustee" "cease to attend and to support the worship of said church" for "six consecutive months, he forfeits his office."

arches, after mature consideration, may adopt. They would be the preacher and the preaching just as well, and would give the same benefit from it, as they do now. They would honorably and justly pay for what they received. Ordinarily, as matter of fact, now, very few pew-holders or nominal members of the Society, who are not church members, attend the society's meeting, or care to give any vote in its affairs, except cases of special excitement. When they see the anomalous character of the Society's existence, they will, for the most part, readily assent to its abolition. While those who avowedly pay by virtue of their being members of the Society, commitmen, trustees, or vestrymen, are likely to be near kinsmen of Strophes, or Alexander the coppersmith, whose apparent help is real harm.

6. It is said to be *just* that all who pay money to the church should have a voice in the use made of the money which they
7. There should be no taxation, avowed or implied, without representation.

This is a plausible plea. Justice ought to rule in all dealing the church with the world. If any moneys paid into the church treasury were of the nature of an investment, or a subscription paid for stock in a company, the plea would hold,—the argument would be valid. Our answer to the plea is that all support of the church is entirely voluntary, and ought to be an act of conscience and honor, by church member and non-church member alike. Hence the maxim, "No taxation without representation" does not apply. The contributor votes upon the use to be made of his money in his act of giving it to the church. The church does not *tax* the polls, or the property, of its own members, and does not receive any money from them in the character of equitable tribute-money. We have no church rates, or church dues. The church ought not to admit the principle of any *rights* purchased in it or over it, by church members or by non-church members, with money. Every dollar contributed to the support of the church, by whomsoever contributed,—the widow's two mites and the rich man's abundance,—is to be received and used as a free and outright gift, a free will offering, through the church, to the Lord. Whoever gives his money to the pastor, or to the church treasury, parts

with all claim upon it, as fully as does the donor of a dollar to a street beggar, or the donor of a million of dollars to trustees to found a university. The full recognition and acceptance of this idea will probably be the abolition of annual pew rentings and all forms of assessments, and of all individual ownership of pews, or shares of stock, in the church edifice. The Sunday offering method, now rapidly extending among the churches, will facilitate this reform. We have it, in the churches, without any hint or thought of a helping society other than the church, as our immediate and imperative commission from our Lord, the Head of the church, to give His gospel to the world, as freely as He has given it to us, and not to ask the world to pay for it. This principle we acknowledge and act upon, now, in our missionary work. We give the gospel to the heathen nations, without charge. The same principle holds, and we ought to act upon it in the same way, with reference to all who are out of Christ's kingdom at our own doors. In its attitude toward the world, every church is a missionary society, in New York city equally as in Bombay, in New York State as in China and Japan. Intelligent and noble-minded men not members of the church, will freely give to its support, for the benefit that they receive from it.

4. It is said that the Society secures to the church the services of capable business men in the management of its temporalities, without whose aid many weak or small churches could not be maintained.

We offset this plea by two considerations. The affairs of churches ought not to be administered on the principles on which secular business is managed. Those principles are selfish. "There is no friendship in trade." But the whole work of the church is a work of benevolence, in Christ's name, and for Christ's sake. A worldly business mind cannot rightly apprehend it. This world-wise policy has been to the great injury of many churches. The treasurer of a certain ecclesiastical Society is a shrewd business man, chosen treasurer for that reason. Yet his own subscription is almost nothing, and he almost never enters the sanctuary on the Sabbath. Now, in the judgment of the community itself, that church is not doing its work decently and in order. And as to feeble churches,

have not sufficient talent to manage their temporalities, therefore cannot stand alone, nor with the counsel and help of sister churches,—it would probably be better, in most cases, they should cease to exist. Christian men and women who manage their own business, can passably manage churchness. If they cannot, their light is not likely to be that of a city set upon a hill, nor their church existence to be well sustained by them that are without.

I. Our third inquiry is, What are the disadvantages of a society in connection with a church?

The union of church and Society is an inapposite yoking of incongruous bodies. It is an anomaly. Of the multitude of associations, companies, communities, fraternities, lodges, partnerships among men, what one has, or needs to have, a cooperative company over it, or attached to it, to enable it to do the work, to carry out the legitimate purpose for which it itself organized? We think of none but the Union Pacific road and its unsavory Credit Mobilier. The Society complicates the church's activity. It is therefore an impediment to the church. Did Christ institute a church against which the powers of hell should not prevail, with officers, and with Himself its Shepherd and Bishop, which was incomplete in itself, incapable of maintaining its own existence, and inadequate to the work which He commanded it to do? And he gave no hint of the church's necessity to ally to itself a secular society? Plainly not.

2. A Society is not legally or civilly necessary. Or, if it be necessary under existing laws, any legislation that is now lacking can be obtained for the asking, to constitute the church, or its officers, a body corporate for the management of its temporalities, with a just limitation as to the amount of its invested capital. By the laws of Iowa, churches, seminaries of learning, agricultural societies, and all associations of a benevolent or charitable character, may incorporate themselves by simple means of public notice and record. The committee are informed that more than half, perhaps five-sixths, of the churches in that State, have no separate Society. The plan works well, to harmony and success.

3. In the light of common sense, it is absurd to subject the

church or the pastor to any real or implied servility to the world, and, as a matter of Christian conscience, it is wholly wrong. On this question of conscience, in the year 1843, four hundred and seventy-five pastors and a greater number of churches went out from the National Church of Scotland, voluntarily, renouncing Cæsar's money, because he claimed that its reception by them implied his right to some degree of control over them. The church is a society of Jesus, a brotherhood, a family of those who have come out from the world and are separated from it. The pastor and teacher is an officer in the church, not in the world, whom the Holy Ghost has set to oversee and to feed the flock of Christ, not a flock outside the church. By no right of reason or of Scripture, therefore, can a pastor submit himself, as to the tenure of his office *in the church*, to a society of men, even honorable and good men, outside the church. It is an indignity and injustice to a pastor of a church of God, that a notice to quit may be served upon him at any time by men outside of the church and of sympathy with him, even by the most ungodly and odious one of their number. There is no logical standing place for a secular Society beside the religious society, for the transaction of religious business, or the doing of religious work. All the legitimate work of the church and pastor is religious work. It includes the religious receiving and expending of money to carry out plans determined upon by Christian deliberation and prayer. The Church of England is avowedly a part and parcel of the State, inferior to the State and subject always to the authority of the king and parliament. The local congregation, and even the bishop of the diocese, have almost no power against the patron, who may choose to appoint over them an incompetent, heretical, or immoral man as their parish minister. Our Pilgrim and Puritan fathers came away from England to escape this tyranny and corruption of the world over the church,—and yet did not escape it long. For our society-church method is legally very similar, and practically often gives the Society an English power over the pulpit and the pastorate. The Society subordinates the church to itself. Tacitly, at all times, and avowedly in times of emergency and excitement, the Society commands and rules the church, by its power to stop pecuniary supplies, and to veto

every action of the church that concerns money. The Society has the power to employ or to dismiss a minister, directly, or indirectly, by coercing the church. It is usual, of course, for church and Society to coöperate with mutual good will. By common courtesy the Society votes upon the question of calling or dismissing a pastor after the church has voted, thus seeming to follow the lead of the church. But in Massachusetts it was judicially decided, in 1820, that a church had no legal existence, apart from a parish, or Society, and that the Society may hire or discharge a minister, or may install or dismiss a pastor, without consulting the church, and even against the unanimous vote of the church.

4. The Society prevents the installation of the pastor by a council.

Men of the world do not apprehend the need or worth of this form of inter-church fellowship and guard over each other's welfare. The Society makes the minister *their* hired man,—not even the hired man of the church,—to be discharged by the Society, as any other employe is discharged, at the employer's will. Most churches would like to have their pastors recognized by a council of churches. Societies do not wish it.

5. This prevention, or frequent breaking up, of council-pastorates, by the Society, while the church and the pastor are still united in heart, disheartens pastors, and repels them from the work of the ministry, or drives them to other denominations, in the hope not always realized, of finding a more certain tenure of their office. A burnt child dreads the fire. Why should a pastor who has been burned and branded by one, two, or three Societies, and leaves each one with a sense of outrage received, go near the fire again elsewhere? This power of the Society over and under and behind the church and the pastor, exercised or held in reliant and sometimes defiant reserve, is the visible explanation of the disastrous frequency of pastoral changes, the non-employment of capable and experienced ministers, and the large annual waste from the active working force of the ministry. This is one and probably the chief reason why there are so many ex-ministers unemployed, or in secular business, many of whom have been

helped to their education by the beneficence of the churches, through the education societies, or in other ways.

6. It is the indisputable fact, that nearly all difficulties between the pastor and the congregation, which affect his usefulness or his continuance in his pastorate, originate in, and are fostered and carried on to a crisis by the Society, and not by the church, or the pastor. We call particular attention to this fact, which every one can verify, and which has given rise in many churches to a desire for the abolition of the Societies.

Very few cases occur of irreconcilable differences between the pastor and the church, causing turmoil in the community, making the dissolution of the pastorate necessary, or calling for appeal either to a civil court, or to a council of churches. Pastors and churches usually agree with each other, and are disposed to dwell together in unity, or to separate in peace, that the cause of Christ be not blighted.

The following well known facts are illustrative examples.

A pastor departs from the faith, to the grief of the church, who wish therefore to dismiss him. The Society retains and supports him, until the strong church has become weakened, or nearly extinct, by the conscientious withdrawal of its members to other churches, and the pastor at last retires, from sheer exhaustion.

A church of two hundred and thirty members voted not to call a certain man as pastor. The Society twice voted him a call, and freely said, as individuals, that they would employ him either in the church edifice, or in a public hall. Under this intimidation, the church voted a call, by absence and silence of members, and the council installed the pastor for the sake of peace,—to the immediate and rapid decline of the church, so long as that pastor remained with them.

In a multitude of communities the Society and the church co-work without dissension or collision, as this entire Associational body can probably testify from their own experience and observation. The great majority of individuals and families connected with us seek for peace and harmony, not discord and strife. Yet so many are the cases of trouble by or with the Society, that we incline to the opinion that the majority of the members of the Societies would prefer a condition of church

cial management, in their communities, in which churches people would not be liable to such troubles.

The Society secularizes the church. It brings the spirit of worldliness into the churches. And worldliness,—conformity to the world, contrary to the command of Christ,—is the greatest peril of our churches, in this age of unparalleled material development of our country. Worldly conformity prevents the churches from outgrowing this growth of the world, the increase of their spiritual power and the expenditure of money to preach the gospel in every new settlement. It does not refer exclusively to church members' following the fashion of this world in their dress and style of living, but especially to the great costliness of church edifices, often adding or burdening the people with a debt, and resulting in shutting out of the poor, to whom it is Christ's special mission that His church shall preach His gospel. Some worldly-minded man offers what he calls liberal aid to build a new meeting-house. The church accepts the Devil's bait, and is caught, to their spiritual death or loss, by the pride and glorying of the worldly Society. If a debt is incurred, it is an incubus on the church's prosperity. Building beyond the people's ability is one of the crying evils of our time, as pious men also to this Association testify. The church members lose reverence and piety. Non-church members quietly abandon the pews. New comers avoid it. Or, if the costly temple be kept for, it fosters the worldly spirit, at the expense of revival and living brotherhood with the poor. So it comes to pass as a tendency always, and many times, as a real fact, that the whole church enterprise is run as a social enjoyment, or a mercenary speculation, to attract a select class of attendants, so that it shows in the treasurer's accounts that the enterprise pays.

The proposed reform would probably deliver the church from every species of gambling, grab-bags, theatricals, et cetera, which are clearly not included in the New Testament ideal of a free and working church. And as to church debts, it is the duty of everlasting remembrance to the honor of our Puritan forefathers, that they never incurred debts for other people to pay. They put up the frame for a meeting house, enclosed it, and occupied it, without pulpit or pews, if unable to do more

at first, and afterwards made additions to their work, when they became able, until finally they finished it and "paid the last bills."

8. The Society is often a manifest injury to the souls of its members who are not personally Christians. It tends to delude them with the notion that they are doing much for the cause of Christ. They reason that their merit cannot be overlooked. In their activity in the Society, as trustees, choristers, and large contributors, they seem to be as useful as church members. In their position they cannot see the great importance of church membership, nor any sharp distinction between the church and the world. One of them, a large contributor and a constant attendant upon the preaching, said to his pastor,—“You give us no credit here, and no hope hereafter, though we pay the largest subscription to the support of the church.” He spoke with a sense of injustice received. A trusteeship, or committee in the Society, is a half-way house between the world and the church, at which too many contentedly stop by the way,—a fatal compromise of conscience as to the high duty of openly confessing Christ.

9. The Society tends to stunt and dwarf the growth of church members in a character of self-sacrifice and consciously strong independence of the world's frowns or favors. In the leading strings of the Society, the strength of the church is not tested, the ability of the church members is not developed, in self-reliant and Christ-reliant endeavor to do all that each one can do for Christ and for souls, by personal effort and sacrifice and pecuniary contributions. The church leans upon the Society. Church members are weighted by the world, so that they cannot *run* the race that is set before them in the gospel. Men of the world look upon the church, especially upon the ministers, as mendicant or mercenary. The church is shorn of its strength by its own dalliance with its Delilah. The fact stands, that in the first three centuries the churches grew and multiplied mightily, without a helping or hindering secular Society, by their own innate and heaven-inspired powers of life and action. Why may they not grow as mightily now, in the same way, without a Society, and go up and possess our country and the whole earth for God?

7. Is it desirable that each church assume the entire management of its own temporalities,—the duties now done by the Society?

If the points above named are well taken, the conclusive answer is, Yes; as speedily as it can be done in an orderly and fitting way. We recommend the thoughtful, frank, and careful investigation of the subject, by the churches and by Societies, avoiding hasty and revolutionary action, to the end of securing the purity, peace, and greatest power of the churches, as Christ's visible organized kingdom, both for the edification of His saints and the ingathering of souls to His glory. As a question of conscience, its urgency does not require an uprising against the Societies, to-morrow. But we are in an age of new study of the nature and mission of the churches. Improvements have been recently made, each after investigation and sometimes a struggle,—as, the surrender of virtual ownership of pews, and the weekly offering method instead of pew rentings. Progress will yet be gained. Without investigation there will be no change of opinion; without change of opinion, no correction of errors in practice; without the correction of errors, no matured improvement and stability. Let the motive and the end be Christ,—all for Him, the Head of the church on earth and in heaven!

ARTICLE VI.—ROBERTSON OF BRIGHTON.

A BOOK was published a year ago which should have received more attention than it did receive. Not remarkable for its ability, in detail, it is remarkable for its main purpose, the generalization to which the essays which compose it are subservient, for the thought of which it is full,—remarkable as a sign of the times. The book is entitled “The Religion of Our Literature,” and the author is George McCrie. Who George McCrie is I do not know, and for our purpose it does not matter. His previous literary work, according to the British Museum catalogue, has been limited to a translation of a volume of Calvin’s Commentary on the Psalms and a long poem on “The Old World,” and his religious standpoint, according to the book before us, is that of Scotch Presbyterianism.

Mr. McCrie believes that our general literature is full of infidelity, under the plausible disguise of a new Christianity, and this it is the object of his volume to canvass and expose. He observes very sagaciously that literature, in the centuries before the Reformation, did an immense service in preparing the way for it. The poet and the literateur being universally allowed great license, even the priesthood had not prevented them from speaking the truth, underrating their influence, and doomed to find at last that it was the mightiest influence of all and had honey-combed the system which Luther crushed. The same considerations that made literature an admirable herald of the true make it a dangerous pioneer of the false. “The false in religion, as well as the true, will make appearance first in our literature. When advocated there it makes rapid progress, because it excites no alarm, and because sound theologians are smiling at the flimsiness of the argument, while they forget the fascination by which it is recommended.” Such a false religion, he believes, has not only made its appearance in our literature but has completely permeated it. Our great literary men “profess to reach a conviction of the truth of Christianity by a new way of their own; though, as might be expected, it turned out

to be a Christianity entirely different from ours." There is great religious earnestness among them. "They at once recognized Christ to be the Son of God; not because He is proved to be so by miracle or record, but from his corresponding in character and message with this idea." They consider miracles of no value; they do not think it possible to establish the historical accuracy of the Bible; they slight such of its doctrines as have not the supposed seal of the moral sense; they put an entirely new construction upon the atonement, and they pass over easily all that has been counted vital in the Christian system.

With this introduction, Mr. McCrie proceeds in the first place to review the works of Carlyle, the fountain head, as he believes, of many of these dangerous streams; and essays follow upon Browning and Tennyson, George Eliot and George MacDonald, each alike being found full of the new theology. Finally, leaving the realm of poetry and general literature, he proceeds to show that the doctrines have invaded the pulpit, and he finds them centered in their most captivating and dangerous form in the sermons of Robertson of Brighton. If the man who reads "Sartor Resartus," "In Memoriam," and "Felix Holt," has sermons upon his shelf, they are very apt to be Robertson's sermons;—and in these, as dealing definitely with theological and religious questions, it is the easier to detect and condemn what is opposed to standard formulas.

It has seemed to me worth while to review the works of this man, who is thus made to typify the religious spirit of the age,—to separate from varied discussions of almost all the vital moral, social and religious interests of our time, those views to which we viciously restrict the term doctrinal, and reduce them to something like a system,—that the constantly growing circle of readers of these sermons—"the 'bloom and wonder' of modern pulpit eloquence," as some one has called them—may be able to see more clearly perhaps what are the views of Christian truth upon which they are based, and that we all may be helped intelligently to decide how much of truth, half truth, or error there is in the teaching to which attention has thus conspicuously been called. To this presentation I think it important to prefix a brief history of Robertson's doctrinal development.

Robertson's earliest doctrinal views were those of the Evangelical school, with a tendency to underrate Calvinism. These views he retained throughout his Oxford course and during the first five years of his ministerial life. It was not till 1846, when he was thirty years old, that, compelled to a most searching reëxamination of the bases of faith, he adopted the positions on which his Brighton teaching was grounded, and which he has perhaps done more than any other to popularize. But even at Oxford we find him keenly alive to the excellencies of other religious parties than his own and an attentive bearer of Newman and men of the most diverse views. His dislike of partisanship was strong from the first, and his only anxiety was to find the truth. The manliness and devotion of the leaders of the Tractarian movement made a deep impression upon his mind, and we often find him protesting against the abuse which was heaped upon them. He read Newman's sermons with profit and delight as long as he lived, and no book was dearer to him than the "Christian Year." He said, too, that, as a body, these men had reasserted the doctrine of a spiritual resurrection which had been almost put out of sight by the "Evangelical" party. But he convinced himself of the error of their general opinions and always maintained a sharp though broad and philosophic opposition. The Tractarian excitement was at its height during the years of his Oxford residence, and no subject seems to have interested him then so deeply. His copy of Tract 90, and of Dr. Pusey's letter to the Bishop of Oxford, are largely annotated by his answers to their arguments, and he carefully read Calvin and Ranke, and studied the history and doctrines of the Apostolic age to satisfy himself of the falsehood of the Tractarian theory of sacraments and of the Church. He not only satisfied himself of the falsehood of these views but he keenly felt the danger that was in them and worked zealously to counteract their influence on the circle of young thinkers in which he moved. He writes to his father with characteristic intensity, of the "paralyzing effects of the Oxford delusion-heresy." "To know it a man must live here and he will see the promising and ardent men sinking, one after another, in a deadly torpor, wrapped up in self-contemplation, dead to their Redeemer, and useless to his Church,

nder the baneful breath of this accursed upas tree." "The tract views," he writes to his friend, Moncrieff, "amount to nothing less than a direct, or, as Hooker would call it, an 'indirect denial of the foundation.' Our motto must be, morning and evening, and converted into a prayer, 'Stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made you free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage.'"

Perhaps the most significant thing which we learn of Robertson while at Oxford is the strong admiration and love which he felt for Arnold of Rugby. It was during his university life at Arnold, who had been for years the object of abuse and suspicion, charged with heresies innumerable, was lifted by a action of public feeling, to the professorship of modern history at Oxford; and the manner in which Robertson refers, many years after, to the scene in the "Sheldonian," where his first lectures were delivered, testifies to the deep feeling which the event inspired in himself. "Such a scene had not been seen in Oxford before. The lecture-room was too small; all adjourned to the Oxford theater; and all that was most brilliant, all that was most wise, and most distinguished, gathered together there. He walked up to the rostrum with a quiet step and manly dignity. Those who had loved him when all the world despised him felt that, at last, the hour of their triumph had come. But there was something deeper than any personal triumph they could enjoy; and those who saw him then will not soon forget the lesson read to them by his calm, dignified, simple step,—a lesson teaching them the utter worthlessness of unpopularity and of popularity as a test of manhood's worth."

At Winchester, where Robertson's clerical life began, we find him preaching all the doctrines which at Brighton he preached against. Here too, and here only, we find him more less one-sided and intolerant, inclined almost to deny that there could be any truth in views opposed to his own. We cannot help comparing his sweeping denunciations of Roman Catholics with the calm and philosophic manner in which, at Brighton, he showed the real truth which underlies their persecutions; and there could be no more striking contrast with his later methods than the anxious interest in little theological points which some of his letters now reveal. "The desire to

die," writes his biographer, "partly suggested by ill health, seemed to him to be a spiritual desire. The sensitiveness of his conscience unduly exaggerated every failure into a sin. He fell into a habit of unwise self-dissection. It is painful to read his diary, in which all his inward life is mapped out into divisions, his sins and errors labeled, selfishness discovered in all his efforts and resolves, and lists made out of the graces and gifts which he needed especially. It is impossible not to feel, when he got rid of all this, and felt its fruitlessness and its antagonism to the true spirit of the life of Christ, how he sprang from a dwarf into a giant." But his Winchester sermons were full of earnestness, and, to those who *heard* them, did prophecy of his future excellence.

At Cheltenham, his sermons, written with much greater care, became at once broader, bolder, and more practical. His real individuality began to assert itself and his expressions attracted attention. "I have been set down sometimes as a Tractarian," he writes, after having preached a few times, "sometimes as an ultra-Calvinist. I trust the accusations neutralize each other." "The fact is," he writes, at the end of his year at Cheltenham, "we have one thing, and only one, to do here on earth,—to win the character of heaven before we die. This is practical and simple to understand. We cannot do it alone; but the Spirit's agency is given us under our present dispensation to mould us by his influences into the image of God. And with this great truth, what madness it is to spend our time in speculating about our election?"

Robertson's faith in Evangelicalism was first shaken by the cant, the unreality, which he found among the religious people of Cheltenham. He found the Christian life held to consist in certain opinions, and expressions and feelings, and his earnest nature was shocked. "He was so pained by these expressions of religious emotion which fell from those who were living a merely fashionable life, that he states himself in one of his letters, that he gave up reading all books of a devotional character, lest he should be lured into the same habit of feeling without acting." "A strong shock threw me off the habit"—these are his words,—“partly the extreme circumstances of my life, partly the perception of a most important fact, that devo-

nal feelings are very distinct from uprightness and purity of,—that they are often singularly allied to the animal nature, result of a warm temperament,—guides to hell under the n of angels of light, conducting the unconscious victim of ing that appear divine and seraphic, into a state of heart life, at which the very world stands aghast. Cases of this d came under my immediate cognizance, disgusted me, le me suspect feelings which I had hitherto cherished as the iest, and produced a reaction.”

but Robertson was not the man to be misled and clouded by extreme feeling. Perceiving its truth, he as plainly ceived its one-sidedness. “The only true use of such a dis- ery,” he adds, “is this,—that our basest feelings lie very r to our highest, and that they pass into one another by nsible transitions. . . . The true lesson is to watch, sus- t, and guard aspirations after good, not to drown them as rious. Wordsworth says,—‘True dignity abides with him e who, in the patient hour of silent thought can still sus- t, and still revere himself.’” And at Brighton he returned he practice of reading the devotional books which for many rs he had refused to open. “I perceive more than ever the ernessity of devotional reading. I mean the works of emi- tly holy persons, whose tone was not merely uprightness of racter and high-mindedness, but communion—a strong sense personal and ever living communion—with God besides.” sickened of the evangelical phrases. Years afterwards, en he wrote, “My whole heart’s expression is ‘None but rist,’” he immediately added,—“not in the (so-called) evan- ical sense, which I take to be the sickliest cant that has eared since the Pharisees bare record to the gracious words ich He spake and then tried to cast him headlong from the of Nazareth; but in a deeper real sense,—the mind of rist.” He became disgusted with the state of the evangel- clergy. “I see sentiment instead of principle,” he writes, d a miserable mawkish religion superseding a state which e was healthy.” Equally abhorrent to him was the violent uncharitable tone of the “religious” papers of the extreme angelicals in the controversies of the time. “They tell lies,” said, “in the name of God; others tell them in the name of Devil; that is the only difference.”

I say these things first roughly shook him out of the simple belief of his earlier years—"that all who spoke of Christ were Christ-like." But we must go much deeper than this for the causes of his recoil from evangelicalism as a system, and his abandonment of it altogether. We find them in the very spirit of the times, in the tone of the men he met, and of the literature of the day, so strikingly at variance with the narrow interpretations to which he had been schooled. Everything forced doubts upon him, and he was compelled to turn a new light upon the very foundations of his temple. "A young man of twenty-three," he says in one of his sermons, "with such light as he has, forms his views: is he never to have more light? Is he never to open again the questions which his immature mind has decided on once? Is he never in manhood, with manhood's data and manhood's experience, to modify or even reverse what once seemed the very truth itself? Nay, my brethren, the weak pride of consistency, the cowardice which dare not say I have been wrong all my life, the false anxiety which is fostered to be true to our principles rather than to make sure that our principles are true, all this would leave in Romanism the man who is born a Romanist. It is not so. The best and bravest have struggled from error into truth: they listened to their honest doubts, and tore up their old beliefs by the very roots." It is the story of his own experience. His convictions changed; he plainly saw at last that his position was a false one, and he left Cheltenham and wandered through the Tyrol. There, alone with nature and God, he fought his way to light. He returned to England fixed in those views of Christian truth from which he never after swerved.

We are able, however, to discover some of the particular influences which affected Robertson at this most critical period of his life. He was at Cheltenham a continuous reader of Carlyle. "I have gained good and energy from that book," he says, speaking of "Past and Present," and he writes afterwards, "Sure I am that Carlyle's mind has had more influence on the thoughtful young men of the day than any other I could name." But he was by no means a blind worshipper of Carlyle, as sharp criticisms in many of his letters show. Thus he says in one place: "If a man sets his face like a flint, and des-

rately runs a-muck with his eyes shut, caring not who is
 ended, then he injures his own spirit, becomes, like noble
 rlyle, ferocious, and loses the stream of living waters in dry
 sert sand." And again, "Carlyle does cry out too much, in
 way that has now become cant, against cant and shams,
 ver hinting a remedy; but," he adds, "this reviewer has
 ver got into the atmosphere which he breathes, nor attempted
 master his meaning and objects, without which thorough
 mprehension no one has a right to criticise." Tennyson and
 nte were the poets whom he now chiefly read, though, since
 delivered at Cheltenham the lectures on poetry which he
 erwards delivered more fully at Brighton, his reading of
 etry must have been very extensive. Of Tennyson's deep
 luence upon him we find many traces. To German philoso-
 y he also gave much attention, having formed a close friend-
 ip with a gentleman who was deeply read in metaphysics,
 ose problems were the same as his own, and whose desire to
 t at the truth was as single and as keen as his. "Their con-
 rsations were frequent and interesting," writes his biogra-
 er, "and it was partially, at least, due to this friendship that
 r. Robertson escaped from the trammels which had confined
 s intellect and his spirit." It is to this friend that he writes
 om Heidelberg, "Set your mind at rest on one point. What-
 er mental trials I may experience, you are not responsible
 r any. I have heard you state difficulties but never argue
 r them; and the difficulties could not come upon my mind
 r the first time,—of a man who had read theological and phi-
 isosophical controversy,—long before, with painful interest,—
 man who, at different times, has lived in the atmosphere of
 ough, in which Jonathan Edwards, Plato, Lucretius, Thomas
 rown, Carlyle, Emerson and Fichte lived,—who has steeped
 is soul and memory in Byron's strong feelings,—who has
 alked with Newman years ago to the brink of an awful preci-
 ce, and chosen rather to look upon it calmly, and know the
 orst of the secrets of the darkness, than recoil with Newman,
 fear and tenderness, back to the infallibility of Romanism.
 ch a man is not likely to have been influenced by a few
 sual statements of difficulties which he had read of a thousand
 nes before." In the same letter he says, "I have found

minds here that understand me, if they cannot help me, and in the conviction that a treasure lies near me in German literature, I am digging away, night and day, at the superincumbent earth, in order hereafter to get at. Indeed, I have already plunged into it."

In one of his lectures to the working men of Brighton, a passage occurs which is so manifestly a description of his own experience at this time, and so surcharged with deep meaning, that I may well digress, if indeed it be a digression, for the sake of introducing it:—

"It is an awful moment when the soul begins to find that the props on which it has blindly rested so long are, many of them, rotten, and begins to suspect them all; when it begins to feel the nothingness of many of the traditionary opinions which have been received with implicit confidence, and in that horrible insecurity begins also to doubt whether there be anything to believe at all. It is an awful hour,—let him who has passed through it say how awful,—when this life has lost its meaning, and seems shrivelled into a space; when the grave appears to be the end of all, human goodness nothing but a name, and the sky above this universe a dead expanse, black with the void from which God himself has disappeared. In that fearful loneliness of spirit, when those who should have been his friends and counsellors only frown upon his misgivings, and profanely bid him to stifle doubts, which for aught he knows may arise from the fountain of truth itself; to extinguish, as a glare from hell, that which for aught he knows may be light from heaven, and everything seemed wrapped in hideous uncertainty. I know but one way in which a man may come forth from his agony scathless; it is by holding fast to those things which are certain still,—the grand simple landmarks of morality. In the darkest hour through which a human soul can pass, whatever else is doubtful, this at least is certain. If there be no God, and no future state, yet even then it is better to be generous than selfish, better to be chaste than licentious, better to be true than false, better to be brave than to be a coward. Blessed beyond all earthly blessedness is the man who, in the tempestuous darkness of the soul, has dared to hold fast to these venerable landmarks. Thrice blessed is he who,—when all is drear

and cheerless within and without, when his teachers terrify him and his friends shrink from him,—has obstinately clung to moral good. Thrice blessed, because *his* night shall pass into day, bright day. I appeal to the recollection of any man who has passed through that hour of agony, and stood upon the rock at last, the surges stilled below him, and the last cloud drifted from the sky above, with a faith, and hope, and trust no longer traditional, but of his own,—a trust which neither earth nor hell shall shake thenceforth forever.”

With such a trust—a conviction, not a tradition—Robertson returned to England. He surrendered his curacy at Cheltenham—“I can no longer brook to walk in leading-strings”—preached for two months in Oxford, and then accepted Trinity Chapel, Brighton, which he occupied for the rest of his short life, and where he delivered all the sermons by which he is known to the world. “From henceforward,” says his biographer, “his religious convictions never wavered, and the principles of his teachings never changed,”—and his opinions on all points to which I shall have occasion to refer appear repeatedly

in his letters and addresses through these years, in but slightly varying forms, and are to be accepted as his maturest and soundest conclusions. It does not fall within my province here to touch upon the events of his life at Brighton, the constant misconception of his teaching, the prejudice that never would be overcome, the unflinching fidelity to truth, the exquisite suffering, the slander and abuse, the persecution that killed at last. To review all these things might indeed be a work as profitable as my own, but I can only commend it to each reader who has not done it, and pass at once to matters of relief.

In a very short space of time, says his biographer, he had “put himself into opposition with the whole accredited theological world of Brighton on the questions of the Sabbath, the Atonement, Inspiration and Baptism.” Of all strictly doctrinal subjects these four are perhaps those which he treated most fully and we are able to state his positions with precision. His views on the nature of the Sabbath are embodied in two sermons, on “The Shadow and the Substance of the Sabbath,” and “The Religious Non-observance of the Sabbath.” Of

these the former is the more important, and I will epitomize it as briefly as possible.

There is no trace in the Old Testament of the observance of the Sabbath before the time of Moses. It was given by him to the Israelites, partly as a sign between God and them, marking them off from all other nations by its observance; partly as commemorative of their deliverance from Egypt. The spirit of its observance, too, is Jewish. The spirit of Judaism is separation. To separate the evil from the good was the aim and work of Judaism—one nation from all others, certain meats, certain days. Sanctify means to set apart, and the very essence of the idea of Hebrew holiness lay in sanctification of this essence. The spirit of Christianity, on the contrary, is permeation:—it permeates all evil with good; it desires to transform the spirit of the day of rest into all other days, and to spread the holiness of one nation over all the world. To saturate life with God and the world with heaven—that is its genius.

The rigorous Jewish observance of the Sabbath has passed away. It was typical, shadowy. We have changed the day of the week, the computation of hours, the mode of observance. Nothing of the literal portion remains except one day in seven; and that is abrogated if the rest be. We have no right to say that one part is indifferent and another moral and unalterable. There are those who demand a strict observance of the letter of scripture, yet except works of necessity and mercy by Christ's example. Tell us, then, ye who are servants of the letter, on what self-evident ground is it shown that the Jew might not light a fire, but the Christian may; yet that if the postal arrangements of a country permit the delivery of a letter, it is an infraction of the Sabbath? Is a hot repast a work of mercy or your carriage a spiritual necessity? O! it rouses in every true soul a deep and earnest indignation to hear men who drive their cattle to church on Sundays, because they are too emasculated to trudge through cold and rain on foot, invoke the severity of an insulted law of the Decalogue on those who provide facilities of movement for such as cannot afford the luxury of a carriage. It is right that a thousand should toil for the few! That a few should toil to help the thousands to health and enjoyment is a desecration of the Sabbath!

There is, however, in the Sabbath a substance, a permanent something. "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." In that principle rightly understood, lies the key to the whole matter. The Jews said that the Sabbath was written in the book of the Law and on that based the obligation to observe it, maintaining that man's necessities must give way. Christ said that it was written on man's nature, that the law was merely meant to be in accordance with that nature and must yield to man's necessities.

A wise physician prescribes a regimen of diet to a diseased patient. Does the obligation to obey rest on the arbitrary authority of the physician, or on the nature with which his prescription accords? When health is restored, the prescription falls into disuse; but the nature remains unalterable, which has made some things nutritious, others unwholesome, and excess ever pernicious.

So Moses prescribed the Sabbath to men who did not feel the need of spiritual rest. On what does the obligation rest to obey the rule? And when spiritual health has been restored, the law regulating the details of rest may become obsolete, but the nature which demands rest can never be reversed. You may abrogate the formal rule, but you cannot abrogate the needs of your own soul. Eternal as the constitution of the soul of man is the necessity for the existence of a day of rest. Men's arguments are wrong. The Sabbath is not a perpetual obligation; it was Jewish and passed away with Christianity, which made all days and places holy. Nevertheless, the reason for the observance of the Sabbath lies deep in the everlasting necessities of human nature. The soul withers without it. I even believe the stern rigor of the Puritan Sabbath had a grand effect upon the soul. And as long as man is man the blessedness of keeping it will never be annulled. It is necessary not because it was commanded; but it was commanded because it is necessary.

That which is rest for one man is not for another. To require the illiterate man to read his Bible for some hours, would impose a toil to him, though it might be relaxation to you. To the laboring man a larger proportion of the day must be given to the recreation of his physical nature than is necessary for

the man of leisure. But he who confines his conception of the need of rest to that of bodily rest has left man on a level with the brute; and experience tells us, after a trial, that those Sundays are the happiest, the purest, the most rich in blessing, in which the spiritual part has been most attended to. This is, in fact, the very distinction between the spirit of the Jewish Sabbath and the spirit of the Christian Lord's day. The one is chiefly for the body—"Thou shalt do no manner of work." The other is chiefly for the soul—"I was in the spirit on the Lord's day." This is an admirable instance of the application of Robertson's favorite principle, that truth is always the union of two contradictory propositions, not the *via media* between them. The discussion is so complete that we could afford to leave the subject at this point; but there are in the sermon on "The Religious Non-observance of the Sabbath" some thoughts so valuable that I hate to pass them by. Thus, referring to St. Paul's rebuke of the Galatians,—"*Ye observe days, and months, and times, and years. I am afraid of you, lest I have bestowed upon you labor in vain*"—he notes that the apostle's objection was "not to Jewish days, but to the very principle of attaching intrinsic sacredness to any days. All forms and modes of particularizing the Christian life he reckoned as bondage under the elements or alphabet of the law," defensible only on grounds of expediency. "His heart would have sunk within him could he have been told that at the end of eighteen centuries the Christian Church would be still observing days, and months, and times, and years,—and, still more, needing them.

"*Needing them*, I say For who is he who needs not the day? He is the man so rich in love, so conformed to the mind of Christ, that he needs no carnal ordinances at all nor the assistance of one day in seven to kindle spiritual feelings, seeing he is as it were, all his life in heaven already."

The following touches a very important point in this question of the Sabbath:—"It is wisely taught by St. Paul that he who does anything with offence—that is, with a feeling that it is wrong—does wrong. To him it is wrong even though it be not wrong abstractly. Therefore it is always dangerous to multiply restrictions and requirements beyond what is essential; because

men, feeling themselves hemmed in, break the artificial barrier, and, breaking it with a sense of guilt, do thereby become hardened in conscience and prepared for transgression against commandments which are Divine and of eternal obligation. Hence it is that the criminal has so often in his confessions traced his deterioration in crime to the first step of breaking the Sabbath; and no doubt with accurate truth. But what shall we infer from this? Shall we infer, as is so often done upon the platform and in religious books, that it proves the everlasting obligation of the Sabbath? Or shall we, with a far truer philosophy of the human soul, infer, in the language of St. Peter, that we have been laying on him "a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear?"—in the language of St. Paul, that "the motions of sin were by the law;" that the rigorous law was itself the stimulating, moving cause of the sin; and that when the young man, worn out with his week's toil, first stole out into the fields to taste the fresh breath of a spring day, he did it with a vague secret sense of transgression; and that having, as it were, drawn his sword in defiance against the established code of the religious world, he felt that from thenceforward there was for him no return, and so he became an outcast, his sword against every man, and every man's sword against him? I believe this to be the true account of the matter; and believing it, I cannot but believe that the false, Jewish traditions of the Sabbath-day which are prevalent have been exceedingly pernicious to the morals of the country."

The subject of Inspiration was of course one which deeply interested Robertson's mind. In the third year of his residence at Brighton, he writes: "I projected once a work on Inspiration, and had well nigh resolved to do it,—a year ago, when the impulse to do great things and to be a standard bearer was renewed with mighty force. Had I kept to this resolve, Lessing's remarks, and some other fragments, should have been translated by pioneers; for the English mind is not prepared yet, and Lessing's advice is worth attending to." He did at this time translate Lessing's *Education of the Human Race*, and he delivered a series of lectures on Genesis—which are about to be published—in which he did not hesitate to put forward the results of German criticism and state the claims of scientific

and historical truth, even when they conflicted with the literal narrative. "In no case, however," says his biographer, "was his preaching destructive, but constructive. Men went away from his chapel opposed, it is true, to the popular theory of inspiration, but deeply convinced of *an* inspiration." He followed here substantially in the steps of Arnold of Rugby, whose essays on Scriptural Interpretation had before this time deeply affected English thought. "I look upon Bibliolatry," he writes, "with quite as much dislike as Arnold did,—as pernicious, dangerous to true views of God and His revelation to the human race, and the cause of much bitter Protestant Popery, or claims to infallibility of interpretation, which nearly every party puts forth. I believe Bibliolatry to be as superstitious, as false, and almost as dangerous as Romanism." "The Inspiration of the Bible," he says further, "is a large subject. I hold it to be inspired, not dictated. It is the Word of God,—the words of man." And again, "Martineau's views about Inspiration I think, on the whole, correct. He would not, I presume, deny that artistic power, etc., can be called in a sense inspiration; but he rightly draws a distinction between that kind of power and the power to which we, by common consent, chiefly consign the word. . . . The prophetic power, in which I suppose is chiefly exhibited that which we mean by inspiration, depends almost entirely on moral greatness. The prophet discerned large principles, true for all time—principles social, political, ecclesiastical, and principles of life,—chiefly by largeness of heart and sympathy of spirit with God's spirit. That is my conception of inspiration." He follows out this thought more fully in another place. "The difference between Moses and Anaxagoras, the Epistles and the 'Excursion,' I believe is in degree. The Light of the Word which dwells in all men, dwells in loftier degree in some than in others, and also is of a nobler kind of inspiration. Bezaleel and Aholiab, artificers, were men inspired, we are told. Why they more than other seers of the Beautiful? But who would compare their enlightenment with that which ennoble the life instead of purifying the taste? And, again, who would compare a philosopher, physical or metaphysical, revealing in the one case the laws of matter, and in the other the laws of mind, with the

vealer of spiritual truth? Is the *dictum* of Anaxagoras, that our sense of knowledge is delusive, to be compared with that which Moses reveals,—Jehovah is one Lord and Holy? The *Excursion* reveals some beautiful truths of our moral being, but by how much our spiritual life is higher than our sensitive and moral, so much are the Epistles above the *Excursion*, higher in kind and higher also in degree of inspiration, for the Apostle's claim, in matters spiritual, unerring power of truth. Newton's revelation of the order of the heavens, grand as it is, is inferior to that which we technically call inspiration, by how much one single human soul transcends the whole material universe in value.

"I think it comes to this: God is the Father of Lights, and the King in his beauty, and—the Lord of Love. All our several degrees of knowledge attained in these departments are from Him. One department is higher than another; in each department, too, the degree of knowledge may vary from a dimming glimpse to infallibility: so that all is properly inspiration, but immensely differing in value and in degree. If we be replied that this degrades inspiration by classing it with things so common, the answer is plain: a sponge and a man are both animals, but the degrees between them are almost calculable.

"I think this view of the matter is important, because in the latter way some twenty or thirty men in the world's history have had a special communication, miraculous, and from God. In this, all have it, and by devout and earnest cultivation of the mind and heart may have it increased illimitably. This is wholly practical."

Discussing methods of Scriptural interpretation, in a sermon on Inspiration, published in the Fifth Series, he says: "There is nothing more miserable, as specimens of perverted ingenuity, than the attempts of certain commentators and preachers to find remote and recondite and intended allusions to Christ everywhere. For example, they chance to find in the construction of the temple the fusion of two metals, and this they conceive is meant to show the union of Divinity with humanity in Christ. If they read of coverings to the tabernacle, they find implied the doctrine of imputed righteousness. If it chance

that one of the curtains of the tabernacle be red, they see in that a prophecy of the blood of Christ. If they are told that the Kingdom of Heaven is a pearl of great price, they will see in it the allusion, that as a pearl is the production of animal suffering, so the Kingdom of Heaven is produced by the sufferings of the Redeemer. I mention this perverted mode of comment, because it is not merely harmless, idle, and useless; it is positively dangerous. This is to make the Holy Spirit speak riddles and conundrums, and the interpretation of Scripture but clever riddle-guessing." The Bible is indeed full of Christ, he argues, but in no such way as this. Prophecy, and promise, and aspiration point to him only as they are universal in their stature and as we regard him as the type of perfect Humanity.

This is a proper place to introduce Robertson's view of Miracles. A miracle seemed to him no more to contravene the laws of the universe than the direct interposition of a nation, at critical junctures, to maintain what is right against what is established, to contravene the laws of the State. For law, he says, "is the expression only of a people's will." Ordinarily we see that expression mediately made through judges, office-bearers, kings: and so long as we see it in this mediate form, we are, by habit, satisfied that all is legal. There are cases, however, in which not an indirect, but a direct expression of a nation's will is demanded. Extraordinary cases, and because extraordinary, they who can only see what is legal in what is customary, conventional, and in the routine of written precedents, get bewildered, and reckon the anomalous act illegal or rebellious. In reality, it is only the source of earthly law, the nation pronouncing the law without the intervention of the subordinate agents.

"This will help us to understand the nature of a miracle. What we call laws are simply the subordinate expression of a Will. There must be a Will before there can be a law. Certain antecedents are followed by certain consequents. When we see this succession, we are satisfied, and call it natural. But there are emergencies in which it may be necessary for the Will to assert itself, and become not the mediate, but the immediate antecedent to the consequent. No subordinate agent

interposes,—simply the first cause comes in contact with a result. The audible expression of will is followed immediately by something which is generally preceded by some lower antecedent, which we call a cause. In this case, you will observe, there has been no contravention of the laws of Nature,—there has only been an immediate connection between the First cause and the last result. A miracle is the manifestation to man of the voluntariness of power.”

But no one has more sharply rebuked the evil and adulterous generation that seeketh after a sign, the spirit that would base religious truth on wonderful works. Most men, he says, “believe that the life of Jesus was Divine, because He wrought miracles. But, if their faith in miracles were shaken, their faith in Christ would go. If the evidence for the credibility of those miracles were weakened, then to them the mystic glory would have faded off his history. They could not be sure that His Existence was Divine. That love, even unto death, would bear no certain stamp of God upon it. That life of long self-sacrifice would have had in it no certain unquestionable traces of the Son of God. See what that implies. If that be true, and miracles are the best proof of Christ’s mission, God can be recognized in what is marvelous—God cannot be recognized in what is good. It is by Divine power that a human being turns water into wine. It is by power less certainly Divine that the same being witnesses to truth, forgives His enemies, makes it His meat and drink to do His Father’s will, and finishes His work. We are more sure that God was in Christ when he said, ‘Rise up, and walk,’ than when He said, with absolving love, ‘Son, thy sins be forgiven thee’; more certain when he furnished wine for wedding guests, than when he said, ‘Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.’ O, a strange and low, and vulgar appreciation this of the true glory of the Son of God, the same false conception that runs through all our life, appearing in every form,—God in the storm, and the earthquake, and the fire,—no God in the still small voice. Glory in the lightning-flash,—no glory and no God in the lowliness of the dew-drop. Glory to intellect and genius,—no glory to gentleness and patience. Glory to every kind of power,—none to the inward, invisible strength of the life of God in the soul of man.”

Robertson's position on the subject of Baptism is set forth with great fulness in two sermons preached in 1850, at the time the English Church was so greatly exercised over the Gorham case. His argument is substantially this: Baptism *proclaims* the child of God. The Romanist says it *creates* him. He assumes baptism to be not the testimony to a fact but the fact itself. Then and there a mysterious change takes place, inward, spiritual, effected by an external rite. In the spirit of this superstition the mother baptizes her child in all haste, because she believes it has a mystic influence on its health, or because she thinks it best to be on the safer side, lest her child should die and its eternity should be decided by the omission. This is materialism of the grossest kind. The order of Christian life is from within to that which is without,—from the spiritual truth to the material expression of it. The Roman order is from the outward to the creation of the inward. This is magic. This makes baptism not a sacrament, but an event, and it is degrading God. Yet the doctrine has this merit, that it permits no arbitrary drawing of the lines of that which calls itself the church. A large, broad, mighty field, the Christian world; all baptized; nay, expressly, even those who are baptized by heretics. It shares the spirit, instead of monopolizing it.

Calvinism, on the other hand, maintains that you are not God's child until you become such consciously. It distinguishes between the visible and invisible church. The real benefit of baptism belongs only to the elect. This view is identical with the Roman one in this, that it *creates* the fact instead of proclaiming it. Only, instead of baptism, it substitutes certain views, feelings, and impressions, and asserts that these *make* the man into a child of God. The Romanist says Baptism, the Calvinist says Faith, makes that true which was not true before. Observe the pernicious results of this teaching in the matter of Education. Happily men are better than their views, and the heart of the mother is more than a match for the creed of the Calvinist. Some, however, do not shrink from consistency,—and children told of a depression for sin and of certain mystic joys and sorrows which they are painfully conscious they know nothing of, at last take for granted what has been told them, that they are not God's children,—

and so they live. Yet we are grateful to the Calvinist for his strong protest against formalism ; for his assertion of the necessity of an inward change ; for the distinction which he has drawn between being in the *state* of sons and having the *nature* of sons of God. We are grateful to the Romanist also for the protest which his doctrine makes against all party monopoly of God ; and I would far rather hold the Romanist than the Evangelical vulgarisms upon the subject. But if baptism makes God our Father, baptism is incantation ; if faith makes him so, faith rests upon a falsehood.

Christ came to reveal a new name of God,—the Father ; and a new name of man, or Humanity,—the Son. Human nature became viewed in Christ, a holy thing and divine. His revelation is the sanctification of the human race. The development of this startled man. Sons of God ! Yes ; ye Jews have monopolized it too long. Is that Samaritan, heretic, and alien, a child of God,—these outcasts of society, that publican, this woman, the Gentiles ? Yes, the Gentiles too. This is the Revelation. Man is God's child, and the sin of the man consists in perpetually living as if it were false. It is the sin of the heathen. It is the sin of the baptized Christian,—waiting for feeling for a claim on God.

A permanent and authoritative pledge was wanted ; for, to mankind in a mass, spiritual facts need to have a formal existence. This pledge is baptism, declaring to the individual what is true of the race. You are a child of God. Remember it henceforth. You will have foes to fight, but remember they only keep you out of an inheritance which is your own ; not an inheritance which you have to win by some new feeling.

Baptism only appropriates that which is a fact already. We say coronation makes a sovereign ; but it can only *make* a sovereign of one who is a sovereign already. Coronation is the authoritative act of the nation declaring a fact which was fact before. Again, had the Dauphin of France been apprenticed to the cobbler Simeon till twenty years of age, he was, by right, heir to the kingdom, but, in fact, ignorant of his right, with no royal character, but with base habits. Now a revelation of the fact would have altered all, put him in possession of new motives, and, if accession had been possible, in posses-

sion of the kingdom. You would then have said rightly that the letter conveying that intimation, authoritatively, had made him a royal child and heir of the kingdom. Yet made only in a figurative sense—made only as resting on a previous fact. And so of baptism.

This view proclaims a kingdom, not for a few favorites, but for mankind. It forbids exclusiveness and spiritual pride. It asserts sonship as a broad, grand, universal, blessed fact. It bids you pray with a meaning of added majesty in the words, Our Father. Do not say of others that they are of the world. Do not make a distinction within the church of Christians and not Christians. That wretched beggar is God's child as well as you. You know it,—he does not; that is the difference; but the immortal is in him too and the Eternal Word speaks in him.

This leads me to notice Robertson's general view of the nature of a sacrament. The Romanist, he says, was feeling his way to a great truth—when he said that there are other sacraments besides baptism and the supper. But by the extension of these symbols from two to seven he really limits the meaning of the sacraments and gets into superstition—he says that seven *alone* are holy. We, by retaining the commonest of all *elements* and the simplest of all *acts*, see in these symbols the statement of two universal truths,—that all the material universe and all acts ought to be holy to the Lord. To some minds it appears an honoring of the sacraments to represent them as solitary things in their own kind. My conviction is that no greater dishonor can be done them. "Go out at the spring season of the year, see the mighty preparations for life that Nature is making, feel the swelling sense of gratefulness, and the pervasive expanding consciousness of love for all Being, and then say whether this whole Form, which we call Nature, is not the great sacrament of God, the revelation of His existence, and the channel of His communications to the spirit." And "if there be anything in this life sacred, any remembrance filled with sanctifying power, any voice which symbolizes to us the voice of God, it is the recollection of the pure and holy ones that have been taken from us, and of their examples and sacred words—

'dear as sacramental wine
To dying lips.'"

The controversies on these subjects, as common and as bitter the English Church thirty years ago as to-day, excited his attempt and anger. "It is a fact worthy of deep pondering," says, in one of his Brighton addresses, "to me a singularly striking one, that at the moment when we, the priests of England, were debating, as a matter of life and death, the precise amount of miracle said to be performed in a Christian sacrament, and excommunicating one another with reciprocated charges of heresy,—the working men of this country, who are not to be put off with transcendental hypotheses and mysterious ruseology, on whom the burdens of this existence press as awful realities, were actually debating in *their* societies, here beneath this very roof, a far more awful question, whether there indeed a God or not. It might suggest to one who thinks, a question not altogether calming in these days, what connection there is between these two things."

His attitude towards every subject in this whole field of thought was the same. With regard to the doctrine of Apostolic Succession, he says: "There is an Apostolic Succession. It is not the power of God conveyed by physical contact,—it is not a line of priests; it is a succession of prophets,—a broken, shattered one, but a real one. John was the successor of Elias's spirit. In the spiritual birth Luther was the offspring of the mind of St. Paul. Mind acts on mind, whether by ideas or character: herein is the spiritual succession." And elsewhere, as the true children of Abraham were not his lineal descendants, but the inheritors of his faith, so the true apostolic succession consists not in what these men pride themselves upon—their office, their theological attainments, their ordination . . . ; but it consists rather in a life of truth."

"What is the Church?" he asks. "It is that body of men in whom the spirit of God dwells as the source of their excellence, and who exist on earth for the purpose of exhibiting the divine Life and the hidden order of Humanity; to destroy evil and to assimilate Humanity to God, to penetrate and purify the world and, as salt, preserve it from corruption. It has an existence continuous throughout the ages; continuous, however, not on the principles of hereditary succession or of human election, as in an ordinary corporation, but on the principle of

spiritual similarity of character." "The Church of Christ depends upon these three things: first, the recognition of a common Father; secondly, of a common Humanity; and thirdly, of a common Sacrifice." The meaning which he attaches to this last term we shall see presently in his treatment of the question of the Atonement. "Would we force on other churches our Anglicanism?" he asks. "Would we have our thirty-nine articles, our creeds, our prayers, our rules and regulations, accepted by every church throughout the world? If that were unity, then in consistency, you are bound to demand that in God's world there shall be but one color instead of the manifold harmony and accordance of which this universe is full; that there should be but one chanted note which we conceive most beautiful. This is not the unity of the Church of God. The various churches advance different doctrines and truths. The Church of Germany something different from those of the Church of England. The Church of Rome, even in its idolatry, proclaims truths which we would be glad to seize." "Institutions pass," he says. "Churches alter, old forms change, and high-minded and good men cling to these as if *they* were the only things by which God could regenerate the world." But, "to mourn over old superstitions and effete creeds, is just as unwise as is the grief of the mother mourning over the form which was once her child. . . . All things outward change and alter; but the God of the church lives on."

"There is a church on earth larger than the limits of the church visible; larger than Jew or Christian or the Apostle Peter dreamed; larger than our narrow hearts dare to hope even now. They whose soarings to the First Good, First Perfect, and First Fair, entranced us in our boyhood, and whose healthier aspirations are acknowledged yet as our instructors in the reverential qualities of our riper manhood. . . . The North American Indian who worshipped the Great Spirit, and was thereby sustained in a life more dignified than the more animalized men amongst his countrymen; the Hindoo who believed in the Rest of God, and in his imperfect way tried to "enter into rest," not forgetting benevolence and justice,—these shall come, while 'the children of the kingdom,'—men who, with greater light, only did as much as they—'shall be cast out.'"

"Christianity," he said, "is a few living pregnant *principles*, and on these you may construct various buildings. Thus in doctrine you may erect on this Calvinism or Arminianism; or ecclesiastical polity, you may build on this a severe simplicity, or a highly ritual one, or an imaginative one with a splendid cultus. Or, in life, you may live on this devotionally actively; you may pursue the life of the hermit of the third century, or of the Christian merchant of the nineteenth. For Christianity is capable of endless application to different circumstances, ages, and intellects."

And yet among the thousand charges brought against Robertson during his lifetime, that of High Churchism was one. The principles we have been considering plainly enough show that he was as far from this as pole from pole. But his strong expressions against Evangelicalism were quite sufficient for those who sought material for charges; and indeed he believed deep truth was connected with every Tractarian error and faithfully labored to recognize and declare it. There is no better instance of this than his treatment of the question of absolution, which is so delicate and thorough that no brief abstract of it, such only as I am able to give, can show its grounds in any degree of justice. I love the Church of England, he said, because she has retained the declaration of absolution, because she has dared to assert herself as what she ought to be—God's representative on earth. She says to her minister, stand before a darkened spirit, on whom the shadows have begun to fall; in human flesh and blood, representing the Invisible; with words of human love, making credible the Love Eternal. Say boldly, I am here to declare, not a perhaps, *but a fact*. I forgive thee in the name of Humanity. For human nature represents God. The Church represents what human nature is, and ought to be. The minister represents the church. He speaks therefore in the name of our God-like human nature. It was so that Christ said, 'Thy sins be forgiven thee.' Men have said this absolution was true because of Christ's Divinity. It is not so. Christ forgiving on earth is a *new truth* added to that of God's forgiving in heaven. It is the declaration of forgiveness by Humanity. He bade the palsied man walk, that they might know that the Son of man hath power on earth to

Church. It was a power belonging to *all* Christians apostles, because they were Christians, not because they were apostles. Beware of making this a dead formula. If it be not a living truth, it becomes a monstrous fiction if you take absolution as a mystical gift conveyed to an individual man, called a priest, and mysteriously efficacious in his lips, and his *alone*, you petrify a truth into death and untruth. It is a power delegated to you and to me; and just as we exercise it lovingly and wisely, in our lives, and in our lips, we help men away from sin; just so far as we do not exercise it, or exercise it falsely, we drive men to Rome. Where the heart cannot have a truth, it will take a counterfeit. By every magnanimous act, by every free forgiveness, by which a pure man forgives, or pleads for mercy, or as a penitent, he proclaims this truth, that "the Son of man has power on earth to forgive sins,"—he exhibits the priestly humanity.—*he does* absolve; let theology say what it will. In absolution, he gives peace to the conscience—he is a witness of assurance of what God is—he breaks the chains and the captive go free.

Against the principles of priestcraft and church authority, Robertson waged the fiercest fight. The difference between the priest and the minister, he says, is that the one works by his own official powers and prerogatives, the

gyman, or layman. Those who accept their teaching, and sit at their authority, they call humble, meek, Christ-like. The priestly estimate of saintliness is always a peculiar one, and the main element of it is obedience and submission and subservience to individual teaching. But those who dare doubt, who seek truth for themselves, not blindly *their* truth, they call proud, heretics, self-willed. They are always persecuted: the assumption of authority over men's faith necessarily persecutes them so. In some ages they burn, in others curse, in others they call names.

These are the two results which come from all claims to infallibility, and all prohibition of inquiry: they make bigots of the feeble minded who cannot think . . . ; and they make sceptics of the acute intellects which, like Pilate, see through their fallacies, and, like Pilate, too, dare not publish their misgivings. And it matters not in what form that claim to infallibility is made: whether in the clear, consistent way in which Rome asserts it, or whether in the inconsistent way in which churchmen make it for their church, or religious bodies for their favorite opinions: wherever penalties attach to a conscious conviction, be they the penalties of the rack and flame, or the penalties of being suspected, and avoided, and slandered, or the slur of heresy affixed to the name, till all men count him dangerous,—and let every man who is engaged in persecuting opinion ponder it: these two things must follow—you make bigots, and you make sceptics,—believers you cannot make. Therefore do we stand by the central protest and truth of Protestantism. There is infallibility nowhere on this earth;—not in Rome; not in councils or convocations; not in the Church of England; not in priests; not in ourselves. The soul is won in the grandeur of a sublime solitariness on God. Woe to the spirit that stifles its convictions, when priests threaten, or the mob which they have maddened cries heresy and accuses disloyalty: 'Thou art not Cæsar's friend.' "

"Do not coerce belief," he writes to a young friend who had asked advice on the beginning of Christian life. "Do not begin with distasteful religious duties, long prayers, &c. Begin with the distinct moral duties. "If any one will do His will he shall know of the doctrine." Be simply a seeker of God

and truth : and be sure you never can seek him in vain." "I cannot by an act of volition," he writes to a friend about to join the Church of Rome, "receive a system for the sake of the comfort which I know to be to *me* a lie. It is at my peril that I thus falsify my inmost nature, and consent to be deluded by a figment.... Dare you so stifle God's voice in your soul, which comes in the simple rushings of earnest thought, and then call it conscience?.... You do not feel the solitary yet humbling grandeur of being in this vast universe alone as Christ was, without your Father. You must have a crowd of—and a number of other good men by some hundred thousands to assure you that you are not alone.... Alas! alas! for the substitution of an artificial, *created* conscience for the sound and healthy one of humanity, whose tides are distinct and unmistakeable in their noble music, like those of nature's ocean in its irresistible swell!" "To live by trust in God,"—he says in another place, "to do and say the right because it is lovely,—to dare to gaze on the splendor of the naked truth, without putting a false veil before it to terrify children and old women by mystery and vagueness,—to live by love, and not by fear, that is the life of a true, brave man, who will take Christ and His mind for the Truth instead of the clamor of the worldly world or the religious world."

Against the mere worship of the mysterious he never ceases to utter warnings. As you teach laws, he said, you undermine *that* religion. Men cease to tremble. They are no longer awed by an eclipse when they can calculate it with unerring accuracy, and their dread of lightning, as the bolt of God, is over when they see the philosopher draw it from the clouds and experiment on it in his laboratory. And the Romanist, or the semi-Romanist, whose flesh creeps when he sees a miracle in the consecration of the sacraments, ends, as is well known, in infidelity, when reason has struck the ground of false reverence from beneath his feet. The worship of the supernatural must legitimately end in Atheism as science advances. If the only basis of religion is awe, then there remains nothing for the human race to end in but blankness. "Dim religious light" and mystery—these are not the atmosphere of Christ's gospel of liberty. Base the heart on facts. The truth alone

make you free. Superstition is the refuge of a sceptical
t which has a heart too devout to dare to be sceptical. Men
ble at new theories, new views, the spread of infidelity;
they think to fortify themselves against these by multiply-
the sanctities which they reverence. But all this will not
"I show unto you a more excellent way."

I think a great deal of law," he says, in a tone almost like
of Emerson. "Law rules Deity; and its awful majesty is
re individual happiness. That is what Kant calls the "cat-
ical imperative," that is, a sense of duty, which commands
gorically or absolutely,—not saying "it is better," but
ou shalt." Why? Because "thou shalt," that is all. It
t best to do right,—thou must do right; and the conscience
feels that, and in that way, is the nearest to divine human-
Not that law was made, like the Sabbath, for man; but man
made for it. He is beneath it, a grain of dust before it: it
es on, and if he will not move before it, it crushes him:
is all, and that is punishment. I fancy that grand notion
aw is what we have lost." There are no favorites of heaven
may transgress the laws of the universe with impunity;
who can take fire in the hand and not be burnt; no ene-
s of heaven who if they sow corn will reap nothing. The
will wreck an apostle, and bear a murderer triumphantly.
y in poetry can Purity lay her hand on the fawning lion's
e. In God's spiritual universe too there are no favorites
can attain knowledge and spiritual wisdom apart from obe-
ce. There are none reprobate by an eternal decree, who
surrender self, and in all things submit to God, and yet fail
piritual convictiona. It is not an arbitrary condescension
od, which gives knowledge of the Truth to some, and
s it out from others; but a universal, glorious law. The
t lighteth every man that cometh into the world. "If any
will do his will he shall know." Everything in this world
its price; and the price buys that, not something else. A
ary education is not the road to military glory. You can-
enjoy the statesman's influence together with freedom from
lic notoriety. Tare-seed comes up tares and wheat-seed
at. And "he which soweth sparingly, shall reap also spar-
y; and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap also boun-

tifully"—sparingly or bountifully of what he sowed, not of something else. The mistake men make is that they sow for earth and expect to win spiritual blessings; or, they sow to the spirit, and then wonder that they have not a harvest of the good things of earth. They expect both harvests paying only one price. They would have that on which they bestowed no labor. They take sinful pleasure, and think it very hard that they must pay for it in agony and souls deteriorated. Or they complain that the riches and rewards of life fall to bad men, and take it for granted that there must be a future life to make this fair—that is, that because a man who has sown to the spirit does not reap to the flesh here he will hereafter. Do you think that God is going to reward honor, integrity, high-mindedness, with this world's coin? Be not deceived. If you sow the wind do not complain if your harvest is the whirlwind. If you sow to the spirit, be content with a spiritual reward—invisible—within—more life and higher life.

It is unnecessary after this to say that for the spirit of routine in religion and the church, the merely formal and conventional, he had the utmost impatience. "I wish to God," he cried, indignant at the treatment which Kingsley had received, "we had a little soldier's spirit in our Church! No! the Church of England will endure no chivalry, no *dash*, no effervescing enthusiasm. . . . We bear nothing but sober prosaic routine; and the moment any one with heart and nerve fit to be a leader of a forlorn hope appears, we call him a dangerous man, and exasperate him with cold unsympathizing reproofs, till he becomes a dissenter and a demagogue. . . . Day by day my hopes are sinking. We dare not say the things we feel. Who can? Who possibly may, when 'Records,' 'Guardians,' brother ministers, and lay hearers, are ready at every turn to call out heterodoxy?" And he prophesies that if the church's attitude is not changed, all noble spirits will be banished, leaving her to flounder in the mud of common place unable to rise or sink above the dead level." "As to our 'incomparable church,'" he writes in another fit of hot feeling, "why it does not require a prophetic spirit to see that in ten years more she must be in fragments, out of which fragments God will reconstruct something for which I am content to wait, in accordance with His

ual plan, which is to be forever evolving fresh forms of life out of dissolution and decay. If not in my time, why then will I wait." "It is so rare," he writes, again referring to Kingsley, "to find a clergyman who can forget the drill and peccadillo of the profession, and speak with a living heart for the suffering classes, not as a policeman established to lecture them into proprieties, but as one of the same flesh and blood indicating a common humanity." "I have almost done with divinity," he says elsewhere—"dogmatic divinity, that is,—except to lovingly endeavor to make out the truth which lies beneath this or that poor dogma, miserably overlaid as marble monuments are with whitewash. I read Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Keats, Coleridge, Philip Van Artevelde, for views of man, and meditate upon, instead of theological caricatures of humanity." He remarked upon the great difference between theological and scientific controversy. "Theologians are proverbially superstitious: because it is a question of veracity—the truth of their views, their moral perceptions, their intellectual acumen. There exists no test but argument on which they can fall back. If argument fails, all fails. But the man of science stands firmly on the facts of the universe. He is based upon reality. All the opposition and controversy in the world cannot alter facts, nor prevent the facts being manifest at last. He can be silent, because he is a witness for the Truth."

He protested against the spirit of compromise, the adoption of current views with no vital sense whatever of their meaning, and on social grounds alone,—a religion of expediency. "It is a startling thing," he said, "to see men protecting popular superstitions which they despise: taking part, with solemn gravity, in mummeries which in their heart they laugh at." *Be real*,—that was the burden of his preaching. There is a tendency, he said, always to think in the masses; men ask not what is true, but what is respectable, correct, orthodox, authorized. It comes partly from cowardice, partly from indolence, from habit, from imitation; from the uncertainty and darkness of all moral truths, and the dread of timid minds to plunge into the investigation of them. We are not righteous, but we expect God to make believe that we are righteous, in virtue of some peculiar doctrines which we hold. And so religion becomes a thing

of forms, men settle into a routine of externals, and decencies and proprieties form the substance of life. "The Pharisees were men who rested satisfied with the outward. The form of religion, which varies in all ages, *that* they wanted to stereotype the inner heart of religion—the unchangeable—justice, mercy, truth—that they could not feel. They had got their two schools of orthodoxy, the school of Shammai and the school of Hillel; and under the orthodoxy of these popular idols of the day, they were content to lose their own power of independent thought. Souls that had shrunk away from all goodness and nobleness and withered into the mummy of a soul. They could jangle about the breadth of a phylactery. They could discuss, as if it were a matter of life and death, ecclesiastical questions about tithe. They could decide, to a furlong, the length of journey allowable on the Sabbath day. But they could not look with mercy on a broken heart, pouring itself out to God in His temple; nor suffer a hungry man to rub an ear of corn on the Sabbath; nor cover the shame of a tempted sister or an erring brother. Men without souls, from whose narrow hearts the grandeur of everlasting truth was shut out." Jesus identified Religion with Goodness. Spiritual excellence, not orthodoxy or ritual regularity, is the righteousness which God accepts.

But if Robertson protested thus strongly against formality, the resting in a dead and hollow orthodoxy, he protested just as strongly against confounding religious sentiments with a holy life. This we have seen in considering the causes of his reaction from Evangelicalism; but it is a matter which assumes so large proportion in his teaching, that further reference seems to be demanded.

"Excitement and impression," he said, "are not religion. Neither can you trust to the alarm produced by the thought of eternal retribution. Ye that have been impressed, beware how you let those impressions die away! Die they will, and must; we cannot live in excitement forever; but beware of their leaving behind them nothing except a languid, jaded heart." "There is great danger in ungoverned feeling. There are persons more highly gifted with fine delicate sensibilities than others: they are not moved to action like others, by convic-

sions of the intellect or by a strong sense of duty: they can do nothing except through their affections. All this is very precious, no doubt, if well used: but just in proportion as feelings are strong do they require discipline. The temptation is great to indulge from mere pleasure of indulgence, and from the admiration given to feeling. It is easier to gain credit for goodness by a glistening eye, while listening to some story of self-sacrifice, than by patient usefulness. It is easier to get credit for spirituality by thrilling at some impassioned speech on the platform, or sermon from the pulpit, than by living a life of justice, mercy, and truth. And hence, religious life degenerates into mere indulgence of feeling, the excitement of religious meetings, or the *utterance* of strong feeling. In this sickly strife, life wastes away, and the man or woman becomes weak instead of strong; for invariably utterance weakens feeling." "It is a perilous thing to separate feeling from acting; to have learnt to feel rightly without acting rightly. It is a danger to which, in a refined and polished age, we are peculiarly exposed. The romance, the poem, and the sermon teach us how to feel. Our feelings are delicately correct. But the danger is this: feeling is given to lead to action; if feeling be suffered to awake without passing into duty, the character becomes untrue. "We pity wretchedness and shun the wretched." We utter sentiments just, honorable, refined, lofty,—but somehow, when a truth presents itself in the shape of a duty, we are unable to perform it." "Know we not that by merely talking of duty, our profession of admiration for duty will become a cant? . . . An indolent habit of admiring goodness is got easily, and is utterly without profit." Discussing the subject of moral virtues and religious graces, he said, "Beware of talking contemptuously of 'mere morality.' If we must choose between two things which ought never to be divided, moral principle and religious sentiment, there is no question which most constitutes the character 'which is not far from the kingdom of heaven.'"

Yet I do not need to say to any one familiar with Robertson's life and writings that never was one whose feelings were keener and sympathies quicker than his own, or who more persistently demanded for the sphere of feeling the high regard which belongs to it. "Believe," he says, "that deep feeling

has a meaning, though you may not have experienced it. Sympathy is needful in order to rightly understand the higher feelings. There are cold intellectual men, afraid of enthusiasm, who frown on and forbid every manifestation of feeling; they will talk of the elocution of Isaiah, or the logic of St. Paul, and they think to fathom the meaning of Scripture by grammatical criticism; whereas only the Spirit can interpret the Spirit. You must get into the same region of feeling in which prophets breathe, and then only can you understand them."

I have reserved till the last the presentation of Robertson's views on the subject of the Atonement. On no subject perhaps were his views so widely at variance with the views most current in the Church. His position here has exposed him more than anything else to the hostility of such men as Mr. McCrie, and it was upon this position more than upon any other that his general system of Christian truth was based. I therefore give the subject this prominence and shall abridge his statements with special care.

In the first place it is well to note the not uncommon parallelism here drawn between Robertson and our own Bushnell. That their difference was a very real and important one will be seen at once, but we fortunately have a very distinct declaration from Robertson on this point. "I have read Bushnell," he writes: "there are some good things in him, but on the whole I think him most shadowy and unsatisfactory. He does not sufficiently show that dogmas express eternal verities and facts; that they are what a mathematician might call approximative formulas to truth. In this spirit I always ask, what does that dogma mean? Not what did it mean in the lips of those who spoke it? How, in my language, can I put into form the underlying truth, in correcter form if possible, but in only approximative form after all? In this way purgatory, absolution, Mariolatry, become to me fossils not lies."

Vicarious sacrifice may be contemplated in two ways. It may be viewed as the sublimest of all truths; or it may be viewed in the spirit which says: "It is expedient for us that one should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not." It was with Caiaphas simply a question of numbers—better that one should die than many. The reply to that was

Expediency cannot obliterate Right and Wrong. Expediency may choose the best possible when the conceivable is not attainable; but in right and wrong there is no and best. It is *not* expedient to do injustice. When a regiment has mutinied, the commander, instead of gentleness, may select a few to perish as examples to the rest. But no principle could justify a commander in selecting an innocent man, condemning him unjustly, and affecting to regard him guilty, while the transgressors escaped, and learned the enormity of their transgressions by seeing execution done to the guiltless. No man would justify the parent, purloining a lamb from his flock, who throws one of his children to the pack, that the rest may escape while their father is buried in the victim. In horrible bewilderment we conceive him resolving to sacrifice one rather than lose all; it is not conceivable that the doubt in his mind should be, Shall I and the rest perish, or this one. This aspect has been given to the sacrifice of Christ. It has been represented that the majesty of Law demanded a victim—the purer and more innocent the better. It borrows the principles of legalism. And there is a kind of acquiescence in the sentiment which is entirely selfish. The more wrath instead of love is believed to be the Divine name, the more may a man find satisfaction in feeling himself sheltered from it. It is a Jewish feeling: Christ has suffered and I am safe. It is to call that acquiescence humility; but whoever can see in that thought, without desiring to share the Cross, has something of the spirit of Caiaphas. No, it was not that which made Christ's sacrifice the world's Atonement. There is no special virtue in mere death, even though it be the death of the Son of God. So mournfully do we deface the humanity! The Romanists have a further perversion. They are pictures which represent the Virgin as interposing between the world and her angry Son; laying bare her maternal bosom by way of appeal, and the Son yielding to his mother's entreaty, which He would not do for Love. The principle in both views is the same. Again it is assumed that Christ was conscious, by His Omniscience, of the sins of the world; that the duplicity of the child, and the crime of

the assassin, and every unholy thought that has ever passed through a human bosom, were present to His mind in that awful hour as if they were his own—and that thus he bore our sins. This is utterly unscriptural and fanciful; and again, it is dangerous, for it represents the whole atonement as a fictitious and shadowy transaction. Mysterious enough His sufferings were, as the sufferings of the deepest hearts ever must be but mysterious only in this sense.

The atonement will become a living truth only when we humbly recognize in it the eternal fact that sacrifice is the Law of life. It is a mysterious and a fearful thing to observe how all God's universe is built upon this law; how it penetrates and pervades all Nature, so that if it were to cease Nature would cease to exist. "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit"—that Christ himself represents as the parallel of His sacrifice. The destruction of the mineral is the life of the vegetable. Upon the life of the vegetable world the myriad forms of higher life sustain themselves—still the same law. We see the dove struck down by the hawk, the deer trembling beneath the stroke of the lion. And as often as man sees his table covered with the flesh of animals slain, does he behold the mysterious law of being. It is as impossible for man to live as it is for man to be redeemed, except through vicarious suffering. The anguish of the mother is the condition of the child's life; our very bread is only obtained after the toil and anguish of suffering myriads; we possess no atom of knowledge which has not, in some century of the world or other, been wrung out of nature's secrets by the sweat of the brow or the sweat of the heart. Our cultivated lands, the peace which we enjoy, how have they been purchased? Creation itself is sacrifice—the self-inpartation of the divine Being.

In the redemption of our humanity, a moment comes when that law is recognized as the will of God adopted *consciously*, and voluntarily obeyed as the law of man's existence. Then it is that man's true nobleness, his redemption from mere instincts and selfishness begin. You can only bless when you have done with the pursuit of personal happiness. You can

only save others when you have ceased to think of saving your own soul. The Highest man recognized and gladly embraced that law. It was the consciousness of His surrender to that as God's will, and the voluntariness of the act, which made it a sacrifice. It was a sacrifice offered up to conscience. He suffered as a Martyr to the Truth.

It was not merely a sacrifice,—it was a sacrifice for sin, the world's sin. To understand this, two ideas must be distinctly apprehended—the idea of punishment and the idea of the world's sin. Punishment is of two kinds. If you approach too near the whirling machinery, the mutilation which follows is the punishment of temerity. If the traveler ignorantly lays his hand on the cockatrice's den, the stroke of the envenomed fang is the punishment of his ignorance. Further—according to the constitution of this world, the faults of others, as well as our own transgressions, bring pain and sorrow upon us. Penury or an irritable temperament are the harvest of some ancestor's extravagance or intemperance. The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. Strictly these are punishments; and, in the language of theology, they are called imputed guilt. But there is an all-important distinction between them and the chastisements of personal iniquity, the result of personal misconduct. Apply all this to the sacrifice of Christ. Let no man say He bore the wrath of God. He came into collision with the world's evil, and He bore the penalty of that daring. He approached the whirling wheel and was torn in pieces. He laid His hand upon the cockatrice's den, and its fangs pierced Him. It is the law which governs the conflict with evil. It can only be crushed by suffering from it. The Son of Man who puts His naked foot on the serpent's head crushes it; but the fang goes into His heel.

The second idea to mention is that of the world's sin. Let us see it as a great connected principle; *One*; a single world-spirit. Separate acts of sin are but manifestations of one great principle. So Christ viewed them. The Jews of that age had had no hand in the murder of Abel or Zacharias; but they were men of kindred spirit with the men who slew them. Condemning their murderers, they imitated their act. In that imitation, they "allowed" the deeds of their fathers and shared

in the guilt. So, too, Stephen looked on the act of his sins. It was an outbreak of the Great Principle of resurrection of the spirit of those who had "resisted the Ghost" in their day, slain the prophets, opposed Moses, defied "the Just One;" their genuine descendants were opposing themselves to the form in which Truth and God were appearing in their day. Similarly Christ died for our sins. If you have been a false friend, a sceptic, a cold disciple, a formalist, selfish, an opposer of goodness, an assessor, whatever evil you have done, in that degree and you participate in the evil to which the Just One fell a victim—you are one of that mighty rabble which cried, "Crucify Him, Crucify Him." For your sin He died; His blood cleansed your threshold.

The act of Christ is the act of humanity—that which humanity is bound to do. His righteousness does not supersede our righteousness, nor does His sacrifice supersede our sacrifice. It is the representative of human life and human sacrifice—vicarious for all, yet binding upon all. He is the ideal that is shrined in every true heart; and, regarding that perfect Life, we say, "That is my religion, that is my righteousness, my life as I would wish to give it,—freely, not checked, entire and perfect."

Such were the doctrines of Robertson of Brighton. In the general spirit of comprehension, his broad sympathies, his leaning to universal rather than exclusive truth, it is quite untrue to speak in detail. They follow from what has been said. "As to the desire after breadth and comprehension, thank God, I am sick of hatred, suspicion, slander, and condemnation of one another, and long to believe in men's good rather than in their evil, in God rather than in the Devil."

There is only *one* thing we have to wage a perpetual war with,—sin and wrong, in whomsoever found,—Church, Roman Catholic, or Protestant Dissenter." "I hold it my duty to be liberal and generous even to the illiberal and bigoted." "There is no surer mark of a half-educated man than the incapacity of admiring various forms of excellence. . . . Feel all that is beautiful—love all that is good. The maxim in religion and in art is—sever yourself from all

nism; pledge yourself to no school; cut your life adrift in all party; be a slave to no maxims; stand forth unfettered, free, servant only to the truth." "Do not tremble at difficulties and shoreless expanses of truth, if you feel drifting into them. God's truth must be boundless."

That such teachings should draw upon him suspicion and censure from the narrow minds as numerous about him as about like him, was inevitable; but for this he cared not. "Once these things moved me: it is strange how little I care for them now." "Do you know what don't care came to, sir?" asked one of the many women who called to correct him. "He came to Calvary," was the quick reply. "It seems to me a pitiful thing," he said, "for any man to aspire to be true and to speak the truth, and then to complain in astonishment that truth has not wings to give, but thorns."

It is unnecessary too for us here to consider his strong protests against confounding clear ideas with righteousness, intellectual culture with moral good, the prominence which he gave to the doctrine of the spiritual discernment of spiritual things, his condemnation of merely curious inquiry in matters of religion, his conviction of the limitations of the common scientific method, of the enormous falsehood of the necessarian scheme, of the vanity of a mere economic progress. However shrewdly and brilliantly his ideas here are clothed, they are only those that are universally accepted by religious men. I have sought only to present those views of Christian doctrine which may be considered original or peculiar, and which have exposed him to the criticism of such men as Mr. McCrie.

Many of Robertson's friends and brothers in the Church, so anxious to vindicate his orthodoxy, have said that in all his teachings there was really nothing new, that he only removed the dust and rust from the currency of the church, only translated into common human words the familiar terms of Christian doctrine, that he did not so much enlarge the horizon of our religion, as illuminate what already lay within the field of it." This is untrue,—and for himself Robertson would have scorned to make any defence. Mr. McCrie is right. The doctrines are new, if by new he means irreconcilable with the views which gave birth to the Thirty-nine Articles and the Westminster

Catechism. Common enough indeed in the pulpit of to-day, at the roots, as he has shown, of all that is highest and most powerful in our literature, they are new, if by new he means as far as the east is from the west from the religious standpoint from which he writes. If those things be vital to religion which he declares, then verily has Robertson drifted far from true religion—and Tennyson and Carlyle, and Martineau and Emerson, and all who have made the characteristic thought of this great age of ours what it is. Never was an age before when the great underlying current of earnest thought was untrue, never an age when the results of a broad survey of the world's literature were misleading. If this be so, are not all men called loudly to think twice and to think deeply before accepting, with Mr. McCrie's facts, his conclusions? Not what is new, nor what is old, but what is true—that is the question. God's truth indeed is boundless; and if Robertson or any of the world's great philosophers, poets, priests, or prophets, have enlarged the horizon of our vision, let us be reverently thankful for what they have shown and for what they have shadowed.

VII.—SHALL WOMANHOOD BE ABOLISHED?

PER of progressive sympathies remarks that "this has often been settled by learned exegesis, and argument appears impregnable. But it does not stay settled. It sees how to confute the argument, but the conclusion does not harmonize with sanctified common sense."

It may be thought as to the sanctified character of common sense, which, though itself not clearly in a true weight of character if in numbers, persists in practice both Scripture and reason condemn, the fact thus is a significant feature of the present state of the world before us. Masses of compact argument, certainly of serious attention, have been placed before the public to be quietly ignored, or met with vague sentiment, or which excites a smile on the face of every expert. Inspiring, to be obliged to repeat again and again the same notions, which ought to have been either answered or long ago, yet such work sometimes has to be done. In the present case the field is so wide that the more salient points can be touched in a single article.

In the first place, let the true question be understood. Whether the sphere of activity usually occupied by women may not occasionally be considerably enlarged. This has been conceded. Society was not agitated by the example of Caroline Fry, or that of Mary Lyon, or Catherine Beecher, or Delia Bacon. Nor is the question whether new activity may not offer themselves to women as to men without trenching upon the essential idea of woman-

more than this is now demanded. Women are crowded into the public gaze, and men invite them there, without any special occasion. Publicity for its own sake is sought; praise and flattery are lavished; vanity is the result; admiration awakened; the religious conscience is silenced, and told that this is the natural, if not necessary

expression of love to Christ; the reason why the cross has not conquered the world more rapidly is said to be, that woman has not assumed the harness of public fight; the laudable ambition of maidenhood is directed into this channel; a distinctive idea of propriety for woman is denied, and the rule substituted that she should do whatever she is able to do, or whatever can be done for Christ, or whatever she herself thinks fit; in short, not modification but revolution is aimed at, and is accomplished, to an extent that leaves surprise struggling with grief, in many, if not most of the clearest and most far-seeing minds. Those whose eyes are opened to what is going on know, that the conception entertained by our mothers as to what is true womanhood is rapidly dying out. Not merely certain acts or customs, but the very atmosphere of time is changing, and the instinctive sense of delicacy that forms its oxygen, so far as female character is concerned, is charged with poison.

The terms of our title, therefore, present the true issue. Shall Womanhood, as the civilized world has hitherto understood it, be abolished?

The central utterances of the New Testament upon the subject are well known. "Let your women keep silence in the churches, for it is not permitted unto them to speak, but to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home; for it is a shame for women to speak in the church." "Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach nor to usurp authority over the man; but to be in silence," 1st Cor. xiv, and 1st Tim. ii. This language is perfectly plain, and has been considered so by the church generally in all ages. Of the twelve or fifteen commentators whom I have consulted—including Bengel, Rosen-Müller, Olshausen, Lange, Bloomfield, Alford, Conybeare and Howson, Barnes, Robinson, and others more recent, not one seems to regard any other exegesis as possible.

But in an age which has produced, and with Christian pretence, grave arguments in favor of polygamy, and the unrestrained intercourse of the sexes; and against the received principles of geometry, the spheroidal figure of the earth and

the right of individual property, persons are found to make "no" mean "yes" in the passages before us. Various interpretations of this sort have been proposed, no two of them agreeing; each more absurd, if possible, than the others, yet some of them elaborate and exhibiting a show of scholarship, but collapsing as utterly, on examination, as ever did bubbles blown from the lips of childhood. The once notorious "*λαλεω*" argument, for example, giving to that word a meaning which would make Christ, the Apostles, the Holy Spirit, and God the Father himself "babble" throughout the New Testament, seems to be given up, yet persons who passed for Greek scholars have urged it in its day; and many an honest Christian still feels the influence of that strange vagary, with the ridiculous history of which he is unacquainted.

There is a kind of work in the field of exegesis, which depends upon a critical knowledge of New Testament Greek, such as few besides professional scholars can be expected to possess. But the next best thing to the possession of it, is to be aware of the want of it, and thus to avoid making one's self ridiculous.

Not being an expert in this department, I have taken pains to obtain the opinions of men who, by position or reputation, are responsible to the world for the judgments they give. The commentators have already been cited. Others have been consulted, and especially, for the sake of definiteness, as to the exegesis of 1st Cor. xiv: 34, 35, proposed by a writer in the *New Englander*, for Jan., 1877. The answers in writing, of even men, all of them occupying, or having done so for years, some of the highest chairs of instruction in New Testament Greek in the land, are before me.

Several others, known to be among the first non-teaching Greek scholars, are to be added to the list. One of the writers, —a member of the American committee for the revision of the New Testament,—says: "The exegesis (in the *New Englander*), first amused me, and then provoked me. The whole article is an attempt to fit scripture to the exigencies of the times." Another, also a member of the same committee, says: "It is melancholy to me, that a man should spend so much time and thought as the writer in the *New Englander* has done, and

think he has rendered so much service to the church, when his positions are perfectly untenable." These extracts exhibit the judgment and feeling of *all* the persons consulted. All of them condemn absolutely, and in detail, the exegesis in question. And if any reader knows of a man, in any country or age, responsible, either by position or reputation, as an eminent scholar in New Testament Greek, who dissents, I think the case requires that his name should be given to the public. Until some such names can be found, it seems to me that most of us would better make few words in the field of critical Greek exegesis.

There is, however, a kind of scrutiny, which persons of general culture and sound judgment, with, or even without some knowledge of Greek, may exercise upon the interpretation of the New Testament. Thus we observe how short-sighted appears the attempt to get rid of the import of the word "*λαλει*," when the phrases "keep silence," "under obedience," "ask husbands at home," as well as the similar language in the epistle to Timothy, would still remain. Can this language be neutralized by questioning the meaning of "*laleo*;" or that of "*ἄλλα*;" or the use of the dative as subject of the infinitive? Indeed it is remarkable throughout, how the passages which fall with most crushing force upon the new philosophy, 1st Cor. 11th, and Eph. 5th, are ignored by its defenders, while, ostrich-like, they hide their heads in the dust raised about some other texts, which, even if demolished, would leave the case against them scarcely weaker than before.

But, on the other hand, the logical relation of other passages in more than one of the apostles, throws a flood of light upon the subject, by unfolding the New Testament theory of the nature of the sexes, and of the family, the relation of husband and wife; and since the family is the true unit of human society,—the husband the normal man, and the wife the normal woman, and their relation the normal relation of man and woman,—as involved in this, the true constitution of all human society. "Wives submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord;" "ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands, as in the old time the holy women; even as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord." "And the wife, see that she reverence her husband."

the apostles were not looking at one side of the subject only, when they wrote these words. They saw all around and knew well the significance of what they were saying: husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church." "Let every one of you so love his wife even as himself." But the word to the husband of obedience, or of reverence, though in a certain sense of the latter word it is due in the highest degree to the true woman and wife.

Into the depths of social philosophy underlying these directions, the mind of the apostle also penetrates. "For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church." "Therefore as the church is subject unto Christ, so the wives be subject unto their own husbands, in everything." "The head of every man is Christ, and the head of the woman is the man. Man is the image and glory of God; the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman, but the woman for the man." Please observe this is not my language, but that of the New Testament. Few men would care to quote such texts, had not the proud, self-worshipping spirit of modern democracy, in what may be called its social "*avatar*," turning its envious eyes on the family, chafed at the sight of the happy organization, and before subordination constituted by God and Nature there. So that spirit organized subordination,—"*many members in one body*,"—seems slavery. "But if all were one member, ye were the body?" "Are all apostles? are all prophets? are all teachers?" "Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular." "If the foot shall say 'because I am not of the body,' is it therefore not of the body?" Evidently both Paul and Peter regarded the family as an organization, made up not of identities, but of different members, each having its own distinctive nature, and occupying its own naturally assigned place, and that of this organization the husband is the head. Admit this, and the rest follows. The husband is the elder and representative of the family before the world; he shines, and charms, and reigns, queen of the consecrated home. In the mind of the apostle, marriage is fraught with mysterious, almost sacramental import. "As we are mem-

bers of Christ's body, so they two shall be one flesh." "He that loveth his wife, loveth himself. For no man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth it, and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the church. For we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall be joined to his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh. This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church." These profound ideas are yet, perhaps, a mystery; but they are not thereby emptied of their truth, or their power. Marriage is yet the Ark of the Covenant of human society. Of all the sacred arcana of human happiness, outside of the personal character itself, there is none so deep, so rich, so important. It makes the man and woman both, far more than any other worldly condition; and whatever interest or destiny is rooted in the healthy nature of the marriage relation grows in the richest soil that earth or life afford. And to that mystery of mysteries, the union of Christ with the church, and its soul-pervading, life-creating power, comparing marriage, the apostle may well affirm that the highest welfare of the wife is wrapped up in the love of her husband; and on the whole is safer there than in any possible self-asserting power, or position, or office of her own.

It may seem to a hasty thinker, too hazardous thus to commit one's all to the free care of another. But a deeper thought shows the whole progress of the race, from barbarism to the highest Christian civilization, a steady development of more and more vital and complicated relations of interdependence between man and man. The savage hunter roaming the forest, of all men, trusts least to the faith and goodness of his fellows. Civilization, and Christianity are mutual trust. Nor less really does the husband commit his life to the keeping of his wife, than she her's to him. It is a mutual bond,—a casket rich in the treasure of two immortal lives. "They twain shall be one flesh."

True, marriage often falls short of its high ideal; but not more so than the parental, and all other human relations. And no more in the former than in the latter does the remedy for any short-coming lie in the alteration of the terms of the relation, or escape from its natural sweep, but in the improve-

t of character under it. The condemnation of this whole
ement for the masculinization of woman is written in its
mistakable tendency to develop husband and wife into dis-
t, on pretence of equal powers, and to profane the domes-
ltar into an arena of business relations,—“you stand for
r rights and I stand for mine.”

et in all this the apostle still shows that he remembered
sides of the case, and weighed well the significancy of
t he was saying. “Nevertheless neither is the man with-
the woman; neither the woman without the man in the
l. For as the woman is of the man, even so is the man by
woman, but all things of God,” that is, all things in due
er,—each in its own place, without envy or strife. “If the
le body were an eye, where were the hearing?” This is
slavery, but order, organization; and there is no true lib-
, but liberty in order. The opposite of organization is
s and death. How little sympathy had the writer of 1st
12th, with the defiant individualism of modern character!
he apostle fortifies himself by citing the law of Moses. “As
saith the law,” referring, perhaps, to Num. 30th, where, if
ife make a vow unto the Lord, even that solemn obligation
declared not binding if her husband disallow it. How
nge such a statute appears in the light of modern theories!
he history of the creation is also appealed to, for illustra-
if not for argument. “For Adam was first formed, then
2. And Adam was not deceived; but the woman, being
eived, was in the transgression.” That is to say, Adam, as
head, was formed first, and with a nature fitting his posi-
1: and naturally, from both the nature and position of the
, Eve, not Adam, was deceived and led in the transgression.
That the apostle thought the nature of woman adapted to
position appears also elsewhere. “Husbands, dwell with
m (wives) according to knowledge, giving honor unto the
e, as unto the weaker vessel.” Man, then, is the stronger
ure, fitted to lead, and fight, and govern, and protect the
er, choicer, sweeter, and not less precious and truly honora-
nature of the weaker wife. And neither he nor she must
fuse the system, and destroy its harmony, by confounding
two offices, or encroaching either upon the office of the

other. It did not seem to the apostle, as it does to many now, that woman is not honored because she is not made a man of. The whole modern theory is cut up by the roots, by the single phrase, "giving honor . . . as unto the weaker vessel."

And finally the apostle appeals to the instinctive sensibilities of woman's own nature, as testifying to the propriety of a more shadowed career on her part than that of man. "If a man have long hair, it is a shame to him (as indicating effeminacy), but if a woman have long hair, it is a glory to her, for her hair is given her for a covering." Why covered, if she is to look surging multitudes in the face, and ride the storm of public debate like a man? "It is a shame for a woman to speak in the church." Would some one kindly tell us where was Paul's inspiration when he wrote these sentences, if the modern theories of womanhood be correct? But inspired or not, his philosophy is the same throughout. Here is his picture of the true Christian woman. "If she have brought up children; if she have lodged strangers; if she have washed the saints' feet; if she have relieved the afflicted; if she have diligently followed every good work." Not a word about preaching; or the public platform: or any form of activity which all ages have assigned generally to men. And is it fair to suppose that under the vague phrase, "every good work," there lie hidden lines of conduct so widely different from the preceding, as to require, to effectually suggest them, a quite definite expression? And so again, "Teach the young women to be sober; to love their husbands; to love their children; to be discreet; chaste; keepers at home; good; obedient to their own husbands." Why did he not say, "Earnest speakers for Christ?" In describing a different class of women, the picture does assume more "advanced" hues. "Withal, they learn to be idle, wandering about from house to house, tattlers also, busy bodies, speaking things which they ought not." It is easy to see the sort of character the apostle had in mind;—a character tired of the modest duties of home, and ambitious for a wider sphere of action.

Such are the teachings of the New Testament on the distinctive nature of man and woman, and their mutual relations as involved in the family, and in society. Is there any difficulty

in accounting for the strong expressions of Paul in 1st . 14th, and 1 Tim. 2d? Is it possible any longer to doubt that he means what he there says? Women are forbidden to speak in the church because God and nature never intend them for public characters.

The texts in question were written, some to the Corinthians, some to the Ephesians, some to the Colossians, some to Titus

Timothy, to be by them expressed in all their charges, some by Peter in his general epistle to the churches. And then the grounds upon which the prohibition is evidently rested,—the order of creation, the relation of man and woman before the fall, the law of Moses, the theory of marriage, the still deeper nature of the sexes, the instinctive modesty of woman and the proprieties thereby implied, and the ideal conception of Christian womanhood. And yet men are heard to talk about the prohibitions of Paul being designed for a peculiar use of society in ancient Greece!

And when all these considerations have been placed before the public, and remain unanswered, dreams are still entertained of meeting the tide by remarking on the inadequacy of a verbal interpretation of the Scriptures, as if the distinguishing feature of this whole argument were not, that it rests on the philosophy of the sexes and of society running as a stream through the New Testament! We are still treated to such rich-like efforts to reverse the plain meaning of certain texts, as if these were not sustained by the system, instead of being sustained by any two or three of these!

The absurdity of some things of this sort which have lately appeared in the *New Englander*, may be seen without the aid of the eminent Greek scholarship which has been appealed to in vain. Thus when it is proposed to completely reverse the meaning of a text by assigning rare and forced, if not impossible senses to some words (*ἄλλα*, 1 Cor. xiv, 34), and interposing others, without the slightest justification, in a way that, if carried out, would send a man through the New Testament mending and adding to the text at pleasure (pronoun after *καὶ*, v. 35); objecting to a construction in one verse (dative before the infinitive, v. 35), while accepting it in another (v. 34), any trained and balanced mind can see the unsound-

ness of the exegesis. And when it is arbitrarily assumed that "not to speak" means only "not to dispute in a disorderly way," although the apostle had just treated that topic, and given it a nevident close (v. 32, 33), opening upon the silence of women with the air of a new topic, and when, had the former been still in his mind, there was no reason for distinguishing the sexes, as if disorder were no evil in a Christian assembly unless produced by women; and when the force of the words, "I suffer not a woman to teach," is sought to be broken by assuming something disorderly in their manner, which alone the apostle wishes to censure, ignoring the connected language, "in silence, with all subjection," as if there were no alternative to woman's wrangling but absolute silence, nor any remedy but subjection to men, and this concluded on no other ground than a clause in the context enjoining simplicity in dress! and when, in the face of the apostle's solemn objurgation, after the prohibition, "If any man think himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord," we are taken back to the 11th chapter to find a phrase, which, when carried on to the 14th chapter, and applied to another topic than its own, might seem, though hardly justly, to indicate a somewhat yielding tone of feeling on the part of the apostle; and when the mere omission of the prohibition in one passage (11th chapter) where another topic forms the subject, and woman's speaking is only incidentally alluded to but not discussed, is held to neutralize the most positive and direct language in another passage where the practice in question is the main subject of discussion, besides that chapter xi, 7, 8, 9, inevitably implies the whole conservative idea of the relation of the sexes, which renders any discussion of the propriety of public action on the part of women a waste of words; and when we are told that the promise, "Ye shall be my sons and daughters" proves that both were to run the same public career; and that the words "They were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with tongues," necessitate that women spoke in a public way, although the writer himself admits that the language of the narrative covers "conversation with one another in different

as of the assembly, as well as public speech," besides that the surprise and excitement of that occasion there was some order, giving rise to the suspicion of drunkenness, which sensible Christians would hardly select as a feature of the day worthy of imitation; and when Anna giving thanks for the gift of the infant Jesus in the temple is claimed as an example of public speech; and when we are asked to consider the founding of the way of the Lord to Apollos by Aquila and Priscilla at home as constituting them both public teachers; that Christ sending by Mary, the first disciple whom he loved, the news of his resurrection, inducted her into public speech; and every woman who "labored in the Lord," or even sympathized with an apostle is of course a public speaker, although the same language might have been used, without the slightest strain, of the Christian faithfulness of the silent retiring of our modest mothers; nay, when even the title "Lamb's wife," applied to the church is thought to count for nothing against such a mass of testimony as has been adduced,—when feats of exegesis like these are proposed, it would be bold indeed to deny to any sensible man the privilege of dissent.

In the whole New Testament there is but a single text,—1 Cor. xi, 5: "Every woman that prayeth or prophesieth with her head uncovered, etc.," that looks in the other direction. This has already been slightly noticed. It may be added that the apostle does not here say "in the church," and may refer to more private occasions. He is speaking of another subject; and there is no evidence that the propriety of a woman speaking in public was in his mind at all, any more than was the custom of wine-drinking, when, a little further on, he condemns gluttony and drunkenness at the table of the Lord, or the propriety of private brawls in the mind of Moses when he forbade a certain mode of interference on the part of a wife, Lev. xxv, 11. And this appears the more natural since the writer may have had already in mind, awaiting its proper place, the prohibition three chapters further on. The changes are made with childish delight, on the various allusions in the New Testament to the faith and labor of women in the Lord, as if their labor were necessarily public! The daughters of Philip

prophesied. But prophesying was not always public discourse; and if it were, women generally, in these days, are perhaps not prophets. Who shall assure us that an instance of this kind establishes a rule any more than the "having all things common," and the summary punishment of Annanias and his wife? What is to be said of the state of mind which can cite mere historic allusions of this sort against the positive commands upon the other side, supported as they are by equally clear ideas respecting the nature of the sexes, running through the New Testament? And yet there is no proof that in a single instance in the apostolic age, a woman stood forth as a public much less as an official preacher of the Gospel.

We are often reminded of the evidently high appreciation by both Christ and the Apostles, of the faith, and love, and self-denial of women. I accept all that can be said on that topic. Nothing can be more certain than that Christ and the Apostles understood the value of woman. And that renders the fact more noticeable that they never placed her in any public position; a fact utterly unexplainable except upon the theory that they did not regard her as a candidate for anything of that sort.

The remark just made respecting the force of historical allusions to practices clearly condemned by positive commands applies with even greater force to the Old Testament than to the New. The ancient civilization was crude, coarse, and semi-barbarous. The Hebrew Scriptures are a history of the religious growth of a nation's mind. Polygamy, slavery, and a multitude of single acts which would destroy all title to Christian character, on the part of the perpetrator now, are mentioned without censure, in favor of which an argument from that circumstance might just as well be offered as from similar grounds in favor of public life for women. Nowhere in the Old Testament is there any approval, in terms of any such practice as a rule. There is only practice uncondemned; or, to give it the strongest statement, practice approved for the time. But if this establishes the Gospel rule of morals, how about the conduct of Rebekah and Jacob toward Isaac and Esau? and that of David toward the innocent sons of Saul and Rispah? and the policy of

ordecai in the matter of Esther and the vacant place in the king's harem? and many similar transactions. Shall the practice of a state of society like that be set up against the most clear and positive precepts of the New Testament? Moreover the strongest passages in favor of the public position of women, which are found in the Old Testament, early break down when looked at closely. No one of them more frequently quoted, for example, than the words of Joel "I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh; your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions." But the sole import of this passage is included in the single phrase,—a general out-pouring of the Holy Spirit. The other particulars are merely the drapery, or machinery. As in the phrase, "they shall beat their swords into plow shares, and their spears into pruning-hooks." What would be thought of an exegesis of this passage which should lay stress upon the distinction between swords and spears, and base an important rule of human conduct, one even to be set up against Gospel precepts, upon it!

One could better have patience with interpretations like these than those who propose them adhere to them themselves, any longer than to serve the present purpose. But we do not find those who wish to make woman a public character attaching importance to the distinction between old and young men, or to that between dreams and visions, or to the place of these latter in a prophecy at all. Why not, if the mention of both "sons" and "daughters" is so significant? Besides, was this prophecy surely to be public?

But it is said "God recognized Deborah as a prophetess," true, and he calls Cyrus his "Shepherd,"—his "Anointed," and he "recognized" Balaam; and directed Samuel to anoint David to be king over Israel, yet either of those persons would be a poor example in some respects, for the Christian now. Deborah "recognized" Jael calling her "blessed above women," an act which would now consign her name to infamy. We shall find the acceptance of all the Old Testament practice that appears to have been "recognized" at the time somewhat embarrassing. Some one has discovered that the "publishers"

in Ps. lxxviii, 11, were women, and therefore women should preach. But that passage is a "Te Deum" on the deliverance of Israel at the Red Sea; and the women spoken of are those who sang with Miriam the song of triumph. Thus far, no farther; it is another example of Hebrew practice.

The course of the Biblical argument on this subject has not been of a character to feed the professional pride of an American clergyman. What shall be said, for one more example, of the frequent citation,—even by men supposed to be of sound mind, of the words, "In Christ there is neither male nor female," as if they bore upon this question! *Can* it be necessary to spend words upon such applications of Scripture as this? A woman has said, "what I have seen and heard on the *pro* side of the subject, has (with one exception) appeared so weak, such special pleading, has shown such ignorance of the Scriptures, and such light regard for their authority, that it scarcely needed the arguments against woman's speaking to convince me that God did forbid it." These words are not too strong, though charity may allow us to find the cause in a too ready yielding to a popular impulse rather than a light regard for the authority of revelation. My own views of the nature of inspiration are not such as to render me a "strict constructionist" in the interpretation and use of the Bible. But the nonchalance with which it has been treated in the matter before us, is something appalling to minds even more "liberal" than mine. Brethren, do you not *know*, after all, that the New Testament theory respecting woman is not the same with that of modern reform? How long will scholars and intelligent men of the world believe us honest in our claims in behalf of the Bible, when they see us treat it in this way?

Were there any general consent of human reason against the New Testament theory upon this subject, that fact would furnish an excuse for our conduct, though it would not save the honor of revelation. But on the contrary, a majority, it is believed, of the best minds, hold the modern movement to be as supremely foolish in philosophy as it is rebellious in religion. The intellectual fatuity which marks the movement on this field is scarcely less astonishing than that shown in the

l of exegesis, though assuming, generally, the form of sistent ignoring of vital considerations rather than of absurd umentation.

It will scarcely be denied that *organization* is the constructive of the universe; that the material and the spiritual world organizations; that all human society, and the family—the doubted natural and Divine unit, and germ of society, are anizations; that male and female, father and mother, brother sister, are parts of a system, each having its own nature, ce, and office, which it must therefore keep, or be out of ce, and violate nature. It *cannot* be denied that nature, and l, by making woman the mother, have shown which half of great sphere belongs to her. Science teaches that her sical nature is adapted to her own work rather than to that man. The general consent of the race testifies that her ritual constitution exhibits a similar adaptation, and differs much from that of her stronger, coarser brother, as the sical. And why should it not be so? Would nature likely to impose the duties of motherhood, through all ie, without the corresponding faculties? And so of man- d on the other hand. And *can* anyone pretend that the rk of exterior life which generally falls to man, is so nearly same with that of the mother as to call for no difference spiritual nature? Why then should father and mother k to exchange or mingle, and so to confuse their duties, d thereby thwart their action in both departments? The auty and perfection of the whole system, and of each indi- dual part depend upon each keeping his own place, and ing his own duty, and that means letting the duty of others one.

The obvious specific character of both the male and the male organization confirms this view. The exquisite delicacy l sensibility of woman point unmistakably to a delicate and ltered career in life. The eñd, and the adaptation illu- te and prove each other; and both reveal the design of ure that woman should be woman, and not man. The stitution and temperament of man are different. Can any e suppose that he would succeed in the realm that belongs woman, even could he assume the mother's place? Now

these facts of organization are undenied, and undeniable, and they lie at the foundation of the whole subject. But who in the interest of change, has considered and weighed them fairly? It may perhaps be supposed, that while the organizing purpose of nature now described is a reality, the execution of it may also be left to her; with an open door, and encouragement from society to as many exceptions as may choose to present themselves. And this might perhaps be so, were woman's instincts left to their own unbiased choice. Natural womanhood does not seek to endue itself with the attributes or the functions of manhood. But in these days nature is not left to herself in this matter. An agitation is raised; a crusade preached; the trumpet of "reform" is blown; religious conscience is appealed to, and abused; every unfortunate masculine weakness in a woman's character is scented out, and quickened into activity; and women are flattered, and beguiled, and almost forced upon the public stage. It is anything but spontaneous womanly nature that has taken the direction of woman's career of late. The effect of an occasional exception to nature's organizing rule might not be seriously bad. Nature herself seems to contemplate something of the sort, indulging, now and then, in a *usus naturæ*,—a Joan of Arc, or a Penthesilea cutting off her breast to become the better archer. But the general confusion of functions which is now sought is a different thing. Confusion of function is confusion of thought, of feeling, and of character. Is it possible that anything is to be gained for woman or for society, by running athwart nature's plans, and confounding things which she intended to be distinct? Plato dreamed of improving upon nature's plan of entrusting the raising of children to parental care and love. Of course he expected other care and love to replace that of the parent, and with superior wisdom and advantage to the child and to the State. And doubtless advantage would thus have accrued in some cases, and some threads or elements of it in other cases, and in as many, probably, as would be afforded by a similar traversing of nature's assignment of position and duty, respectively, to man and woman. But exceptional advantages do not justify a rule. Nature understood her work; and men work most successfully

harmony with, and not in violation of her plans. The amount of talent and energy and vitality, which make a good husband and a good wife, when properly distributed, will make failures of both if the distinction be disregarded. After age, as civilization advances, and the power of the races in grander and grander proportions, *division of labor* becomes more and more the law of all human activity. It is a strange time now to reverse the rule, travel backward and unperform functions which nature, and all time thus far, have made distinct. What if, as might have been in Plato's state, individual instances, the artificial way seem to have an advantage over the natural plan. Nature sees further than we, and if blacksmiths, painters, and musicians join confusedly in each other's work, the result on a broad scale will be excellence in nothing. And loss to society will carry with it, in the end, loss even to the individual who thinks he gains. Schiller, in his version of the story of Joan of Arc, brings out the principle in the hesitation, dismay, and paralysis which oppress the soul of the maiden, when, at the climax of her career, she finds the crown that she had won too heavy for her strength to bear, sees her mistake in attempting with a woman's soul to run a hero's race, and passionately exclaims,

"High Queen of Heaven! O would that thou
Had'st ne'er revealed thy self to me!
Take back,—I dare not claim it now,—
Take back thy crown, 'tis not for me.
Why, Holy One, on me impose
This dread vocation? Could I steel,
And to each soft emotion close
This heart, by nature formed to feel?
Choose not a tender woman's aid,—
Not the frail soul of shepherd maid."

True, this is the poet's interpretation of the story. But great poets are great seers of natures, and read the secrets of the human soul by the inspiration of genius. Schiller, in this case, had aright. And George Eliot bears testimony, all the more mighty because unconscious, to the truth, in making Gwendolen, while unloving, strong, self-reliant, and masculine, an object of disgust; but when, with broken spirit, and heart touched by the magic wand of love, the woman awakes within her, and she brings confidently to a stronger arm for support, she wins the sympathy and respect of every reader.

It would be interesting to learn whether the friends of so-called "reform" have formed any consistent theory of the reformed distribution of labor which their notions involve. They propose that woman shall take upon her shoulders perhaps a quarter or a third of the work of man; and that the very portion of his work most taxing and wearing on brain and nerve, and self-relying resolution and force. In fact the argument might go further. For if woman is to share the most showy, proud, and popular portion of man's work, why not also that which is most disagreeable, slavish and degrading? If she is to go with him upon the platform, into the pulpit, and to Congress, she should, and eventually she will go with him also into the ditch, the forge, and the wood-yard, the fore-castle, and the battle-field. And this is another point on which we should like to be enlightened as to the expectations of our friends—the reformers. What is their programme? Do they expect woman to share the coarsest, hardest, most repulsive and slavish of man's labors, or only his privileges, and his honors without his burdens? This is a very important question, which ought to be answered before we go much farther. It most assuredly will have to be answered, in the end, and in a way consistent with justice. It need not be imagined that man, with his superior strength and nerve, and power to fight, when the old chivalrous regard for woman as a creature of beauty, and weakness, and dependence, and love, shall have been choked by her assumption of the helmet, and the baton, the horny fist, the iron nerve, and the war-club will yield to her the prizes without the blanks of the new apportionment. If woman aspires to manhood, she must eventually accept its burdens with its joys. And then the question "Is she equal to all this?" will compel an answer. But taking the claim of the reformers as it now stands, they demand for woman a share in *certain* of the privileges, the honors, and the duties of men. How then is the new distribution to be arranged? It is thought by many that the burdens of American women are about as heavy as they can bear, as it is. Is it desirable that a portion of the burden which nature and all ages have laid upon men, should be taken from them, and laid upon the shoulders of women? Are men thus

be relieved at the expense of women? Or is an exchange expected? Shall men assume, in turn, a portion of the burdens women? If so, which? and where shall they begin? How ly in the care of children for example, shall the hand of man place that of woman? Or in the "keeping of the house," at that point shall that be separated from the care of children, or at portion of it shall be thrown upon the husband, while the e goes to the court-room, the pulpit, or the stump? These, , are questions, which, however ignored now, lie embedded in every substance of the subject, and must be met, and answered by and by.

Nay, can the ideal character of man and woman thus be mixed up and confused without detriment to each, and therefore to the society which together they compose? Why were they made so different, if, after all, there was no reason or necessity for the distinction? Nature seems to have thought there was reason for it. Are the two characters so similar that the same person may possess them both? Can a single person be perfect man and perfect woman too? In the answer to this question lies the solution of the whole problem. There are few, I am sure, who will answer it in the affirmative; yet there is a source of error, at this point, that should be pointed out. The graceful, lithe, and charming form of man may ornament the equestrian ring, or even the stately hay field. But how long will the fairy form retain its grace, the cheek its bloom, the hand its soft and magic touch and the movement its aerial charm, if woman take her place beside man in every field of coarse rough toil? In the realm of character. When woman, clothed with the modesty of ages of modesty, appears on a sudden in the court room, on the platform, or the stump, or on crusade at the bar, she strikes the beholder with pleasure, and tenderness, and something of awe, and exerts an influence for the good, exceeding perhaps all that man could do. Thoughtless philanthropists cry out: "Behold! a new power appears to strive for the right. The world will now be converted to good." Alas, the white robes of the succouring angel will soon grow dim, if put to such use. A woman might buffet her way through a riotous crowd of half drunken men, and

triumph, apparently, over them on their own ground. But how many times could she do it? How long would the magic power of her womanhood prove effective? The Lady Godiva might ride through Coventry in safety once "clothed on with chastity." But let the experiment become a practice! The success of woman in doing man's work, without injury to womanhood, and thus finally to her own security and influence is not to be inferred from the first few experiments. Deteriorations of spiritual character, like those of bodily health in some miasmatic clime, are usually slowly wrought. He who takes only a hasty view overlooks the inward process that is going on. Let any one compare the ineffable odor of character belonging to some of our most public women to-day, with that which distinguished them ten years ago, and he will not be surprised at the remark of another: "You can see in the case of a truly modest woman, who begins to appear in public a gradual stiffening of nerve, and emboldening of eye, and thickening of skin which mark the eclipse of whatever is distinctively characteristic in woman."

No, one cannot play the role of man and woman both with success. "For either he will love the one and hate the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other." The family, again and again, is an organization, and it is, in this respect, the germ, and embodies the love of all human society. Man and woman are not identities, but supplements of each other. And this relation they fill, by *virtue* of their differences, not by the extinguishing of them. A beautiful illustration of the true philosophy is furnished by harmony in music. The higher and lower notes are not the same; they are different. Nay, the qualities of the base and treble voices, in other respects than pitch, are different. And these differences there must be no thought in the use of them, of disregarding, much less attempting to abate. The perfection of the harmony requires them all, each in its proper place, one, in some sense, less prominent, or sometimes leading than another; but all in reality equally necessary, equally honored. "For if all were one member where were the body." If all were the treble, or the base, where were the music? It is amazing that the richness, and beauty, and power of the

ony produced by the different characters of man and in human society should not be perceived, or else that should dream that the harmony can be preserved while destroy the differences of character from which it springs; that the distinctive character itself may be kept while giving it with other than its proper food, and employing it other than its proper work! If you value the harmony, you guard the integrity of the qualities from which it springs." The poet, and the great creator of imaginative fiction, are used to see as clearly as any one, where lies the real man, and therefore power of womanhood. With one accord, age to age, they place it in the distinctively feminine, not masculine characteristics. Desdemona, Miranda, Juliet, and the female characters in whom Shakspeare evidently took delight were women, true women, who would have felt out of place and as uncomfortable in meddling with part of man's distinctive work as they would in a suit of manly armor. It is true, women are often introduced with more or less of the masculine in their composition, and yet on the whole are lovely and admirable. But a close observation always shows either that they were regarded as exceptional, unnatural cases, studies and curiosities in human character, hands with six fingers in the museum of the surgeon; or the masculine elements were designed as faults, to bear in the fifth act as such, or as foils to bring out by contrast with greater brilliancy the finer hues which they partially show. Creators of fiction present startling forms and colors, for the sake of effect; no one of them, perhaps, has ever drawn an unwomanly woman as thereby winning woman's true nature. The instinct of the creative imagination feels that man's true heaven on earth is love; and that to be loved, must be woman, with woman's delicacy, tenderness, clinging-trust, and even weakness, and not least, with woman's instinct shrinking from the public gaze.

"And her little hand lay lightly, confidingly in mine."

Why is it that in the ceaseless song of love, in the poetry of fiction of all ages, the sweet refrain suggested by the words "little" and "lightly" in this line sounds like the note of some enchanted and enchanting harp? Why "little" and

"lightly?" Why not strong, and firm and manly? Why, but that it is nature's voice, echoing the truth as it lies in the core of every human soul. Love, between man and woman, is normally the sweet harmony that unites the strong and the weak, the bold and the timid, the rough and the beautiful, the inflexible and the gentle; loving protection and loving trust. This is love, and nothing else is love, in its true ideal, between man and woman. And whatever tends to emasculate man, or to masculinize woman, acts upon love like choke-damp upon the human lungs. And the moment the wife steps forward into the field of manly work she both emasculates her husband and masculinizes herself. And thus in the traditional sense of the English race, nay of civilized men, the husband of the wife who rules the family, stands only second in disgrace to him who owns a dishonored bed. And this again is the voice of nature, echoing the everlasting truth, concerning the relations of sex and the family. Love, like other relations, depends for its validity upon the integrity of the objects which are to stand related. Genuine love cannot exist without the genuine man and the genuine woman. Two persons, merely, are not sufficient; one must be man, and the other woman, and that through and through, and not merely persons clad in the respective robes of these. But no woman can play a man's part in life, and remain a true woman. No person can practice public speech, for example, without acquiring, if not possessing at first, self-confidence, boldness, firmness of nerve, an eye that will not quail, a cheek that knows not how to blush, everything in fact that is manly, with the corresponding loss of everything that is distinctively womanly. Let this be the type of character cultivated by women, and what becomes of that only true nectar of the gods on earth, love between man and woman?

The question must be answered, though with reluctance.

The spiritual element in love,—that which distinguishes it from the mutual attraction of brutes, depends on the spiritual differences of the sexes. Reduce the two to a character of the same type, and there might be friendship as between man and man, but not the love of man for woman. Everything that goes to assimilate the character of woman to that of man, tends in this direction. Were such processes to go on to com-

etion, there would remain in love only the animal element. Men and women would still come together because they are animals as well as spiritual beings; but they would unite as animals only. That is to say, love, and the family that springs from it would sink below their level in barbarism, for there is no barbarism but where the spiritual distinction of the sexes is wholly blotted out. Such a result would be much more impious and fatal to all high and pure society than the free-love doctrine which excites so just a horror in every pure mind. Free love might retain some slight element of spiritual elevation and sweetness; animal attraction none. It may seem harsh to say that to this result the whole course of this "reform" is tending; yet this is the simple truth, as not a few of our best minds clearly see. The old lofty, ineffable type of love is fading, just in proportion as the new ideas come in. I know keen, observing ladies who believe that no married man or woman goes into this movement, who knows by experience at home what true connubial love is. The lips that have sipped the sweetest draught from life's cup are most likely to thirst for some unknown good elsewhere.

It is surprising that certain sources of popular error, which all thinking men know to exist in our society and institutions, have not been recognized more generally as the sources from which this movement for the abolition of the old womanhood springs. Nothing is plainer than that the history and experience of our race in this country, and the conditions under which it has lived, and thought, and felt, and grown in character, and reared its children for two hundred years have been such as inevitably to form a certain type of character, with many virtues, and some unmistakable faults. The direction in which the virtues and the vices will respectively lie it would seem impossible to mistake. Among the former will be energy, enterprise, helpfulness for the future, courage, self-confidence, justice between man and man, readiness to awake from error and to set off prejudice, to acknowledge equal rights, to live for the benefit of our fellow-men, etc. Our vices are for the most part the correlatives, or extremes of our virtues. Too little respect for the past, too little regard for any authority, too much self-confidence, pride, ambition, utter disbelief that there is any

human good to which we personally may not aspire, envy at the sight of good that we do not ourselves possess, utter ignorance of the depth of the vast system of human society, utter disregard therefore of the danger of laying hasty hands upon the most sacred parts of it, outward thrust and drive regarded as constituting nearly the whole of character and of value, little sense of organization, everything swallowed up in individualism, these are among the faults to which, by universal admission, the American character of to-day inclines. Why cannot men see that these are precisely the springs which give to the modern woman movement its motion?

"Fair-play," for example, cries one, "woman shall have fair-play." Fair-play! Where, then, is organization? Is society only a congeries of identities? Shall the infantry soldier insist on mounting a horse; and the artillery-man upon carrying a musket; and the organist upon preaching half the sermons; and the preacher upon playing the organ; and the woman upon going to Congress; and the man upon nursing the baby; and the maiden upon singing base; and the young man upon learning to crochet? Is this fair-play? It may be said that fair-play for woman is the liberty to do those things which she finds she can do. But this is granted. No one asks a law to prohibit these things; the question is what shall be advised, encouraged, and thought to be the true mission of woman in human society. Woman has liberty to loaf among rowdies in bar-rooms and saloons, but sensible people do not advise, or invite it.

But cries another, "Christianity is shorn of half its strength by the silence of woman in public." That is, noise, talk, outward thrust and drive constitute the real force that is to move the world, and bow the hearts of men to God. This is a characteristic American idea; but more and more, in politics, in business, in education, and in religion we are beginning to see that we have carried it considerably further than the soundest and healthiest state of mind requires. What the world needs most to bring it to Christ, is not so much more talk, as better character and better life. More and more pure and exalted Christian homes, rather than more wives and mothers to leave their homes, and go out to preach. Little was gained

ward the real establishment of the kingdom of Christ on earth by the sweeping of the barbarians who overthrew the Roman Empire into the Church, they formed the soil in which sprang up Popery, and the Christianity of the Dark Ages. That we want now is a kind of Christianity, to which, when a man is converted, he will be better, more to be trusted in political, social, and business life. But female character, rough mother and sister, and wife, lies at the heart and lungs of all character; and we shall make a very poor exchange if we coarsen, and brutalize, and degrade the character of woman, we surely shall if we masculinize it for the sake of adding to the number of preachers.

Women, and men for them, sometimes rebel against the feeling of constraint as put upon them by men. A lady once said, "I don't wish to do thus and so; but I don't wish to be rebidden." This, too, is the extreme democratic spirit of the age. No one assumes to forbid anything in this matter, save the authority of trust. What would be said of a student who should rebel against the authority of his teacher, because the latter insisted that the rules of algebra and geometry must be obeyed? Truth is true, and right is right, and the business of every rational being is, first to offer his own loyal submission to truth and right, and then, as far as propriety admits, seek to persuade his neighbor to do the same. Now a large number of us,—men,—are officially set apart to the business of public instruction; the solemn commission of Christ is in our hands, and the awful vow to exercise it we have taken upon our souls. And shall we be silent when we see women misled, and seduced into practices which will stain their own bright robes, and mar the beauty and excellence of human society? This is no question of dictation, or authority, or liberty, at all. It is a question of what constitutes true female character; and who is the true friend of woman, the man who attracts her to her ruin, or he who warns to save? Be assured, Christian sisters, the woman has already one foot on the slippery path who begins to talk about asserting her liberty to do, *she please*, the thing that is foolish and wrong. Eve asserted her liberty, and under precisely the same temptation that tempts her daughters now,—the ambition to exalt herself, that

is, "ye shall be as gods," and earth and Eve's own children have groaned in consequence for six thousand years. Have our reformers realized how exactly they are playing over again the part of the Serpent and his victim in Eden? "Ye shall be as gods, to know good and evil." That is the temptation now, "ye shall be emancipated," and obtain your "rights," and rise in the scale of being, and act for yourselves as men in the affairs of the world, and "know good and evil." Woman certainly will know a good deal of evil that she does not now, when she becomes at home on platform, and stump, and in court room, and jury box, with what effect on her womanhood, imagination may conceive.

The whole movement for the masculinization of woman bears the marks, to a remarkable degree, of a hasty, ill-considered, popular tide of feeling and practice rather than thought, prompted by immediate apparent advantage, and the gush of pleasing sentiment. In seasons of religious revival, or when distinctive revival hopes rule the hour, Christians come under the sway of feeling to an unusual degree, and that so associated with the thought, and perhaps the fact of the agency of the Holy Spirit, that they scarcely dare to hold the reins. To yield to feeling is sweet. Error, and even sin, often comes in, introduced by that which is innocent and fair. But in the shadow of Flatterwell, to assail poor Parley, lurked an hundred robbers.

The eagerness of some men to call out the "fairy forms," and "sweet voices" of the "sisters" upon the religious stage, has been called, it is said, on the highest progressive authority, an "aberration of amativeness." I do not discuss the propriety of the term. But it is possible that if the psychology of the whole movement could be explored, there would appear more to move to pity than is sometimes supposed.

A late writer occupies twelve solid pages in drawing out the single idea that woman, having been held in early and barbarous times substantially as a slave, had gained a slowly expanding liberty, under the influence of Christianity and advancing civilization, until the present hour. Ergo, she must throw off restraint more and more. Were the ground that has been entrenched on the conservative side, to be traversed by

ments with the same freedom and license of motion
l in the case now mentioned, a small library would
used of the books that should be written. But the
may be more brief. The progress of Christian
the past in a given direction does not prove that
progress in the same direction is required, since it is
that we have already reached, possibly passed, on that
golden mean of true wisdom. Thus in the relation of
to parents, in that of crime to the administration of
that of subjects to government, and in that of free
to intellectual authority, there has been a similar
throughout Christendom, and in the same direction.
t men would agree that with large numbers of the
ice at least, the progress in these cases has gone quite
gh, sometimes too far. So I think it is with the
of woman. And inasmuch as the writer in question
point unguarded, his twelve pages were not of material

clusion, let me ask two or three questions of my
of progressive sympathies, which I would fain hope
considered somewhat thoughtfully.

o you believe that mere virtue, without the fine,
delicacy and modesty that makes woman, to the appre-
of every true man, sacred, is sufficient for the highest
and influence, of the female character?

not, do you believe that a woman can play the part of
public, through her lifetime, and retain those finer
istics above named?

nd do you believe that a woman can be taught and
to sacrifice those attributes habitually, on the religious
Christ, and at the same time retain them in other than
fields of thought and action?

you think that religion ought on any pretense of
present usefulness, to coarsen, and degrade, and
the finest, and most exquisitely beautiful, and capti-
tributes of female character?

you believe that souls will be saved, in the end, by
curse?

ARTICLE VIII.—THE EASTERN CHURCH

THE term "Eastern" as applied to a portion of the Christian Church, is, primarily, neither geographical nor characteristic, but *historical*. Its use dates back to the division of the Roman Empire, when it was applied to those churches that existed within the borders of the eastern portion of that empire, and which continued to exist even after its downfall. The Eastern Church then includes those churches that are the lineal descendants of the churches of the Eastern Roman Empire, together with those that have become connected with them.

If this distinction be kept in mind, much of the vagueness that has gathered around the term will be dispelled. That it is not geographical will be readily seen, for two of its largest divisions, Russia and Abyssinia, can hardly be said to belong to the "East." Neither is it characteristic of certain peculiar qualities, as synonymous with Oriental, for in modern use Oriental has come to mean Asiatic, and calls to mind Persian, Arabic, Turkish, anything but Russian or Slavic. So, too, to call it the Greek Church, as is often done, is incorrect, for the Greeks anathematize the Armenians, Nestorians, Jacobites, &c., and no statement of the Eastern Church would be complete that should not include them.

To give as clear an idea as possible of this great section of the Christian Church, in its extent, and its distinguishing characteristics, is the object of this paper.

I. Its extent:

1. Ancient; 2. Modern.

1. Ancient; *a.* Within the limits of the Roman Empire; *b.* Outside of those limits.

a. Within the limits of the Roman Empire.—The only definite boundary of the Eastern Empire was that which separated it from the Western, and extended from the junction of the Save with the Danube, directly south to Barca on the north coast of Africa. On the north, the Danube and Black Sea formed a natural boundary which, however, was overstepped

mes, if not by actual rule, yet by influence, so that the aric tribes along their shores acknowledged the general reignty of the Roman emperors. On the east the boundary d very greatly at different times. At the division of the re, it extended in a devious line, from the southeast emity of the Black Sea, skirting Lake Van, to the Gulf of ba. Beyond this, however, the provinces of Armenia or, including Georgia, Assyria beyond Arbela, and Mesonia to the Persian Gulf, acknowledged at different times Roman rule, and may for the present purpose be fairly ded within the bounds of the empire. On the south the : deserts of Arabia and Africa formed another natural dary, interrupted only by the valley of the Nile, where an power was recognized as far as Berenice and the lesser racts. It will thus be seen that the Eastern Roman ire covered almost exactly the territory at present under way of the Turkish Sultans, including Greece and excluding ia. This territory was divided politically into six dioceses, a (Eastern Illyricum), Thrace, Pontus, Asia, the Orient, Egypt. Dacia and Thrace divided the European portion. a, including Greece and the part immediately north, as far e Danube, and Thrace the remainder, to the Bosphorus. us embraced the upper part of the Asiatic portion north line drawn from Cyzicus on the Marmora to the Euphrates, of Edessa (Oorfa). Asia took in southwest Asia Minor, of Cilicia and Isauria. The Orient covered Syria,— ding Palestine,—and Mesopotamia.

o Egypt were left the African provinces. These political ions were strictly followed in the organization of the ch, and each diocese was under the ecclesiastical rule of xarch or archbishop, who had under him the metropolitans e various subdivisions. Five of these exarchs became iarchs, and divided among themselves the various dioceses. e Patriarch of Constantinople claimed Dacia, Thrace, and us. To the Patriarch of Ephesus was given Asia. The iarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem divided the Diocese of Orient, and the Patriarch of Alexandria had Egypt for his ion. Subsequently the Diocese of Asia was transferred to amalgamated by Constantinople, and the Patriarch of esus ceased to be more than a metropolitan.

Of these four Patriarchates, that of Constantinople with its four Dioceses of Pontus, Asia, Thrace, and Dacia, was the most important, not simply from its extent, but from the character and influence of its ecclesiastica.

The exarch of Pontus resided at Cesarea in Cappadocia, and had under him thirteen metropolitans and one hundred and eight bishops. Among the metropolitans were those of Sebaste (Sivas), Ancyra (Angora), Amasia, Nicomidia, and Nicea; among the bishops, those of Nyssa, Nazianzum, Trapezus (Trebizond), Chalcedon, and Brusa. Under the exarch of Asia, resident at Ephesus, were twelve metropolitans and three hundred and fifty-one bishops. Among the metropolitans were those of Laodicea, Sardis, Rhodes, Perga in Pamphylia, Antioch in Pisidia, and Iconium; among the bishops, those of Pergamus, Smyrna, Ilium, Troas, Colossae, Dorrylaeum, Philadelphia, Thyatira, Halicanassus, and the various islands of the Cyclades.

Under the Exarch of Thrace, resident at Heraclea, were five metropolitans and eighty-two bishops. Of these, few were of any especial note except the Exarch himself, who maintained the high though merely honorary title of First, of the Most Illustrious, and Exarch of all Thrace and Macedonia, and who held the privilege of consecrating the Patriarch of Constantinople, which privilege he still keeps, the Metropolitan of Cesarea being next in position to him.

Connected with this diocese, were the sees of Scythia and the barbaric tribes, which acknowledged Roman supremacy. There was a metropolitan residing at Tomi in Little Scythia, the province included between the Black Sea and the Danube, where it flows to the north, and five bishops in the Crimea, though it seems impossible to locate them exactly.

In the Diocese of Dacia (Eastern Illyricum), under the Exarch of Thessalonica, there were eight metropolitans and one hundred and sixty-nine bishops. Among the metropolitans were those of Larissa, Corinth, Dyrrhachium, and Sardica; among the bishops, those of Cenchrea, Athens, Argos, Lacedaemon, Marathon, Thebes, and Ithaca. Total number of metropolitans in the Patriarchate of Constantinople, thirty-eight, of bishops, seven hundred and ten.

The Patriarchate of Antioch covering the Diocese of the Orient, with the exception of Jerusalem and a few sees immediately in its vicinity.

The Bishop of Antioch, who was both Exarch and Patriarch, had under him twelve metropolitans and one hundred and twenty-six bishops. Among the metropolitans were those of Tyre, Damascus, Tarsus, Edessa, Amida (Diarbekir), Seleucia, and Salamis; among the bishops, those of Sidon, Palmyra, Hama, Mopsuestia, and Samosata.

In the middle of the sixth century, in consequence of the Monophysite controversies, there was formed in Syria and Mesopotamia a Monophysite Church, since called *Jacobite*, which had its Patriarchal seat at Antioch, though the Primate did not permanently reside there. They included twenty metropolitans and one hundred and three bishops, whose sees covered about the same ground as those of the orthodox Patriarchate.

In the seventh century, in consequence of the Monothelite controversy, a *Maronite* Church was formed among the Christians of Mt. Lebanon. It was not a large body, and in the twelfth century was drawn into communion with the Church of Rome. There seems to be no record of bishopricks.

The Patriarchate of Jerusalem. This included the three metropolitans of Cesarea, Scythopolis (Bethshan), and Petra, with thirty-six bishops, among whom were those of Ascalon, Gaza, Hebron, Nazareth, and Gadara.

The Patriarchate of Alexandria. In this Patriarchate the political divisions were not followed in the establishment of episcopal sees, and there were no metropolitans. One hundred and four bishops are enumerated, among them those of Arsinoe, Menouthis, Memphis, Pelusium, Ptolemais, and Syene.

The Eastern Church outside of the limits of the Eastern Empire. The churches outside of the empire were all connected, at least in their origin with some one of the Patriarchates within the Empire, and are more readily understood in that connection.

Churches in connection with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Russian, Georgian, and Armenian; the first two orthodox, i. e., in communion with the Church of Constanti-

nople; the third schismatic. Of these, the last, the Armenian Church, was the first to be founded, dating back to the year 302, when the first bishop was consecrated (there were converts as early as 250), and was the first to embrace the whole nation among which it was started. The successors of St. Gregory reigned at Etchmiadzine, receiving ordinations from the Exarch of Pontus, until the conquest of the Persian Sassanidae, when all intercourse with Cesarea was forbidden. In consequence of this persecution no Armenian prelates were present at the Council of Chalcedon, and as the Church received all its information of that Council through the Jacobites of Mesopotamia, it withdrew from the orthodox church. Some considerable disturbance at that time resulted in the establishment of four rival patriarchates, but these were afterward all subordinated to the Patriarch Catholicos of Etchmiadzine. The Church was a large and important one, but there seems to be no definite statement of its ancient extent or numbers. That extent must have been great, as one of the four rival patriarchs established himself at Sis in Cilicia; and a hint of the number of their clergy would be gained from the number of these rivals.

Next in age to the Armenian Church is the Georgian, which has since been absorbed into the Russian. It was established on a firm basis in the fifth century, and acknowledged the supremacy of the Constantinople Patriarch, though it was founded—as was also the Armenian Church—by missionaries from the Patriarchate of Antioch. In the ninth century, its ecclesiastical body included the Patriarch Catholicos of Mtskètha and all Georgia, with eighteen bishops; and the Catholicos of Abkhasia with sixteen bishops.

The Russian Church can only claim a mention in the account of the ancient Eastern Church. As early as 891 there was a nominal metropolitan subordinate to the See of Constantinople, but it was not till the conversion of Prince Vladimir in 988 that the nation became Christian. A metropolitan was established at Kieff, and presumably bishops were appointed in all parts of the empire, as fast as might be, but there seems to be no record of their number until much later. Connected with the Patriarchate of Alexandria, and acknowledging its Primate as their superior, were the Churches of Abyssinia and Nubia.

atholic, Metran, or Metropolitan of Abyssinia, Axum pia" (for by all these names he was known), had seven under him; and the Metropolitan of Nubia had three

the most interesting of the sections of the Eastern beyond the bounds of the Roman Empire, is the ate of Chaldea, which may be considered an offshoot Patriarchate of Antioch. Its Primate resided at dif- mes at Magna Seleucia, Babylon, Bagdad, and Mosul, extent of his ecclesiastical sway can hardly be better than by quoting from Neale the entire list of his s, each province being under a Metropolitan.

shapoor (Khuzistan in Persia) Nisibis; Maisan or Mosul or Adiabene; Beth-Garma in Assyria; a or Zohab (the border land of Persia and Media); rom Van to Hormuz; Meru (in Khorassan); Herab;

China (probably the more southern portions); including the Christians of St. Thomas?); Armenia; bardaa (the province of Azerbigan in Persia); Raia ages of Tobit, now Rai, near Tehran) and Tabrestan and Mazanderan; Dailam (on the southern banks of ian); Samarcand; Cashgar and Turkestan (Independent ; Balkh; Seistan; Hamadan (Media); Chanbalek Tanguth, Chasemgara, and Nuacheta (in Tartary).

were thus twenty-five metropolitans, and how many t is impossible to say, but it is easy to see how the t that has been made that the Nestorians and Jacobites l in numbers the Greeks and Latins, may be correct, ainly of these two the Nestorians or Chaldeans were numerous.

tern Extent of the Eastern Church.—In the amount of ter- vered there is not much difference between the extent odern and of the ancient Eastern Church. What was entral and Eastern Asia has been compensated by the f the Russian Empire through Siberia even into , so that we find a Bishop of the Western Continent in nnection with the successors of the Byzantine Patri- The geographical boundaries thus include the empires a, Turkey, and Persia, Greece, Abyssinia, and a small

section of the western coast of India, together with a few bishopricks within the limits of Austria.

With regard to the contents, however, of this vast territory a great change has in many parts taken place. A large number of once flourishing metropolitan sees have become extinct, and others are merely nominal. While on the other hand there have been comparatively few new ones established. So, too, a change has taken place with regard to the relations of different churches to each other. There has been disintegration rather than centralization, and the different parts have drawn asunder rather than together. These considerations will make a different division better adapted to give an idea of the present extent of this great section of the Eastern Church, and we will notice first those churches that are the historical descendants of the orthodox ancient church, and secondly the schismatical or heretical sects.

1. *The Orthodox Greek Church.*—After the fall of the empire the patriarch of Constantinople remained the sole representative of Eastern orthodox Christianity, who still possessed any real power, and was so recognized by the Turks. As such he was treated with great consideration, yet he was after all subordinate to the Sultan, and any appointments he might make must first receive the Sultan's approval. This was especially galling to the Russian Church, whose Primate received ordination at the hands of the Constantinople Patriarch. Accordingly about a century after the fall of Constantinople its Patriarch raised the Metropolitan of Russia to the Patriarchal dignity and thus made the Russian Church independent. The example of Russia was followed by Greece as soon as she achieved her independence of Moslem rule, and a distinctive Greek Church of Greece was formed. Aside from these, various sees are really independent, as Cyprus, Servia, Bulgaria, &c., but for the present purpose they may be classed with Constantinople. The modern orthodox Greek Church therefore is naturally divided into three parts. The Greek Church in Turkey, in Greece, and in Russia.

a. *The Greek Church in Turkey.*—This is under the nominal supremacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and includes as independent sees, the Patriarchates of Constantinople, Antioch,

Jerusalem and Alexandria, the Archbishopricks of Cyprus, Servia, Mt. Sinai, and Montenegro, and the Exarchate of Bulgaria. Though so wide in geographical extent, covering nearly the same ground as the Eastern Empire, the number of sees in actual existence has diminished very greatly.

In the diocese of Pontus, instead of thirteen Metropolitans and one hundred and eight Bishops, there are eleven *Metropolitans* and *no* suffragans, and the Metropolitan of Cesarea, still the primate, has his residence at Constantinople.

In the diocese of Ephesus, instead of twelve Metropolitans and three hundred and fifty-one Bishops, there are twenty-one Metropolitans, the only suffragans being three, immediately under the Primate of Ephesus, who resides at Constantinople, as does also the Metropolitan of Koniah (Iconium.) In European Turkey, covering the dioceses of Thrace and Dacia, with the exception of Greece, instead of thirteen Metropolitans and two hundred and fifty-one Bishops, there are thirty-eight Metropolitans and fifty-four suffragans. This includes the churches of Austria and those under the Exarch of Bulgaria, of which special mention should be made.

The Eastern Church has three strongholds in Austria; in Hungary, where the Wallacks, under the supremacy of the Archbishop of Carlowitz, are to a man orthodox Greeks; in the province of Levoff, wrested by Austria from Russia in 1772; in Dalmatia, which as a province never belonged properly to the Eastern Church, though a large number of Greeks, about 80,000, are resident in it. In all there are estimated to be about 2,800,000 orthodox Greeks in the Austrian dominions: these are in connection with the Metropolitan of Belgrade.

After Greece had freed herself from subjection to the Patriarch of Constantinople, and had established her own national church, the Bulgarians, who were gradually rising as a nation, desired to effect the same freedom. They were assisted in this by the influence of the Russian government, which hoped thus to bind them to herself and to secure their assistance in any designs she might have upon the Ottoman Empire. There was a long struggle, but at last the separation was effected, and a distinct Bulgarian Church was recognized by the Sublime Porte,

whose representative was the Exarch of Bulgaria, resident at Constantinople.

The Patriarch of Alexandria, with three titular Bishops (unknown in their own dioceses) are the sole modern representatives of the orthodox Greek Church in Egypt, where, formerly, besides the Primate, there were one hundred and four suffragans. The Patriarch of Antioch, resident at Damascus instead of Antioch, has under him twelve Metropolitans, who have no suffragans, as successors to the one hundred and twenty-six Bishops of the ancient church.

In the Patriarchate of Jerusalem there are now six metropolitans and seven suffragans against thirteen metropolitans and thirty-nine bishops formerly. The Patriarch resides at Constantinople. The independent sees of Mt. Sinai and Montenegro have no suffragans.

The Servian Church in the 18th century included under the Metropolitan primate at Ipeik thirteen suffragan sees in Turkey and seven in Germany. According to a later arrangement the metropolitan resides at Belgrade and has but three suffragans. Most of the other sees however continue to exist, though not in connection with the Servian Church. The metropolitan of the independent church of Cyprus has four suffragan bishops, instead of fifteen as formerly. He resides at Famagousta.

In this enumeration no individual sees have been named, as they are almost all identical with the prominent ones mentioned in connection with the Ancient Church.

b. The Greek Church in Greece.—The following propositions adopted at the Synod of Nauplia in 1833, represent the constitution of this Church.

1. The Eastern, orthodox and Apostolic Church of Greece, which spiritually owns no Head, but the Head of the Christian Faith, *Jesus Christ* our Lord, is dependent on no external authority; while she preserves unshaken dogmatic unity with all the Eastern Orthodox Churches. With respect to the administration of the Church, which pertains to the Crown, she acknowledges the king of Greece as her Supreme Head, as in nothing contrary to the Holy Canons.

2. A permanent synod shall be established, consisting entirely of archbishops and bishops, appointed by the king; to

the highest ecclesiastical authority after the model of the Russian Church.

In the divisions of the dioceses ten definitive sees were appointed, and forty provisional sees, which it was intended gradually to absorb into the larger sees. This, however, has not been fully carried out. The Synod consists of a President and four members, who must be bishops, a secretary, a royal commissioner, and supernumerary members.

c. *The Greek Church in Russia.*—During the invasion of the Tartars, Keiff was destroyed, and the metropolitans removed their seat to Vladimir, and again, in 1320, to Moscow. About 50 years after the independence of the Church was allowed, Peter the Great, disapproving of the immense power of the Patriarch, effected a change in the constitution of the Church, by the appointment, in 1721, of a Holy Governing Synod to supply the place of the Patriarch. This Synod is the supreme Church authority, and consists of "five or six bishops, one or two other ecclesiastics of dignity, and several laymen as officials, all appointed by the Emperor."

There are four sees of the first class, under the metropolitans of Keiff, Novgorod, St. Petersburg, and Moscow, the first being honorary primate of all the Russias. There are seventeen sees of the second class, including, among others, those of Askaniya, Tobolsk, Irkutsk, Kherson, and the Tauride, and Lithuania.

In the third class are thirty-one sees, prominent among which may be noticed Smolensk, Archangel, and that of Sitka, Kamtschatka, the Aleoutines and Russian America. There are also ten vicariates of the fourth class.

In 1783, the Catholicos of Mtskheta, of Georgia, became a member of the Holy Governing Synod, and in 1801 Georgia was added to Russia, since which time its Church has been subordinate to that of Russia, though it has maintained its own national synod. Its Metropolitan, Exarch of all Georgia (ex officio member of the Holy Governing Synod), resides at Tiflis, and has under him four suffragan bishops.

2. *Churches not in communion with the Greek Church.*—These are four in number and are directly descended from the heretical sects that separated from the orthodox Church in conse-

quence of the Nestorian and Monophysite controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries.

(1.) The *Armenians* form the largest and most important of these Churches in their modern extent. They have spread themselves over the whole Turkish Empire, through Persia, Russia, and India. They have not been, however, influenced in this by religious zeal as were the Chaldean Nestorians, but by desire for trade; hence, though they carry their own Church rites with them wherever they go, they do not gain large additions to their Church.

Early in the present century the monastery of Etchmiadzine, the seat of the Armenian Catholicos, was annexed to Russia, and soon after a new arrangement of sees was effected, or if not an entirely new arrangement, still a more perfect one. This, however, is not entirely satisfactory, as it brings very unequal portions to the different primates, as for example the bishop of Kars is six or seven hundred miles from his superior at Constantinople, while he is only sixty or seventy miles from Etchmiadzine.

There are five nominal Patriarchs.

I. The Patriarch Catholicos of Etchmiadzine, who is supreme head of the Armenian Church. His Episcopal Court includes twelve archbishops and bishops and forty archimandrites or abbots of monasteries. He has also in immediate dependence upon him five archbishops and eight bishops in Russia, and two archbishops and three bishops in Persia.

II. The Patriarch of Akhtemar, an island in Lake Van; he however, is merely nominal Patriarch and has only the authority of a suffragan bishop.

III. The Patriarch of Sis in Cilicia, of the same position as the one just mentioned.

IV. The Patriarch of Jerusalem, who in his own diocese Palestine and Cyprus, is dependent on the Patriarch of Constantinople.

V. The Patriarch of Constantinople, who is acknowledged by the Turkish government as head of all the Armenians in the Turkish Empire, a general dependence upon the Patriarch Catholicos being however recognized. He has under him eighteen archbishops and twenty-six bishops, covering in general

same territory as the Greek Church, and many of the sees being the same, the preponderance being, however, in the east rather than in the western sections of the empire.

2.) The Copts, including the Abyssinians. The Patriarch resides at Cairo, and claims authority over thirteen Episcopal sees, two more than existed in the 17th century. The last addition was the Bishoprick of Khartown, so that the old Nubian arch, extinct during the middle ages, has been revived. There is no list of the sees of the Abyssinian Church.

3.) The Jacobites of Syria and Mesopotamia have diminished greatly in numbers since the 10th and 11th centuries, and now five metropolitans take the place of the twenty metropolitans and one hundred and three bishops of the Ancient arch. The Primate still calls himself Patriarch of Antioch, and resides at Diarbekir.

With the Jacobite and Coptic Churches are now connected the Christians of St. Thomas, on the coast of Malabar, who were formerly connected with the Nestorians. Unable at one time to procure a bishop from Babylon, they turned, and now give their prelates, sometimes from Alexandria, sometimes from Diarbekir.

4.) The Nestorians have also diminished in numbers very much. After the conquest of Hulaka Khan, in the 12th century, their widely extended Catholicate was greatly abridged, and they are confined principally to Persia. Their ecclesiastical body consists of the Patriarch, with two metropolitans, and thirteen bishops.

These include all that properly belong within the Eastern Church, yet, as the term is frequently used to denote simple geographical extent, it practically includes a number of other churches in connection with the Roman See. One of the principal of these is the Maronite Church, which still holds to the Roman Catholic communion. There are also United-Armenian, Jacobite, Coptic, and Nestorian Churches, so-called, as *united* to the Roman Church. The United Armenian Church has recently experienced a schism on the question of papal authority and infallibility. The United Nestorians are properly called Chaldee Christians and outnumber the members of the Eastern Church.

The United Greeks, or Uniats, principally resident in Poland, drawn off to the Romish Church in the 16th century, have gradually lost their original power and returned to the Russian Church. They spread through Russia, Austria, Italy, &c., and number several millions.

Tabular statement of the numbers of the Eastern Church.

1. ORTHODOX GREEK CHURCH.			
In Turkey, including Austria, 2,800,000,	-	-	15,020,000
Greece,	-	-	750,000(?)
Russia,	-	-	50,000,000
Total,			65,770,000
2. OTHER CHURCHES.			
Armenians,	-	-	2,750,000
Jacobites,	-	-	30,000(?)
Copts and Abyssinians,	-	-	4,500,000
Christians of St. Thomas,	-	-	200,000
Nestorians,	-	-	70,000
			7,550,000
Total,			73,320,000

In communion with the Romish Church: The United Nestorians number about 90,000; the Copts 13,000; the Maronites 200,000; 96,000 are claimed in India. Of the Armenians and Uniats no statistics are at hand.

With regard to this comparison between the ancient and modern Eastern Church, a few things are to be noticed.

1. The diminution in the number of bishopricks. This, however, does not necessarily imply all that might be inferred from it. In the ancient Church these were far more numerous in proportion to the number of inhabitants than in the modern. There was scarcely a prominent town in the diocese of Asia that was not an Episcopal See, and so to a more limited degree in the other dioceses. These smaller bishops, *chor episcopoi*, gradually yielded to the metropolitans, and in the modern Church there is the opposite extreme, as in the territory covered by the old diocese of Pontus, where there are eleven *Metropolitans*, and not a single suffragan bishop. Hence, it must not be inferred that because in a certain section there are few prelates there are therefore few churches. The metropolitan of Bukharest has no immediate suffragans, yet in that city alone there are 360 churches or oratories.

the covering of the same territory by several different sects. This is especially noticeable in Asia Minor, where Armenian, Jacobite, and Catholic ecclesiastics will often live in the same city. Hence, to judge accurately of the population of any section, all the different communions must be taken into the account. The case was far different in the ancient Church. Then orthodox and schismatics could not live side by side, nor could schismatics mingle with heretics, and the number of any one faith was the number of the Christian population.

The devastation of many parts of the country, consequent upon the tyrannous rule of the Moslem government. This has had a great influence upon the extent of the Church in two ways. By actually diminishing the population. Large sections of country in Asia Minor, which were without doubt thickly settled are now almost deserted, partly because the natural increase is stunted, and partly because of the emigration which invariably follows misrule. This has also affected the extent of the Church by preventing growth from outside additions. A community that lives upon itself invariably deteriorates. This is seen by comparing the churches of Asiatic Turkey with those of Russia. In certain parts of European Turkey, where the Moslem rule has not been as great in that regard. That the Church has been diminished to any great extent by defections to Islam is not true, except in some sections of European Turkey.

The actual crushing out of certain churches, notably those of the Catholicate of Chaldea, by the conquests of Hulaku Khan, which reduced the most numerous and powerful of all the churches to the smallest and weakest.

The great impulse given to Eastern Christianity by the conversion of Prince Vladimir, resulting in the addition of a new and widely extending empire, in the infusion of new life and vigor into what had largely lost its vitality, and the encouragement to that missionary effort which is essential to the growth of any church. Other points might be noted, but they are rather to the characteristics than to the extent of the Church.

Distinguishing characteristics of the Eastern Church.—

These in a general way is necessarily a task of great importance.

difficulty, for what can there be in common between Abyssinia and Russia, Servia and Malabar. Yet no one can follow the course of this great portion of the Christian Church, or study it as it now is, without feeling that somewhere, hidden deep perhaps under the rubbish of successive contests, religious, social, and political, there may still be found the bonds that united the various portions to the original center, and which, if brought to light, shall still draw the same portions into one whole.

Of the many characteristics that might be suggested as distinguishing various sections of the Eastern Church, there are three that stand out so prominently, and apply so universally, that they deserve especial notice. These are, first, a spirit of subtle, speculative thought; second, a spirit of persistency or conservatism operating favorably to prevent defection, and unfavorably to prevent growth; and third, a spirit of nationalism, effecting a most perfect blending of Church and State, but resulting in a disintegration of the Church. These are all deeply inwrought into the very nature of the different races connected with the Eastern Church, and are indicated more by the general history of that Church than by any particular condition whether in modern or ancient times.

That history is topical rather than chronological, and according as one characteristic or another is taken will the point of view be changed. There are, however, two facts that must ever be kept in mind, as two of the most important factors in the development of Eastern Christianity. The paganizing element introduced by Constantine and the rise of Islamism. These were both of them somewhat vague in their influence, yet very potent. Operating in different lines they wrought some good and some evil. The culture of pagan learning was overbalanced by the laxity of pagan morals. The Puritan rebuke of Moslem Monotheism was forgotten in the ferocity of Moslem tyranny. While the one lowered the tone of Christian life, the other served as a weight to prevent its rising again.

1. The spirit of subtle, speculative thought. This has been characteristic of Greeks and Orientals through all time. It is an earnest searching after the deep things, an effort of the mind to get away from the ordinary bounds of nature. It is not the hair-splitting acumen of the schoolmen, though there was much

It was as childish as the worst of that. It was more genial, resorted to the open public life of the East. Its discussions were not confined to the cloister, but were held in the open places, in baths, wherever men met in friendly converse. It was on the Areopagus, in full view of all Athens, that Paul addressed those who came out of mere curiosity to see or hear some new thing, and stayed, because the apostle struck the key note of their own philosophical inquiries. It was the genius of Plato rather than that of Aristotle that pervaded Christianity of the East. This is seen in the questions that were for discussion. Even within the time of John, we find the Church of Ephesus speculating about the Word, that mysterious Logos of God. So later on, Gnosticism and Manichæism sprang up with their weird accounts of the Demiurge, and the eternal conflict between good and evil. As the good became omnipotent, and there were no more persecutions to bring the subject so prominently before men's minds, thought turned for the new difficulty and met the mystery of the Trinity. Immediately the whole expanse was aflame. Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, even the newly initiated Constantinople, entered into the discussion of an "iota," and that an iota which stood alone but in a diphthong. So it seems to many, yet it was more than that, as is conceded by the great importance still attached to that controversy. It was not so much that the subject itself was peculiar as that its apprehension by a whole people was peculiar. Of what other region in the world could the story of Nyssa's famous description be true even in caricature. So again, when the doctrine of the Trinity was settled, the doctrine of the Person of Christ became the all-absorbing theme. Here too the discussion hung on a single letter. All would admit the $\epsilon\chi$, but all would not admit the $\epsilon\zeta$, and consequently unsurpassed in ecclesiastical history for bitterness and useful result waged around those two prepositions. These instances so prominent in the history of the Church indicate very clearly the union of closest subtlety with loftiest speculation, and that too among the masses, not merely among their teachers. An interesting proof of the wide-spread passion for the profoundest theological discussions is seen in the part that the Emperors took in the different controversies. Con-

stantine, Basilicus, Zeno, Justinian, are known as much or more in connection with Councils and Church decrees as in matters of political interest. This would have been impossible where the laity felt that they had no right to their opinion on doctrine, or ability to discuss. So too with regard to the Councils. The seven Ecumenical Councils were all really Eastern, called by Eastern Emperors, composed principally of Eastern ecclesiastics, with relation to Eastern questions, and representing Eastern peoples. This representative character is one of their most distinguishing features. The monks of Nitria, the populace of Alexandria, the mob of Constantinople, were as really present in them as are the American citizens in their legislative halls to-day. Hence the separation of the Nestorians, Monophysites, and Monothelites. These schisms were not the result merely of a blind following a favorite teacher, though the personal regard for Nestorius, and the personal influence of Cyril had doubtless much to do with the controversies. The common people, shopkeepers, farmers, artisans, discussed and decided questions that had puzzled the deepest theologian. After the close of the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies, this speculative discussion ceased to be particularly noticeable, but it was due more to outward pressure forbidding its development than to any lack of tendency of thought itself in that direction. Under the tyranny of the late Byzantine Emperors, which forbade any departure from customary belief, there was little opportunity for free independent thinking, and under the iron rule of the Moslem, the principal object of life was the obtaining of a daily sustenance. Enforced hunger and nakedness are incompatible with much intellectual activity. Yet even now the same tendency is seen. The Abyssinians are said to be still discussing seventy different forms of the doctrine of the Person of Christ, and no political harangue or social gossip is so attractive to the crowds in the streets of Constantinople to-day as a discussion between Greek, Armenian, Protestant, and Jew. The shopkeepers of the interior cities, the muleteers of the desert, will roll off the phrases of the Nicene creed and discuss them with eager avidity.

2. A second noticeable characteristic of the Eastern Church in all its parts, is the conservatism it manifests. It is said that

the Roman Catholic Church never changes, yet there are many doctrines now received by it that were either unknown to the early Latin Fathers or else strenuously opposed by them. The proof of this is seen in the practical displacement of older by later creeds: the Niceno-Constantinopolitan creed while theoretically acknowledged has really had to give way to the Tridentine confession. Not so in the east. Every theological dogma must prove itself to be in accordance with the early declarations of the Church. It is true that modern belief includes many articles unknown to the ancient, yet if it can be shown that they are inconsistent with that ancient belief they will be discarded, except where political or ecclesiastical ambition steps in with its objections. This is in entire accordance with the character of all Eastern races, whether Christian or not. That their fathers have done a thing is of itself sufficient reason for their doing the same, and he who travels through the Levant to-day will see the same style of life, that obtained in the days of Roman and Greek rule. This has doubtless been due to a considerable extent to the same causes that checked the outflow of religious and philosophical speculation, namely, the tyranny and misrule both of Byzantines and Moslems, yet there is underlying that a spirit of persistent conservatism that thinks the old better than the new, and dreads any change. The consequences of this spirit have been both advantageous and deleterious, as conservatism is always, at the same time, a preventive of defection, and wild wandering, and a hindrance to growth and development. This conserving element in the Eastern Church is seen most markedly in the history of its doctrine.

At first thought it might seem that this tendency was entirely opposite to and inconsistent with the tendency to high abstract speculation, yet we find them side by side. There is no section of the world where so many startling theories upon every subject connected with the supernatural have been broached, none where there have been such violent controversies, extending even to riot and bloodshed, yet none where through it all there has been such an undercurrent of conservative thought that has in every case gained the mastery, carrying along with it whatever was kindred to it, wrecking

whatever was opposed. As we read of the turbulent proceedings of those early councils, when argument was drowned by shouts of applause or imprecation, it seems strange that any good could have come from them, still less any influence to preserve that which was time-honored. No mob of the Paris commune was more bitter than the crowd that followed Peter the Reader to the murder of Hypatia, yet the same elements were employed in the cause of religious purity of doctrine. There is ever a curious mingling and union of the extremes of radicalism and conservatism. It is not the effervescent who have effected the greatest changes in the world's history, whether in thought or action. It is the cool, quiet, reflective, independent class, midway between these extremes. Fickleness is ever allied with obstinacy, and he who changes his mind twenty times a day, if perchance he gets it fixed on some one thing definitely, will hold to it for a year, against all attempts to dislodge it. Thus the Orientals, unstable in everything else, so variable that no one will place implicit reliance upon them, became in religion the conservators of true doctrine and belief. Wave after wave of heresy rolled over them, carrying off here and there a comparatively small portion, but leaving the mass unchanged, and the constant fight with different influences, while it checked life, only molded the doctrine more firmly. So of the effect of the paganizing element and of the contact with Islamism. They served indeed to almost destroy religious life, cut at the very roots of growth, by hindering and discouraging missionary work, yet made them cling all the closer to the forms of their belief, and the bare statement of doctrine was thus preserved almost intact. The result is, that as far as creeds and confessions are concerned, the Churches of the East are to-day almost exactly where they were fourteen centuries ago. The query then comes naturally, if this is so, why are they not on a par with the Protestant Churches, who claim to have gone back, overleaping the erroneous accretions of the Romish Church, to those very creeds and confessions. The answer lies partly in the fact that these doctrines are mere dogmas with little or no spiritual life, but still more in the fact, that however much it may be claimed, Protestant Churches have *not* gone back, to those old creeds and confessions. They have taken them up

and with all the light of these centuries turned upon them we have read in them true statements of Christian belief. But those statements as read by them are very different from those which are read in the same creeds by the priests of the Eastern churches. It is like the difference between looking at a planet through an opera glass and through a great telescope. Thus we see that while this spirit of conservatism or persistency, operated to preserve the faith in its purity against the storms that threatened it, it also operated to prevent its normal development. Christianity as a system of belief is a very different thing now from what it was in the 4th and 5th centuries. Not that its essential character has changed, but man's apprehension of it has, and statements and forms that were accurate and complete then, are now accurate perhaps, but very incomplete. This is the theory of the Protestant Church, and to a certain degree of the Romish Church. The Eastern Church, however, has always held that what has been once correctly stated, is so stated for all time, that no further light can be thrown upon it, that as it stood so it must ever stand. It is not claimed that *all* truth was known then, that would preclude any dogmas of the present time, but merely that in regard to any subject, that was once fully delivered upon, there can be no change, that statement must ever remain the same.

3. *The spirit of nationalism.*—To understand this, the whole rise and development of the church polity of the east must be kept in mind ;—the gradual elevation of a presbyter into a bishop ; the connection of churches, and the according to the bishop of one church a sort of primacy among those of the other churches ; the revenue paid to the apostolic sees, and the gradual assumption of superior rights by those ; the establishment of the metropolitan system, and the patriarchates ; the concentration of extraordinary powers in the Patriarchate of Constantinople, under the influence of the emperors, and the position from Alexandria and Antioch ; the long struggle in Rome ; the subordination of the Patriarch to the Sultan, and the subsequent separation of various sees, impatient of the powerful influence exercised by the Moslems in the nomination and appointment of prelates. This in the orthodox church. With regard to the separated churches it was much the same,

though in general in a more limited degree: the Primate of the Catholicate of Chaldea exerted an almost imperial power over the remotest sees of his vast jurisdiction, requiring from all his prelates that they should either present themselves before him at certain definite seasons to make confession of their faith, or if too far removed to come in person, that they should send a written statement.

Thus everywhere we see the churches of a certain section of country gathering around their chief bishop, and forming with him as their ruler a sort of spiritual kingdom. To him they looked for protection and assistance, and him they in turn were bound to support and maintain in all his rights. He in turn transferred his allegiance to his metropolitan, and the metropolitans with their retinue of bishops gathered in the court of the patriarch. As the ecclesiastical divisions were made coincident with the political, this ecclesiastical became still more markedly a territorial unity, and to churchly interest became added more definitely an interest of country, a germ of patriotism. Egypt and Syria, proud of their respective schools at Antioch and Alexandria, would yield neither to the other, and both resented any claim to superiority by the fledgeling at Constantinople. So, too, the Primate of Ephesus, with his ecclesiastical court far outnumbering those of his brethren, demanded an honorable place, and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem gloried in his own position as the birthplace of Christianity. Thus there were five separate sections of the empire, each preserving its own integrity, and jealous of any encroachments upon its rights or fame. One of these, the Patriarchate of Ephesus, was obliged to yield to the increasing power of Constantinople, but the others held their own, until Constantinople itself was too much weakened to attempt further encroachments, indeed had to submit to divisions in her own domain. It followed that in the East a Papacy was an impossibility, each section being too strong to admit of any such supremacy on the part of any other, but it also followed that the personal attachment of the inhabitants to their sees was still greater. Obedience and loyalty became not so much a matter of submission as of preference. Hence whenever an ecclesiastic was charged with heresy and put under the ban of the Church,

flock proudly and gladly gathered around him and formed a church of their own, replying to anathema with counter-anathema, and stoutly claiming that they had not separated from the others, but the others from them.

Owing to the continuance of the imperial power in Constantinople, the Eastern escaped to a great degree the secularization that affected the Western Church. The patriarchs, though exerting a very great influence, never really attained to temporal power: they continued to be strictly *pretates*, not *cesars*. As the government passed from the hands of the emperors into those of the sultans, this relation continued in the main. The civil rule was in the hands of the Moslems, and the church officials were recognized as the leaders and protectors of their flocks, and to them their people must look in any case of difficulty with the civil officers. The Turks recognized no distinction of races, but only of religions. As it made no difference whether a man was Turk, Tartar, Persian, Arab, or Egyptian, so long as he was an orthodox Moslem, so they made no inquiries as to whether a man was Slav or Greek, Armenian or Russian; if he professed the Greek religion, and resided at the Greek church, he was, as far as they were concerned, a *Greek*, and through the Greek Patriarch he must make his appeal to, or gain his decision from, the government. So of the Armenians, Jacobites, &c. No matter what blood flowed in their veins, or what the physical features, or language, or use who made the sign of the cross with one finger were mixed together as were those who made it with two, or with three. A great impulse was thus given to this tendency that had been growing up during the earlier history of the Church. Each church became a nation, and the bishop became its virtual ruler. To leave the Church was to leave the nation, and every heretic was also a traitor.

The patriarchs resident at Constantinople were from the very fact of that residence recognized by the Sublime Porte as the representatives of all the churches of their communion within the bounds of the empire, whether under their immediate ecclesiastical jurisdiction or not. Thus the Armenian patriarch of Constantinople became the head of the Armenian nation, and the Greek patriarch the head of the Greek nation,

which was considered to include all in communion with him, whether Greeks, Slavs, Russians, or anything else. Hence very possibly the immediate origin of the term "Greek Church" as including these various races. The power of the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, rapidly declined, until at last their positions became merely nominal, and the Patriarch of Constantinople remained the only really important primate of the orthodox Church. Gradually, as corruption became prevalent, the respect for his office declined, and with it his power. This national feeling came again more prominently to view. Russia, as has been said, withdrew and formed her own church. Servia had never been in strict subordination, and early boldly declared her independence. So with the Bishops of Cyprus, Mt. Sinai, Montenegro. All of these, with the exception of Mt. Sinai, and possibly Cyprus, forming virtually distinct nations. When Greece secured her independence of the Sultan, she too must be free from the Sultan's Patriarch and have her own strictly national church. So again more recently with the Bulgarians. The result is, that the Greek Church, as it is called, consists in reality of ten distinct, independent churches, and most of these are national.

The same influence is seen to be at work among the Armenians. When a body of them broke away and joined the Roman Catholic Church, they were recognized by the government and treated as a separate nationality. They afterwards broke into two parts on the question of papal supremacy and infallibility, and thus became two nations. The Protestant converts formed another, and now in the Armenian race there are four Armenian nations. So again among the Jacobites, Nestorians, and Copts. Thus this perfect blending of church and State, connected with the general spirit of nationalism, has had a most important effect upon the whole Eastern Church. More than any other one influence it has helped to disintegrate it, and by the disintegration the old bonds have been weakened, and there is more hope of a higher life in the future.

These three characteristics, it is true, have always existed, yet each has had its period of full development, and by them we may mark three ages in the history of the Church.

The first, extending to 787, second Council of Nice, is the age of speculative thought: it covers the seven ecumenical councils, and the Arian, Monophysite, and Monothelite controversies.

The second, from 787–1458, the fall of Constantinople, is the age of conservatism: it covers the discussion with the Latin Church: and in internal life is marked chiefly by the writings from the early Fathers.

The third, from 1458 to the present time, is the age of nationalism: the formal disintegration of the Church, connected with the impulses toward life.

The briefest account of the Eastern Church would be incomplete without some statement in regard to its separation from the Western Church.

The nominal grounds for the separation lay in certain differences of doctrine and worship. A still deeper reason is found in the essentially different polity of the two churches, which polity in turn was the almost if not quite inevitable result of the peculiarities characteristic of their nature. The question of the filio-que, the use or disuse of the azymes—heavened bread in the eucharist—the celibacy of the clergy, &c., were points that might have been set aside with comparatively little difficulty. More nearly insuperable were the objections to the Papacy on the part of the ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, yet even these might have been overcome; witness the agreement at the Council of Florence. The exception accorded to the delegates to that council on their return to the East shows that the antagonism between East and West was deep seated in the very nature of the differences.

As the Eastern Church was speculative, the Western was practical. Athanasius in Theology, Theodore of Mopsuestia in Christology, were set over against Augustine in Anthropology. Still more noticeable was this difficulty as manifested in the different types of Monachism. St. Simeon Stylites would have been an impossibility in Europe, and Bernard of Clairvaux an equal impossibility in Asia. The hospice that opened its doors freely and widely to all comers, and the mon-

asteries of Mt. Athos stand as types of the prevailing style of religious life in the two Churches.

The distinction in regard to conservatism has already been noticed. The Western Church, even the Roman Catholic portion of it, accepts the idea of development. The Eastern Church acknowledges accretion, but not development.

So again with regard to the spirit of nationalism. In the East there is a failure to recognize the broad principles that may unite factions held apart by minor difficulties. It is the diversity in unity rather than the unity in diversity that is considered. The Western Church is all things to all men, bending to circumstances, adapting itself with wonderful facility to varying conditions of peoples, and thus drawing them under one common rule. The Eastern Church rigid, unyielding, commanding absolute conformity in the minutest particulars of the most trivial rites, split up into sects, and each sect became a distinct people, with its own government and worship. Thus while in the West the individual was sacrificed to the whole, in the East the whole was sacrificed to the individual. Thus when this same spirit of nationalism, taking its rise in a different way, yet exhibiting in the main like peculiarities, began to exert so great an influence in Europe, and proved a great factor in the disruption of the Western Church, we find the Protestants seeking a reunion with the Greeks. But the spirit of nationalism had not then received the infusion of new life that should overcome the conservatism, and the advances were repulsed. So of the later efforts at reunion. They have too often been begun and carried on, on the basis of a mere outward, formal disagreement between the two great sections, ignoring the fundamental difference in their natures. Doubtless some of the disagreements are important, yet their importance lies rather in the fact that they are indications of deeper characteristics than in any intrinsic value of their own. The doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from the Father alone, is involved in the subordinationism that has ever characterized Eastern theories of the Trinity. The question of the *Azymes* is a question of conservative tradition. The Eastern Church having always used leavened bread, must always continue to use it. The ordination of married men to the lower orders of

clergy marks the closer connection of the Church with the people in their social, and thus their national life.*

Thus, the separation of these two great sections of the Christian Church was due to no mere adventitious circumstances, but to deep seated differences by which it was rendered inevitable. The separation is not merely between the Greek and

Latin Churches, but between the whole Eastern and Western Churches, including all their divisions and subdivisions; Greek, Armenian, Nestorian, &c., on the one side, Catholic and Protestant on the other. It is a separation that has been well nigh absolute. The Eastern Church has made no converts from the Western Church, and the Western converts from her have been such rather in name than in real character. Those portions of the Armenian Church which acknowledge the Papacy are not essentially different from their former Gregorians. So with the Coptic and Jacobite Churches in communion with Rome. Of the Protestant Churches it is perhaps too soon yet to speak.

The course of the separation, commencing with the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451, and closing with the formal excommunication of the Greek Patriarch by the Latin Legates in

Perhaps no better proof of the triviality of the nominal charges made against the Greek Church by the Latin can be given than to quote a section from the bull of excommunication laid on the altar of St. Sophia in Constantinople by the Papal legates. After rehearsing at some length the events of the controversy the bull proceeds.

Quia sicut Simoniaci donum Dei vendunt; sicut baleii hospites suos castrant, non solum ad clericatum sed insuper ad episcopatum promovent: sicut Arriani baptizant in nomine S. Trinitatis baptizatos, et maxime Latinos; sicut Donatistæ mutant, excepta Græcorum ecclesia. Ecclesiam Christi et verum sacrificium et baptismum ex toto mundo periisse: sicut Nicolaitæ carnales nuptias concelebrant et defendunt sacri altari ministris; sicut Severiani maledictum dicunt legem dei: sicut Pneumatomachi vel Theomachi absciderunt a symbolo Spiritus Sancti communionem a Filio: sicut Manichæi inter alia quodlibet fermentatum fatentur natum esse: sicut Nazareni carnalem Judæorum munditiam adeo servant, ut vulos, morientes ante octavum a nativitate diem baptizari contradicant, et heres in menstruò, vel in partu periclitantes communicari, vel si pagani sint baptizari prohibeant, et capillos capitis ac barbas nutrienteas, eos qui comam dent, et secundum institutionem Rom. Ecclesiæ barbas radunt, in communione recipiant: Michael et . . . et omnes sequaces eorum in præfatis erroribus et assumptionibus, sint Anathema Maranatha, cum Simoniacis, Valesis, etc.—et cum omnibus hæreticis, uno cum Diabolo et Angelis ejus nisi forte resipuerint. Amen, Amen, Amen.

1054, is coincident with the rise of the Papal claims. The Council of Chalcedon, called to settle the Christological controversy, and settling it on the basis of the letter sent by Pope Leo the Great, to whom both parties looked for assistance, nevertheless declared the Patriarch of Constantinople the equal of the Pope. This Leo could not brook, and though the creed of Chalcedon was recognized as valid, its canons were rejected. The contest increased, different points being brought up at different times, upon which the discussion hung. In 589 the Council of Toledo added the "filioque" to the creed, and thus an additional reason for complaint was afforded the Eastern Church. In the ninth century we find as rival Primates Nicholas I. at Rome, and Photius at Constantinople. The upholder of the pseudo-Isidorian decretals could hardly endure the rivalry of a man who had been raised so rapidly from the post of prime secretary to the Emperor, and captain of his body guard, to the patriarchal dignity. The Pope remained firm, the emperors wavered, and Photius was compelled to see the power of the Latin Church constantly increasing. Then again there was a temporary lull in the contest till the middle of the eleventh century, when Michael Cerularius renewed the conflict with Leo IX, who was supported by Hilderband. The Emperor sought to mediate, but mediation was impossible, and the Papal legates laid upon the altar of St. Sophia the fierce letter referred to above. This anathema was replied to by counter-anathema, and the rupture was complete. From this time on, all efforts to unite the two Churches, though frequently made, were unavailing, and it is easy to understand why. They were commenced either by the Greek Emperors in order to secure the aid of Europe against the encroachments of the Turks, or by the Popes. In either case the result was the same. There was to be an acknowledgment of at least the nominal supremacy of the Pope, and this the Eastern Church would not allow. The last notable instance of this effort was at the Council of Ferrara-Florence, 1439. Pope Eugenius, anxious to defend himself against the proceedings of the Council of Basle, and the Emperor Palæologus, fearful of the advance of the Turks, were alike eager to secure a mutual support, and a compromise was effected. But before its final consummation

genius had been deposed at Basle, and the Greek ambassadors found empty churches and popular imprecations awaiting their return. At the same time a like effort to bring the Armenians into communion with the Latin Church was made, with no better success. Fourteen years later Constantinople before the army of Mohammed, and the West lifted not a finger to save the East. Since then no efforts have been made at reunion, until the Old Catholic movement and the Councils at Bonn a few years since, but from this no definite results have as yet been reached.

In considering the future of the Eastern Church, it must be remembered that it is no homogeneous body, united under one hierarchy, with common rites and doctrines. Its 73,000,000 communicants, scattered from the Danube to Behring's Straits, from Archangel to Bombay, are divided among as many sects as is the Western Church. Indeed, were it not for the lines of their history converge to one center, and for underneath the great dissimilarities we find equally great similarities, it would seem as if we ought to speak, not of the Eastern *Church*, but of the Eastern Churches. There is too a fierceness in the rivalry between these different sections, almost unknown at the West. Greeks, Armenians, Copts, will scarcely talk together at the same trade, much less accord to each other in daily fellowship. Even within what we are wont to consider as one Church, Greek, Bulgarian, Russian, hate each other with a bitter hatred. The Patriarch of Constantinople anathematizes the Exarch of Bulgaria, and both fear the Synod of Russia.

Thus the present condition is one of commotion, almost of chaos. There is no unity of thought or purpose. What is ordered by one Synod is denied by the next. Bishops, ambitious of rivaling the fame of their predecessors, come forward and seek alliances with Western Churches, but they have little following in their own dioceses, and are very likely to meet the reception that awaited the delegates to the Council of Florence. Yet in these very facts lie the grounds for a hope that this great Church will come forth to take up anew the work done so nobly in the past.

As centuries ago, from the cloisters and palaces of the Orient, there poured into the West those influences that gave

a re-birth to Western thought. So now, from the universities and Churches of the West, there are pouring into the East influences that shall ere long give us an Eastern Renaissance. Old prejudices are being uprooted, old shackles thrown off, and as a more liberal education is making its way among the masses, the spirit of thought is achieving independence from the long bondage of conservatism.

At first there is inevitably the rebound from ecclesiastical domination to the denial of all obligation in religion, and forms of Pantheism and Atheism are spreading on every hand. Yet with the education there is gradually making its way a purer gospel, and as the people for the first time in many centuries read in their own daily language the doctrines of their Church fathers, as laid down in the Bible itself, they are discovering their mistake, and turning gladly to accept a simpler faith and worship. It is in the communities that, scattered up and down the whole domain of the Eastern Church, weak as yet, but growing stronger and stronger, which teach this simpler faith that we are to find the influences which shall yet bind the East to the West. Councils may meet, and creeds, confessions, liturgies, may be harmonized, but all will be of no avail until the people themselves recognize the harmony. The time has gone by in the East as well as with us when whole Churches will follow the beck of a bishop in regard to the faith that they shall profess, and it is only as any given creed commends itself to the consciences of the people that it will gain general acceptance.

In view of the inner characteristics and historical tendencies of the races that make up the Eastern Church, it may perhaps be doubted whether an organic unity will ever be attained with the Western Church. The same causes that inevitably resulted in their separation will doubtless keep them more or less apart. Yet a deeper and truer unity in the great work of the Christian Church will exist, is even now manifesting itself. Rites and ceremonies, even formulas of doctrine may vary, but the spirit shall be one, and each section doing its own work in its own way shall contribute its share in the building up of the kingdom of a common Lord.*

* The statistics above are principally compiled from Neale's "*History of the Holy Eastern Church.*"

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS.*—Mr. Chauncey Wright's *Philosophical Discussions* cannot fail to attract the attention of many readers. The reputation which he gained for himself in Cambridge and in its vicinity as a thinker and teacher, the unstinted commendation which he receives from a biographer of so high authority as Mr. Charles Eliot Norton—the exquisite paper and presswork of the volume, will give to the author's contributions a favorable introduction to those readers to whom he had been hitherto unknown, irrespective of the value of his opinions and the ability with which he stated and defended them. The papers which are contained in this volume are chiefly a few elaborate articles originally published in the *North American Review*, and several briefer critical notices from the *New York Nation*. Most of these papers relate to philosophical topics, such as relate to the doctrine of Evolution and the Associational Metaphysics. As the author does not hesitate to characterize those from whom he differs as mystics and theologians, we deem it no injustice to describe him as a materialistic atheist. He was evidently a thinker of extraordinary reach and acuteness, who had special power in expressing his views upon others in debate and conversation, but more than usual infelicity in the exposition of his opinions by writing. We infer that the first was true from the warm and positive assertions of his biographer. We are equally confident that the last was true from the perusal of the most elaborate essays in this volume. We specify the most elaborate of these essays, because these are also careful expositions of the author's own philosophical opinions, and yet in respect of their style, are somewhat advantageously contrasted with those which are shorter and more dogmatical.

Of the more elaborate essays the critical examination of "the philosophy of Herbert Spencer" and "the Evolution of Self-consciousness" are the most significant, as manifesting the peculiar ability, and, we may add, the peculiar weaknesses of the writer, and

Philosophical Discussions; by CHAUNCEY WRIGHT, with a biographical sketch of the author, by Charles Eliot Norton. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 7.

as exhibiting more fully his own opinions. His estimate of Spencer's merits and defects is independent and able, and so striking, that we are surprised to find in "the Evolution of Self-consciousness" an exemplification of the same oversights and mistakes which he finds so abundant and so glaring in Spencer. This entire essay reads, to us, like a philosophical romance, so difficult is it to one who cannot accept the associationalistic psychology to follow, with even a slender modicum of confidence, a *rationale* of mental development which is founded upon Mill's nominalism, Darwin's heredity and Spencer's physiological theory of ultimate relations. That the genesis of self-consciousness from brute intellectualism and of brute thinking from inorganic tendencies, should be soberly defended by strong-headed thinkers like Mr. Chauncey Wright, and endorsed by so cultivated a critic as Mr. C. E. Norton, is one of the philosophic miracles of the times, which we should have said could not possibly have occurred were the evidence of experience not decisive, and that of testimony so unshaken. We are forced to conclude from this and other examples, that the Materialistic Atheism of our times is not exempt from the confidences and credulities of its sister theologies.

THE CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH.*—This work does not discuss the idea and constitution of the State, but only the relations of the State and of civil government to Christianity. In discussing this general subject, it treats, with ability and candor, many of the most difficult and important of the questions of our time. Among these are: The relation of Christianity to existing authority and to the various forms of government; Its relation to absolute monarchy and to modern liberal tendencies; The relation of the Christian state to education and marriage; The temporal and spiritual power, the national church, Christian and non-Christian toleration, the emancipation of the Jews, and the separation of Church and State; The position of the Christian State in reference to the pretensions of the Papacy; Its duty to the working classes; War and International Law; Criminal Law, etc., etc. The work abounds in suggestions and discussions pertinent to

* *On Christian Commonwealth.* Translated and adapted under the direction of the author from the German of Dr. HENRY W. J. THIERSCHE, author of "the Church in the Apostle's time," "Christian family life," etc. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. 1877. New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, 743 and 745 Broadway. 8vo, pp. xii and 272. Price \$3.75.

tions of immediate and vital importance in our country. For example, he distinguishes the Christian doctrine of the separation of Church and State from the unchristian. The former "is a definition of, and distinction between the spiritual and temporal power, followed by a friendly agreement between the two, which each, unhampered by the other, and yet mutually co-operative, may strive to attain their common aim, the spiritual and moral welfare of the nation." The latter is the doctrine of the first French Revolution, "The State is Atheist." The latter, we are told, is gradually but steadily displacing the Christian and American doctrine of the separation of Church and State. If the State has no God, that is of itself a sort of establishment by the name of the atheist's creed, and is necessarily fatal in its tendencies to the well-ordered and prosperous State, and antagonistic, at least, and oppressive to all religion.

While the work abounds in valuable thought, it rests on erroneous principles. Monarchy under constitutional limitations is recognized as the best form of civil government, episcopacy as original and best form of ecclesiastical polity. A national Church with large toleration is advocated. No basis of popular government is recognized except the "Social Contract," and no basis of it except the Red Republicanism of Europe. The right of revolution is denied. The original work is "translated and adapted"; the notes have been omitted, except a few which the translator has incorporated without designating them into the text.

We protest against these "adaptations," which make it impossible to know in reading the translation, what is the language of the author and what the language of the translator—adapting" the author's thought to his own.

THE CRADLE OF THE CHRIST.*—This work consists of nine essays expressing the extreme of unbelief respecting the historical Christ and the authenticity of the New Testament.

The actual Jesus is . . . inaccessible to scientific research. "The image cannot be recovered." "The purpose of [this] essay is to give the history of an idea, not the history of a person, to show the development of a thought, not the influence of a life." "The ideal image which Christians have, for nearly 2000 years

The Cradle of the Christ. A study in Primitive Christianity. By OCTAVIUS MORTIMER. New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 182 Fifth avenue. 1877. pp. xii, and 233.

worshiped under the name of Jesus, has no authentic visible counterpart in history. This conclusion . . . will be welcome only to the few calm minds who feel the force of ideas, the regenerating power of principles. These will rejoice to be relieved of the last thin shadow of a supernatural authority in the past." "National philanthropy in London and New York finds no more serious obstacle to its advance than the benevolence that is inculcated in the name of Christ and by authority of the New Testament. It is the battle of science against sentiment."

THE TRAINING OF THE TWELVE.*—This work presents the history of the twelve apostles and the instructions given them by Christ, with the design of setting forth the education and training which they received during Christ's life for the work which they were appointed to do after his death. In this second edition the author has made important modifications, retrenching the homiletic element; bringing out more fully the history, and the connection of events and of thought; giving more attention to the theory of the Tübingen school and other recent discussions. We think the "homiletic element" might have been still further retrenched with advantage. But the work is rich in thought and worthy of extensive circulation.

THE NATURAL SOURCES OF THEOLOGY.†—This work consists of six essays full of fresh, original, vigorous thought. They are a valuable contribution to natural theology.

IS "ETERNAL" PUNISHMENT ENDLESS?‡—This little book maintains that the Bible does not teach that the punishment of the

* *The Training of the Twelve*; or passages out of the gospels exhibiting the twelve disciples of Jesus under discipline for the apostleship. Second edition, revised and improved. By ALEXANDER B. BRUCE, D.D., Professor of Theology, Free Church College, Glasgow; author of "The Humiliation of Christ in his Physical, Ethical, and Official Aspects." Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. 1877. New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, 743 and 745 Broadway. 8vo, pp. xiv and 539. Price \$6.00

† *A Statement of the Natural Sources of Theology*, with a discussion of their validity, and of modern sceptical objections; to which is added an article on the first chapter of Genesis. By THOMAS HILL, D.D., LL.D. Reprinted from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1877. 8vo, pp. iv and 139.

‡ *Is "eternal" punishment endless?* Answered by a restatement of the original Scriptural doctrine, by an orthodox minister of the gospel. Boston: Lockwood Brooks & Co., 381 Washington st. 1876. pp. x, 106.

cked is endless; that it does not teach that this punishment has end; "but that the ultimate fate of the impenitent wicked left shrouded in impenetrable mystery, so far as the total declaration of the sacred writers is concerned." The argument is principally from the use of the Hebrew, 'Olam (עולם) and the Greek, αἰών, both in the Septuagint and the New Testament, to denote periods of time, from which it is inferred that the adjective αἰωνιος must follow the usage of the noun, and therefore cannot denote "endless." The same is inferred from the usage of the adjective. It is also maintained that in this adjective, *aeonian*, "the *qualitative*, not the *quantitative* idea predominates," e. g., "This is the aeonian life, that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." "The aeonian life, *primarily*, as defined by its divine author himself, is *of a kind* of life which is vitalized, formed, and blessed by knowing God and his Son. The idea of perpetuity inheres in it, no doubt, but *how?* Not primarily. *Only so far as the qualities themselves, which characterize that life, are vital, progressive, and during, is that life perpetual.* Precisely in the same way, then, does the idea of perpetuity inhere in the antithesis, 'aeonian punishment.' This punishment, like that life, is *primarily* defined by the term 'aeonian' as of a certain *kind*, rather than of a certain *length*."

The discussion is scholarly and pervaded with Christian courtesy and candor. The work evinces ability in the writer, and the argument, though we do not regard it as convincing, is clearly and forcibly presented, and is probably the strongest possible in support of the proposition.

SALVATION HERE AND HEREAFTER.*—This volume is a collection of sermons and essays. There is no recognition in it of the redemption of man from guilt and sin through Jesus Christ, which is the distinctive and essential characteristic of Christianity. The author confines himself to the truths of natural religion and of Christian morality. The subjects are treated not controversially but practically. Within the range of thought to which the author is limited, he presents, with much freshness and earnestness, important aspects of truth seldom noticed by writers more

* *Salvation here and hereafter.* Sermons and essays. By Rev. JOHN SERVICE, Minister of Inch. Second edition. London: Macmillan & Co. 1877. pp. 267. 6s \$1.50.

distinctively evangelical, and well fitted to broaden and enrich their common presentations of religious truth.

FROM TRADITIONAL TO RATIONAL FAITH.*—This is an autobiographical narrative of the transition of an English Baptist to Socinianism. The author appears to be devout and reverential in spirit; but the book contains nothing that is quickening or suggestive. His lack of careful study appears in his saying: "Yet I knew that the New Testament mentioned no such formula as 'In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost.'" He reveals the spirit of recklessness of all past thinking with which he studied in saying: "The Denomination said, 'your reason is reliable enough to decide the nature of Baptism in face of all the priests and theologians who differ from us. Pass on; past the learned and the holy; past the venerable and the exalted; past thrones of bishops and ranks of hierarchs; do not be abashed by their presence, their numbers, their arguments, their frowns, their menaces, their taunts—boy, novice, uncritical as you are, you are qualified in this matter to think for yourself, to waive away all literature but the New Testament, and to arrive at a decision radically different from that of all Christendom.' Indeed I can never forget the debt of gratitude I owe to a large portion of Baptist teaching."

THE MEANING AND POWER OF BAPTISM.†—This work is in opposition to the doctrine that there is no baptism without immersion. The author does not aim to discuss the subject in all its aspects, but has treated such points as have from time to time come up for inquiry in the prosecution of his ministry. He has evidently aimed to discuss thoroughly the points which he has selected.

KLECZKOWSKI'S CHINESE GRAMMAR.‡—Previous to the present century little interest was taken in what is termed Sinology; the

* *From Traditional to Rational Faith; or, the way I came from Baptist to Liberal Christianity.* By R. ANDREW GRIFFIN. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1877. 16mo, pp. 219. Price \$1.00

† *The Meaning and Power of Baptism.* By Rev. J. G. D. STEARNS. New York: N. Tibbals & Sons, 37 Park Row. 1877. 12mo, pp. 287.

‡ *Cours Graduel et Complet de Chinois Parlé et Écrit.* Par Le Comte KLECZKOWSKI. Paris, 1876.

the language and literature of China. Francis Varo, a Roman Catholic missionary, published at Canton, in 1703, the first Chinese Grammar; but a hundred years elapsed before the attention of European scholars was earnestly directed to the subject. In 1815, M. Rémusat was appointed professor of Chinese in Paris. He was followed by the celebrated M. Julien. This important chair is now held by Le Comte Kleczkowski, who was at one time connected with the French diplomatic service in this country, and has more recently been *chargé d'affaires* at Pekin. This distinguished scholar has lately given to the world a complete grammar of the Chinese language, written and spoken, which is regarded by critics as among the best works of its kind. Mrs. Penno Tudor, of Boston, has generously presented copies of it to several institutions of learning, one of which is Yale College, where there is already a professorship of Chinese, to which the celebrated oriental scholar, Mr. S. Wells Williams, has been appointed. Should Chinese immigration increase as rapidly as is predicted by some, the day is at hand when it will be highly desirable for our men of learning to have at least a little knowledge of a language spoken by this new element of our heterogeneous population.

The introduction to Kleczkowski's Grammar treats briefly of the material resources of China, its commercial importance to France, Germany, Russia, England, and the United States; compliments American enterprise in developing trade with the Celestial Empire, and censures the prevailing apathy, ignorance, and prejudice on a subject affecting at least one-quarter of the human race. Chinese progress is eulogized. Great transformations have been witnessed since 1860. Treaties with foreign nations are explained, and sanguine expectations encouraged as to the result of a liberal policy in the future. The relations are disclosed between the Chinese and other languages. The faithful student is cheered by being told, that if he will only master six thousand characters he can readily make his way in China. But he is also warned that each of these six thousand characters has four distinct names; hence to be truly proficient he must retain in memory twenty-four thousand signs! But, again, it is hardly expected of foreigners, that they will gain a practical knowledge of more than three or four thousand letters, by means of which the ordinary phrases can be compassed. The author recommends for two years the exclusive study of the great dictionary of

K'ang Chi; and considerably warns the impatient sinologue that for him "study must be gradual and progressive." The beauties of Chinese literature cannot be appreciated at a single glance. Beyond the period mentioned, at least two years more must be devoted to the classics, allowing from two to five hours study daily according to the habits of the student. The prize is evidently considered worthy of the effort. The mastery of this tongue, in the author's opinion, is for a young man hardly more difficult than the acquisition of the Russian, or even the German language; and it should be remembered that "a knowledge of Chinese unlocks for its possessor the door into a fourth part of the whole world."

Certainly on cutting the leaves of the Count's admirable grammar, one feels, perhaps, for the first time in his life, that an ordinary mortal might by taking pains enough, learn to converse with Ah Sin, Lee Lang, and four hundred thousand other celestials, without resorting to the absurdities of "pigeon English." The body of the work is divided into two parts. "*Partie Française*" treats of the nature and general principles of the Chinese idiom and the best method of study; written Chinese; pronunciation and intonation; radicals and phonetics; Chinese literature and the rewards awaiting a faithful student. "*Partie Chinoise*" bears on its first page the emblematic character "Yong," meaning *eternal*, from whose nine elementary parts all the Chinese characters are said to be constructed. The next page is Chinese text, opposite to which are two French translations, one literal and the other idiomatic. Copious notes embellish every page, of which one or two specimens may suffice. "Two characters of simple number placed one over the other always imply the conjunction *or* (example, three *or* four.) It is the same of all characters which, placed one over the other, have exactly opposite meanings (example, good *or* bad, black *or* white.)" Again, in the fifth chapter: "*Chenn* means God, the Spirit that animates all the innumerable deities of China. This is the character that serves the English Protestant ministers to express the idea of the only true God. *Sienn* means merely a genie, sage, deified hero, one of the immortals." These notes, however, chiefly elucidate the grammar and syntax. And thus through twelve chapters, this gifted and titled author unties the mysteries of the most difficult language spoken on earth.

The present review is merely designed to call the attention of

a general reader to the existence of a new and valuable work, which must be of great service to missionaries, travelers, and men of commerce, while it has a certain degree of interest for every naturalist, even though he may bestow upon it only a superficial glance.

CORONATION.*—This is a book of unique power and fascination, every one who knows the author would have expected. It is not so much a story whose scene is laid in the forest and the sea, as a dramatic monograph in which forest and sea are principal actors. The two educate Cephias together, mould his habits, direct his thinking, guard his solitudes. The one shelters him in the forest, half insane, he is tracked by the English detective and leads his pursuer such a wild chase among the California sierras; the other, with tragic fate finally puts a quietus alike to his restless wanderings and his splendid dreams. The unknown home missionary, nursing his vast schemes of education in the obscurity of the forest, takes them down with him at last into the eternal oblivion of the sea. There is something intensely pathetic in this memorial of a humble life fired with the divinest enthusiasm—there is such a contrast between the grandeur of the projects and the poverty of the force which is to execute them. The author seems to be unintentionally revealing some of his own deepest secrets of spiritual life. These vivid and marvellously diversified pictures which pop out everywhere, of woods, mountains, and seas, in all their possible moods, convince us that the writer has lived in the closest companionship with nature; and it is not hard to believe, or rather it is hard not to believe, that in the equally vivid descriptions of secret conflict, solitary prayer, personal conviction and mortal experience, the writer is opening only another door of his own inner life.

The story starts on Cape Anne (the author revives the ancient name), and hovers caressingly over the rocky headlands and long beaches of that much billowed promontory. Once or twice it takes a sudden flight to California or Colorado, but instantly it comes back to the nearest mountain peak or plunges into the heart of the woods. The chief actor, Cephias by name, is the young pastor of several small parishes in succession, situate along the rough shores of Cape Anne, in which he lives sublimely content on humble fare, but with the loftiest spiritual ambitions for

* *Coronation.* A Story of Forest and Sea. By E. P. TENNEY.

his people and himself. The story is told by a friend who is also a young pastor, and who has a talent for looking after a "wider field." The two characters are foils to one another. And while "I" preaches solemnly to Cephas on the subject of burying himself in such obscure parishes, Cephas retorts upon "I" with counsel which is often as keen as it is sagacious. Here is a specimen, which we commend to all young men about to graduate from theological seminaries: "Your success, Edward, is in your own hand, in your own study. It avails not for you to seek this and that high place. Some one may object to your removal to this or that station; but no one can object to your being a man where you are. There is no objection to your being a man. . . . You have many times complained to me that yours was only a common career. Now what you want is to turn to and make that common career illustrious. . . . If you want to rise in the world, rise in your parish. . . . Do not try to climb the heavens and occupy a prominent place, but first of all make your soul luminous, and then the planets will circle around you." (p. 127.)

In one of these parishes, his island home, Helen died. Cephas buried his young wife on a hill overlooking the sea, turned the key of his house, and never entered it again for many long months of agony. When, in later years, another bolt descends upon his health and his hopes, it wrings from him the confession, "This is the heaviest blow of my life, putting an end to the sleeping and waking dream of all my years. Nothing has so completely wrecked me mind and body since Helen's death. I cannot so truly say that Providence has balked my plans, as that I have done it. . . . I have known so little of the usual course of divine providence that I have made impracticable schemes. My knowledge of human nature has not been sufficient to prevent my being buoyed up by vain expectations, the failure of which has sunk me deeper in difficulty, . . . there are many, wise and unwise, who finally face the fact that life-long projects are overthrown by mistakes that could have been easily avoided." (p. 299.)

Between the early experiences and these riper reflections of this lonely man, there stretches a period of toil, courage, joy, suffering, and adventure, sufficient to hold the reader's eager attention to the story, and enlist his hearty sympathy; and at the same time there is enough of ideal development and wise counsel to set him to thinking even in spite of himself. The book is really two books

one; a literary experiment somewhat hazardous. There is the dry itself, running its clue through the whole, sometimes slight and scarcely visible, sometimes flashing into brilliancy and breathless rapidity; but the main structure of the book is a mass of philosophy, apothegm, speculation, and instruction, through which the silver thread of story deftly weaves its way without being overwhelmed or even concealed. It is this that makes the book rich with suggestion to thoughtful minds. Preachers will find it a strangely direct and pertinent fund of inspiration both for their homiletical studies and for their devotional moods. Cephas as a man who made his whole experience a prayer-guage. His mind "was fixed upon gaining the highest possible power by the inspiring presence of God in all his studies." And it would seem to be impossible for any earnest pastor to read this memorial of such an ambition, and not rise from it with a hearty resolve to pray more and preach better.

At the same time the story is as redolent with the fragrance of nature as it is with the incense of religion. It smells of the piney woods, and like a shell, echoes with the beating of the "multitudinous sea." "Not yet," says the story in its closing pages, of one of its characters who had been rescued in childhood from shipwreck, "Not yet does he know the dark tragedies of the sea, not yet has he read the record of his own drawing forth from the waters. The sea is a robber and full of graves. English Helen's death was hastened by long pounding on the bar in a storm at the mouth of an English harbor. Cephas, and his brother, and the brother's wife so like the first Helen, were the victims of the sea. The grave of Helen on the island home has been almost swept into the ocean. The mighty waves have, in these last years, broken through a thin barrier of rock and found an approach to the cliff where her body lies, and have torn out the soil; and now 'the foaming tusks of the sea' are goring the rocks at the base of the crag. I find I the sea mingling with my affairs, as if it were one of the characters of this story; an instrument in moulding the spiritual nature of men and shaping their destiny: rather, these incidents, which are so much to me, form a minute part of the grand story of the sea." (pp. 387, 388.)

The total result of Cephas's habits of solitude and prayerful study along the sea shore and aloft in mountain fastnesses, can be best summed in the author's own words (p. 375): "I ask—What the use? I am more impressed by the strangeness of his con-

duct, than by his devotion. I less admire his intercession than wonder that this Wild Man did not break his neck. And now that the sea has swallowed him up, I inquire of myself, —What came of all his strivings in the hours of solitude? No marvellous result appeared in his outer life. His life broke like a bubble on the sea. Was his the prayer of faith, to be answered in some future time unknown? Was it answer enough, that his soul grew nobler day by day? Was his voice no more than the wild cry of a buffeted sea bird? Were his hours of agony or ecstatic joy merely a beautiful display of the devotional spirit, like the white flowers of the sea that spring and blossom upon the crest of rising waves, then fall and fade upon the beach?"

These are the questions. The verdict soon follows: "I am led to feel that somehow such experiences brought a rich reward to the character of him who had them. I cannot ask whether or not this prayer or that was answered, for I am persuaded that to his mind all things were answered; he was satisfied in the shining of the light of life."

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXLI.

OCTOBER, 1877.

ARTICLE I.—ENGLISH MYSTICS OF THE PURITAN
PERIOD.

MYSTICISM is a type of thought and devotion, which reappears in every age of the world, and either within every religious system, or external to it and in antagonism to it. It owes its universality to the fact that it is the feminine mode of thought and aspiration. Whenever woman's intellect or even that of the more woman-like part of the other sex, finds itself repelled and excluded from the sanctuary of religious thought, it asserts for itself a right and a place by effecting a reaction against the principles and methods which would have excluded it. Hence the readiness with which Buddhism was welcomed in the far east, by those who found in Shintoism, Confucianism, and other indigenous Turanian faiths no play for the affections, no scope for the gentler virtues. But Mohammedanism presents within its own sphere the most striking instance of this. If ever there was a purely and thoroughly masculine creed, it was Islam,—a religion made up of external duties, public relations, and abstract beliefs, and making little demand upon the affections. It was utterly theocratic;

it presented God as a king, a man of war, an irresistible ruler; not as a Father, a Friend, a Comforter. It upheld the masculine virtues of truth, courage, soldierly obedience, self-respect; for those of woman it had no blessing, no recognition. And its works have been according to its faith. It has taken, it is every day taking, villages of low caste Hindoos and debased negroes, and lifting them to their feet, bidding them to know themselves the equals of the greatest on earth, and to look their fellow men in the face. And for the same reason its foot has been on the neck of woman, crushing her down from the place of free equality where the Prophet found her, as the mistress of a free Arab home, to the place she now fills in every Moslem country, as the slave, the plaything of man. Mohamred never taught that women have no souls; but he might as well have done so, as proclaim a creed which presents no object to her affections, and puts no honor upon her virtues. The mystical reaction against his creed shows by its intensity, how utterly masculine it was. Soofeeism is mysticism of the extreme type. It arose in the very first century of the Hejira, and among its earliest saints the woman Rabia holds the chiefest place, as the sublimest instance of its gospel of resignation and submission. To her, Allah was not king and sovereign, but lover, and as such she addressed Him in her prayers; by the paths of mystic self-denial, mortification and annihilation, she had entered into the union of her being to that of God; and the narratives of her life represent her as the center of the great Soofees of her time, inciting their devotion and reproving their lack of faith.* But it was in the following ages that Soofeeism flourished the most, when the crude theocratic optimism of Islam became no longer credible to men, during the dissolution of the Caliphate, and the expiration of the great hopes of the conquest of the world. It was then that princes and generals abandoned the world, to adopt the life of voluntary mortification, to put on the wool (*soof*), and to become monks after the model of Christendom or of Buddhism, in spite of the Prophet's express prohibitions. Hence the vast outgrowth of Dervish orders, anchoritism, and all the paraphernalia

* See Tholuck's *Soufismus sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica*. (Berlin, 1821.) pp. 50-54.

an exuberant monasticism. It seems not unlikely that just the Caliphate was broken up by the reëmergence of old lines national division and the reawakening of national feeling, so too Soofeeism was not without historical relation to the mystical elements in the religions which Islam was supposed to supersede. It seems to have flourished best on the ground previously occupied by Zoroastrianism and Magianism. Inside Christendom reactions of this same sort have repeatedly occurred, but never with such violence. Christianity itself being utterly free from all onesidedness, and complete in its recognition of every aspect and power of man's nature, every ignored or depressed interest can rightfully appeal to the original norm as given in the life and teachings of the Master. In these teachings and in that life, the feminine virtues are exalted to an honor which they never before received. The beatitudes are a series of blessings pronounced upon man's condition; and the revelation of God as the Friend, the Comforter, the Father, and the Helper to whom man can have the freest and most immediate access, is given in all its fullness. The Christian system presents the Truth not in an abstract form, as a system, but concretely as a person, a living object of trust and faith, to which the heart of woman, and the heart of womanliness in every complete man, can alike cling. Christianity is as manly as it is womanly. It does not set aside the social and civic virtues; it enjoins truth and courage and all the manly excellencies with the largest emphasis in its teaching. It declares that God is King as well as Father, and that to consecrate all public and private relations alike as part of the order of His Kingdom is one purpose of the Incarnation. But the treasure is put into earthen vessels,—very earthen vessels sometimes. And therefore the Christianity of different periods in the Church's history may be but partial and onesided, as provoking reaction and antagonism. The church has had her periods of dry, arid dogmatism, in which a masculine intellectualism has prevailed in the elaboration and the defence of systems of theology. She has had periods of rigid hierarchy, in which the soul was shut out from the light of God's countenance by the shadow of pope and priesthood. Such were the middle ages of Europe, when dogmatism and hierarchy were in

close alliance, and provoked a wide-spread reaction in mediæval mysticism. All classes shared more or less in the reaction. Doctors like Richard of St. Victor and Gerson taught mysticism in the schools; preachers like Eckhart, Tauler and Suso proclaimed it in the pulpit; devout laymen like Nicolas of Basel, Rulmin Merswen and the author of the *Theologie Deutsche* spread it by voice and pen among the people. Very significant is the name by which the German mystics distinguished themselves from the mass of less enlightened Christians; they called themselves the "Friends of God" to mark the fact that they had discovered in God something more loveable and intimate than was known to those who knew him only as a king. But besides these more sober mystics, there were some who rushed to wild extremes of fanaticism, "Brethren and Sisters of the Free Spirit" who denied the very basis of common morality, and held all acts alike sinless in the illuminated. These deniers of the kingship and the kingdom of God had their parallel among the Soofees of the school of Bustami, and afterwards among the English Ranters.

The Puritan period of English Church history is one whose nobleness and fruitfulness in great principles have been coming into ever clearer recognition, since Mr. Carlyle's *Cromwell* opened up the way for a fairer estimate of the men and the measures of that time. To Mr. Carlyle and many others, the thorough masculinity of the Puritans is clearly the most admirable thing about them. They were manly men,—men of the soldierly temper, true as steel, courageous with a courage not of earth. And their Christianity was masculine. It was intellectual, to a degree. Their Bible was not merely studied, but intellectually appropriated; its teachings took shape in their minds as a connected and logical system of doctrine, in which every conception was clear, sharply cut, well defined. They had unflinching faith in their own capacity to thus connect and harmonize the sum of scriptural teaching. Furthermore their Christianity was theocratic. An actual real kingship of Christ over the nations was the watchword of the Scottish Covenant, with which the great uprising against the Stuarts began. The Puritans of all classes responded to that proclamation. It was embraced by those who quarrelled with the Scotch and put

em down at Dunbar and Worcester, even more than by those who sided with them in upholding the Presbyterian theory of Church Government. It found utterance in Cromwell's speeches and proclamations; it was caricatured in the beliefs of the Fifth Monarchy Men. In both its intellectual and its theocratic aspects Puritanism was masculine, even onesidedly masculine. It had more faith in the Kingship than in the Fatherhood and in the Friendship of God. It was not, with all its nobleness, a reproduction of the Christianity of the Gospels in the full, rounded completeness of Christian truth. It did but slight justice to the needs of more feminine natures, and to the glory of the feminine virtues.

It was therefore to be expected that both within Puritanism and alongside of it, a reaction in the direction of mysticism would take place. And when we come to look more closely at the literature of the period, we find that this was decidedly the case. In manifold forms, and in various circles, we find genuine mysticism, akin to that of Rabia, Tauler and Böhme, while bearing also the impress of its own age. It was heard in Puritan pulpits, even those of the chaplains of the army and of the Protector. It taught in the universities; it permeated the lives of statesmen and the lives of cobblers. It set healthy citizens at the work of translating into English the profoundest writings of this sort known on the Continent; it invited others of them in the practical attempt to realize the mystic's ideal of a true church—the fellowship of an elect and holy seed. It blended with the thinking of the calmest and best minds of the age; and it was mixed with the crude notions of the age's coarsest fanatics. It was in the minority of days, but it was everywhere. Its adherents were more by sight than by count. At every step, if we look for them, we find the representatives of the tendency.*

The theology of the Puritans—I would not be understood to deny—in general abounded in practical and devout teaching, and they insisted on the living truths of Christianity. St. Theresa's last English biographer can find nothing in English literature so like the Spanish mystic, as are some parts of the *Life's Rest*. Gottfried Arnold in his *Historia et Descriptio Theologiae Mysticae* (2) enumerates among English mystical writers John Abernethy, Richard Baxter, Paul Bayne, Robert Bolton, John Bunyan, John Cotton, Daniel and William Dyke, John Downname, John Everard, John Fox, Thomas Godwin,

The best known group are of course the Cambridge Platonists, who were also the forerunners of the Latitudinarian party. As this indicates, the mysticism of some of them was but one of the several reactionary elements of their creed; with John Hales of Eton, they had "bid good-night to John Calvin," and that they were "great readers of Grotius and Episcopus," a contemporary tells us. But while they possessed certain common characteristics, they exhibit great individuality and marked differences in their views. They were often very unlike each other, but always still more unlike their times. They were all great admirers of Plato, or rather of Plotinus; all the later and younger members of the group shared in an admiration of the new philosophy of Monsieur Des Cartes. And in nearly all there was a certain rationalizing element, an assertion of the greater importance of practice as compared with principles, which accounts to us for the fact that "they begot a race of moralizers whom we have learnt to look back upon as respectable and instructive, but unable to do any great work for the renovation of human society or the discovery of truth."*

At the head of the Cambridge School we believe must be placed a man whose name is never mentioned in connection with them by the historians of philosophy or of theology, whom indeed Mr. Maurice contrasts with them. A contemporary authority, quoted in Brook's *History of the Puritans*, says that Peter Sterry and "one Sadtler were the first who were observed to make a public profession of Platonism in the University" of Cambridge. And when we compare the evidence of speculative power and of original thought presented in his works, with that of his associates, we see no reason to doubt that here we have the true master of the Cambridge Platonists. A graduate of that "Puritan foundation," Emmanuel College, to which they

James Guthrie, Bp. Joseph Hall, John Haywood, William Perkins, Nicholas Rogers, Francis Rous, Thomas Shephard, Richard Sibbes, Emmanuel Sonthomb, Thos. Taylor, Arthur Warwick, — Whalley, Thos. Walter, and Robert Wilkinson. But there is a vast difference between most of these (concerning Everard and Rous *vide infra*) and the mystical writers. Sonthomb's *Golden Key* had a great circulation in German, having been printed as late as 1746; it, together with the German translation of Bp. Lewis Bailey's *Practice of Piety*, made a great impression on Spener the founder of the Pietists, when still a lad.

* Maurice, *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, ii, 350.

all belonged, he first became the chaplain of (the second) Brooke, who was killed at the siege of Litchfield Castle in 1645. Then and afterwards he was known as the friend of Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell and his circle, with whom he sat in the little group of Independents in the Westminster Assembly. Seven times he stood before the Long Parliament, and in one of these sermons he eulogized the Roman Catholic Church as in this better than the Presbyterian Kirk because "they give a large scope to the understanding and the affections in serious contemplations, in mystical divinity." He became a member of the Council of State, and then to the Lord Protector's Council, and in 1654 was appointed one of the Commissioners for Approbation of Public Preachers. At the Restoration he of course retired to private life, preaching, and died in 1672, to a conventicle of men like-minded with himself. The substance of his preaching we have in two famous works, *A Discourse of the Freedom of the Will* (1675), and *The Rise, Race and Royalty of the Kingdom of God in the World* (1683). It would carry us too far were we to attempt to trace his life more closely, or to analyze his works. Only we will note, that wherever we can discern his influence in the work it is fruitful in the dissemination of mystical views in the minds of men. With his college friends, with Lord Brooke, with Cromwell and his circle, his fellow-chaplains under the Protector and even Cromwell himself, and lastly the little group of men that gathered around him in later years, he seems to have held the same commanding position of teacher and master, and we can everywhere trace his fertilizing influence in the thoughts of other minds. As regards his works, Prof. Maurice Storry is "one of those men, into whose writings few look without carrying away some impressions which would be very sorry to lose. Dwelling in the midst of civil war, full of all the highest aspirations which that war kindled, not surpassed by other Independents in his dislike of monarchy and hierarchy which he supposed had shut out the perfect monarchy and hierarchy from the vision of the enlightened men, he was led to a different conception of the natural world and of the kingdom of darkness from that which had those champions of the commonwealth who regarded

themselves as the saints of God and all besides as His enemies. A struggle of essential light with outer darkness, of original good with evil in its first motions, sometimes overwhelmed, sometimes elevated, his spirit. The reader may be utterly lost in the wealth of Sterry's thoughts and imaginations; he will seldom have to complain of poverty or barrenness . . . Sterry is little read in the nineteenth century; but a better knowledge of him would often throw light upon the works of his contemporaries, and would enable us to prize them more."*

Two of the Cambridge School died in their youth, and both in the year 1652, but not until both had left behind them evidences of extraordinary gifts. John Smith was in his thirty-fourth year, and was already famed as a preacher before both academic and less learned audiences. Coleridge pronounces him an "enlightened and able divine." His *Select Discourses*, edited by his friend Dr. Worthington, though but ten in number, fill nearly five hundred quarto pages, and their merits are attested by their frequent republication, as well as by the praise bestowed upon them by Chalmers and others. He was a thorough Platonist; he quotes the sayings of that and of some other Greek philosophers as if he were quoting scripture. His friends seem to intimate that in political matters he had as little sympathy with Puritanism as in theology, which was little enough. "To seek our Divinity (he says) merely in books and writings, is to 'seek the living among the dead:' we do but in vain seek God in these, where His truth too often is not so much *enshrined* as *entombed*: no; *intra te quære Deum*, seek for God within thine own soul: He is best discerned *νοεργᾷ ἐπαφῇ* as Plotinus phraseth it, by an intellectual touch of Him." He rebels, as the Protestant mystics of all sorts have rebelled, against the theological notion of imputed righteousness, declaring that the righteousness which is by faith "is in its own nature a vital and spiritual administration, wherein God converseth with man." For he asserts "That the divine judgment and estimation of everything is according to the truth of the thing; and God's acceptance or disacceptance of

* Maurice, *ubi supra*, pp. 250-1. Cf. Hare's *Memorial of a Quiet Life*, ii, § 6 and 182. I have in preparation a paper devoted to Sterry's life, and his *magnum opus*, the treatise on the Will.

ings is suitable to His judgment," and that "God's justifying sinners, in pardoning their sins, carries in it a necessary inference to the sanctifying of their natures."*

Only three years older than Smith, was Nathaniel Culverwell, scion of a family which produced many Puritan divines. His *Discourse of the Light of Nature* is far more readable than Smith's *Discourses*; it is "a book instinct with literary life," and very unjustly neglected. It bristles at times with Greek, Latin, and Hebrew quotations, for the range of his reading is something wonderful. He has dwelt much with Aquinas and the other scholastics, as one might have conjectured from the disciplined minuteness of his intellect. But his authorities are not authorities masters; they are friends and helpers of his wit. He bears a load of learning easily and gracefully, and exhibits a literary power and vivacity to which Smith is a stranger. His theme is the saying of Solomon, "The understanding of a man is like the candle of the Lord," and his object is to show that the light of nature is indeed a diminutive light,—a candle and not the sun—yet a divine, directive, elevating light, by which to bring men back to the Fountain of all light.†

Smith's tutor, Benjamin Whitecote, (1609–1683) might be regarded as in some sense the central figure of the Cambridge group, so fully does he combine and represent all its tendencies.

* *Select Discourses*, treating, 1. Of the true Way or Method of attaining to true Knowledge. 2. Of Superstition. 3. Of Atheism. 4. Of the Immortality of the Soul. 5. Of the Existence and Nature of God. 6. Of Prophecy. 7. Of the Difference between the Legal and the Evangelical Righteousness, the Old and New Covenant, etc. 8. Of the Shortness and Vanity of a Pharisaick Righteousness. 9. Of the Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion. 10. Of a Christian's Conflicts with, and Conquests over, Satan. By John Smith, late Fellow of Queen's College in Cambridge. Also a Sermon preached by Simon Trick, (then Fellow of the same College), at the Author's Funeral: with a brief account of his Life and Death. London, 1660. Reprinted Cambridge, 1673; Edinburgh, 1756; London, 1823; and Cambridge, 1859. The sixth discourse translated into Latin by Le Clerc.

† *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, with several other Treatises*, by Nathaniel Culverwell, Master of Arts, and lately Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. London, 1652, 1654, and 1661, and Oxford, 1669. Berwick, 17. The last edition omits the "other Treatises," (five sermons and a treatise on Spiritual Optics, first published 1651), and is edited by Dr. John Brown, father of the author of *Leisure Hours*, with a Critical Essay by Rev. John Cairns. There are copious extracts from Culverwell and Smith in Mrs. Lowell's *Seed Grain*.

He has been called, and not inaptly, the Frederick W. Robertson of the seventeenth century. His political sympathies seemed to have leaned towards the Royalist side, but he was not a vehement partizan. He received ordination from Laud's enemy, Bishop Williams; he was selected as the Provost of King's College in the Puritan reorganization of Cambridge in 1643. and though he hesitated for a time, he finally accepted, but with the good will of his ejected predecessor. He was removed at the Restoration, but conformed, and became a preacher in London, where he spent the close of his life. He has left us three volumes of Sermons, of unusual quality, and a collection of twelve hundred aphorisms. These latter are most instructive reading; a double strain of thought and feeling runs through them, showing us the Platonist with his faith in the eternal "rule of right" and immutable morality on the one hand, and the moralizing Latitudinarian with his dread of zeal, his passion for moderation, on the other. "If you will be religious," he says, "be rational in your religion." More instructive still is the controversial correspondence between Whitcote and Anthony Tuckney, Master of Emmanuel College, bound up with these *Aphorisms* in the edition of 1753. It is a correspondence which does credit to both the men, and its interest lies in this, that the exceptions taken by Tuckney to Whitcote's sermons bring the two tendencies then at work in theology to direct and plain speech with each other. One passage will give the points made on the Puritan side. Tuckney refers to his correspondent's earlier years at Emmanuel: "Whilst you were fellow here, you were cast into the company of very learned and ingenious men, who, I fear, at least some of them, studied other authors more than the Scriptures, and Plato and his scholars above others." "And hence in part hath run a vein of doctrine, which divers very able and worthy men, whom from my heart I much honor, are, I fear, too much known by.—The power of nature in morals too much advanced.—Reason hath too much given to it in the mysteries of Faith.—A *recta ratio* much talkt of, which I cannot tell where to find.—Mind and understanding is all; heart and will little spoken of.—The decrees of God questioned and quarrelled, because according to our reason we cannot comprehend how they may

stand with His goodness, which, according to your phrase, He is under the power of.—Those our philosophers, and other heathen, made fairer candidates for heaven than the scriptures seem to allow of, and they, in their virtues preferred before Christians overtaken with weaknesses.—A kind of moral divinity minted, with only a little tincture of Christ added; nay, a Platonic faith unites to God.—Inherent righteousness so preached as, if not with the prejudice of imputed righteousness, which hath sometimes very unseemly language given it, yet much said of the one and very little or nothing of the other. This was not Paul's manner of preaching.—This inherent righteousness may be perfect in this life.—An estate of love in this life, above a life of faith.—And some broad expressions as though, in this life, we may be above ordinances;—with diverse other principles of religion by some very doubtfully spoken of." The Puritan knew how to strike for the openings in the joints of the armor, and time has justified many of his censures.

Dr. John Worthington (ob. 1671) a pupil of Whitecote's, and the editor of Smith's *Discourses*, was known to us till quite recently only by a number of ascetical treatises, such as that on the *Duty of Resignation*, frequently reprinted and even translated into German. His recently discovered *Diary and Correspondence* have given him a new claim on the attention of students, as they are said to cast great light on the literary history of the times. Burnet reckons him among the Latitudinarians. Although a Cambridge man, he was made Master of Jesus College in Oxford, when Cromwell removed the old heads of houses for their Royalism. Yet he seems to have been much of his master Whitecote's mind in politics.

Ralph Cudworth (1617–88), another of the six masters of colleges chosen from the fellows of Emmanuel in 1643, is known to all the learned world by his huge and candid refutation of Atheism and Hobbsism, *The Intellectual System of the Universe*, whose Latin translation by Mosheim is said to be much more readable than the English original. He dealt so fairly with his opponents, that he was suspected of a secret agreement with them, and he has also been accused of Arianism. His sermon on the Lord's Supper, and his treatise on *Immutable Morality*, are better reading, and the latter especially

exhibits his reverence for Plato and his acquaintance with him at first hand. It was first edited by Bishop Chandler in 1731, and others of his works are still in manuscript. From the allusions Mr. Emerson makes to Cudworth, it would seem that the American philosopher has learnt much from the Englishman.

Three Cambridge men, master and scholars, are distinguishable from the other Cambridge Platonists by the fact that they were not students of Emmanuel College. They are Drs. Robert Gell, Henry More, and George Rust, all of Christ's College, where John Milton also studied. Gell and More were decided Royalists, and both were students of the Cabbala. Dr. Gell (ob. 1665) was one of the most successful of the tutors of his time, but left the college to become rector of Alder-Mary Church in London, where he preached through the Commonwealth times. He published an *Essay toward the Amendment of the last English Translation of the Bible* (1650), and after his death appeared in two folio volumes his *Remains: or Several Select Scriptures of the New Testament Opened and Explained*, being in fact his notes of his Cambridge and London sermons. Gell was a stout Perfectionist, for which reason his *Remains* was a favorite book of John Wesley's, and it is said that Charles Wesley got from it the suggestion of several of his hymns. "His works," says Orme, "are a curious mass of learned, occasionally original, interpretation of the Scriptures, and mystical speculation, often of a very peculiar character." Both his books were translated (in an abridged form) into German by R. Bacon, and published at Berleburg in 1723. They were used afterwards in the preparation of the famous mystical translation and commentary, known as the Berleburg Bible (1728-1741).

Henry More (1614-1687) is the best known of all the Cambridge Platonists. He was more properly a Neoplatonist and a Cabbalist, besides being a student of Des Cartes and the Arminians; but he was also a disciple of "that golden little book, with which Luther is also said to have been wonderfully taken, viz: *Theologia Germanica*." He says there was none of his "Platonick writers," nor any of "the mystical divines," that "to speak the truth so pierced and affected me." His singularly amiable character, his great personal excellence, and

is many gifts, have won him the friendly regard of later generations as well as of his own. Few writers of his time wrote so much that is worth preserving; none managed to bury it under such a heap of rubbish. He enjoyed a European reputation. His Cabbalistic studies brought him into friendly relations with Knorr von Rosenoth, the German master of such studies, and at the request of continental friends he wrote in Latin, an *Estimate of the Philosophy of Böhme*, in which he shows some acquaintance with the theosopher's writings and a disposition to treat him fairly.

Gell's other pupil, George Rust (ob. 1670), Bishop of Drogheda in Ireland after the Restoration, was a Platonist and also Universalist, as may be seen from his *Letter of Resolution concerning Origen and the Chief of his Opinions* (1661 and 1707) and his *Discourse of Truth* (1682).

This closes our list of the Cambridge Platonists. There are, indeed, a few others, of whom we know only the names. Such are the "one Sadtler" mentioned as Sterry's Platonic colleague—possibly the Mr. John Sadler "well known and beloved of" Dr. Gell, who helped to edit Gell's *Remaines*; the William Dillingham, who edited Culverwell's *Light of Nature*, and succeeded Dr. Tuckney as Master of Emmanuel College; and Lazarus Seaman, dear to Bibliomaniacs as the owner of the first library of which we possess a printed auction catalogue. There is also a group of Oxford scholars who are frequently associated with the Platonists of Cambridge, such as Dr. Thos. Jackson (ob. 1640), the elder Dr. S. Parker, Bishop of Oxford (ob. 1687), Bishop John Wilkins (ob. 1672), Theophilus Gale (ob. 1677), Joseph Glanville (ob. 1680), and John Norris of Emerton (ob. 1711). But they all belong to the Restoration period except the first, whom Coleridge classes as a Platonist, what grounds we cannot say.

Somewhat akin to the Cambridge men, was the group which takes the name of Vanists from the younger Sir Harry Vane. They were all united in the love of religious liberty, and in a certain practical mysticism, which starts from the same premises as the ordinary Puritan theology, but reaches very different results. One might say that from Puritans they came mystics by merely changing the doctrinal perspective,

and making that chief which had been subordinate, and *vice versa*. Such doctrines as that of the mystical union, spiritual communion and illumination, inward sanctification by the mortification of the old man and renewal in Christ, they put into the first place.

Robert Greville, second Lord Brooke, already mentioned as Sterry's patron, was one of Vane's disciples. An ardent champion of English liberty, he had at one time fully determined to embark for America with his friend Lord Say; and the town of Saybrook recalls both their friendship and their purpose. He was one of the three whom Baxter in the earlier editions of the *Saint's Rest* mentioned as men whom he would rejoice to know again in heaven. Elsewhere Baxter says Brooke "was slain before" Vane "had brought him to maturity." His *Discourse of Truth* (1641) is of such a tenor that Mr. Hunt in his valuable *History of Religious Thought in England*, classes him as "a Platonical or Mystical Christian," and says of Sterry, that "he was of the same mystical spirit as Lord Brooke." John Wallis, Secretary of the Westminster Assembly, afterwards founder of the Royal Society, wrote an answer to it. Wallis was one of Whitcote's pupils; he was at this time a zealous Presbyterian, but conformed at the Restoration and became Professor of Geometry at Oxford.

Vane himself is the best known, through his connection with the political history of the times. The part he played in American history is too well known to need repetition. "He had not been long in New England before he ripened into more knowledge and experience of Christ than the churches there could bear the testimony of. Even New England could not bear all his words, though there was no 'king's court or king's chapel,'" says George Sikes, his mystical biographer. His mysticism has been a great stumbling block to his eulogists and his biographers. Hume pronounces his religious writings "absolutely unintelligible. No traces of eloquence or even of common sense appear in them." Mackintosh and Foster would fain see everything excellent in so staunch a champion of liberty of conscience, but they are quite unable "to place him," and are obliged to confine their praises of him to the one point we have mentioned. Even Prof. Maurice classes

him—hesitatingly—with the Millenarians, though he sees in his writings “deep principles and remarkable distinctions.” How he fared with his contemporaries may be imagined. Clarendon says, “Vane was a man not to be described by any character of religion, in which he had swallowed some of the extravagances of every sect and faction, and was become (what cannot be expressed by any other language than was peculiar to that time) *a man above ordinances*, unlimited and unrestrained by any rules or bounds prescribed to other men, by reason of his perfection. He was a perfect enthusiast, and, without doubt, did believe himself inspired, which so far corrupted his reason and understanding (which, in all matters without the verge of religion, was inferior to that of few men) that he did at some time believe that he was the person deputed to reign over the saints on earth for a thousand years.” The fact being that Vane looked for no such external millenium or reign of the saints. Elsewhere Clarendon detects a close resemblance of the style of one of his books to that of Father Augustin Baker’s *Sancta Sophia*—a Catholic mystical work—but seeing that “in a crowd of easy words the sense was very hard to find out, I was of the opinion that the subject matter of it was of so delicate a nature that it required another kind of preparation of mind, and it may be another kind of diet, than men are ordinarily supplied with.” Burnet calls Vane and his friends “Seekers,” thus confounding them with a very different set of persons, and misleading many subsequent writers. He says of him: “Though he had set up a form of religion of his own, yet it consisted rather in a withdrawing from all other forms than in any new or particular opinions and forms. In the meetings of his friends “he preached and prayed often himself, but with so peculiar a darkness, that though I have sometimes taken pains to see if I could find out his meaning in his works, yet I could never reach it.” But Baxter is worse than either Clarendon or Burnet: “His unhappiness lay in this, that his doctrines were so cloudily expressed that few could understand them, and therefore he had but few true disciples. The Lord Brooke was slain before he had brought him to maturity. Mr. Sterry was thought to be of his mind, as he was his intimate friend; but was so famous for obscurity in preaching, being,

as Sir Benjamin Rudyard said, 'too high for this world and too low for the other,' that he thereby proved almost barren also; and *vanity* and *sterility* were never more happily conjoined. Mr. Sprigge is the chief of his more open disciples, and too well known by a book of his sermons. This obscurity was imputed by some to his not understanding himself; but by others to design, because he could speak plainly when he listed."

Vane's writings which were found so obscure by his contemporaries, contain nothing especially puzzling to those who are acquainted with writers of his class, and who are therefore aware of the unusual and profounder sense which the mystics are accustomed to ascribe to very common words, such as *principle, opening, forms*. The influence of Sterry seems to us everywhere palpable in them, and they certainly rise at times to a very lofty and impassioned eloquence. He differs from the Platonists, as do his friends generally, in being far more practical and less speculative, and in showing more Hebraic earnestness. As to his ecclesiastical position, he—like Milton—did not feel at liberty to unite in communion with any of the outward fellowships of his time, regarding as he did even the Reformed Churches as under a cloud of darkness. But he looked for the breaking of that cloud to the fuller disclosure of Christ, and the "speedy and sudden revival of his cause and spreading his kingdom over the face of the whole earth." For the present he fell back upon the patriarchal form of religion, worshiping God with his household; but in his dying advice to his children he recommended them to conform to the religious usages and worship of the community they lived in, in so far as conscience permitted. He looked for no miraculous transformation of Church and State, no fifth monarchy.*

Henry Stubbe (1631-1676) was a *protégé* of Vane's and wrote a defence of him against some aspersions of Baxter's in 1659. But at the Restoration he conformed, and afterwards came forward as the champion of Aristotle against the Royal

* Of his many works, the best worth reading seems to be *The Retired Man's Meditations, or the Mysterie and Power of Godliness shining forth in the Living Word, to the Unmasking the Mysterie of Iniquity in the most Refined and Purest Form* 1655.

society. He practiced medicine, and was drowned on his way home from visiting a patient. His Vanism was never more than skin deep, seemingly.

A more ardent disciple was George Sikes, who wrote *The Life and Death of Sir Harry Vane, Kt.** Vane's modern biographers have very different opinions of its worth. Mr. Forster thinks it "a very singular and valuable book," while Mr. Jpham calls it "a mere rhapsody by a religious enthusiast." Singular enough it certainly is, being much more occupied with a rehearsal and vindication of Vane's views, than a narrative of his life. There is a pound of mystical theology to every ounce of biography in it. And it is notable that the author censures the *Theologia Germanica* for its pantheistic tendency. In this work first appeared Milton's sonnet to Vane, which was written on Vane's return to public life after his retirement consequent on the execution of the king.

"The chief of his more open disciples," Joshua Sprigge (1616-1684), is the author of the well known *Anglia Rediviva, being the History of the Motions, Actions, and Successes of the Army under the Conduct of Sir Thomas Fairfax* (1647). Two years later he published a volume of sermons, *Testimony to an Approaching Glory*, described by Mr. Orme as "somewhat mystical, but creditable both to the talents and the piety of their author." Of earlier date is his rare and curious pamphlet (privately printed in only a hundred copies), *Some Weighty Considerations humbly submitted to Members of the High Court of Justice*, 1648. He pleads for the King's life, but premises, "I do acknowledge you to have cognizance of this Cause, and to have the right of deciding it, if that the Lord do set up Himself in you and bring forth Himself in and by your Judgment; that is, if you are able to search into and lay open the Root of all our Evils." But proceeds to plead that this Root is not Charles Stuart, but the "hiding" the unseen King by the Babylon in Men's hearts and consciences. But a Royalist

* The full title is worth quoting: *The Life and Death of Sir Harry Vane, Kt., or Short Narrative of the main Passages of his Earthly Pilgrimage; together with a true Account of his Christian, Peaceable, Spiritual, Gospel-Principles, Doctrine, Life & Way of Worshipping God, for which he suffered Contradiction from all Sorts of Men and at last a violent Death*; 1662. Sikes also wrote *The Book of Nature, translated and Epitomized*, 1667, which I have not seen.

pamphleteer says that Sprigge preached at Whitehall on the Fastday kept on the day after that on which the King's trial began, from the text "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."

Along with Sprigge may be mentioned three other army chaplains of similar principles, William Dell, John Saltmarsh, and John Webster.

William Dell (ob. 1697) was a Cambridge man and at one time a Fellow of Emmanuel College, but he had studied at Gains College, of which he was appointed Master, in 1643. He was one of the five appointed to give Charles I. spiritual aid after his sentence. Although a chaplain in Fairfax's army, and apparently also in Cromwell's household, he gradually approximated to the views of the Quakers, especially as regards baptism with water and the requirement of a university degree for admission to the ministry, and the general influence of studies not explicitly Christian in their character. His works, or a selection from them, have been repeatedly printed by the Friends in England and America. They exhibit an acquaintance with Luther's Latin writings not usual with English theologians.

John Saltmarsh was one of those natures which have an innate tendency to extreme views on every subject. Before the outbreak of the war, he was a zealous Conformist, but when he espoused the popular cause, he at once swung to the other extreme. He was charged with Antinomianism and the charge is now all that is remembered about him; but the Antinomians disclaimed him, as one too unsettled in opinions and too ready to catch at novelties. In Fairfax's army, "Saltmarsh and Dell were the two great preachers at the headquarters," chaplain Baxter says. Saltmarsh published a great number of pamphlets, many of them against the scheme of Presbyterian government devised by the Assembly and favored by the Parliament. He died in December, 1647, and one of his last acts was a solemn and public protest, in the prospect of death, against the sinful compliances and negotiations with the king. This protest must have shortly preceded the famous Conference, held just before Christmas of that year, in which the officers and the representatives of the soldiers, after prolonged prayer and fasting, reached "a very clear and joint resolution on many grounds at large

debated among us, that it was our duty, if ever the Lord
ht us back again in peace, to call Charles Stuart, that man
od, to an account for that blood he had shed and mischief
d done to his utmost against the Lord's cause and people
ese poor nations." Saltmarsh's best known book is his
*les of Glory, or some Beams of the Morning Star, wherein
any Discoveries as to Truth and Peace, to the establishment
ure enlargement of a Christian in Spirit and Truth* (1645 ;
lished 1847). Dr. Stoughton (*Eccles. Hist. of England*, iv,
) claims that its author is the Puritan mystic, more
y of the name than even Sterry.

in Webster has left us several books. He came up to
on to preach after leaving the army, and excited some op-
on by the manner and the substance of his sermons. His
's Guide, or Christ the Rule and Ruler of Saints (1653), pro-
d a reply, to which he responded in his volume of sermons,
*'udgment set and the books opened, and all Religion brought
xl* (1654, republished 1835). His sermons are vigorous
eighty, Puritan in tone of severity and earnestness, but
where divergent from the Puritan type of doctrine, and
gent in the same direction as Vane and Sterry. He was
nbridge man, but of what college I cannot say. He and
am Erbery the Seeker held a public disputation in Lon-
n 1653, anent the maintenance of the universities and the
nal clergy; and in the following year he published an
ination of the Universities, which provoked replies from
Ward and John Wilkins, afterward Bishops, then Presby-
ns. At the Restoration he withdrew from the ministry to
ice medicine, and wrote one of the first English works
st a mischievous superstition, *The Displaying of supposed
hcraft*, folio, 1677. This "admirable treatise" as Coleridge
it, is not even noticed or mentioned by any writer on the
side. It was translated into German.

ebster's sermons are commended "to the reader" by John
ell, Joshua Sprigge, R. Bacon, and Thomas Somerton, who
their entire agreement with the author. Sprigge has al-
y been spoken of; of Somerton I can learn nothing, nor do
ow who R. Bacon is, unless it be the "R. B." who in 1678,
d Dr. Gill's *Remaines*, and the "R. Bacon" who made the

abridged German translation of them. John Cardell is still known to us by three volumes of *Sermons* (1647, 1649, 1650), and by his very explicit and emphatic commendation of Dr. Everhard's *Gospel Treasury* (*vide infra*).

Distinct from the Vanists stand the Seekers, of whom William Erbery is the representative and leader. "These taught," says Baxter, "that our scripture was uncertain; that present miracles are necessary to faith; that our ministry is null and void, and without authority, and our worship or ordinances unnecessary or vain; the true Church, ministry, scripture, and ordinances being lost, for which they are now seeking. . . . They closed with the Vanists, and sheltered themselves under them, as if they had been the very same." Penn (in his "Preface" to Fox's *Journal*) confounds them with the "Family of Love," and says that "as they came to the knowledge of one another, they sometimes met together, not formally to pray or preach, at appointed times or places according to their own wills, as in times past they were accustomed to do; but waited in silence, and as anything rose in any one of their minds that they thought savored of a divine spring, so they sometimes spoke." And he derives the sect of the Ranters from such of these Seekers as "ran out into their own imaginations." They looked for a complete transformation or re-creation of the church, to be ushered in by the revival of the miraculous gifts of the primitive church, and heralded by inspired Apostles. One might call them Irvingites born out of due time; but the same excited expectations have reappeared again and again in Church history. They watched the discomfiture of sect after sect with increasing confidence; "Popery is fallen" says Erbery in his *Children of the West*, "Prelacy is fallen, Presbytery and Independency are fallen likewise; nothing stands now but the last of Anabaptism, and that is falling too. Thus they are all fallen to those who already stand in God alone, who see God in spirit; and to spiritual Saints in this nation the Churches are nothing." He gives us his estimate of the Vanists when he speaks of Sterry as one of those "who had the knowledge of Christ in the spirit, and held forth Christ in the spirit. These men are nearest to Zion, yet they come not into it. For as every prophet shall one day be ashamed of his prophecy,—yea, proph-

itself shall fail,—so is it manifest that these men are of a
 k and deeper speech than can easily be understood ; there-
 e it is not Zion."

The Seekers have but slight claims to be classed as mystics ;
 have mentioned them here not only to distinguish them
 m Vane's friends, but also to point out their relation to
 other group of which they were the forerunners, and into
 ich they were for the most part absorbed. About 1650, at
 rate not much earlier,* George Fox and the first Quakers
 an to attract attention by their proclamation that it had
 ased God to call out of the dispersion of an unchristian
 istendom and into the fellowship of His Spirit, a true
 urch, a Society of Friends. Fox and the first generation of
 Friends were mystics to a man. Some of them, like
 lliam Bayley, had been of the Böhmenist sect, which had
 a sprung up in England (*vide infra*) ; Robert Cobbett made
 contrary change. That Fox himself had plowed with
 me's heifer is evident from many expressions of his *Jour-*

"I saw," he says, "that there was an ocean of darkness
 death ; but an infinite ocean of light and love, which
 ved over the ocean of darkness. In that also I saw the
 nite love of God, and I had great openings." Here we have
 me's victory of the light principle over the dark principle.

Fox, in his "Narrative of the Spreading of Truth and of the Opposition
 eto," written in 1676, says: "The Truth sprang up first to us, so as to be a
 le to the Lord, in Leicestershire in 1644, in Warwickshire in 1645, in Not-
 hamshire in 1646, in Derbyshire in 1647, and in the adjacent counties in
 3, 1649, and 1650 ; in Yorkshire in 1651, in Lancashire and Westmoreland in
 2 ; in Cumberland, Durham, and Northumberland, in 1653 ; in London and
 t of the other parts of England, Scotland, and Ireland, in 1654. In 1655
 y went beyond sea, where truth also sprang up, and in 1656 it broke forth in
 erica and many other places." The earlier dates are probably correct, but
 r cannot be reconciled with those of his *Journal*, unless the Society of Friends
 ted before Fox joined it, which is quite possible. Fox says, under the year
 7, "during all this time I was never joined in profession of religion with any."
 beginning of his public ministry seems to have been at the great gathering of
 Baptists at Broughton in 1647. The earliest notice of the Friends I have
 is in a letter of news to Lord Clarendon under the date 1647 : "There are a
 t of women, lately come from foreign parts, and lodged in Southwark, called
 kers, who swell, shiver, and shake, and when they came to themselves they
 in to preach what hath been delivered to them by the Spirit."—(*State Papers*,
 383.)

"I saw into that which was without end, things which cannot be uttered, and of the greatness and infinitude of the love of God which cannot be expressed by words. For I had been brought through the very ocean of darkness and death, and through and over the power of Satan, by the eternal, glorious power of Christ; even through that darkness was I brought, which covered all the world, and which chained down all, and shut up all in death." "Now was I come up in spirit through the flaming sword into the paradise of God. All things were new; and the creation gave another smell unto me than before, beyond what words can utter. . . . The creation was opened to me; and it was showed me how all things had their names given them, according to their nature and virtue." Here is Böhme's description of the process of regeneration, by which the soul is carried through "the first principle" with "its dark, fiery, astringent properties," represented by the cherub's flaming sword at Eden's gates, and into the paradise of light and joy, the second principle. And here too are Böhme's "signatures of things" and "speech of nature." As we know from Fox himself, he spent the years prior to 1647, when he began preaching, in an anxious search through all England, seeking to find any that could point out to him the way of life and peace. And during those years the Böhmenists were busy with press and voice spreading their theosopher's views.*

* These coincidences have been partly indicated in Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*. In Hancock's *Peculium*, the mystical as well as the High Church character of primitive Quakerism, the transformations it has since undergone, are well insisted upon. He also notes that Giles Calvert was publisher to both the Böhmenists and the first Quakers. I would not be understood to insinuate any plagiarism on Fox's part. He no more plagiarized from Böhme than from the Apostle John. He was a man of real spiritual power and insight, not a fanatic pretender, such as arose in great numbers at that time. Such were John Tany, King of the Seven Nations, sent forth to gather the Jews together; John Robins, alias Adam Melchizedek, who had met Abraham on the way, and the like.

But the top-sawyer of all such fanatics was Ludovick Muggleton, who with John Reeve founded the sect of the Muggletonians, which still exists and has even spread to America. My friend, Rev. B. W. Chidlaw, the zealous missionary of the Sunday School Union, once accosted a man who was unloading a wagon on the streets of Cincinnati, with: "Well, stranger, have'n't you some little boys and girls at home?" "Yes, I have." "You send them to Sunday school, I hope." "No, I don't; *Sunday schools are a sprout of free agency.*" "Ah! what

Besides these native types of mystical thought and devotion, there were three attempts making to transplant foreign types on English soil. The first was that of Dr. John Everard, Giles Randall, and John Deacon, to naturalize the mysticism of the mediæval "Friends of God" of the Rhine Valley. Dr. Everard was a Cambridge man, who graduated A.B. in 1600, and took prominent place as an extreme Puritan. He was imprisoned for seven times for preaching against the Spanish marriage, but at last King James, punning upon his name, said that instead of Everard he would make him Dr. Neverout. In his later years he underwent a very great change of views, so that he used to say "he was now 'ashamed of his former knowledge, expressions, and preachings, ever since he commenced Doctor of Divinity;" although he was known to be a very great scholar and as good a philosopher, few or none exceeding him: but when he came to know himself and his own heart, and also to know Jesus Christ and the Scriptures more than grammatically, literally, or academically, viz: experimentally, he then repented all these things loss and dung." His change of views fully gave Laud and his associates in the High Commission a new hold upon him. In a previous trial before that court he had been deprived of his benefice; he was now again called to account for holding conventicles and preaching heresies. His case was kept hanging from term to term without even the charges being formally presented, until the downfall of Laud and his associates gave him peace. But he died soon after in 1641. His hostility to the Prelates and their doings continued to the last; he foretold their overthrow when they were at the very zenith of their power. And when the Scotch Covenanters rose in 1638, he declared "the work was begun; and I do serve (saith he) by their countenances, their hearts fail; for

arch do you belong to?" "I'm a Muggletonian." Reeves and Muggleton are two apocalyptic witnesses, with power, which they freely used, to curse unto everlasting damnation all who gainsayed their testimony. Their testimony amounted to nothing in particular, except a materialistic and Sabellian notion of God, and the assertion of their own mission, and the opinion that the heavenly lies are no bigger than they seem. There was something sturdy, matter-of-fact, and British about their fanaticism, which brought them into repeated collision with both the Böhmenists and the Quakers. See Muggleton's *Acts of the Witnesses*, 1639 and 1764; and Hunt, i, 241-3.

I see very lead in their eyes." The character of his theology we know from his *Gospel Treasury*.^{*} His mysticism differs from that of the Cambridge Platonists in his greater emphasis on the natural inability of man, and the need of self-denial, mortification, and annihilation, that we may attain to "deiformity." The high ground which he took as regards the powerlessness and worthlessness of legal obedience and empty forms, attracted some who sought to be not only law-free but lawless. "Some of his acquaintance and following, who indeed were very knowing men, and pretended high things, as indeed they were, but abused by them to great licentiousness, making even these precious truths an occasion to the flesh; insomuch that he was constrained to threaten prosecution of them to punishment, for their vile words and actions, if they so persisted, after so often admonition; and he forbade their following or hearing of him, except they came with affection to the truth and willingness to be built up in the most holy faith." Of the more faithful friends, who accepted his teachings in the right spirit and in their entirety, we can catch but few glimpses. Rapha Harford was the editor of his sermons, and speaks as one who knew him most intimately. He tells us of "some religious lords," who interceded with Laud for permission for him to preach once a week in Latin *ad Clerum*, offering to pay a hundred pounds a year for any object the Archbishop might select, if this were granted. Some of his sermons were preached for Mr. Hodges, who had a lecture in the Old Jewry. As already said, John Webster and John Cardell commended the book from the pulpit, and in the strongest terms, but

^{*} *The Gospel Treasury* [or, in the first and fourth editions, *Some Gospel Treasures Opened, or the holiest of all Unvailing, discovering yet more the Riches of Grace and Glory to the Vessels of Mercy, . . . in several Sermons preached at Kensington and elsewhere.* London, 1653, 1659, and 1679; Germantown (Penn.), 1757. Dutch translation, Amsterdam, 1688. The second and third editions have appended to them translations from "Dionysius the Areopagite," John Tauler, John Denck the Anabaptist disciple of Tauler, A. Tenzel, and other mystics not named. The American is a reprint by Christopher Saur of the first edition, and is the handsomest. Anthony Benezet reprinted in 1773 (in a volume of religious tracts) Everard's "Supposition of Two Drops reasoning together," from one of the sermons, and it has been recently reprinted in England. Everard also translated *The Divine Poemander of Hermes Trismegistus*, London, 1650 and 1657; and it has been again reprinted in Boston in our own times.

either of them seem to have known him personally. More notable still is the "Approbation" signed by Thomas Brookes, the well known Puritan divine, which praises the sermons artfully and with a discrimination which shows that he had read them. "While some seek," says Brookes, "to build up themselves upon the deceitful foundation of corrupted nature, and struggle, though in vain, in the light and power of it, to advance toward perfection, he is planting his spiritual artillery against it, to throw it into the dust, that man may come to be truly bottomed upon the righteousness, power, and wisdom of Jesus Christ."

Dr. Everard's translation of the *Theologia Germanica* lies in manuscript in the Cambridge University Library. It would probably have been printed by his executors, had it not been anticipated by a translation* published by Giles Randall in 1646. Both are from the Latin version of Sebastian Castellio. Randall was a sore puzzle to the heresiographers of his time. Ald Paget catalogues among the Antinomians "one Randall, who preaches about Spital Yard," and is followed by the London Presbyterian divines in their *Testimony for the Truth* (1647). Robert Baillie, the Scotch Commissioner to the Westminster Assembly, in his *Dissuasive from the Errours of the times* (1645), also describes him as having "for some time past preached peaceably in the Spital," and classifies him, with usual inaccuracy, as a Familist. Baillie seems to have had the curiosity to hear Randall preach; he says he taught "that all resurrection and glory which Scripture promises is past ready, and no other coming of Christ to judgment or life eternal, is to be expected than what presently the saints do enjoy; that the most clear historical passages of Scripture are

Theologia Germanica, or Mystical Divinity. A little Golden Manual briefly describing the Mysteries, Sublimity, Perfection, and Simplicity of Christianity in Belief and Practice. Written in High Dutch, and for its Worth translated into Latin, and printed at Antwerp, 1588. London, 1646 and 1648. Archbishop Leighton's copy in his notes is still preserved. A third translation, also from Castellio's Latin, was made by Rev. Francis Okeley, the Moravian, during last century, but was never published. The fourth, by Mrs. Malcom, was from the imperfect text first used by Luther, of which text an edition appeared at Lancaster (Penn.) in 1823. The fifth, by Miss Winkworth, is from the perfect text, first edited by Dr. Franz Xaver in 1861, and again in 1864.

mere allegories; that in all things, Angels, Devils, Women, there is but one spirit and life, which is absolute and essentially God; that nothing is everlasting but the life essence of God, which now is in all creatures." This is a recognizable caricature of the teachings of the school which produces the *Theologia*, though there stand two refractory points between us and the original light, viz: Randall's understanding of his author, and Baillie's understanding of Randall.

John Deacon we have put with Everard and Randall because his *Guide to Glory* (1658) contains a translation of Tauler's "Dialogue with a beggar." Another Taulerian is the "P. who published at Oxford in 1673 a translation of Boethius' *Consolatione*.

Both Everard and Randall were classed as Familists. The most general, the vaguest, and the most effective charge brought by the heresy-hunters of that age. "Family of Love" was founded in Holland about the middle of the sixteenth century by Hendrik Niclaes, an Anabaptist of mystical but unsound views,—unsound both as to Trinity and the moral law. He labored also in England. His sect were charged with regarding Christ as a quality in man Jesus, a quality which might be shared by other men in which their founder did share as much as the Founder of Christianity, or even more. Moses they said had preached dispensation of hope; Jesus that of faith; Niclaes that of the greatest of all. Asceticism the severest, and Antinomian notions the loosest were blended with them. One of their notions was the propriety of denying or concealing one's faith that the "Family of Love" was organized as a secret association whose members were unknown as such to the world at large. This made their sect a terrible bugbear, and caused the worst suspicions. Baillie writes home to Scotland that several sons, "counted zealous and gracious," including "a great peer of the land," were commonly believed to be affiliated with them. Mrs. Hutchinson and her followers in Massachusetts were charged with Familism, and Mr. Thomas Watson's absurd pamphlet about her proceeds upon that supposition. The heresy seemed to Dr. Henry More so dangerous that he wrote a big book, *The Mystery of Iniquity* (1650), to re-

it.* But from the very first the Familists excited attention and alarm. A Catholic controversialist in 1560 mentions them as one of the "four known religions" of England. In 1575 they printed a Confession of Faith and transmitted a copy to the Queen. In 1580 Niclaes' works were ordered to be burnt, and all persons were declared punishable who had them in their possession without permission of the Ordinary. But they continued to print their tracts at a secret press during Elizabeth's reign, and in the period of the Civil War and the Commonwealth there was great activity in secretly reprinting and circulating these.

Rapha Harford, Dr. Everard's editor, says that his master kept clear of the "Familist, who saith he lives above ordinances, and so hath quite left all religion, and by degrees hath turned licentious Ranter." It is impossible to say whether this, or that which Penn gives, was the origin of that curious party, the extreme left wing of the mystical protest against the moral severity and legality of Puritanism. They correspond—as we have said—to the Brethren and Sisters of the Free Spirit in Mediæval Germany, and to the Soofees of the school of Bustami. "They made it their business," says Baxter, "to set up the light of nature in men, under the name of Christ, and to dishonor and cry down the Church, the Scriptures, the present ministry, and our worship and ordinances. They called men to hearken to Christ within them, but withal they enjoined a cursed doctrine of libertinism, which brought them to all abominable filthiness of life. They taught as the Familists that God regardeth not the actions of the outward man, but of the heart; and that to the pure all things are pure, even things forbidden: and so, as allowed by God, they spake most hideous words of blasphemy, and many of them committed whoredoms commonly." "I have seen myself letters written from Abingdon where, among both soldiers and people,

* See Hunt, *ubi supra*, I, 234-7; and Nippold in the *Zeitschrift für hist. Theologie*, 1862. David Joris is sometimes mentioned as their founder, but wrongly, although there is a decided resemblance of the Familists to the Jorists, as Nippold points out at the close of his third paper on Joris, *Zeitschrift f. histor. Theologie*, 1868. English writers against Familism are John Knewstubb: *A Confutation of Heresies taught by H. N. of Leyden, and embraced by a number who call themselves the Family of Love*, 1597; Dr. Stephen Dension: *The White Wolf*, 1627; and a Mr. Dealop.

this contagion did then prevail, full of horrid oaths, curses, and blasphemy, not fit to be repeated by the tongue or pen of man; and all these uttered as the effect of knowledge, and a part of their religion, in a fanatic strain, and fathered on the Spirit of God. But the horrid villainies of this sect did not only speedily extinguish it, but also did as much as ever anything did to disgrace all sectaries, and to restore the credit of the ministry and of the sober, unanimous Christians." We have still more exact and trustworthy accounts of the Ranters from the early Quakers, especially George Fox. The history of Ranterism is closely interwoven with that of Quakerism. They, like the Seekers, were for the most part swallowed up by the Society of Friends; when Baxter proceeds to say that the Quakers "were but the Ranters, and turned from horrid profaneness and blasphemy, to a life of extreme austerity on the other side," he is an unwilling witness to the services rendered by the Friends in damping and quenching the lawless and fanatic spirit, which before their rise seemed so threatening. Justice Hotham, a well-wisher to the Friends, told George Fox, "If God had not raised up this principle of light and life, which I preached, the nation had been overrun wth Ranterism, and all the justices of the nation could not have stopped it with their laws; because (said he) they would have said as we said, and done as we commanded, and yet have kept their own principle still. But this principle of truth, said he, overthrows their principle, and the root and ground thereof." And Fox's principle was that of the presence of both light and darkness in the heart of man, and salvation through the victory of the former,—a victory attained through abiding in Christ, waiting upon God, submission to the leadings of the Spirit, walking in the light.

In the third year of Fox's ministry (1649) he came to Coventry "and heard of a people that were in prison for religion. . . . When I came into the jail where the prisoners were, a great power of darkness struck at me, and I sat still, having my spirit gathered into the love of God. At last these prisoners began to rant and vapour and blaspheme, at which my soul was greatly grieved. They said they were God, but we would not hear such things. When they were calm, I stood up and asked them whether they did such things by motion, or from

Scripture; and they said, from Scripture. A Bible being at hand, I asked them to point out that Scripture, and they showed me the place where the sheet was let down to Peter, and it was said to him what was sanctified he should not call common or unclean. When I had showed them that that Scripture proved nothing for their purpose, they brought another, which spoke of God reconciling all things to Himself, things in heaven and things on earth. I told them I owned that Scripture also, but showed them it proved nothing to their purpose. Then seeing they said they were God, I asked them if they knew whether it would rain to-morrow? They said they could not tell. I told them God could tell. Again I asked them if they thought they should always be in that condition or should change? and they answered they could not tell. Then said I unto them, God can tell, and God doth not change. You say you are God; and yet you cannot tell whether you shall change or not. So they were confounded and quite brought down for the time. After I had reproved them for their blasphemous expressions, I went away, for I perceived they were Ranters. I had met with none before. . . . Not long after this one of these Ranters, whose name was Joseph Salmon, put forth a paper or book of recantation, upon which they were set at liberty." In his early years of ministry he encountered them in London, and in no less than eight English shires, chiefly in the north. And whenever any body of Friends fell away from the Society and "went out into imaginations" they gravitated uniformly into Ranterism. Such was the defection of the Friends at Cleveland, in Yorkshire. "They had formerly had great meetings, but were then (1651) all shattered to pieces and the heads of them turned Ranters. . . . They had some kind of meetings still, but they took tobacco and drank ale in their meetings, and were grown light and loose." Such was James Naylor's fanatical escapade in 1656, when he allowed a company, of women chiefly—William Erbery's wife was one—to address blasphemous titles to him. "But he came to see his outgoing, and to condemn it." Such also was the outcome of the schism begun in the north by Story and Wilkinson, about 1676, on the occasion of Fox's setting up meetings for discipline, especially women's meetings separate from the men. They pleaded that the Society had hitherto existed

without any such meetings, under the discipline of the Spirit alone; and their case was very plausible. But the schism faded away like the snow; great numbers returned to the Society, and others became by degeneracy Ranters of a new sort. "They frequently come into our meetings," says Thomas Story, "and rant, and sing, and dance, and act like antics and madmen, throwing dust into the faces of our ministers when preaching; and though they profess the Truth, and are called Quakers, and have meetings of their own as we have, yet they have no discipline or order among them, but deny all that as carnal and formal, leaving every one to do as he pleases, without any reproof, restraint, or account to the Society in anything, how inconsistent soever with civility, morality, and religion; and are in mere anarchy. . . . And as they go under the name of Quakers, as the world calls us, and often come into our meetings and act such things and many more the like, other people, who do not know the difference, think we are all alike; and since we cannot oppose them by force, they continue to impose upon us in that manner."

The profound theosophy of Jacob Böhme (1575-1624) had already found a considerable body of English adherents, and his influence has never ceased to be more or less widely felt in England as well as in Germany. One of the numerous myths connected with the history of his theosophy, represents Charles I. as profoundly impressed by a perusal of the *Forty Questions* (of which Werdenhagen had published a Latin translation, 1632), and as sending a learned man into Germany for the sole purpose of mastering the language and translating Böhme's works. An English life of Böhme did appear in 1638, and as soon as the cessation of the civil war gave opportunity for other literature than pamphlets, sermons, and *Mercuries*, the translation of the theosopher's writings was begun. Between 1644 and 1659 the work was nearly completed, all that was wanting being published in two volumes in 1662. The expense seems to have been borne by Humphrey Blundel, a rich merchant, who also took part in the translation, but it was mostly done by J. Elliston and John Sparrow. This is the *only English translation* of Böhme, although there are later versions of tracts and passages. That printed in quarto in 1764-81 is not (as an ambiguity on

the title page has led many to suppose) by William Law; it is a mere (imperfect) reprint of the old translation with some corrections and many arbitrary changes.

The sect of Böhmenists is never mentioned by Fox, nor is their master, yet we have seen reason to believe that there were many points of actual contact and sympathy between them and the Quakers. Muggleton found in the North of England, societies composed of a mixture of the two parties. Bayley still retains many things from his earlier theosophy in his Quaker tracts. Baxter says of the Böhmenists that their "opinions go much towards the way of the [Quakers] for the sufficiency of the light of nature," i. e., of the Light within, "the salvation of heathen as well as Christians, a dependence on revelations, and so forth. But they are fewer in number, and seem to have attained to greater meekness and conquest of passion, than any of the rest. Their doctrine is to be seen in Jacob Böhme's books, by those that have nothing else to do than to bestow a great deal of time to understand him that was not willing to be understood, and to know that his bombastic words signify nothing more than before was easily known by common familiar terms." All of which shows that Richard Baxter had not wasted that "great deal of time" in finding out what Böhme meant. The Silesian is a theosopher, not properly, or, shall we say, not merely a mystic. "Mysticism and theosophy," Richard Rothe says, "are both of an essentially religious character; but it marks both their distinctness and their relation to one another that the former knows in God only the subjective self, the latter the entire objective universe equally with it."* And in the passages quoted above from Fox's account of his own experience, and in others besides them, it is evident that in his earliest stages of illumination, he passed beyond the limits of mysticism into theosophy.

"The chief of the Böhmenists in England," says Baxter, are Dr. Pordage and his family, who live in community, and

* Rothe's *Stille Stunden*, 262-3. Durandus Hotham wrote a *Life of J. B.*, which was bound up with the translation of the *Mysterium Magnum* (folio 1654). Edward Taylor (1682) published an epitome of Böhme's works, with introductory matter of his own. I have discussed the life and theosophy of Böhme in two papers, which appeared in *The Unitarian Review*, September and November, 1874.

pretend to hold visible and sensible communications with angels," and so forth. Pordage had studied Böhme, but as he himself advertises us in his works, his own theosophy differed very essentially from that of the German, in spite of its large obligations to it. Pordage's visions and theurgies are utterly alien to the broad-day-light of Böhme's "beholdings," and when his works, and those of his disciples, Rev. Thomas Bromley and Mrs. Jane Leade, were translated into German by Loth Vischer,—chiefly from the unpublished manuscripts,—they excited among the orthodox Böhmenists of the continent the fiercest spirit of opposition that theosophers are capable of entertaining. Pordage was expelled from his Berkshire rectory in 1644 by a Committee of Tryers, for his various heresies and sorceries; but he lived till 1697, and in his later years united with Leade, Bromley, Francis Lee, and a goodly number of others in founding the Philadelphia Society. It was dissolved by his death, but had two successors of the same name, the later lasting till well into the reign of George II.*

Besides these six groups, there are many single figures, who cannot be omitted in the history of the mysticism of the period. They may generally be described as having some affinity for some of the groups, but not strictly as members of any.

John Howe and Robert Leighton might fairly be associated with the Cambridge Platonists. Platonism indeed is rather a flavor than a doctrine in their writings, but this is equally true of Worthington and of Whitecote. Howe studied at Cambridge before he went to Oxford, and as Cromwell's chaplain he was necessarily brought into contact with Peter Sterry. Another of the Protector's chaplains bears much more distinct marks of Sterry's influence. Jeremiah White edited the second of Sterry's posthumous works, and with such expressions of his

* Dr. Pordage's account of his trial in the *State Trials*, ii, 217-60. The Philadelphia Society had branches on the continent, and was stoutly opposed by the *Engelsbrüder*, the strictly Böhmenist society founded by John George Gichtel. It seems probable that it was from a Manchester branch of it that Ann Lee derived her spiritual culture, for the very slight doctrinal element in Shakerism is clearly traceable to Pordage's Semi-Böhmenism, and her early membership in some such sort of a religious fellowship is recorded. John Murray, the founder of American Universalism, found a society of Böhmenists in Boston in 1772. Rev. Drs. Richard Peters and Jacob Duchè, of Philadelphia, were of that school.

approbation of their contents, as leads us to expect some similarity to them in his own. And in his *Restoration of all Things*, 1712) we find that the form of thought and expression is modelled after that of Sterry, in much the way that might be expected to result from the close contact of a receptive with a productive intellect.

Francis Rous (1579–1658), “that old Jew of Eton,” as the Cavaliers called him, might perhaps be classed among the Vanists. He was an Independent, and a zealous adherent of Cromwell, regarding the Protector as a second Joshua raised up for the deliverance of the elect people. Cromwell made him Provost of Eton, and he had previously sat in the Long Parliament and the Westminster Assembly. He is now best remembered for his version of the Psalms, a version vigorous and terse, if not always smooth, which has enjoyed the admiration of three such critics as Thomas Campbell, Sir Walter Scott, and Thomas Carlyle. Three of his numerous treatises obtained Continental reputation, being translated into German and Latin, and highly esteemed by the foreign mystics.*

Here also might be placed the millenarian Nathaniel Holmes, whose *Resurrection Revealed* (1654 and 1833) enjoyed the praise of Sterry. And here perhaps Magnus Byne, the mystical opponent of Quakerism (*The Scornful Quaker answered*, 1656), who declared that “the first principle of pure religion” is “the son of God dwelling in us. He who lives in this principle is taught to be religious.” And the sacred poet, Royalist and Conjuror, Edmund Elys of Oxford, shows himself a kindred spirit when he says, “The people called Quakers do affirm that the principal rule of Faith to a sincere Christian is that which Almighty God has written in the hearts of all men; and in this I fully concur with them, and I say, for want of a belief in this, the whole world lieth in wickedness.” But Elys belongs rather to a later generation, although his earlier publications bear the date of Commonwealth times.

* These are “*The Great Oracle*, *The Heavenly Academy*, (1638), and *The Mystical Marriage* (1663.) The Latin version of the three bears the title *Interiora Regni Dei*, 2d ed., 1673. Peter Poiret catalogues him as *Mystices commendator Anglus*; and Gottfried Arnold says *Mysticas materias non solum per experientiam descripsit, sed et expressè professus est*.

Other later representatives of the mystical thought and spirit are Walter Marshall, author of *The Gospel Mystery of Sanctification*; Bishop Jeremy Taylor, who in the *Holy Living*, and in the chapter "Of Meditation" in his *Life of Christ*, teaches the standard mystical theology of the Roman Catholic ascetics, especially their three degrees of mystical ascent, first stated by "Dionysius the Areopagite," viz., Purification, Illumination, and Union, using, says Dr. Pusey, "their very words and turns of expression, giving their advice and their cautions;" Bishop Fowler, who called down Bunyan's Lutheran indignation by asserting that sanctification is the sum and substance of Christianity, but received the qualified approval of Richard Baxter, whose *bête noir* was Antinomianism; Edward Polhill, who maintained the truth and reality of the mystical union of Christ and believers as fundamental to all Christian theology, against Stillingfleet and other rationalizing divines, who inclined to represent it as a trope; and Samuel Shaw, the much enduring Dissenter, whose *Immanuel*—a book still read—insists that religion is nothing unless it be "a living principle in the minds of men."

As Puritanism lost its masculine, public, and political character, by becoming non-conformity and dissent, as it ceased to be the creed of soldiers and statesmen, of armies and of parliaments, it also ceased to provoke any reactions of the sort we have been describing. Its sharp lines and definite distinctions became less distinct, because of the new influences of a new age, so that the theology of Owen and of Manton has little more than a formal kinship to that of Watts and of Doddridge. The later representatives of English mysticism are to be found chiefly within the Establishment and among the Nonjurors, until in Methodism there arose a type of Protestantism with many points of contact with mysticism itself.

**TITLE II—AN ARGUMENT FOR MAN'S IMMORTALITY
ON RATIONAL GROUNDS.**

MATERIALISTS claim that the human soul, or the spirit of man, is not spirit at all, but the product of organization. Hence, when that organization is dissolved, as it is at death, the soul itself has vanished into non-existence. It cannot, therefore, be immortal. On the other hand, Immaterialists claim that the soul, though for a time linked to an earthly body and dependent upon that connection for its early discipline and its knowledge of the material world, is yet, in its superior nature, a distinct spiritual entity, and a persistent unit being; that in its higher relations it is independent of organization, as under the dominion of spiritual laws, and belonging to a higher sphere of existence. Hence, when the earthly body is dissolved, the spirit retains its own integrity, unharmed and indestructible.

These inferences both stand upon the assumption that we fully know what is the essential nature of the soul; in the one case that it is a dependent, vanishing product like the perfume of a flower, or the life of a plant, with no existence independent of the material organism of which it is the outcome; in the other, that it is a distinct independent existence, indestructible by its nature. But we cannot infer either the mortality or the immortality of the soul from its essential nature, and for two reasons. First, we cannot know the essential nature of either matter or spirit but only their phenomena. And second, if we could, we cannot infer from that nature alone, the soul's total destruction, or its proper conscious immortality.

Granting that the soul is here dependent upon a material organism, and that its present body is to be destroyed; may not the essential personal life take on some other organism, by metemorphosis, or metempsychosis, without extinction? Possibly it may be clothed upon with a body more subtle, like the invisible ether, its life passing on into a different stage of being, changing the form of its activities, but preserving its identity.

Or, supposing the soul to be an indestructible entity independent of a body, does this necessarily involve its conscious immortality as a self-active, responsible being? "The simple elementary atom," says Sir Balfour Stewart, "is an immortal being." But such an immortality, whether of the ultimate atom, or of an immaterial principle, is not what we are seeking for, but that of the *conscious personality*, the Ego, with its reason, affections, memories, and will centered within them all, and directing them, under the government of God.

But the soul, like any other object, cannot be properly known, by itself, independent of its relations. Who can understand the human eye, except as related to the light without and to the soul within? Who can comprehend an ultimate atom, independent of the laws of chemical affinity and of those forces which build it up into structures of crystalline beauty and of manifold life. We know a single thing perfectly, only when we know all things; for each object has relations to every other, and to the whole. God, only, knows any single thing perfectly.

Hence, man's immortality must be learned, if at all, not from the study of matter by itself, nor of spirit, nor of the life-principle as related to organization; but either from Revelation, or from finding the *place man holds* in the *creation*; in other words, from a just view of his relations to the *great system* of which he is a part. The physiologist does a most welcome service in throwing light upon brain structure, and upon its functions as related both to the body and the mind. He may demonstrate that the living organism is directed, played upon, like an instrument of music, by an intelligent agent invisible and outside the instrument; and since this agent may have existed before the organization began, it need not perish with the organism. But his demonstration of man's immortality, on *physiological* grounds, must certainly fail. Not only is the argument too effective, as involving equally the fellow-immortality of all the Rhizopods and Trilobites of the geologic ages, but, to the searching, fundamental questions concerning this invisible agent, What? Whither? the physiologist at once takes the attitude of the sphinx and answers not a word. As the destination, or the *whither*, of this agent, is the very thing to be proved, we cannot turn silence into proof.

But on the other hand, so profound is the mystery of the life-principle in any form, and especially as endowed with rational and moral intelligence, that the materialist in denying its possible immortality, only shows that he would have been wiser to turn sphinx, than to make answer without any possible data in present human knowledge.

It is conceded to be a doctrine of the Bible revelation. Some assert that they know their own immortality by intuition, another form of revelation. This I neither affirm nor deny. My present argument is based solely on *man's place* in the *system of creation*; and my proposition is, that *consistency and unity* in this, as a *rational and moral system*, involves man's Immortality.

This argument bears *directly* only on the immortality of the righteous; leaving the immortality of all, probable, but on grounds which this argument does not compass.

I assume what every scientist will readily grant, that creation is a rational system; in other words, that in its connections and dependencies throughout, each part works for the whole, and the whole for each part, so as to constitute a rational and consistent unity. Every scientist assumes that there is system, and therefore unity, in Nature. Otherwise science is impossible. The conviction is firm in every intelligent mind, that one truth never conflicts with another truth. It is a demand of our rational nature; and this means that what this rational nature, within, demands, exists in fact, without. In other words there is a correllation, or a complete correspondence between perfect reason and the system embodied in creation. True, the system is vast. We cannot comprehend the whole. But we know in part. In the science of Numbers, there are many relations we cannot grasp, yet, knowing some of them and the ground rules for calculating all numbers, we are sure that nothing in the whole range of numbers can contradict those rules which we do understand. So in the great system of Nature, there are facts, laws, and principles which are plain, giving us, so to speak, the general rules of calculation. On this basis, we are sure that what we do not know as yet, must be consistent with facts and principles which we do know. A system of Geometry that is good for our Earth is good for Neptune. A treatise

on Optics or Gravity that is true here, is true in the far-off Pleiades. So the ground facts and central laws of God's moral government and the fundamental relations of moral creatures to it, which we clearly see, here and now, are essentially the same in all worlds.

I will now state certain facts and principles as the basis of my argument, using within the domain of physical science only those which are held to be established by scientists themselves; and beyond this domain, only what all fully receive, who believe in a personal God and in the moral nature of man. And these are here assumed as truths that can be firmly established on similar grounds.

First. The system of creation has been *progressive* in its formation. Whether formed by successive creative acts, or by the process called evolution, we need not determine. The *fact* is acknowledged; the world has been brought to its present state through unknown, but countless ages, whatever the process.

Second. Its formation has been according to a *law of progress*. It has not been by successive additions and extensions, the same in kind, but by progress from lower to higher forms of being. Dead, inorganic matter preceded organic; the lower forms of vegetable and animal life preceded the higher, the ascending series taking, as characteristics of the advance, greater complexity of structure, a finer organization, and higher intelligence.

Third. With this progress toward higher and higher forms of life, there has been in the advancing grades, a *conserving* of all excellence previously attained, so that the highest of the series combines essentially all that had been gained, with *additions*, not found in any grade below.

Fourth. At the same time other changes have been going on in the earth's structure and temperature and in its surrounding elements which made this progress possible. The air and the water have been precipitating their noxious elements; continents and mountain ranges have been thrown up; rich valleys with their water courses have been formed, and wide plains have been extended; even those strange monuments of the dead, the great chalk and coral formations in the sea, and the

coal-beds on the land,—these, with countless other changes, have been parts of one economy, the result of vast co-ordinating agencies extending through the whole realm of Nature, showing system in the whole order of progression and through all its lines of advance.

Fifth. This system thus advancing through vast periods, has culminated in *man*. All along, until now, the system was preparative. It meant man from the beginning. His appearance explains all that went before, for all before was subordinated to him. Man crowns the whole, and is therefore the *key* to the system.

Sixth. While man crowns the system, *rational and moral* endowments crown man, viz: his capacities to know truth, to choose intelligently the right rather than the wrong ultimate end, and to feel the obligation to make such choice, under the sanctions of moral Law. Summing up in himself, essentially, all excellence previously attained, and dowered with these gifts as his royal heritage, he crowns Nature most royally, indeed, by being exalted above nature, in his higher relations, into the realm of moral and spiritual law. Man alone, upon the earth, apprehends a *moral ideal* with a sense of obligation, under the sanctions of law, to make it practically his own. In other words, he recognizes the imperative obligation to make a moral ideal the standard of his life, with high satisfaction and self-approval, or with self-condemnation and remorse, as he chooses, or refuses it. This exercise of moral powers, involving the free choice of an ultimate moral end, and the obligation to make the standard it imposes the supreme law for the subjection of all lower powers and impulses, differs entirely from the operation of instinct, appetite, and natural affection, associated with such intelligence, as is found in the highest of the animal creation. But man not only has a moral ideal which comes nearer and nearer to perfection, as he advances in spiritual knowledge, but he has the capacity of coming under the power of invisible, spiritual realities, which afford motive, inspiration, and guidance for attaining his ideal. Through Nature and his own Personality, he apprehends God, the supreme Authority and the Righteous Moral Governor; and he knows that God is to be worshipped and obeyed. He has the undoubt-

ing conviction that in the peace and fellowship of God is the true life of man. Hence man is raised to a higher rank and order of being, because he comes up, as a Personality, out from subjection to laws of necessity, under the law of duty, and the inspiration of spiritual motives and attractions. His nobler powers are correlated to a system of law and administration by which no animal can be held bound, because it has no correlative faculty or endowment by which it can have any conception of such a system, or any practical relation to it.

There are two objections to the immortality of man, or to his exclusive immortality, to which reference must be made in this connection. One is, that in the scheme of progression on which this argument is based, man may not be the last of the series, but only a stepping stone to the next above him; in which case he must die as an *individual*, as all below him die, even if he does not become extinct as a species. The second is, that on the basis of evolution and cerebral physiology, there is no distinction *in kind*, between the mental powers of the higher class of animals and of man; hence there is the same reason for the immortality of the one as of the other.

The first objection will be considered later in the course of the argument. The second requires too much space for a full discussion here. The relation of man to the animal creation has risen into especial importance of late, owing to recent theories of evolution. Of course no attempt is here made to disprove the doctrine of Evolution, or to deny any of the facts of Physiology. But, the identity in kind of the mental powers of man and the higher animals, does not necessarily follow either from Evolution or Physiology. It is disproved by facts which must be held conclusive.

First, it does not follow from any rational theory of Evolution, except on the assumption that there is no difference in kind between the mind of a Newton and of the lowest animal that has any cerebral development.

The reasoning is this. Man, the last of the series, is evolved from the next grade below, and that from the next and so on to the ape; several links between, no one knows how many, are extinct, but the variations along the line of progress shade into one another, differing only in degree of development. On the

same principle, why not go downward from the ape to any point along the line of descent, no matter how far; for you never come to a difference in kind only of degree. Would the same reasoning take us down to the Algæ or Fungi of the vegetable kingdom; certainly the boundary line between vegetable and animal life is quite as imperceptible as between any two varieties of the animal creation.

Grant some law of Evolution if you please, but not such a law as confounds all distinctions in Mental and Moral science; assuming virtually that mind acting through the lowest cerebral organ, if not through any nervous ganglia, without vertebra, heart, or brain, is identical *in kind* with the mind of a Newton.

If it be granted that the advance from the lowest to the highest order of mind has proceeded by some law of Evolution, still, along the various lines of progress, the "Spontaneous Variations," so called, aided by "External Conditions," have switched off to different courses, and up different grades, to higher planes of advancing life. And as man is himself a Microcosm, representing in the different grades of his complex being all the stages of progress, and embryologically, the order of the advance, by what rational scheme of classification shall we assign those instincts, appetites, and natural affections, which he has in common with animals, to the same order of mind with that of his highest rational and moral endowments.

The fundamental idea which determines the classification of all objects as higher or lower, is the rank of the laws under which they come and take their peculiar characteristics. A crystal ranks higher than a common stone; a vegetable higher than a crystal; an animal higher than a vegetable; and man higher than an animal. And this, because the law of each advancing grade, not reaching to those below but conditioned by them, makes them subordinate and inferior, as is admirably shown by Dr. Mark Hopkins (see "*Outline Study of Man*"). This "law of the conditioning and the conditioned" puts man into a higher order of beings than that of the animal, *because* the laws of rational and moral life are higher than those of animal life, and differ from them, not merely in degree, but in *kind*. His lower attributes reach down to the lowest orders, and his higher, as they rise, grade above grade, put him in

sympathy with all the higher sentient creation. But his crowning capacities, as correlated to the rational order of the world, giving him Science, and to the Moral Government of God, giving him Religion, lift him into a sphere of motives, attractions, and activities, which touch no plane of animal life. The chasm between, is that which separates the lower intellectual from the rational; the natural from the spiritual; the earthly from the heavenly.

Undeniable facts, then, show that in the progress of evolution different grades of mind, and different orders of endowment are reached, either by gradual or sudden transitions. This being true, why may not *one* of the most important transitions have been made during the long periods of hundreds of thousands of years claimed for that succession of links now extinct, which at last led up from the ape to man—if the *facts* which come from comparing the two, really involve such transition. That such facts exist has been already shown in the elevation of man alone into the sphere of moral and spiritual life, where he emerges from the plane of merely natural law and physical necessity, into that of moral law and spiritual attractions. No transition in the whole course of evolution can be greater than this, and the fact of such transition no possible theory of evolution can set aside.

Again, the objection to this view which is based on Comparative Physiology and Chemistry, is not well grounded, because neither of them furnishes the proper tests of mental and moral qualities. Mr. Darwin says that “this agreement of man with the higher mammals must depend upon our close similarity in minute structure and ‘chemical composition.’” And Mr. Huxley claims that “man differs so little from the other Primates that there is, on Physiological grounds, no justification for placing man in a different order.” Then he asserts on the ground of Physiology that the mental powers of man and of the ape family differ, *not in kind*, but only in degree.

Possibly chemical analysis may prove that similar portions of the brain of a gorilla and of a man have the same constituent elements and in the same proportions. But chemistry is no test of *thought*, and it is such a test that we are now seeking. Chemistry may prove that charcoal and the diamond have the same

constituent elements, but it cannot prove that charcoal and the crystal-diamond do not come under a different order of laws and of rank, as well as of quality and value. But until matter and mind are proved to be the same thing, we need not take the chemical argument into serious consideration.

But can the Physiologist furnish a conclusive test of the mental grade and quality of mind? Are there not important differences of mental grade and power between two brothers of the same family, which Physiology fails to detect, but which the expression of the countenance at once declares and the life confirms? A much finer test of mind is given, then, in its own proper manifestation, than in cerebral Physiology. And such important differences, which Physiology fails to see, are really found to exist between brothers of the same family, that shall we say of the same test for the mental differences found between man and the ape, separated by many successive links, and by geologic periods of which we have no measure?

How does Sir John Lubbock ascertain the extraordinary intelligence of the ant-family? He gives significant looks, doubtless, at so big a head on such a wee body. Perhaps, with the microscope, he discerns a structural form indicating unusual intelligence. But *so much* intelligence in a speck of nerve-ganglia less than one-fourth the size of a small pin-head! And with such scant physiological furnishing, not only able to teach wisdom to human sluggards, but as part of a social organism, to wage wars of strategy, to carry on commerce and husbandry, to give advanced lessons in mechanics, luxury, and every; to furnish, in fact, decisive "Anticipations of man in nature," even pantomimic representations of forms of human civilization in the nineteenth century, and ages before man appeared!—it confounds the wisdom of Comparative Physiology.

Now Sir John Lubbock learns about the wonderful intelligence of the ant-family by simply studying its natural manifestations in the actual work they do in their own haunts. It

is the only decisive test of the order and quality of mind. Whatever light the structural form, and the capacity of brain may afford, the supreme and final test of mind acting through living organism, is not so much its *organs*, as such, as its *manifestations* in its natural *expression*, and in the *results*, of its

proper action. As this is true of ants, it is true of apes. It is true also of man. Put side by side, then, the best individual and community of the ape-family, and the best representative man and society of men to be found. Study their manifestations of mind and character, the work they do, the realms of law, material, intellectual, and spiritual, in which they live; the realities, invisible, which they grasp by faith, which give them practical motive, inspiration, and all the elements of a high spiritual life and character; and then study the *history* in which they express and embody their unfolding and progressive life-power. But we have gone too far. We have passed beyond the boundary of ape-life, into the realm of reason, of moral and spiritual law, of fellowship with the great Source of truth, and life, and righteousness. Man alone enters here. He alone *can* enter, and live here; and by attaining a moral excellence which is itself worthy and divine, assert and verify his own proper dignity. He alone has the elements which enter into history; for man himself has no history except as he transcends the animal life, and enters the rational and spiritual.

Have the ape-race any history? I do not ask for their *language*, with its record. I ask for their capacity to *make* a language, or to use it, if made for them; for the elements of rational and moral life which need rational language for expression, and which are sure to organize a language where they exist, as their instrument. They have no history, no language but what is natural; and the simple reason is, they have not the mental and moral elements that require language to evolve a distinct consciousness, and in the varied activities of life to work out their products into character and into history.

I have spoken of the ant-family as in their community-life more wonderful than the ape-family. But have the ants a history? Do they pantomime human civilization except in its lower forms of secular and savage life? Do they build temples or altars? Do they recognize the obligation to enthrone the moral law in their individual or community-life. Have they any apprehension of those spiritual realities which are the proper element and inspiration of the human soul? Nothing of the kind. The highest of the animal creation give no manifestation of endowments or capacities that lift them into the

here of moral law and of spiritual attractions. They remain bound, with Nature, under the necessities of natural law, and can by no possibility attain, in the knowledge and fellowship of God, that moral excellence for which all creation is working together. They are steps preparatory; but as they answer and are entirely subordinate, they reach their destiny when they return to dust. A Laura Bridgman, deaf, dumb, and blind, can be led up, even through her pathway of utter darkness and silence, to hear the voice of duty and have the vision of God. With the most important inlets of knowledge closed, she yet attains to a high spiritual consciousness and character. Has any animal, of the highest cerebral development, and with all the senses more perfect even than in man, by any instruction or training, ever attained to a spiritual idea? No. Not having the *kind* of capacity necessary, they can no more attain than they can see colors without an eye. Are we to be told then with perfect assurance, that on the ground of embryology and homologous brain-structure, such an animal has the same mental powers in kind, without a single *mental manifestation* to warrant it? The foot of a horse, the flipper of a seal, the wing of a bird, and the hand of man, may be, physiologically speaking, homologous organs of locomotion. But they are for different elements, and spheres of activity, and kinds of life. They are not correlated to the same instincts, or mental aptitudes. The horse can do nothing with the brush of an artist. The seal has no ambition to soar with the bird.

Does the Physiologist understand the brain-substance, and its relation to the central organizing principle, well enough to know whether that principle, by its own affinities, may not, in different species, attempt with *different qualities* portions of brain structure which are homologous in form, but which shall range, functionally, in different spheres of mental life; as the fins of a fish, and the wings of a bird, do, in different elements, and moved by different instincts. The chick, hatched by a cock, turns away from its foster-mother at the call of a hen, avoids the water, and though untaught, pecks straight for the first insect in its way. The duckling, hatched by a hen, goes, against her remonstrance, straight to the first pond or brooklet, for food and congenial life.

It may be very unphysiological, but is it incredible, or even unnatural, that these opposite instincts may act through homologous portions of brain and nerve-structure? The brain of the ant, whatever its structural form, has a peculiar *quality*, as related to the wonderful life-power which organized it. It certainly suggests that quality of brain, as well as quantity and structure, has an important relation to mind-power. And yet this quality eludes the sharpest dissection and the closest microscopic searching. Is it not possible that this central life-power, so different in its character in different species, may organize such *qualities* of brain, that portions termed homologous shall thus be qualified to serve as instruments of different grades of mental power? If this is possible, then important mental evolutions may go on from within their own center of movement, leaving no *visible* trace in *structure*, but giving decided proof in outward *expression*, of new departures and elevations in mental life. Mind has its modes and laws of expression. These are recognized by all, and they are far better tests of the quality and rank of mental powers, than cerebral structure as now understood. We judge an author by what he expresses in his writings; an orator by his speech and action; a musician by his anthems and sonatas; a virtuous man by his benevolence and integrity as seen in his daily life; a vicious man by his vicious conduct. It is indeed a mystery to us, this law of expression. But it is a fact that mind, with an organization, must express its essential qualities and character through that organization. Men instinctively estimate each other by interpreting this expression. Their power to discriminate, through this medium, the almost infinite varieties and shadings of mental qualities and moral character, is wonderful. They thus, almost unconsciously, put every man in his rank as among men, and generally with great accuracy.

Animals, too, give expression to the mind which they have. Though possessing only a natural language, we do, through that, interpret them, and they understand one another. It is simply the language of tones and features and actions. Now take the entire expression of animal life in its highest forms, and you find as its basis, certain instincts, appetites, and natural affections common to them and to man, with certain grades,

higher or lower, possibly, of intellect, or reasoning intelligence. But wanting entirely the rational, moral, and religious elements, they are incapable, as we have seen, both of language and of history, because they have nothing to express and nothing to do, in the sphere of rational, moral, and religious life. In other words, they are incapable of rational ideas, of moral choice, and of religious devotion. But these belong to man. They are his crowning excellence. Take them away and he has nothing left which can make history; nothing which constitutes his dignity and his manhood; or which establishes his proper rank in the scale of being.

Now we will not object to the classification of man among the Primates of the ape family for *physiological* purposes, if in his physical conformation he rightly belongs there. But when the Physiologist makes similarity of physical structure the test of mental and moral qualities, and on that basis puts the *mind* of the ape and of man in the same category, against all the laws of expression and the facts of history, we object to his test of mind as inapplicable. We dispute his premises. We utterly deny his reasoning and his conclusion. Both Chemistry and Philosophy are taken out of their legitimate province, when they are brought to establish conclusions, in the sphere of mental and moral science.

But we have not space for the further discussion of this point. We will only add in this connection, that the best authorities in Physiology not only concede that life, as an entity, may exist before organization, and independently of it, but that mind, also, is a principle and force, distinct from the organs of its manifestation. Is there not then, some reason for believing that the mind, as a self-active principle and life-force, instead of depending upon organization, and according to Hæckel, originating from it, may be itself the organizing principle; the shaping, constructive power; the master of its own house from cellar to attic, selecting, attempering, vitalizing its own material according to its own affinities; acting from its own center outward, under the Great Mind which orders all things? This best accounts for the mystery of expression. The force and law of expression must be from within. Nothing but mind can take expression. As organizations rise in

grade, the whole organic system becomes more and more clearly the instrument of mind, and more and more radiant as its organ of expression. Fine and noble qualities of mind seem to refine and ennoble the organism through which they act. Ugliness within, takes its own shape without. How can the mind thus organically express itself, unless by a law which is central and causal, it so shapes, tempers and controls the organism as its instrument, as to make it supple and pliant to its demands? This accords, too, with the evident fact and law of all cosmic formations, that *mind* must be the primal, and the constructive power.

If then, according to Ulrici, Lotze, and others, who are eminent authorities in Physiology, the atomic structure of the human body cannot, in its constant flux and reflux, account for the unity of the intellectual and moral consciousness, and a non-atomic, ether-like substance, permanently continuous through the organism, can account for it, why may not such a substance be assumed with as little violence to the principles of science, as the existence of an ether may be assumed, to account for the phenomena of light? If a higher order of mind has been really evolved, which is spiritual in its nature and therefore in its affinities, why should it not by laws of affinity, ally to itself for spiritual uses, a body properly termed spiritual, independent of the coarser body which it enswathes, and survive it, as the permanent organ of the true Personality? Certainly the human soul has an instinct for Immortality. Whether the root and principle of this higher instinct is in an incorruptible body which enswathes the corruptible, or whether it has emerged by a divine law of evolution, it must, like all other instincts, have its correlate in a reality.

Resuming now the direct argument—we have found the world to be a progressive system preparatory to man, and attaining in him, apparently, its objective end. We have seen also that the distinctive and crowning endowments of man are the rational and moral, which constitute him a Personality, and as such, raise him above the law of necessity into the realm of spiritual law and divine government. But though free to choose, he is bound under the sanctions of moral law, to choose the right rather than the wrong ultimate end, and all his value

and excellence depend upon such choice, and upon the character and blessedness which are involved in it. This brings him into harmony with God, with the supreme law of the world and with himself. Hence the entire system finds its meaning and end in benevolent, holy *character*.

But how shall this end be secured? Man is a creature of motives. He cannot make the right choice without yielding himself to the right motive, the well being of God and of his creation, rather than his selfish gratification. The claims of God and duty are imperative, and no motives of interest or pleasure should prevail in competition with them.

Suppose now a man by his sincere love and choice of that end, attains that character which is the crowning excellence of creation. The tree planted, after long ages of culture and development, has at last bloomed out its fragrance and is ripening its fruitage. That character as an inward state, seen by the Omniscient eye alone, must *express* itself, as among men, in ways of practical duty, to get full confirmation and completeness. It must go outward in an act *for* men, and before them in manifestations of its loyalty to God and the right. Suppose the person called to this act of duty is Socrates, and the very act performed for them, is repulsive to them. It provokes their opposition. It calls forth their violence. The result is the cruel death of the righteous man. He had risen above fear and every earthly motive, and the very act of loyalty to God and duty which crowned and confirmed him, in highest excellence, sealed his fate. He drinks the juice of hemlock at the command of the very men whose well-being he loved, and is put out of life into utter non-existence. The whole system of creation, for myriads of ages, has been working for just that excellence, and now, satisfied with producing it, turns upon it, and utterly extinguishes the Personality, who by a sublime act of self-sacrifice, had realized it! Shall we wonder then at the terrible significance of heathen mythology,—Kronos devouring his own children; Moloch satisfied when they are thrown into his own fires!

Is there in such results the consistency and unity of a rational system? No! First. It violates a great principle embodied in the system—the conservation of excellence.

How is this? By the law of progress thus far, we have seen that the excellence attained in the ascending grades, is carried forward and conserved, *not* in the *individual*, but in species and genera which preserve the continuity of the advance and aggregate its results. Why then should the man, Socrates, as an individual personality, be preserved, while the individual dog or monkey goes out of being? Because the excellence attained by this *man* is not a means or preparatory step toward something else, but is an *end valuable in itself*. Virtue, a holy character, is not a subordinate thing, a setting for the gem, a scaffolding for the building. It is the gem itself and creation is the setting. It is the building, and Nature is the scaffolding. The difference between man and the animal is one *in kind*, and the character of such a man, the only true crowning and end of creation, can only be preserved in *individual personalities*. Even a toad enclosed in the forming rock, lives for centuries. Shall not a Socrates outlast the toad? Is it a rational working of a rational system, that the temple be destroyed as soon as completed, and the scaffolding be continued to build other temples with the same result?

Even granting, what has little probability, that man is not the last of the series, and that others still higher above him are to be evolved or created; the objection has no force in reference to the Immortality of man. He is not like the animal: a mere stepping stone to a grade above himself. As having attained genuine goodness, or virtue, in a moral system, which is the true end of the natural, he is a worthy end of all below him. He has reached that grade of endowments, the rational and spiritual, in which endless progress is possible without any further evolution in the *kind* of powers which he possesses. Conscious of responsibility and therefore of freedom; constituted a rational, self-active cause and as such, truly creative, and capable of godlike virtue, he is already a godlike creature, if he simply adjust his activities to the laws of the system to which he is certainly correlated. That worth and dignity attained, it is contrary to all the principles of a rational system, that he should perish like a thing which has no value in itself.

" And he, shall he,
 Man, her last work, who seemed so fair,
 Such splendid purpose in his eyes,
 Who rolled the psalm to wintry skies,
 Who built his fanes of fruitless prayer,

Who loved, who suffered countless ills,
 Who battled for the True and Just,
 Be blown about the desert dust
 Or sealed within the iron hills ?

No more ?—A monster then, a dream,
 A discord. Dragons of the prime
 That tear each other in their slime
 Were mellow music matched with him.

A life as futile, then, as frail !
 O for thy voice to soothe and bless !
 What hope of answer or redress ?—
 Behind the veil, behind the veil."

it (2d) such a result nullifies the supreme Law of the sys-

That law is moral, requiring rectitude of intention ; or love and choice of the well-being of all being, rather than personal gratification. That this is the supreme law of the system is evident, because all its arrangements and lines of progress culminate in man, and in man as made for moral excellence. Before this was reached, we found all things preparatory and subordinate. Here, first, we find an end attained, not subordinate, but itself worthy.

What shall we think then of a system which in all its preparatory arrangements and coördinate agencies, points to the moral Law as supreme, and therefore to virtue as the supreme excellence, and yet, when virtue is fairly reached and gained, treats it the sport of accident, or the victim of passion, of less value than the fruits which rot under the tree, more fragile and short-lived than the sporules of a fading fern. It is declaring the great law of the world is of supreme importance, and at the same time, that the highest product of that law is of no importance at all.

But the perishing of the righteous nullifies the law on the human side, as well as on the divine. A moral law is not sustained like a natural law, by force and of necessity, but by motives ; by sanctions addressed to appreciative moral intelligences. If, then, there are no motives to obey such a law, or if

these motives are radically defective in the real import of their claims, it is no law at all. What are the undoubted convictions of a man of living conscience, respecting the sacredness of justice, and the claims of virtue? Certainly the better a man is, and the nobler his impulses, and the sharper his intuitions, the more sacred is justice and the more excellent is goodness. By virtue of his endowments, he *knows* that all motives to injustice and wrong are lower than those to justice and right, and that they are absolutely without authority. He feels the imperative obligation to give supremacy to the higher. He *must* yield to the claims of justice and virtue for what they *are*, rather than to the solicitation of any desires or impulses, for what they can obtain. There is no comparison of claims between the two when they are fairly marshaled for judicial decision. "Let justice be done though the heavens fall," was the clear utterance of the Roman Conscience, expressed in the Roman Law. "The claims of virtue are supreme, whatever the sacrifice," was the meaning of Socrates, when he discoursed doctrine to the Athenians, and when he drank the hemlock as his reward. The claims of virtue are "imperative," is in the category of "first truths," in spite of the entanglements of speculative philosophy and the blinding power of interest and passion. It is the clear authoritative decision of the human soul in its best estate. When a good man puts forth his noblest acts of loyalty to duty, he rises out of the sphere of the temporary, the local, and the earthly, into that of the sacred and the eternal. Interest, friendship, safety—he listens to nothing which touches any earthly desire. In the simple claims of a righteous cause, he feels the power of motives which are absolutely imperative. He sinks all that is personal and perishable out of sight. He is under the inspiration, the command, the sublime attraction of what is sacred and worthy in itself. The world laughs at him. Friends oppose him. The State condemns him. In conscious rectitude and in simple fidelity to duty and to truth, he is sustained, cheerful, triumphant. His face shines with an unearthly radiance, even at the very instant when his loyalty to righteousness is quenched in death. He has no fanaticism; he shows no freaks of an unbalanced mind; he is no monstrosity, or anomalous outgrowth of disordered

humanity. The time will come when the world will see the sublimity of his act. But he thinks of no sublimity in his position. He strikes no attitude for the sculptor or the historian. He does his duty and dies. He knows that for him duty and death are one. . . . So died Socrates, and Huss, and William the Silent, and a great multitude of the noblest of mankind. History does not pronounce them fools nor even heroes. In nobility and worth they transcend every name which the reverence of man can give.

True, it is in the nature of the virtuous principle to make sacrifice; to give up every inferior good to the claims of virtue. But is there any motive appealing to that principle, to do what *virtually annihilates itself*? Whatever self-forgetfulness may prompt, is it not certain that whenever the virtuous principle has vitality enough to assert itself deliberately in the face of public sentiment, and of human authority with its decree of death, it makes its appeal to a higher tribunal. It recognizes not only the righteousness of its cause, but the continuation of the case; and not only its continuation but its vindication; and not *such* a vindication as involves the utter ignoring and extinction of its devoted, self-sacrificing, appellant, and advocate. The very intuitions which recognize the supremacy of the Moral Law, as the ground of virtue, recognize and enthrone the righteous Author of that Law, as the inspiration and strength of virtue. The highest act of a holy personality is to carry up its *decision* and its *case*, as not its own, but as under the jurisdiction of the Maker of the soul and the Ruler of the world. As there is something impersonal in the intuitions of reason, so there is in the clearest utterances of conscience; something, I mean, transcending in origin and character, the peculiarities of temperament and mental structure in the individual, and common to all moral intelligences in their normal state.

When this highest vision and voice of the human soul, then, are made virtually the organ of the Almighty, it involves a conscious alliance of the virtuous principle in man with its divine Source and Law, and a fellowship of the human personality with the Divine. When, therefore, the godly man thus allied and thus sustained in his loyalty to truth and God, even

to the giving up of life, looks upward and listens to the command to perform the virtuous act, what if he should think that that act will have no vindication for *him*, but in a momentary and secret self-approval; that at the instant it is performed, there will be a sundering of all his fellowship with God, an utter extinction of all his virtue with his ability, and a dropping of his whole conscious being into lasting Nothingness! Would not a paralysis strike the power to perform the act? In the nature of the case, virtuous principles have a sustained energy, or feel a vitality, with the conviction that the act commanded is the occasion of its own extinction? Is an utter disrepute of its own existence essential to the disinterestedness of the virtuous? Does the righteous Lord and Father call forth an act of virtue which involves alliance and high fellowship with him, and in the very appeal of his faithful ally and dependent, child, for his sanction and support, suffer him at once to be struck out of existence?

But it may be said, "Virtue is its own reward"—or it has, in its own action, its own proper equivalent and reward. Very well, I do not speak of that form of injustice. Virtue is better and happier than vice, if it last but one moment. It is the conscious rectitude, the sacredness of the righteous cause, the sanctions of divine law, and consciousness of high fellowship with God, in all acts of virtue; here *is reward and support*, and no violence can take these away. But that rich, deep reward of the good man,—what makes it so rich, and so sustaining, but that its roots strike deep into the nature of God and his everlasting Government, and into the imperishable cause which He sustains? This *is* his reward. His convictions, so grounded, draw from those deep fountains their strength and joy. But what think you of the good man of one who inspires this confidence in a man, and draws from such fountains to give strength and joy for the virtuous act, and then *for* that act, lets a wicked judge or mob seal up the fountains to him and destroy his soul? Does the Ruler of the Governor put what is so sacred and precious to Him in the keeping of wicked men? Does he subject the highest principle of the system to destruction by its enemies? Does

the good man up into this high confidence, this conscious alliance of being and destiny, with himself, into this sweet, rich life, which is one with the divine life, to perish forever, as soon as, or because, it has become, divine—with no inheritance and no vindication, beyond the instant of an infamous death? But it will still be said in reply to this, that such sacrifice is not lost to the cause; the death of Socrates may do more for it than his life could; and his *name* will have vindication, a kind of immortality, in the great historic records and monuments of the world. Some profess themselves satisfied with thus handing down the results of their labors, and living in the grateful recollections of posterity.

But Harriet Martineau and her friend Mr. Atkinson, with some others, with all their intellectual and humane aspirations, do not represent, in their views of the present or the future life, the longing and faith of those who have struck the roots of their being deeper, and realized the true soul-life in God. The truth is, the greatest possible sacrifice is, not that of a mortal life, but of a *righteous soul*, of virtue templed in a living Personality. If God does not care to preserve that, the cause of virtue, in and for other souls, cannot be sacred. If all souls, virtuous and otherwise, are to become extinct; if the substantial good in virtue is only apparent, and is temporary, only as it is *carried on* into *successive* generations for an indefinite period, virtue itself becomes a temporary good, calculable and perishable like earthly things. It is not the *end* to be reached through nature, not the supreme interest governing her laws and changes, but an interest waiting on those changes, and subject to circumstances. And this is in direct conflict with the whole course and economy of the system, which, as we have seen, makes the *moral*, not the natural law, *supreme*. Let us carry out the favorite idea of some who assert that the really worthy end to be reached through Nature and society is not virtue in the individual soul, nor in the organized community of individual souls, but in handing down the *results* of virtue from souls that perish, to *successive generations*, thus carrying these results forward, with virtue, into this sort of immortality. But this succession of generations is liable to cease, by war, by pestilence, by a collision of the earth with a

comet. The earth itself, scientists tell us, is growing old when it dies, the last of the succession of human souls, with that that went before, will have died and perished forever. What then is the result? Just this: the earth will be swept through empty space a great corpse and a great cemetery. The system to which the earth belongs may still live and be peopled with living souls. But they, too, are perishable and the whole solar system likewise. The time will come when its population will be dead. What then will be the result? A system of cemeteries sweeping through vaster empty space.

But some conjecture that by a law of the system they propose to have discovered, the dead system will then be pulverized; the central tendency and crash of all its worlds, and that destruction will, through intense heat and expansion, result in the condition of a new movement, a new distribution, a new condensation of atoms; the infancy of a new system of worlds starting on a fresh career; the formative energies of the old system being renewed by its death.

But will the career of this new order of things last longer than that of the old; or has there been some waste of time thrown off into space, that will shorten its period? Will it be an improvement on the old in its gradations of life, or the same thing repeated? No scientist can tell. But on the theory of the mortality of the soul, the only real immortality being the matter as indestructible, and the only lasting product of the virtuous soul-life being what is transmitted in the succession, the succession itself only awaiting the last throb of a system that will die, what will be the *final product* of each world, of each succession of systems of worlds, but a succession of charnel-houses! No advance in the final product; no growing of one kernel of grain from all the harvest-fields of infinity; not a particle of resultant good remaining; nothing to abide but the ashes of worlds, and the potency for new creations with the same result, or, possibly, for shorter and shorter periods of *succession*, till the . . . end!

What is this process of world-making and world-destruction without a law of advance, and a permanent product of intelligence and of supreme excellence? And what can this be but *virtuous souls*, a vast company that no man can number

extinguished by violent hands, nor by the destruction of worlds, but, in their loyalty to God and righteousness, vindicated, exalted into the blessedness of divine fellowship and eternal life.

If there can be no such result, of real, lasting, and progressive worth; a society of the children of God, trained, for a season, under the discipline of necessity, and under the education of material laws, but then, raised up out of subjection to the changing fortunes of matter, and brought under the glad dominion of the royal Law of Love, to unfold their spiritual powers in the individual and social activities of a heavenly society, progressing in knowledge, love, and blessedness under the smiles of God forever—if there is to be no result like this, what shall we think of this process of world-making and world-destroying? The exclamation, “vanity of vanities, all is vanity,” would have an application beyond the sphere of our little earthly life, with its repeating circle of follies. We have all had our child-sport,—built houses of sand and scattered them again,—blown bubbles to float a moment in the air, then—break. It was well for *us* when children. But to interpret the world-making of the All-wise and Almighty, so that it shall work out at last only the *same results*,—houses of sand raised, and scattered; bubbles blown, and bubbles broken! It is an unworthy; it is an irrational estimate of what the wise and benevolent God and Father is working in the great cycles of his endless duration. All our ideas of unity and consistency in a *rational* system; or of worthiness of purpose, wisdom, and good faith, in a *moral* system, are contradicted in the assertion of such results. A system in which moral law is supreme, for the sake of moral excellence as the highest product, cannot make that excellence the mere sport of changes that come under the dominion of lower material laws. Virtue cannot be demanded of man under the solemn sanctions of the highest law of the system, if the very sacrifice required for its existence may be the occasion of its own destruction; or if the assassin may come between the virtuous soul and the deep fountains of its strength, and by a single blow, demonstrate that virtue herself is as perishable as the body which he smites with death. Nor can we call it good faith in the Great Lord and Father, to declare through the endowments he gives and the law he imposes, the

obligations of duty and the sacredness of virtue, and his own alliance with the virtuous soul, and then, having gained its full confidence and inspired its highest act, to suffer that act to be the occasion of sundering the alliance, and of dropping the dependent, loyal, trusting one from the blessed care and life just tasted, into everlasting nothingness. And that this should be true of all loyal, trusting souls!—and yet the moral law be supreme in the system, and moral excellence its supreme object! It is impossible.

If our reason demands for a world so grandly constructed, a First Cause whose attributes are adequate to the work, it demands also, a *product* worthy of the attributes manifested in the work. The governing laws of the system do express a rational and moral cause; can such a cause work without a rational and moral *end*, worthy of itself? What can such an end be but a product embodying rational and moral results of intrinsic, supreme value and of imperishable duration? Such a product we find in personalities of true moral excellence, united in social relationships which give full scope and activity for their varied powers, and together, responding to, and progressing in, that highest Divine life of Love, Righteousness, and Blessedness, world without end. Who can find it in anything short of this?

In conclusion, this argument does not involve the extinction of souls that refuse their true destiny. It is assumed of course that all rational personalities were made to obey the moral law as supreme. It follows then that all were made to be immortal; for endowments given for the practice of virtue must have been given to share in the life of virtue, which is imperishable. But if any refuse their obligation to obey the law of their being, and so fail to attain moral excellence, doing violence to their own nature and to the system itself, and to the benevolence and righteousness of the Great Maker and Lord of all, no man can tell, without a divine revelation, what shall be their destiny. Remaining as they are, out of harmony with God and the system and themselves, they must be miserable. The position is one of awful guilt and peril; and to pronounce upon the purposes or resources of a benevolent and righteous God, concerning them, is beyond the scope of human powers.

ARTICLE III.—EDUCATION FOR THE PULPIT.*

A SCENE which I once witnessed in my boyhood may serve as a point of entry into our theme. I was standing on the shores of the St. Croix and watching a colossal bank of mist which was slowly rolling its way up the river. White as snow and bathed in sunshine, it stretched its fleecy palisade athwart the valley and towered aloft in ramparts and domes of cloud. While I was gazing at this vision of vapor, out of its bosom came sailing a stately ship, all robed in canvas as white as the cloud itself. The graceful apparition emerged into the sunlight so suddenly that she might seem to have been created on the spot; and yet, as even the wondering boy well knew, all her beauty and strength were the slow product of causes remotely working and of labor, long, skillful, and patient. She was a result of the civilization she served; and every particle of her make was the contribution of toil which had been made possible by centuries of inventive genius and mechanical training.

In like manner, when the preacher steps forth in the sight of the world, it is not with powers of conviction and persuasion improvised on the spot. He is no sudden creation, but the resultant of years of persistent industry, and of centuries of Christian learning and Christian experience, of which he is the heir. And the "Building of the Ship," marvelously as Longfellow has melted into music its grimy labor and clamorous din, is but a faint echo of the higher processes, the more distant and complex causes, which slowly work together to build up the effective Christian orator.

Of some of these processes, which are within his own reach, it is my purpose to speak to you. They are many, and some of them are complicated. And lest we should weary ourselves unprofitably in attempting to analyze those which would

* The larger portion of this paper was used by the author as his inaugural address on the occasion of his induction into the Professorship of Sacred Rhetoric and Oratory in Bangor Theological Seminary, June 7, 1876.

appear to us after all as purely theoretical and unpractical. I have thought best to limit ourselves to the discussion of the preacher's convictions, his purpose, and his training. And I propose to introduce each trait with an example of it selected from history, in order that we may if possible approach the subject with a closer sympathy and a more personal interest.

For the first, let us turn back through fifteen centuries, and cross both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In a small village in Northern Africa we shall find a fiery youth, the son of a pagan father and of a Christian mother, precocious in intellect, but dissolute in life. A brilliant scholar, and thoroughly trained in the best schools of his time, Augustine became a renowned teacher in Carthage and Rome; and in both those dissolute capitals, he enriched his mind with heathen lore, and surfeited his passions with heathen vice. Always a profound thinker, he appears to have been a born doubter; and many and fierce, even then, were the struggles which raged between his passions and his conscience. At last the death of his father, the prayers of his mother, the study of certain passages in Cicero, and doubtless the pleadings of the still small voice within, drove him to the Bible. He read, he pondered, he doubted. His heart rebelled, his pagan philosophy interposed. He fled to his favorite classics. There was no rest there, and he turned from them with still unsatisfied longings. Doubt—sensuality—Manicheism—despair—these simple statements would sum up the struggles of years; and the fervid appeals of Ambrose to which he often listened only embittered and intensified the suffering.

I will not recount the long catalogue of his doubts. They challenged all the great questions of human existence and divine revelation. Like the preacher-king of Israel, he tried all the round of earthly indulgence, and penetrated for himself the hollowness and jugglery of its illusions. Like him, he hunted all the realms of science and philosophy, in quest of the one truth that should satisfy his soul—but the mocking phantom eluded his grasp. It was not until in the prime of his manhood, he accepted from Ambrose the vows of Christian baptism, that he reached the shore at last; and bringing with him the direst experiences of tempest and shipwreck, he understood all the

more vividly by contrast the solidity of the truth he had attained. "The firmest thing in this lower world," says Archbishop Leighton, "is a believing soul." This was the discovery of Augustine. And his dearly-bought knowledge not only confirmed him in Christian discipleship forever, but made him all the better pilot to other souls, for having suffered shipwreck on nearly every reef that lined the foaming channel. Whether dealing with his old comrades, the Manicheans, or with the Gnostics, whether with Donatists, Arians, or Jews, whether with Origen, Montanus, or Pelagius—and he encountered them all, and more—he wielded a weapon which was edged with the most tremendous personal convictions. The vicissitudes of his life, the turbulence of his passion, the diversities of his successive beliefs, the mocking changes of his doubts, the long and desperate warfare of his soul with them all, had altogether given him such a many-sidedness of thought, that he could transport himself and his logic into the situation of any imperiled soul, and demonstrate the truth to that soul out of the sympathies of his own experience. Dr. South's absurd eulogy on Charles I. was certainly true of the Bishop of Hippo: "He could defend religion as a king, dispute for it as a divine, and die for it as a martyr."

The lesson to be drawn from the experience of St. Augustine is the *value to the preacher of personal experimental convictions of the truth.*

There are various ways in which we may possess ourselves of the truth. We may take it because we were born to it, without troubling ourselves to question, or weigh, or even think. We may receive it dogmatically, by authority. We may learn it reasonably, from evidence and proof. We may be driven to it as a last hope, as the only refuge from the falsity of other systems. We may be taken captive by it, in spite of the long and desperate warfare of our doubts and fears against it. In whatever way it may come to us, it is evident that no mild grasp of the truth can suffice for the effective preaching of it. It must enter into the preacher's vitality. It must leaven the whole philosophy of his thought. It must pervade all the inspirations of his heart. It must concentrate and command all the energies of his being. He is to speak

not the convictions of others, but his own. It is not that he shall possess the truth, but that the truth shall have got divine possession of him. He is to know it by personal encounter with its forces. He is to know it by his own groping among its mysteries; by personal vision of those perils which sometimes drive the unwary upon the rocks; by the labor and strain of his own soul to right itself after the violence of each wave has passed. It is only as he is able to penetrate into the meaning and beauty, and glory of divine truth, and let the power of divine truth enter into him and seize and hold him in every fibre of his being, that he is competent to be put in trust with such a gospel. It may cost suffering. But he who proposes to be a champion of the truth must be willing to "endure hardness." "None can aspire to act greatly," said Burke, "but those who are of force to suffer greatly." And whatever it costs, the preacher of the Christian faith, so far from resting content with a general confidence in his message, or with a resolute assurance of its revealed certainty, to be believed at all hazards, is bound to "*know* whereof he affirms" by the utmost use and skill of the powers of reason and faith his Maker has given him. So far from shutting the gate to questions that menace his doctrines and opinions, let him grapple with them with the whole force of his soul. How else can he know whom, or what, or why he believes? How else can he sympathize or guide—when the mysteries of life and the perplexities of faith are assaulting the earnest minds in his flock? By what sort of insight of his own will he be able to recognize such religious difficulties among his fellow men, or even to suspect their presence? It is possible for a preacher to plod through the entire cycle of his ministry, and communicate a dull glimmer of the truth to those moderate souls like his own who are content to accept any well-trumpeted dogma—and yet be utterly unconscious that just over the stile from his beaten road is a "Valley of the shadow of death," in which, like Bunyan's pilgrims, his own neighbors are groping their benighted way, assailed by all manner of goblins and spectres of materialism and unbelief.

Let me ask, however, specifically, *wherein* will the preacher be advantaged by entertaining these strong experimental convictions?

First of all, they will develop his own love of truth as truth. Whatever it be, and wherever it lead, if it be truth, his mind holds it as a thing to be honored and prized; prized and honored all the more for the pain it has cost, and may cost again. When the Turkish Atheist, Mahomet Effendi, was burned for his atheism, though he believed the death into which he was so painfully driven would prove to be an eternal sleep, he refused to recant, nobly declaring—"Although there is no recompense to be looked for, yet truth is truth, and the love of it constrains me to die in its defense." If human reason, only half illumined, can attach itself with such ardor to an illusion, with what higher loyalty and more reverent affection should he cling to the truth who "has not followed cunningly devised fables," but with earnest prayer and with divine guidance has painfully climbed over craggy doubts and perils, until he stands at last on the mountain top of God's everlasting revelation. That which is true is to him the thing that is right and good. He hails it from whatever quarter it may come. He is ready to follow any shaft which may bring the miner to the secret place of the gold. And he has no fear lest such excavations might peradventure undermine the ramparts of his faith. Let them dig! They cannot destroy; they can only show to the world that those foundations go down deeper and broader than the roots of the everlasting hills. In the field of science, he looks on as hopefully as though no faintest echo of a collision had ever come to his ear. He thanks God for the armies of patient toilers who are devoting their lives to the study of God's work in nature. He desires the truth, whatever its place or shape. He watches their progress with interest. He receives their announcements with caution. But when any fact has been demonstrated, he hails it with as much enthusiasm as they. "Ever since I have known Christ," says one of the most devout of living English preachers, "I have put Christ in the centre as my sun, and each secular science revolves around Him as a planet."

The man of strong experimental convictions is a man of charity. Some minds hold their opinions with tenacious intolerance. A like bigotry may possibly sometimes be found in minds which have formed their opinions by the hard process I

am trying to describe. If so, they are exceptions. The rule is the other way. The tendency of a deep intellectual experience is to widen the sympathies and enlarge the charity; and more especially toward those who are struggling through similar conflicts—and that too, though they come out in quite the opposite direction. Those conflicts are the crises of eager minds engaged with the greatest of thoughts; and how can we help watching the issue with interest. What shall forbid our natural human sympathy with those momentous toils of the soul when it is working out its salvation with fear and trembling?—when it is grappling in secret with the problems of God and duty and eternal right—when in the hidden laboratory of the soul it is burning off the dross to get the pure metal at the cost of fire and pain; and if in these painful studies we think the results may be mistaken—if one mind shall come out a disciple of Paul, another of Apollos, and another of Cephas—if one shall cast in his lot with the Pope and another with Pelagius, another with Spinoza, and another with the much-belabored disciples of Darwin—our tolerance surely is elastic enough to respect the process, and feel charity for the result. Coleridge described an “error” as “often only the shadow of a great truth yet below the horizon;” and the statement may be taken as an induction from the entire history of human beliefs. How then can those who are on the mountain top already basking in the morning radiance, feel any other than kindness toward those in the valleys and cañons beneath, upon whom the light has not yet risen.

The man of experimental conviction is a man of courage. I need not say that this, to the preacher, is a virtue of inestimable price. Being more sure of his ground because he has fought over every inch of it himself, he knows better what to defend and how to defend it. This was the basis of Augustine's valor. Like him, the modern preacher may have the confidence which rises from knowledge. His mental experience has been checkered with humiliations and defeats; but divine grace has transmitted both into a bravery that like perfect love, “casteth out fear.” When Latimer in a sermon before Henry VIII. rebuked the vices in which his royal patron indulged, the angry monarch threatened him with death if he

did not apologize and retract. On the following Sunday, in the audience of his majesty and in a room crowded with courtiers eager to hear the apology, the brave man loyal to his convictions calmly rose in his pulpit and fixing his eyes on the King, exclaimed, "Bethink thee, Hugh Latimer, that thou art in the presence of thy worldly sovereign, who hath power to terminate thy earthly life, and cast all thy worldly goods into the flames. But bethink thee also, Hugh Latimer, that thou art in the presence of thy heavenly King, whose right hand is mighty to destroy as to save, and who can cast thy soul into hell-fire!" And from this terrible exordium there followed another castigation of royal vice under which the royal criminal cowered in silence and shame. For boldness like this no training is equal to the training of intense conviction. Let the preacher once feel that his feet are planted on the veritable truth of God, and there is nothing on earth can dislodge him or intimidate him. When he stands forth as the herald of the Cross, he stands as being in himself an embodiment of the conflicts which have surged around that symbol of faith. In those passionate appeals with which Lord Chatham was wont to rouse the ardor of Englishmen, he stood, as Cowper describes him,

With all his country beaming in his face.

And when the preacher sets forth God's truth, his face too should shine with the accumulated radiance of that truth, gathered from the most varied and blessed experiences of it in his own soul.

The man of great conviction is better fitted to guide other minds out of the labyrinth of error. For he does not stand at the beginning of the way and merely notify them, like a guide-board, of the bearing and distances of the journey before them; but he is the Greatheart of the whole pilgrimage, and leads them over ground which he has traversed himself before, and where he has had already a personal share in routing the lions, and slaying the giants, and pulling down the Doubting Castles. There is a strong sympathy between him and them. Like the High Priest described in the Epistle to the Hebrews, he "can have compassion on the ignorant and on them that are out of the way, for that he himself also is compassed with infirmity."

Such a pastor conducts his people through the mazes of life as with chains of invisible gold; which are forged not alone of the strength and beauty of divine truth, but also of the finest sympathies of his own soul.

It is not too much to say that every preacher of Christ should be moved by these strong and earnest convictions. But there is no royal road to their attainment. Different minds are of different fibre, and work differently, and yet may reach substantially the same result. Some, by long and profound reflection upon the truth, come to recognize and realize its weight. This begins as a purely intellectual process, but it ends by sweeping in the whole circuit of the soul with an overwhelming momentum. Some arrive at it by the intense rousing of their emotional nature which took place at conversion. This was the channel through which the emotional force moved. Some are constrained to leave one creed for another, by new views of the truth. Such interchanges between sects and parties of all shades of belief are constantly going on; and the step involves such painful sundering of old ties, that none take it but those whose convictions are already mighty enough to surmount the obstacles and compensate the suffering. Some, finally, can attain only as St. Augustine attained, by patient, resolute, vehement determination to find the truth at whatever risk. This is not an attempt to settle religious scruples by mere reasoning. It is not an attempt to reduce the supernatural and infinite to the human and finite. Least of all is it an attempt to turn religion into rationalism. But it is the calm judicial weighing of the evidences of the faith—the earnest investigation of its mysteries—the fearless grapple with its paradoxes—the ardent conflict with whatever of doubt, fallacy, sophistry, error, antagonism, may intrude on the mind and insist upon solution. In a word, it is the arraying upon the field of divine truth all the powers, mental, emotional, and spiritual, which God has given us—the highest capacities of human reason, crowned with the best gifts of divine grace—and with earnest prayer for light, setting them at work to study, and learn, and *know* the revealed truth, until we can throw down the gauntlet to all comers from every region of unbelief, and “render a reason for the hope that is in us.”

In such a labor, it will not hurt the preacher to study the great doubters, and the leaders of opposite faith. Let him spend some of his wakeful nights over Newman and Comte and Spinoza; let him consult Huxley and Wallace and Owen. It will be of the highest service to him to be shaken by these clashing beliefs as by an earthquake, if thereby he may realize how men around him think and feel and reason, if without actually enduring all temptation and all cavil himself, he may yet learn how to put his soul in the soul's stead of those who have; and if also he shall more perfectly appreciate how ineffably strong are the bulwarks of his own divinely-learned philosophy, within which he is dwelling as in the very House of God, a building not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.

It is time that we should pass to the second characteristic of the preacher. He should be a man not only of strong convictions, but also of *intense purpose*.

It might seem at first thought that this characteristic is quite covered by the other; but a moment's reflection will show us that the two differ *toto cælo*, in their basis, their mode of operation, and their effects. The first is grounded in the intellect, and the second in the will. The first works by reason, the second mainly by emotion. The first issues in belief, the second in action. It follows logically, and follows religiously, that where the first is, the second ought to be. But it does not always follow practically. There is mighty power in strong convictions of truth, and yet it may be latent power. It is one of the many wise sayings of Sydney Smith that "a great deal of talent is lost to the world for want of a little courage." And when Pope sharply reminds us that

"Some, to whom Heaven in wit has been profuse,
Want as much more to turn it to its use,"

we recognize the picture not as a satire, but as a melancholy fact. This was what ailed Coleridge; a mind of great proportions, and yet as unsteady of purpose as it was prodigious in capacity; a mind enormous and immense—literally so, out of rule, and without bounds—disdaining boundaries or control; a mind crowded with the greatest ideas, the richest fancies, the sublimest speculations, but with no drive behind them, and no

goal ahead of them; a mind gifted with every power except motive-power; "Excellent talker, very," said Hazlitt, bitterly—"if you let him start from no premises, and come to no conclusion." The *purpose*, then, is to be insisted on, as well as the convictions. For the preacher may have beliefs more weighty than worlds, and more luminous too, and yet be estopped from the free use of them; as, by personal diffidence, by inertia, by reluctance to create a stir, by unwillingness to draw to himself in any way the stare of notoriety. Or, holding the forcible opinions he does, he may divert them from their proper spiritual use, and make them weapons of scholastic combat; as when the Empress Helena found at Jerusalem, as she thought, the two nails that fastened our Lord's hands to the cross, and sent them to her son Constantine, the half-converted barbarian fashioned one into a bit for his war-horse, and the other into a spangle for his helmet. It is belittling to divine truth to expend its force on the gladiatorial shows of religion; and more also, it is defrauding our fellow-men of their share in its "sweetness and light," when we hide it behind our own timidity. Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there ought to be liberty; a great emancipation of utterance, beyond all trammels of modesty, or bigotry, or fear. The preacher's message should be like Mirabeau's eloquence (as Carlyle described it), "Conviction, *that wishes to convince*."

I desire, therefore, to urge *an intense purpose*, as a characteristic quite as essential to the preacher as strong personal convictions. And for an example to illustrate this oratorical quality, let us recross the Mediterranean from the home of Augustine to Florence, and come down from the fifth century to the fifteenth. We shall approach the city two centuries after Dante and Giotto had made it famous, while the Médici were its ruling family, and Machiavelli its honored statesman, while Leonardo da Vinci was already outrunning his age in all the paths of science as well as of art, while Michael Angelo was still a pupil, and Raphael was still a child. It was but just before Columbus restored to the world the lost Atlantis, and more than a century before Galileo was imprisoned for daring to believe astronomical fact.

Of all the names, however, of poet or painter or statesman,

which have shed their luster upon that center of art, not one ever so merited fame for his devotion to the best interests of Florence, as her eloquent Dominican monk and reformer, Jerome Savonarola.

He was a slight and delicate man, but the frail body was animated by a soul compact of courage and feeling and nerve. If the portrait of him in the gallery at Bowdoin College be genuine, his face was tender and spiritual, rather than forcible and glowing. There is a famous picture by one of the masters, of a monk who had been permitted to return from heaven and complete the task at which death had surprised him in his lonely cell; and you can read in his pale face and his concentrated attention the fervor of a soul that has looked beyond the veil. So in the portrait of Savonarola, you see in the eye the light of a mind that is accustomed to look upon eternal things, calm yet earnest, tender yet undeviating from the one great solemn purpose.

"We might call this delicate retired character," says Grimm, in his life of Michael Angelo, "resting only on itself, and woven as out of iron threads, an incarnate idea; for the will which animated him, which urged him forward and sustained him, is so plainly to be perceived in all his actions, that the appearance of the marvellous but one-sided power has something awful in it." This ardent reformer had already for twenty years burned with a desire to remedy the evils which afflicted Rome. He believed God was about to punish Italy and the Church for the corruptions which festered under the surface of both religion and the state. And it was his mighty ambition to rouse men to a sense of the danger and to prepare them for a free Italy and a purified Church. And even if that ambition was alloyed with the moral timidity, the fanatical enthusiasm, the insane dreams of miraculous gift and of supernatural protection, which George Eliot has so powerfully sketched in the character she has given him in *Romola*—and which I feel quite unable to admit—yet the total character and the sublime purpose of the man, as he plunged onward in his great work till he plunged into ruin, present a grand historical figure before which we stand with uncovered heads, as in the presence of one of those great masters of human destiny who constitute of themselves alone an epoch.

Savonarola was thirty-seven years old when he came to Florence as prior of the Church of San Marco; and there his eloquence, his fearlessness, his resolute demands for reform, the prodigious momentum with which he moved on toward reform and carried with him the mass of the Florentines—all these together put him on a vantage-ground of such authority and surrounded him with such a bulwark of popular devotion, that for years all the thunderbolts of Rome, and even its excommunication, could not dislodge him. At last, however, they burned him; but his martyr-pyre, as Latimer said to Ridley at the stake in England nearly sixty years after, "lighted such a candle as by God's grace shall never be put out." And even now, in our own day, that light of divine truth is beginning to illumine Italy again, and with a brighter luster than ever Savonarola dared to hope.

The great power of this man was that to his mighty convictions he added an equally mighty purpose. There was a resistless drive in his will, which carried everything before it. Among all his dreams of political and religious liberty he probably had no thought of absolutely overturning what he called "the Romish Babel;" but he was resolved to reform that Babel at any risk; and not Luther himself ever assailed its corruptions and debaucheries with a sharper lance or with a more furious onset.

Every preacher of Christ is, *ex officio*, a reformer. Not an agitator, not a partisan, not a leader in civil or social convulsions; but a reformer of individual lives, and through them, of the community and the world. He is the messenger of God, and wields "the powers of the world to come;" and the success of his labors among men will make them kings and priests unto God, for a career of endless glory. Into a calling so illustrious he should enter with the spirit of this Florentine monk. Let his convictions of truth and duty be as strong as St. Augustine's, but let him add to them also a purpose as high and as resolute as Savonarola's.

And this great purpose will be found to consist of a strong emotional element, based upon the intellectual. While the mind is taking account of the conditions of the case, the heart with quick sympathies will feel those conditions. On the one

hand, the preacher surveys the fallen race, and contemplates the terrible gulf of guilt and gloom, out of which he is sent to rescue them; and he addresses himself to his saving toil with the profoundest belief and persuasion, not only that the gospel with which he is commissioned is the power, and the only power, which can redeem these sinking generations, but also that there is no depth of despair and no form of guilt, which that power cannot reach. This is, in some shape, the strong conviction of which I have already spoken; and this is the work of the intellect. On the other hand, the heart also follows along the saddening track where the reason has gone before; it contemplates the same scenes; it looks tearfully down into the same gulf; it catches sight of the same struggling masses. But those masses are not mankind in the abstract, as they are apt to be to the reasoning intellect. To the heart they are men and women and children, in the concrete, they are you and me, they are yours and mine, they are real living, tangible sinners and sufferers, and must be redeemed at all hazards; and it yearns over them with tenderest sympathy, it longs for them with insatiable love. This is the office of the heart. And thus roused and reinforced by the convictions of the intellect, the two lay seige to the will, and inflame and inspire that, until its ponderous forces begin to move, and all the powers of heart, reason, and will, presently combine into one great, sublime resolve; a resolve which thenceforth drives the preacher untiringly onward in his sacred work, and makes him a savor of life unto life.

It would seem trivial to dictate rules for the formation of a purpose; and such a purpose would seem to have been already formed, in the very choice of the ministry. But this much at least is true, that it may be confirmed and quickened by simply cultivating the sensibilities. The preacher is to enter into his work with something more than professional enthusiasm. That Huguenot pastor in Antwerp three centuries ago, who one day preached to his little assembly of refugees in a room overlooking the market-place, where at the same moment some of his brethren were burning for their faith, and the light of their martyrdom flickered through the windows of the conventicle—that man preached with an earnest-

ness that was something more than professional. And if we, brethren, when we stand to publish the glad tidings, could realize that we also are "compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses," and that the thousands of martyr-pyres which have lighted the track of the church through the centuries, are casting their radiance upon the very pages of the bible from which we preach, should we not plead with a deeper earnestness and a more resolute zeal?

There are many ways of quickening the emotional nature. Let the preacher revolve in his mind day and night the delusion, the guilt, the peril, of the race. Let him contemplate the treasures of God's love in their redemption. Let him open every pore and nerve of his soul to the claims of human sympathy, and the splendors of divine grace. Let him think, and ponder, and question. Let him watch the jesting multitude crowding, as Tennyson says, "the downward slope to death." Let him weigh the terrible chances; let him study the means of rescue; until his mind is nerved to its utmost tension, and his heart to its fullest passion. Let him attain to the tremendous motives which inspired and impelled the apostle to the Indies; of whom one of his admirers has said, "Scholars criticised, wits jested, prudent men admonished, and kings opposed him; but on moved Francis Xavier, borne forward by an impulse which crushed and scattered to the winds all such puny obstacles."

Coleridge declared of that impetuous orator, Fox, that "his feeling was all intellect, and his intellect was all feeling." No better formula could be devised for the preacher. His feeling preëminently needs to be endowed with the force and firmness and reasonableness of the intellect, and his intellect needs to be interpenetrated through all its substance with the tenderest nerves of feeling, and then the whole sublimated, exalted, transfigured, by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. I have often admired the hopefulness of Confucius, standing alone among the turbulent provinces at our antipodes, twenty-three centuries ago, and attempting to reduce the wild chaos to order by the pure force of reason and moral influence and personal character. It was a sublime undertaking; but the impotency of human reason to stay the red hand of human wickedness

appalled even Confucius, and drove him despairing from the field. Has the preacher no other resources for his mission, than had the great philanthropist of China? Are the powers of brain and heart, even in their highest completeness, the only instrumentalities our Lord has entrusted to his ambassadors? No, no, thank God, there is a divine power added beside. And no servant of Christ is called upon to enter upon a labor so inexpressibly vast and responsible as the Christian ministry, until, in addition to the great impulses roused in his own soul, the Spirit of God has come down to abide in him and give him strength for his work. We are to covet earnestly for ourselves the best gifts, of truth and wisdom, of knowledge and discipline; and then we are to commit ourselves to the mighty tide of the divine Spirit within us, to be borne by Him whithersoever He will.

The preacher who moves forward in his work upon the two-fold impulse of the strongest convictions and the loftiest purpose, may seem to be "thoroughly furnished unto all good works." And here, therefore, our study of his qualifications might fitly end, if it were not that the superstructure of Christian oratory needs a base equally solid and firm. Let me press upon your attention, therefore, the vital necessity of a *thorough and substantial training*.

The oratory of Webster has been well described as "the lightning of passion, running along the iron links of argument." The one thing more to be insisted on is that the preacher be sure of the chain; that he have a conductor for his electric fire. He must learn how to forge these links of argument. And this requires long, laborious discipline, of years and books and experience.

It is by no means certain that a mind full of ideas is, therefore, able to impart those ideas, or that a heart glowing with emotion is therefore able to fire other hearts. Mighty convictions cannot always utter themselves effectively, or even suitably. Prosper Merimeé visited the British Parliament House, and irreverently calls it a "frightful monstrosity," and he adds, "I had previously no conception of what could be accomplished with an utter want of taste and two millions ster-

ling." Where taste is lacking, that is, a well-trained judgment, the very abundance of the resources may prove to be an embarrassment. And so the great orators have found it. Sheridan was a man of the most forcible opinions, and yet it required the training of years to enable him to express them. The same thing may be said of Savonarola in his early preaching. Fox rose to be "the most brilliant and accomplished debater the world ever saw," as Burke declares; but it was "by slow degrees," and Fox himself admits that it was "at the expense of the house." Lord Chatham attained to extraordinary powers of convincing and moving his fellow-men; but it has been said of him that "probably no man of genius since the days of Cicero has ever submitted to an equal amount of drudgery," in order to acquire them.

Let any average mind thoroughly inform itself upon any subject whatever, and without previous discipline attempt to move an audience with the material collected, and we need no sorcerer to divine for us the result. Accordingly the best speakers have placed the art of expression almost on a par with the ideas to be expressed. Look at that eldest of orators, who stood peerless and alone on the horizon of Grecian history; the name of Demosthenes has been through all the ages since a familiar synonym for laborious oratorical training. And from his day to the present, few distinguished names could be found, in the annals of forum, pulpit, senate or bar, in any country, which would not represent a similar patient toil.

Among them all let us fix our attention upon one, a preacher, who became so eminent for the melody of his persuasive periods, for the fascination he exerted over the highest culture and the rudest ignorance alike, and for the power with which he swayed even the rabble and prevented the crimes of mobs—that he has lost his own name in history, and is known only by the title won for him by his transcendent eloquence. We never hear of him as John, but as Chrysostom, or the "Golden Mouth." He was a contemporary of St. Augustine, and was born in Antioch, where the disciples were "first called Christians." His childhood was moulded by a Christian mother, as devoted as the mother of St. Augustine; his youth by a careful training in the school of the pagan rhetorician, Libanius.

It was under Libanius that he acquired his taste for oratory, and won his first honors. The drill was severe and thorough. And as he grew older, other schools trained him in the Platonic philosophy and in Christian theology. He spared neither labor nor time. He hesitated at no difficulty. He acknowledged no impossibilities. The discipline to which he subjected himself was the same that Tacitus calls *infinitus labor*. Four years he spent with a hermit in the mountains, two years he lodged by himself in a lonely cave, and the whole time was given to meditation upon the Scriptures and the practice of austerities. Worn down with his fastings and vigils, the recluse returned at last to the haunts of men, and for a long period confined himself to the private labors of an author and a student. It was not until more than twenty years of practice and study had developed the training he had received at the school of Libanius, that he suffered himself to be ordained as presbyter in his native city, and began to preach. After such a course we are not surprised to find that his eloquence soon attracted the crowds. So vast a power did he come to wield over them that when, some years after, his fame had reached the court, and the Emperor determined to transport him to Constantinople, he had to be enticed from Antioch and kidnapped, lest his devoted people should rise and detain him by force.

Our modern courses, of academy and college and seminary, are in many respects more complete and more fruitful than the courses Chrysostom took at the hands of Libanius and Andragathius, or with hermits in the mountains. But in one respect no modern curriculum affords any such thorough and continuous drill as that through which the golden-mouthed preacher so patiently worked his way—and that is in the one specialty of oratorical training. Chrysostom would have eagerly accepted all the opportunities our modern institutions afford; and not content with that, would have pushed on his laborious discipline far beyond the last university year. He would not have deemed himself fit to accept a trust so sacred as an ambassadorship from the Court of God, until all the powers of brain and hand and voice had been wrought to their utmost skill. What would he say to the indecorous haste with which we

sometimes transform ourselves into preachers of the Word—restless under the slow culture of study—impatient of the drag of education—more ardently hurrying into the field than laboring to prepare for the grave duties we shall find there? If such a master of tragedy as Macready could not personate Hamlet till he had studied that one play *seven years*, can we persuade ourselves that an apprenticeship of one year, or two, or three, or five, will amply endow us for the sublime duties and sometimes tremendous exigencies of a profession so immensely more responsible and holy? The young artist may have the most ardent longings, the most ravishing dreams, the most sublime imaginings, but he knows well that none of these ideals can be realized on canvas or in marble, without previous years of rudimentary drill in anatomy and perspective, in lights and shadows, in mechanical drawing and even in the drudgery of mixing colors. And if we claim, as we do, that the solemn work of the preacher is so much higher than the fancy-play of the artist, and if we admit, as we do, that few men are *born* orators, why shall we not demand of ourselves a preparatory course *as much more* severe, faithful, patient, laborious?

Think a moment how responsible the office of the preacher is. Look at the trust which is committed to him in the care of individual souls, in the nurture and maturing of their best elements, in the watchful repression of every tendency to evil, in holy ministrations to the child as well as to the adult, to the doubter as well as to the believer, to all possible diversities and shades of temperament and experience. In what a labyrinthine network of relations does that one man stand toward the multiform influences, the plans, affections, interests, and hopes of the hundreds of souls around him, no two of whom stand in the same attitude toward each other, or toward the truth, or toward him. Observe, too, how the very props of society—the principles of virtue, purity, truthfulness, and honesty between man and man—depend for their strength, almost for their existence, upon the truths he is called upon to proclaim, the divine law he is commissioned to interpret. And then remember to how vast an extent the destinies of these souls around him depend upon his powers of persuasion, destinies not for a trivial three-score years and ten, but for a magnitude of duration

absolutely infinite and inconceivable. No wonder that as we read Christian biography, we find that all those who have realized the high character and the vast possibilities of their office, have confessed themselves often overwhelmed with the sublime responsibility and the sometimes appalling burden. Shall we dare to enter upon such a trust with less preparation than will fit us for its duties? Shall it be said of the Christian ministry, that "Fools rush in where angels fear to tread?"

There may be danger, as Professor Park says, of being "slaves to a good rule." "As there is wisdom," he adds, "in the rule that a ministerial candidate must study ten years in the academy, college, and theological seminary, so there is wisdom in making certain exceptions to it. . . . The cry has come of a sudden; 'the Philistines be upon us!' We cannot wait for the symmetrical culture of all our ministers."

Certainly we cannot. And if any young minister *must* be an exception, let him take his lot and bow to the will of God; but not until he is reasonably sure that it is the will of God. The presumption is that if preachers partially trained may be useful, those who are entirely trained will be doubly useful; and in this presumption no one would agree more strenuously than the eminent authority I have quoted. The argument is not that every preacher should have a college training. A college training may be, or may not be, the best. Some of our foremost speakers, whether in the pulpit, on the platform, or at the bar, are men to whose eloquence no college ever had the privilege of contributing. There is no comparison attempted between the different methods of education. It is not the methods, but the results. And the argument is that no preacher should content himself with any preparation but the best obtainable, whether in college or out.

For how otherwise shall he dare trust himself with so mighty an office as an embassy from the Court of God? How shall he be sure that he understands the truth committed to him, if he brings to it only partially disciplined powers of thought? How effectively will he bring it to bear upon his fellow-men, if he has never learned to reason, if he has never trained himself to think, if he has never had practice in forging these Websterian links of argument, if his best powers, of

perception, of imagination, of insight, of reflection, of expression, are still half dormant in his inexperienced mind?

And consider, too, the stores of knowledge, which are as essential to the preacher's use as his mental discipline. Let his intellectual powers be never so finely tempered, and yet wherewithal shall he labor if he have not a magazine of material for the use of these disciplined faculties? What knows he of the bible, the very book from which he takes his commission, the exhaustless repertory of divine wisdom, which Chrysostom studied night and day for twenty years before he dared to preach it, and that too, though its New Testament was written in his own mother tongue? What knows he of that? of its meaning? of its history? of its original text? of its difficulties, and obscurities, and mysteries? of its marvellous variety and divine exuberance? What has he learned of man, and of the springs of human action, whether by pondering on the lessons of history, or by watching the myriad intricacies of motive and passion and caprice which are to-day shifting and surging all around him like the sea? How can he take the great truths of God's revelation in which he is yet so inexperienced, and apply them with power to the restless fluctuations of human mood and temper, in which he is even still more inexperienced? Is man so intelligible that he can be comprehended at a glance? Is the soul so facile that it will melt into penitence at the first touch? Is the heart, intrenched as it is behind its tough bastions of doubt or obstinacy or indifference—is that heart nevertheless so impressible that it will hasten forth and surrender at the first summons? Brethren, I do solemnly believe that in all our parishes some souls have made shipwreck of their faith, and many other souls are drifting aimlessly to and fro "without God and without hope in the world," not because we, their pastors, so far as we are accountable, have not prayed enough for them, nor because we have not been faithful, or conscientious, or diligent in our duty, but because we have never learned how to persuade them. We have never so studied human experience, we have never so versed ourselves in the complexities and mysteries of the human soul, we have never so explored the secret springs of human thought and purpose and passion, as to have acquired skill in taking the treasures of the Word of God and shaping them into

motives "quick and powerful," applicable to the myriad exigencies of human feeling, and actually persuasive and prevalent. We have never learned how. We slight our training, and then expect God to supplement our raw work. We dash through an ephemeral noviciate, and then expect God to make the world wise through the foolishness of our preaching. We plunge into the holy ministry, and expect God to overrule our maladroitness and save souls in spite of us. No, perhaps Minerva sprang full-armed from the head of Jove; but this is no day of miracles or mythologies; and we cannot expect to vault into the pulpit in full panoply by any such process of sudden parturition.

A due preparation for the ministry requires at least all the three years of a seminary course, and as much of previous academical training as it is possible to obtain; and not only this, but in many cases a post-graduate year could be added, and ought to be added. Milton was famous for his scholarship at the university, and yet felt that he must give himself at least five years more of hard study in the privacy of home before he dared embark in the labors and responsibilities of life; it was the dictate of his own sagacity, that "he cared not how late he came into life, only that he came fit." When we realize the amount of time and reading which must be given to the exegetical study of the bible, to the investigations of theology, to the almost boundless field of history, sacred and secular, to the study of preaching, and the entire art of expression; and beyond these, the vast range of philosophy, science, art and belles lettres, touching human life and representing human interest at every point, and demanding attention from every thoughtful mind, and preëminently from him who assumes to be a public teacher of morals and religion; and still further, when we consider how many faculties of mind are to be developed, and how diverse they are, and how different their handling—how perception, reflection, judgment, attention, memory, are all to be developed, magnified, sharpened—and the imagination too is to be evoked and harnessed to the service of all the rest; and finally, when we remember what pains-taking labor, through a wide reach of reading, and over a long-continued stretch of personal training, must be needful for the mastery of the English language, for the study of the great models of elo-

quence, for the culture of that instrument of marvellous possibilities, the human voice, and for drill in all the appurtenances of oratory:—when we take all these and more into account, how can we desire to convince ourselves that a “partial course” will amply suffice, or will ever suffice, for an office so sacred, and a preparation so vast? If we bring to our labor only the “small Latin and less Greek” which “rare Ben Jonson” ascribed to his friend Shakspeare, are we for *that* reason to enter the great profession by a shorter path? Could we imagine an artist encouraging a pupil with such indulgent sophistry? “My young friend,” (would he say?) “since you have received so little of the rudimentary training which you need before entering my studio, I will for that reason make an artist of you in a shorter time!” No, the less Greek, the longer course; that is more logical, and more consistent. The forty years Ghiberti spent on the two gates of the Baptistery at Florence were not wasted years; Michael Angelo himself pronounced those shapely doors worthy to be the gates of Paradise. And we who aspire to the august privilege of opening the gates of Paradise to our fellow-mortals, should count it our joy to rival these illustrious workers in the time and toil and brains we put into our qualifications for so transcendent a task. We may not hope to become the peers of Augustine, or of Chrysostom, or of Savonarola; but we may expect that any earnest preacher of fair abilities, who has been lifted by the grace of God into great convictions and into a mighty purpose, and who will patiently submit intellect, heart, will, and body, to years of toil and training, will be honored by his Lord with great power of persuasion and with abundant trophies of success.

There is doubtless in some minds a lurking suspicion that all this elaboration may tend to refine away the intense convictions and the solemn purpose with which the student in the ardor of his Christian love hastens to qualify himself for his ministry. Perhaps some will be reminded of Lessing’s fable of the hunter, whose ebony bow was so precious that he wished to adorn it, and had an entire hunting-scene deeply carved upon it; “My beloved bow,” he cried when it came home from the engraver, “you deserve this embellishment!” but when he tried it, the bow broke! I have only “darkened counsel by

ords without knowledge," however, if I have even suggested the thought that any portion of the ministerial training is to be spent upon the embellishments and decorations. The preacher's convictions of divine truth are by these labors not to be rittered away, but rather moulded and brought to utterance. His intense purpose is not to be enfeebled, but shaped and aimed the more exactly at its mark. There are wondrous harms in the purely intellectual study of divine themes, which we well know may become temptations. But he who is inspired by great convictions and a great purpose, we must remember, is pushing his work forward on a very high plane; so high as to unvail to him something of the spiritual wealth of that upper region, so high as to dwarf the allurements beneath him into pigmy trifles, so high as to be very near to the great sources of divine aid. Profoundly convinced as he is of the vital necessity of just that long and hard and patient drill, he presses on in humble self-distrust, but with unbounded confidence in the guardianship of God. The same divine hand which has pointed out to him the labor, will shield him in performing it. He holds himself to be but an instrument in that moving hand. He rejoices to feel that every stroke of patient toil, every day of costly training, every month and year of consuming study, is adding so much to the keenness and force of the blade, and will make it so much the more worthy of the divine hand that is to wield it. It is his to complete and perfect the instrument, to offer to his Lord the finest results of his wisest training; it is the Lord's to use the costly gift in His own divinest way.

When Amrou the Saracen was asked to exhibit the sword which had made such havoc in the ranks of the Crusaders, he drew forth his well-tried cimeter. "This is the sword," he said; "but without the arm of its master, it is neither sharper nor more weighty than the sword of Pharezdak the poet." We also, brothers in the ministry of Christ, ascribe all the success we can win to the arm of the Master. It is His. And let us count it so high honor to be chosen for that service, that no labor shall be too great, no time too precious, no care too burdensome, no sacrifice too vast, to spend upon the instrument, before we dare offer it to Him who is to employ it in an enterprise so illustrious and divine.

ARTICLE IV.—IMMER ON THE INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.*

THE views which have been held regarding Holy Scripture have always exerted an essential influence upon the treatment and explanation of the same. Once the church considered the Bible a through and through inspired book, and the sacred writers merely as God's amanuenses and pens, persons to whom the Holy Spirit dictated the contents and expression of their compositions. In consequence of this view of its origin, the whole Bible from the first verse of Genesis to the last one of the Apocalypse was looked upon as absolutely and infallibly authoritative. In modern times, a contrary view has obtained, namely, that Holy Scripture is all a completely human book, a literary product of the ancient Hebrews and of the earliest Christians, in the same sense in which the writings of the Greeks and Romans are the literary products of these peoples, so that the Bible is to be treated just as these other writings are. The truth lies in neither of these views, nor in a mean between the two, but above both. Both can be derived from it. This true view can only be arrived at by tracing the history of religion.

"Holy Scripture" presupposes a revelation. But revelation is the incoming of a new truth, overpoweringly important, which has so seized and filled the soul of a human being as to make him conscious that he has not himself discovered and brought forward this truth but received it from above. Such a revelation was it by which, in the midst of peoples given up to a sensual nature-worship, there was awakened in Abraham, with all its primitive power, the consciousness of the one God, distinct from nature, all-working and holy; the consciousness of a Personality above all other personalities, the knowledge of whom he was to regard as no secret doctrine but as a common blessing intended for the whole people. Thus the descendants of Abraham became possessors of an ideal blessing of infinite worth. They were made in a quite peculiar sense the people

* Translated from Immer's *Hermeneutik des neuen Testaments*; by E. D. BURTON, Instructor in Kalamazoo College, Michigan.

f God. This, however, at first only potentially (Exod. xix, -6). The problem remained for them to become actually what, in God's purpose, they already were, "a holy people" (Levit. xi, 3-45, xix, 2). As this process went on, the actualization of the idea of a people of God was looked upon wholly as God's work; the difficulty of the same, wholly as the fault of the people themselves. Here, in total contrast with the history of other peoples, all honor is given to God alone. This view of God as the invisible King of the people, and of the people as the object of his guidance and discipline, could have been no mere human thought. This also like the notion of one invisible, all-efficient God must have been a divine revelation. Thus too, it was a revelation, or rather a whole line of revelations, when prophets were called of God and by him impelled to hold up the people's sins before the people's face, to denounce God's judgments against them, and then foretell the glorious time of mercy afterwards to come, when God would again pity his people and bless them with a theocratic and moral restoration. Prophetic revelation thus displayed Israel's history as a history of divine guidance, as a conflict on God's part with his stiff-necked people in trying to educate them. To this prophetic revelation, this talking and struggling of God with his people, there corresponds on the part of the pious Israel a talking with God, which as a rule could only take a poetic form. Now, the pious man celebrates God in the song of praise; now, in silent religious satisfaction, he sings of his safety in his God's protection; still again, we find him in the stern fight of faith, struggling in ardent longing after his salvation or seeking the answer for the deepest riddles of life. Thus the whole history of this people appears in the light of the revealing spirit, as on the one hand God's struggle with the people in educating them (see especially Hosea and Jeremiah), on the other hand a praying struggle of the people with God, typically set forth at Gen. xxxii, 24-32. Comp. Hos. xii, 4, 5. This, the Holy Spirit of revelation prevailing over and in the people of Israel, is a reality presupposed by all Holy Scripture.

There is no direct necessity that such a divine revelation should be expressed in writing. The revelation is a revelation wholly apart from such an expression of it. In general, one

may say, it does not belong to the idea of revelation that it be put in writing. The necessity for this proceeds from the nature of the theocracy. The most fundamental piece of writing in and for Israel is the law of the two tables, written at the original organization of the people of God. Of no other writing is it said, as of this, that it was written with the finger of God (Exod. xxxi, 18, xxxii, 16). Later indeed many other laws were added, and the "book of the law" is mentioned several times even in the Pentateuch; but these laws served still less the purpose of revelation and in still higher degree the unique aim of the theocracy. Even the oldest historical records show a theocratic end (Exod. xvii, 14, and Num. xxxiii, 2 ff.). In the prophetic revelation it is entirely clear that it was recorded not so much because it was revelation as because it was to be a testimony for coming generations. The commands of God to the prophets to record the revelation by them received had no other purpose. See Isa. viii, 16, Hab. ii, 2, 3, Jer. xxxvi, 2, 3. Comp. 32. True, whole groups of prophecies were sometimes written, and those of the period of the captivity, such as the visions of Ezekiel and the discourses of the Babylonish Isaiah, were probably written only; but the reason of this lies entirely in the condition of affairs at the time. It was otherwise with the recording of songs and other poetical pieces. These were put forth rather as the outgoings or outgrowths of meditation upon divine and human things than as revelations. Revelation proper, in which the individual was receptive and controlled by the higher truth, was not in its time of bloom, bound to the writing, but the writing was subordinated to the revelation. Indeed, the inspiration referred much more to the oral expression than to the writing, and even the form of song and music in which lyrics were expressed,—a form entirely lost to us—was regarded, in part at any rate, as a gift of God. It is clear that the divine inspiration, which was restricted primarily to the spoken word and attached only indirectly to the record thereof, belonged by no means equally to all discourse and all writing. To be sure, during the period of the captivity and that immediately succeeding, scripture as scripture, acquired an ever increasing importance, because with the restoration of the theocracy a greater tendency to legality was connected, and

little by little, scriptural learning took the place of free, prophetic inspiration. Beyond question however, this rising veneration for the written word as such, was no indication of healthy life. Rather, it marked the decline of the higher spirit in the people.

Of course this reverence in which the scripture was held was of incalculable moment to the preservation of the theocracy. The period of production was followed, as always, by a period of conservation. But where shall we locate the boundary of this age of writing, and what shall be considered the criterion of the sacredness of the writings? Even the author of the book of Ecclesiastes complains: "Of making books there is no end." (Chap. xii, 12.) It would undoubtedly be incorrect to assume that, even at first, such a criterion was immediately and clearly perceived and a definite line of division drawn. The prologue of the book of Sirach shows us clearly the uncertainty of this boundary. It is well known that the Alexandrian Jews had a more comprehensive canon than the Palestinian Jews. It is worth while to notice from what books the New Testament writers quote and from what they do not quote; from what books frequently, and from what ones only seldom. Every one is aware that the expression: *ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται*, or *ὁ νόμος, οἱ προφῆται καὶ οἱ ψάλλοι* was the uniform designation for the collection of the sacred books of the Old Testament. The estimate in which the different books of the Old Testament were held in the time of Jesus and the apostles is shown by the fact that quotations are made from the Pentateuch, Isaiah, and the Psalms most frequently, from acknowledged canonical books, such as the Proverbs, and Job, comparatively seldom, from Solomon's song, the books of Esther, and Chronicles, very seldom. From the book of Kings again quotations occur quite often, while from the books of Ezra, Nehemiah, and Ecclesiastes no quotations whatever are made. On the other hand, here and there, though very seldom, reference is made to uncanonical books, such as the book of Tobit, the second book of Maccabees, and perhaps also to the book of Wisdom, while the Epistle of Jude undoubtedly makes reference to the spurious book of Enoch. All this is a clear proof that at that time the distinction between sacred and

non-sacred books was not yet so firmly fixed as it was at a later day. When Josephus in the well-known passage (c. Apion. I, 8) enumerates twenty-two sacred books of the Hebrews, and then adds that, though since the time of Artaxerxes various other books had been written they were not considered trustworthy, *διὰ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τῇν τῶν προφητῶν ἀκριβῆ διαδοχὴν*, he fixes the limit in time, namely, the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus, not far distant from the time at which prophecy is commonly supposed to have ceased. But the argument which Josephus advances for the inferior authority of these later books is based not upon inspiration, but upon tradition.

As concerns now the sacred writings of the New Testament, these likewise presuppose a revelation. This revelation is the appearance of a God-man, i. e., of a man who was not separate from God, but united with God, and who revealed the possibility and the reality of a union of man with God. The relation of man to God should not be a mere legal relation, but it should and can be a relation of love. And because man is designed to be united with God and to become a child of God, there is herein revealed a regard for man and an estimate of man such as is found in no other religion and no ancient philosophy. It is here revealed in one word—"the Son of God" in contrast to the Old Testament phrase, "servant of God." In contrast with the Old Testament theocracy, over against the inseparable unity that subsisted between the kingdom of God and the Israelitish nation, between the blessing of God and earthly prosperity, there is here revealed a kingdom of God which is designed precisely for the poor and oppressed, a kingdom of God independent of worldly powers and earthly prosperity, a kingdom of God in which the opposition between desert and reward reaches its highest point, but by that very means is overcome. And not only was the life of Christ, his words and his works, a revelation, but also his passion. In this there was made known to the receptive soul, on the one hand a manifestation of the guilt of the world and its enmity towards God, along with an impulse to repentance which no instruction and no law could have given; on the other hand, a sacrifice and suffering which could be interpreted by the believing soul

only as the fulfillment of the deepest Old Testament idea (Isaiah liii), i. e., as a suffering and death for us. Moreover, inasmuch as out of this death came forth life, out of this defeat a new power, a real victory, the death became to him whose eye is enlightened, not only his own assurance of resurrection and life, but also the interpreter of that great world-mystery, that Truth generally appears in the form of a servant and must rise to life and to victory through suffering and humiliation. Such ideas, which "had never entered into the heart of man," are revealed in Christ and through Christ, and impulses are given, stirring anew the souls of men and establishing a new civilization, the elementary principle of which is love (2 Cor. v, 17).

Upon this revelation the sacred Scriptures of the New Testament depend, but by no means directly. In the case of the New Testament, still less than in that of the Old, is it essential to the conception of a revelation that it be written. It is indeed significant that Christ himself neither wrote nor yet instructed others to write. Nay, so distinctly is his image impressed upon our soul that we can scarcely think of him as writing. His immediate followers and his earliest Church also wrote nothing at all. And precisely for this reason did they abstain from writing, that to them his words and deeds, his life and death, were so fresh and vivid in memory. The motive which the prophets of the Old Testament had for recording their prophecies and sealing them for testimony to future generations must have been entirely wanting to those who believed that they were living in the last days, and who regarded the second coming of Christ as near at hand. Even when the apostles went abroad to preach the gospel to the people of other lands, the oral *κήρυγμα* was the instrumentality of their mission-work. It was the oral preaching of the word by which Christian churches were established. Nothing is more certain than that the apostolic letters were written not for the purpose of founding churches but for confirming them in Christian faith and life, since the apostles often appeal in their epistles to their personal labors and oral instructions among their readers (cf. 1 Thess. ii, 1-12; 2 Thess. iii, 10; Gal. iv, 13-15; 1 Cor. ii, 1-5; iii, 1-sqq.). When the apostle to the Gentiles had founded churches in various and

distant lands, then first arose the necessity for letters of exhortation for the strengthening of the churches in the faith. But important as these letters must have been in the estimation both of the apostle himself and of his readers, yet the apostle Paul was convinced that the New Testament and ministry of the gospel were not a testament and ministry of the letter but of the spirit (2 Cor. iii, 6 sqq.). If we examine the letters of the apostle from the stand-point of their time, as we should, we shall find, together with many great, striking, and imperishable thoughts, those also which are wholly due to his rabbinical education. Among the latter we class the sometimes literal, sometimes figurative interpretation of Old Testament passages. We find that he by no means claims for himself infallibility, but that in certain matters he distinguishes between his opinion and the word of the Lord (1 Cor. vii, 25, 40); that he is sometimes careless in his style; that he was subject to forgetfulness (1 Cor. i, 14-16); that the tests of doctrinal correctness in the modern ecclesiastical sense are not to be applied to him (cf. 1 Cor. viii, 5; iii, 23; xi, 8). As concerns the form, we of course feel the convincing flow of his language and the power of his enthusiasm, but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that many Hebrew expressions and figures, many faulty sentences have been admitted, and that his Greek is generally very far from being classic. As these apostolic hortatory letters served directly the need of the churches and arose immediately from the relation of the apostle to them, so also the gospels, which undoubtedly arose somewhat later, served an indirect and more far-reaching necessity. Gradually immediate witnesses began to disappear from the scene, and with them threatened to perish the direct and credible recollections of the words, deeds, and fortunes of the Lord. Then gradually arose a literature of gospels, in part, as appears, from unauthorized sources. From this gospel literature arose first a gospel which was composed out of the *λόγια* of Matthew; then a second which appears to have been written under the direction of Peter; finally a third addressed to a prominent Christian in Italy and aiming to set forth the views of Paul, and at the same time secure the greatest possible completeness. Still later, at the very close of the apostolic

period, appeared a fourth, which takes a higher stand-point, above Judaism and Paulinism, and aims to exalt *πίστις* into *γνώσις*. These gospels furnish incontestable evidence that at the time of their production differences in the historical tradition already existed, and that the different views and reflections of the different evangelists exerted an influence upon their presentation of the facts which must have existed in the highest degree in the case of the fourth gospel. Even earlier than this, severe struggles had taken place between the Christian churches and the heathen nations, and even with the authorities; the Christians were everywhere a deeply hated sect, and the apostles were obliged to exhort to patience (cf. James and 1 Peter). At length the horrible persecution incited by Nero broke out, seeming to the believers to be the beginning of a decisive struggle between God and the world, between Christ and the adversary. Yet, at the same time, in the midst of this great disturbance shone forth again something of the old prophetic spirit, nourished especially by the visions of Daniel; and thus appeared the apocalypse of John, as a consolation in tribulation and an exhortation to steadfastness in expectation of the early appearing of the Lord. No other New Testament writer has, like the writer of the Apocalypse, appended to his book the threat: "If any man shall add to the words of the prophecy of this book, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book; and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part from the tree of life"—a threat which proved a stumbling-block to Luther and which can be explained only by the excited tone of this book.

The first Christian centuries witnessed the appearance of many writings, gospels and apocalypses in particular, but also Acts of Apostles, and letters or tracts, for the most part spurious, which were recognized only by individual heretical sects. In the middle of the second century Marcion had a canonical collection consisting of one Gospel and ten Epistles of Paul. At the beginning of the third century the greater part of the writings which we now possess in our New Testament canon had obtained canonical authority (cf. fragment of Muratori, Peschito, Citations in Irenaeus). Only in reference

to the Epistle of James, the second Epistle of Peter, the two short Epistles of John, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse, did any doubt still exist. In the Eastern Church, the Apocalypse, and in the Western, the Epistle to the Hebrews, were especially in dispute. On the other hand, during the first centuries there was here and there an inclination to accord canonicity to the Epistle of Barnabas and the first Epistle of Clement, as also to the Shepherd of Hermas. (The first with a fragment of the second Epistle of Clement is appended to the Cod. Alexandr.; the Epistle of Barnabas and the Shepherd of Hermas, to the Cod. Sinait.; Origen also makes respectful mention of the last-named book, which, however, Tertullian rejects.) The doubt in reference to the second Epistle of Peter, the two short Epistles of John, the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse, continued until the fourth century. The Shepherd and the Epistle of Barnabas were, however, already regarded as *νότοι*. (Eusebius, h. e. III, 25.) By these facts it is clearly shown that a considerable time elapsed before the distinction between sacred and non-sacred books was fixed. But what were the criteria according to which certain books were recognized as sacred and others not? In the case of the second Epistle of Peter it was undoubtedly because its authenticity was doubtful; in the case of the second and third Epistles of John it was probably their brevity and the small importance of their contents. It is more difficult to understand why the Western Church so strenuously resisted the recognition of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It cannot have been because of the contents, at least not because of the commonly cited passage (chap. vi, 4-6); for not once did Tertullian and Novatian, who had every reason to appeal to this passage, make use of it. It is more probably due to the fact that the Epistle was not regarded as a work of the Apostle Paul—a supposition in part, perhaps, attributable to the remark* of Origen. (Eusebius, h. e. VI, 25.) No distinction seems to have been made between authenticity and canonicity. The case was different with the Apocalypse; for it was recognized from the first. Justin Martyr

* This remark of Origen's is to the effect that, in his opinion, the *thoughts* of the epistle are Paul's, but the *style* and *phrase*, not.—Tr.

quotes from it. Irenæus makes conspicuous mention of it, and even Origen speaks of it as a sacred book. It was after the Chiliastic movement that the Eastern Church first discarded it. Here also it was the contents and character of the book that caused the dislike of the Orientals for it. If some hesitated to give the pastoral Epistles and the Epistle to Philemon a place in the canon, it was because they were private letters. This argument was strongly urged, especially against the Epistle to Philemon, and was even accompanied by the remark: *non semper Apostolum omnia Christo in se loquente dixisse*. (See Jerome Comment. in Ep. ad Philemon: in præf.). In order to reach the most impartial decision in reference to the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of certain books, it is necessary to consider one more book, the Gospel of John, which was never questioned by the early Church. It is known how sharp-sighted for every heresy the ancient Church was, and how suspicious of everything which gave support or encouragement to the Heretics. But the Gospel of John found immediate sympathy and acknowledgment of its authority among the adherents of the Valentinian Gnosis, so that the Valentinian Hieracleon even wrote a commentary upon this book (cf. Origen Tom. in Joh. Opp. IV, 220, 224). And yet from the end of the second century this gospel was accepted in the Church as a genuine and canonical book. What was it which overcame the scruples that would naturally have existed against this book on account of its Gnostic sentiments and style? Was it the conviction of the apostolic authorship of this scripture? Was it the lofty spirit of its contents, so acceptable to the Christian consciousness? Probably both together? This much then follows from all these facts, that the decision of the ancient Church in reference to the canonicity or non-canonicity of individual books was based not upon fixed principles of criticism, but upon a common, and for the most part, pretty correct sentiment. But what now were the grounds upon which in the fourth century, the second Epistle of Peter also, the two short Epistles of John, and the Epistle of Jude, likewise the so-called pastoral Epistles, together with the Epistle to Philemon and the Epistle to the Hebrews, as the writing of Paul, and finally the Apoca-

lypse, were all pronounced canonical writings? Has it perhaps been discovered since the time of Eusebius that the second Epistle of Peter is genuine, that the Epistle to the Hebrews is after all the work of the Apostle Paul, that, although Chiliastic, the Apocalypse rightfully claims a place in the sacred collection? By no means. The reason was the conservatism of the Church together with the necessity for a general ecclesiastical consolidation. Cf. Cyrill. Hierosol. *περὶ τῶν θείων γραφῶν*. Athanas. *Ep. fest.* 365. Canon 60 of the Council of Laodicea, Canon 36 of the Council of Hippo, etc. With the canonicity ascribed to the sacred books their inspiration naturally connected itself. Cf. e. g. Cyrill. Hierol. *loco citato*, “ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου ἡ τῶν ἁγίων πνεύματι λαληθεισῶν θείων γραφῶν ἑρμηνεία συνετελεῖτο.” But inspiration was at first attributed only to the Old Testament writings. Later, however, especially after the union of the New Testament Scriptures in a sacred collection, these also were regarded as inspired.

An evidence how little the apostles thought that centuries afterward their writings would be regarded as holy Scripture, is the circumstance that the autograph copies of the New Testament writers were lost so early that even the oldest church fathers betray no knowledge of them, either because they were written upon very perishable material, or because the early Christians attached no special value to them. Not the form, the wording, but the substance, was to them important. Would that these or even the oldest copies had been written so that we should be guaranteed against misunderstanding them! But it is well known that the ancients wrote in *scriptio continua* and—although the punctuation marks were known in the schools of the grammarians—without punctuation, without breathings and without iota subscript, which last was not generally employed in the ancient manuscripts. Consequently there existed much uncertainty and diversity of opinion among the ancient Church fathers as to how certain sentences should be read and how connected with the context. Cf. e. g. John i, 3, 9; Rom. vii, 11; 1 Cor. xiv, 33. In the fifth century the division into lines was introduced by Euthalius of Alexandria, and later the lines were separated by points. But this, of course, can show nothing in regard to the division which the

writers themselves had in mind. The same thing is true of the large divisions (*κεφαλαίους*) which came into vogue as early as the second century, and of which Matthew contained 355, Mark 234, Luke 342, and John 231. Our system of punctuation is of very recent origin, dating from the sixteenth century; our division into chapters comes from Hugo of St. Caro (d. 1263), and our present division into verses from Robertus Stephanus (1551). Not only in reference to the external form of the text of the New Testament is there great uncertainty, but also in reference to its inner significance. It is sufficiently evident to every unprejudiced mind that errors could have crept in in the copying. But the alterations in the text were not confined to those made unintentionally. In the early centuries when as yet it was not supposed that in the sacred text importance attached to every word, intentional alterations were made copiously and freely. Offensive or contradictory passages were removed and grammatical errors corrected. Expressions and thoughts which seemed not in accord with orthodoxy were adjusted to it. In the interest of the form of worship, e. g. doxologies were annexed; additions were made from the still existing traditions, as John vii, 53; John viii, 11; John v, 4; Mark xvi, 9, to the end. And in the interest of orthodoxy passages were even interpolated as 1 John v, 7. Such additions were at first merely written in the margin and were afterward embodied in the text. In view of all these circumstances by which the biblical text suffered alterations it might seem very much as if we should find ourselves in utter ignorance in respect to its origin, and, as if we should be obliged to abandon all thought of a possibility of getting at the original facts, especially when we remember that even in the time of Griesbach the variations amounted to 80,000. The orthodoxy of the seventeenth century settled the matter easily. It denied the facts *in toto* by asserting that divine Providence could not have suffered the word of God to be changed or adulterated. Such an assertion is at the present day an impossibility, when the undeniable facts are allowed to have their weight. We are compelled to reverse the dictum of orthodoxy and to say rather: In that divine Providence did not make provision for the unadulterated

preservation of the biblical text, it indicates that it did not desire that the truth of salvation should depend upon the letter of the Bible. Nevertheless, in the interest of theology it must be of great concern to us to press our way through this forest of variations, and to ascertain with the highest possible degree of certainty the original text. Nor is this impossible, but text-criticism conducted upon right principles leads to the goal.

In accordance with what has been said, what conception of holy Scripture may be advanced as the basis of a sound and well-grounded exegesis? (1.) The sacred Scriptures testify to the fact of a revelation. By revelations we understand not only certain truths which the receiver thereof, whether rightly or wrongly, holds as supernatural; we understand rather on the one hand, thoughts which are new ideal creations in the life of the individual, or the history of the nation; on the other hand, events which are full of significance, and exert an enlightening and inspiring influence—in one word, *ideas* which are *facts*, *facts* which are *ideas*. By these the Bible shows why it is the Holy Scripture, the Book of books. The distinction between the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments and other books is not merely—and not mainly—that the spirit of the Scriptures is related to the spirit of other books as universal spirit to particular; still less as enlightened spirit to unenlightened. They are related as the new man who gives to God all honor, who seeks and finds his full satisfaction only in communion with God, is to the old. (2.) But we are to distinguish carefully between revelation and the recording of that revelation, or Holy Scripture. In the revelation the man is entirely receptive, i. e., hearing (1 Sam. iii, 10), or seeing (Isaiah vi, 1, sqq.); in the communication of it (orally or in writing) he is active. The more immediately the record follows the revelation (as Num. xxiii, 12—xxiv, 4; Amos iii, 7, 8; Acts iv, 20; 2 Cor. iv, 6), the more truly is the word of the record itself a revelation. But this is not always the case, as e. g., in writing history when the revelation is transmitted by tradition, and the sacred writer records the tradition; or in writing of a reflective character, when the revelation is colored by the views of the nation and time and the thought of the

individual. This coloring has a much wider influence in the case of that which is written than of that which is spoken. The Holy Scripture contains all shades, from the most direct effusion to the most indirect tradition and human reflection.

3.) The sacred writer as the organ of revelation is, therefore, never merely and simply an organ, but since he is rooted in the views and interests of his nation and time, he is influenced both actively and passively by his general and individual interests. But just as little is he ever entirely destitute of the revealing Spirit. However much of human imperfection and impurity may cling to the writer, he still remains, passively or actively, consciously or unconsciously, under the influence of this Spirit. The divine and eternal on the one hand, and the human and temporal on the other, so unite in the Scripture, that the divine receives from the human its color and bodily form, the human from the divine its sanction. Thus the distinction between *Scriptura Sacra* and *Verbum Dei* is as correct as the separation of the two is inadmissible. (a.) The relation of the New Testament to the Old is in part a relation of unity, in part a relation of difference. The unity consists not only in the idea of one Almighty and holy God, but also in the idea, more or less perfect and spiritual, of a people of God, as the object of his revelations and guidance, and likewise in the idea of a mutual relation between promise and fulfillment. The difference consists partly in the inner and loving reception of God's law and the realization of divine love in human love, partly in the separation of the kingdom of God from the powers and circumstances of this world, and the exaltation of the suffering of death to the highest honor, but especially in the revelation of the relation of sonship, first in the person of Jesus, then also in believers. In some of the writings of the New Testament its unity with the Old Testament is more prominent, in others the difference between them. (b.) But the spirit of the New Testament gives free scope to individuality, in that not only Paul and James, but also John and Peter are distinguished both from each other and from the other two. Even in Paulinism itself there are unmistakable shadings. Between the earlier and the later letters also there is a marked difference, in that in the later letters there appears an advance

from *πίστις* to *γνώσις* and also an advance from the simpler to the more fully developed form of church government. From this it appears that the spirit of the New Testament, in general the spirit of revelation, is not a spirit of stagnation but of development. (c.) It is further undeniable that the New Testament Scriptures arose not in obedience to a special divine commission, but were called forth by the circumstances and needs of the churches. If mention is to be made here of a divine command it consists in the heart-felt desire of the apostle to promote the well-being of the churches. Cf. especially Rom. i, 9-12; 1 Cor. i, 10, sqq.; xv, 1-3; 2 Cor. ii, 12, 13; vii, 5, sqq.; Gal. i, 6, 7; iv, 12, sqq.; John xix, 35; xx, 31; 1 John i, 1-4; 2, i, 26; iv, 5, 13. (d.) No careful reader can fail to notice that the author of the Gospels and of the Acts of the apostles are in part at least, dependent upon tradition, and that the apostles themselves in their letters employ as evidence of the truth of their statements, such documents as from the standpoint of a strict exegesis would not stand the test, and make use also of such arguments as would appear now scarcely defensible; e. g., Gal. iii, 15 sqq.; iv, 21-31; 1 Cor. xi, 1-15; xv, 29 sqq.; Rom. iv, 20-25; vii, 1-6, etc. Not only is the apostle frequently influenced by his rabbinical education, but often his enthusiasm overcomes him, particularly in the Epistle to the Galatians and the second to the Corinthians. These are human weaknesses which indeed mar the purity of the divine truths, but which at the same time present the apostle to us only the more distinctly in historic life-likeness. (e.) Although the New Testament writers, even the writer of the Apocalypse, never supposed that they were writing sacred Scriptures for distant centuries, yet their writings have become so in consequence of a necessary development of the church. Not that Christian churches could not have existed at all without an established canon; but certainly to secure unity and steadfastness to the church there was and still is a need of some fixed authority, connecting it with its divine origin. Whatever flowed from the fullness of the knowledge of the revelation of salvation in Christ, has for all time a reviving and sanctifying power. (f.) As in the first centuries of the Christian church, not all the New Testament writings were esteemed of

equal value, so it must be permitted us to attach different values to them. Nay more, we are justified in going beyond the decisions of the ancient church. Since we know that it was unable to proceed according to fixed principles and with profound insight, we who are in possession of these are permitted to put to proof as well their recognition of some books as their doubts concerning others. (g.) The necessity of text-criticism must appear to us still more urgent when we consider that since by reason of the corruptions and variations of the text, the basis upon which the exegetical exposition must proceed has been rendered unsafe, text-criticism must lay the foundation for interpretation. But here in a thousand cases, only a probability, not a certainty is reached. (h.) Through all the views and modes of thought peculiar to humanity in different nations and times, through the undeniably great difference in value and content among the different parts of the holy Scripture, through the unclassic language and through all the uncertainties and corruptions of the text, there yet shines forth clearly and unmistakably the unique and divine substance of the New Testament. The less we blind ourselves, therefore, to these defects, the more we give our full attention to them, as to the body in which this divine soul dwells, the less repugnance shall we feel towards the soul of this body, i. e., the divine element in Scripture, on account of its being delivered to us thus, as it were, in the form of a servant.

ARTICLE V.—UNRECOGNIZED FORCES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY.

POLITICAL ECONOMY has much to gain in the way of popular favor. Practical men distrust it as theoretical and benevolent men call it unsympathetic. A majority of cultured persons know and care but little about the science which has to do with their daily bread. In so far as this results from ignorance and prejudice, time and increasing intelligence are the remedies; but the science itself may be responsible for a portion of it. There may be economic forces at work which have, as yet, received no adequate recognition; and, if these forces are not exceptional but regular, not mean but noble, if their effects are already great and promise to increase with time, the demand for their investigation is imperative. To show the existence of such forces and to point out some of them is the object of this paper.

Economic laws depend on the voluntary action of men, and the science therefore professes, in effect, to teach how men will act under given circumstances. The motives of human action are the ultimate determining forces, and a misconception as to the nature of these motives is liable to vitiate any conclusion thus attained. The accuracy of the conclusions of Political Economy depends on the correctness of its assumptions with regard to the nature of man. If man is not the being he is assumed to be, there is no certainty that the conclusions will be even approximately correct.

It is more than can be here undertaken, to prove, by the analysis of leading works, that the motives attributed to men have been, in fact, erroneous. That must be done by the reader for himself, by the study of the works themselves. It is, however, believed and asserted that a candid reading of the leading works on this subject will produce the conviction that the writers have troubled themselves very little with anthropological investigation. Their attention has been employed, and well employed, elsewhere. They have assumed, as the

basis of their science, a certain conception of man, and have employed their acuteness in determining what results will follow from the social labors of this assumed being. The premises have not been adequately verified ; the system is, in so far, an ideal one, and it is, therefore, a matter of some chance whether its results are correct or not. Economic science has never been based on adequate anthropological study.

Inaccuracies in the science which result from inadequate conceptions of man are not to be rectified, as has been asserted, by a proper allowance for "disturbing forces." The actual course of a cannon ball may be determined by a mathematical computation followed by the proper allowance for atmospheric resistance; but the social activities of men can not be accurately determined by assuming that man is a being of a certain kind, elaborating the conclusions with nicety, and then endeavoring to introduce subsequent allowance for the fact that man is, after all, a being of quite a different kind. As Mr. Ruskin has well said, such disturbing forces are rather chemical than mechanical. "We made learned experiments upon pure nitrogen, and have convinced ourselves that it is a very manageable gas ; but behold ! the thing which we have practically to deal with is its chloride, and this, the moment we touch it on our established principles, sends us with our apparatus through the ceiling."

The only right course under such circumstances is to begin at the beginning and determine by investigation the nature of man, the subject under consideration ; and this course should be adopted whether existing conclusions be true or false. The object is not so much to attain different results from those already reached, as to attain the same ones by a more legitimate method. The process which changes some false results will verify many true ones. The image which the scientist has constructed as the subject of his discussion may or may not resemble the man whom God has created ; the latter only is the true subject of Political Economy. The science, which has rested on a temporary blocking of assumption, needs to be built on a permanent foundation of anthropological fact.

Having determined the fact that the man of whom the Economy of the past has treated is largely the creature of assumption, consideration will farther develop the fact that the

assumed man does not, in fact, resemble the real one in several important respects, and that there is not only a possibility, but a moral certainty that some erroneous conclusions have resulted from this discrepancy. The assumed man is too mechanical and too selfish to correspond with the reality; he is actuated altogether too little by higher psychological forces. What is true of a laboring machine requiring only to be housed, fed, and supplied with fuel as a motive power, a creature actuated only by selfish motives, and scarcely conscious of spiritual forces, will certainly not be altogether true of a laboring man in modern society.

The recognition of the inadequate basis on which the traditional economic system rests and of the too theoretical character of its methods has led, in Germany, to the originating of a new method of treatment, in which the laws of Wealth are founded rather on recorded facts than upon assumption and deductive reasoning. The new method is termed the "Historical," and the old, in distinction, the "Ideal." So complete a change of method may not be necessary. It is on its anthropological side that the traditional science is chiefly defective, and, by adequate studies in this direction, results may be attained which History will verify. A broad field is thus opened for occupation. The first steps may be slow; it is easier to view a promised land from a mountain top than to capture it from the Canaanites. The richness of the soil is not to be estimated by the first results of its culture; what is thus gained is not the decreasing harvest of an exhausted field but the first sod-crop of a new one.

What is here attempted is rather to point out this field than to occupy it to any appreciable extent. The little that is done in the latter direction is scarcely more than an illustration of the foregoing statements. It is proposed to consider certain facts relative to the nature of man, selecting those which do not require careful investigation, and which need only to be stated to be admitted, and then to apply these facts to some familiar questions of Political Economy. If any light is thus thrown on questions now in doubt, if any new starting-point seems to be attained for future investigation, or if any modification results in economic principles as now understood, much

greater and more valuable results may be expected from more extended inquiry. The simpler and more obvious the anthropological facts here cited, and the more familiar the economic questions to which they are applied, the stronger is the inference as to the ultimate value of completer anthropological studies. Such studies would give a new character to Political Economy; they would verify its truths, correct its errors, impart to it a kindly and sympathetic quality, and elevate it to a recognition of those higher soul-forces which it has heretofore practically ignored.

Political Economy treats of man, not as he was created, but as he has become by ages of social development. An organism is a structure in which each part exists and acts not for itself, but for the whole. Social development means the uniting of mankind in an organism of which the individual man, the highest of simple organisms, is the molecule. Division of labor is the differentiation of parts in the social organism, and, by its greater or less degree, marks, as in the animal kingdom, the grade which the organism has attained. The higher the organism, the greater is the differentiation. The individual man, the molecule of the system, becomes transformed in his entire nature by this unifying process. The simple organism is made in every way higher and better by becoming a part of the social organism. The changes which take place in the individual differ, in the case of different ones, according to the position which each assumes in the organic whole, and social distinctions arise, which are not the result of ignorance or pride, but are founded on fundamental distinctions of social function. The individual man who, in the development of society, becomes a molecule of the brain of the social organism undergoes widely different modifications in his own nature from those experienced by the man who, in society, is simply a molecule of the nutritive organ. The scientist differs in mental and physical development from the tiller of the soil. So-called differences of social position have their true foundation in differences of function in the social organism, and are accompanied by real differences in the individual.

Low organisms of every sort have few and simple wants. Low social organisms, the mollusks and radiates of the social

classification, have few wants in the aggregate, and in like manner, the individual members of the low social unity have correspondingly few. Multiplicity of wants marks the grade of the society and of the individual. Simple food, little or no clothing, and the rudest of shelter, suffice for the tropical savage. Nomads require more varied appliances, the rudest agriculturists still more, and the civilized man of the present has an indefinite variety of wants and possessions. It appears to have been the acquiring of knowledge that awakened, in Adam, the consciousness of his need of clothing, and every subsequent advance in knowledge has brought new wants into active exercise.

As men differ from each other in the number and character of their wants, according as they belong to a lower or a higher social organism, so they differ from each other according to their position in the same social organism. Those who do the thinking for the social unity will have their own intellectual wants developed, while those who simply nourish and clothe it will find their lower wants in the ascendancy. The man of culture desires books, pictures, music, and intellectual as well as physical nourishment, while the rude and ignorant man is chiefly conscious of the need of sensuous comforts and pleasures.

The lowest wants are susceptible of complete satisfaction: the higher are indefinitely expansive. Appetite ceases to act when sufficient nourishment has been taken, and the sense of cold, when the body has been sufficiently clothed. The pleasurable sense of taste is capable of less complete satisfaction; the savage eats long after hunger has ceased, and, even in civilized life, similar phenomena are observed. In like manner, the desire for personal adornment causes the wardrobe to be increased and varied long after the need of simple protection has been fully met. The aesthetic desire for personal comeliness, and the desire for social consideration, are wants which expand indefinitely and are seldom completely satisfied.

Wants of this medium sort are indefinitely expansive but decrease in intensity as the desired objects are supplied. Pleasures of this kind tend to cloy. The first gratification is an object of intenser desire than the second, and the second than the following. An indefinite number of such acquisitions would each afford some gratification, but in diminishing degree.

The highest wants of man are not only indefinitely expansive, but afford undiminished or increased gratification at each successive attainment of the objects of desire. The scientific, aesthetic, and ethic wants of man's nature are, certainly, as well worthy of recognition as the animal desires. These wants as certainly lead men to labor for that which is true, beautiful, and good, as the physical wants lead men to labor for what is pleasant or comfortable. These higher wants increase in intensity with increased gratification. The more a man knows, the more ardently he seeks knowledge and the things which secure knowledge. The more the sense of the beautiful is cultivated, the more it is developed and increased. The better a man becomes, the more earnestly he strives after everything that tends to develop character.

These ideal wants are unselfish. Science, beauty, and moral worthiness are loved and desired each for its own sake. The man who is under the influence of such desires can never be a being striving solely for personal advantage, and the economic activities of a community of such men can never present an ignoble scramble for profit, each man for himself. These wants find no adequate recognition in the systems of Political Economy most widely prevalent, in which it is tacitly assumed that selfishness is at the basis of all economic action. Have such motives ever been carefully discussed as regular forces producing economic results? In so far as they have attracted attention, have they not been treated as "disturbing forces"? In modern times the "disturbances" which they create are of colossal magnitude. Wealth is given, not exchanged, under their influence. It is not "*do ut des*" but simply *do* where these motives are in control. Scientific needs have caused colleges to be endowed. Ethical wants have covered the land with churches and institutions of which morality is the object. Aesthetic desires have secured to the country something of the enjoyments of art. Each of these motives has caused vast amounts of wealth to be diverted into ways of which no adequate account can be taken in a system where each man is supposed to seek only his own selfish ends. Moreover, the action of these unselfish and super-sensual motives is not confined to activities in which they completely predominate, but appears, mingling with other motives,

in every activity of life. They cause higher impulses to mingle with the greed of gain in every department of industry. They soften the edge of hard bargains, and make business relations compatible with mutual good will. They temper the selfishness of employers with generosity, and that of laborers with gratitude. Traced farther and deeper, such motives are the roots of commercial honor; they make combination of effort possible, and are the life of the social organism.

Such results can hardly be ignored in any system of Economy, but the ideal and unselfish motives that produce these effects may be tacitly ignored, or may receive an inadequate recognition as a disturbing element. Such motives, however, are not occasional and exceptional, but constant and regular. They tend to increase with time and civilization, and, if classed as disturbing forces, promise eventually to overshadow those classed as normal. There is, in fact, nothing whatever of a "disturbing" nature about them. Their whole action tends to harmony. They are essential to those "economic harmonies" which Messrs. Cary and Bastiat think they have discovered in the unrestrained action of selfish motives. "Every man for himself" is the principle of disorganization and chaos; "every man for mankind" is the principle of organic unity. The more the action of such motives increases, the more harmoniously and rapidly will social development proceed, and the more speedily will the best and highest activities of the individual man be called forth. Such motives demand the first attention and the profoundest investigation, and not bare recognition as a disturbing element.

The general varieties of wants from the lowest to the highest exist, in some degree, in every man. No man is so rude as not to experience wants of the higher order, nor so cultured as to entirely rise above those of the lower. Classes of men differ in the relative intensity which their higher and their lower wants exhibit. Low wants, strongly marked, characterize ignorance and rudeness, and higher wants indicate education and refinement. Feeble aesthetic desires indicate grossness, and stunted ethical desires, bad moral character. The scale of relative intensity of the different wants varies in every individual, but a certain general classification is noticeable

according to the relative predominance of animal and intellectual desires. A more accurate classification is attainable than is here attempted, and the results of such more extended inquiry would be interesting and useful.

Some wants nature satisfies freely for all men and, here, differences of enjoyment depend on differences of capacity among individuals. The cultured man enjoys more of the free gifts of nature than the ignorant. Aside from the wants thus freely supplied, men gratify their desires in the order of their intensity, as far as their means permit. It is impossible to look into a man's nature and distinguish the relative intensity of his different wants, but it is practicable, in a general way, to observe those which he seeks to gratify. The man who is both uneducated and poor will have neither the disposition nor the ability to obtain many other than animal gratifications and a low order of the intellectual. If he be in the extreme of poverty, he can obtain, aside from what is free for all men, only what is necessary for the maintenance of life and strength. If he be also in the extreme of ignorance, he will desire no gratifications markedly higher in kind, but only an increased quantity of the lower. He will desire food for nourishment, clothing for protection, and a dwelling for shelter, but will care little for the comeliness of person or dwelling.

Should such a man become wealthy without becoming more cultured, he will desire only a quantitative increase of gratifications characteristic of the lowest social type. Personal vanity and love of display are strongly marked in the lowest social grades, and these motives will make themselves manifest in his new surroundings. His dwelling will be more showy, especially on the exterior. For purposes of display it may be of a size which does not increase, but rather diminishes the comfort which its owner takes in it. The furnishings of the interior will exhibit a desire for brilliant effects unregulated by taste. It is such men as this who order libraries according to shelf room, by the linear foot independently of contents, and who cover their walls with pictures in which brilliant coloring and framing strive to atone for the lack of artistic merit.

Poverty is compatible with refinement and education, and, where these exist, a widely different course of life is noticeable

as wealth increases. In such a case the clothing and dwelling will be comely and cleanly from the first, and every increase of means will be marked by an increased gratification of the higher intellectual wants. The dwelling will probably not be larger than convenience requires, but it will be tasteful within and without, and taste and not vanity will guide in the selection of furniture and decorations.

Thus certain broad lines of classification may be drawn between the members of a community, and the condition of the various classes in this respect, will determine the employments of the community.

Wants are either latent or developed, according to the intellectual condition of the person; when developed, they admit of three distinct conditions of activity, according to his ability to gratify them. The desire for what is decidedly beyond the possibility of attainment, is not, in a healthy nature, either constant or active. The peasant passes the palace with indifference, and experiences, at most, a desultory and transient wish to be its occupant. Such a wish is a day-dream; it stimulates to no effort, and its non-fulfilment occasions little discontent. In passing a dwelling slightly better than his own, the laborer may experience a desire of a different and more effective character. The desire for that which is attainable by effort, is active, and stimulates to exertion for the attainment of the object. The failure to obtain such an object, occasions lively disappointment. When such an object has been attained, the want of it ceases, and the active desires extend themselves to higher and remoter objects.

Wants admit of these three conditions; they are quiescent when the object of desire is unattainable, active, when it is attainable, and in a different manner quiescent when it is attained. The first condition is necessary to contentment, the second to ambition, and the third to tranquil enjoyment. Contentment, ambition and tranquil enjoyment are not inconsistent with each other, but, on the contrary, the coëxistence of these three mental states is the natural and healthy condition of the mind. Discontent and despondency sometimes exist in fact, as other unhealthy conditions exist; but they are not, in active life, the prevailing states. In any prosperous community men

tend to contentment, hopefulness, and enjoyment, and the opposite conditions are the exceptions.

These results are conditional on the distribution of property in the natural way. Should the natural conditions be disturbed by an artificial distribution, disastrous results in all these respects would follow. The habit would be acquired by many of coveting what, in the natural way, lies beyond the possibility of attainment, and the desire for such acquisitions would no longer be quiescent. The conditions of contentment would be destroyed and general discontent would be the probable condition of those who were likely to gain by the reallocation. As acquirement would no longer depend on successful exertion, the springs of ambition would be destroyed, and an eager and hungry waiting for a gratuity would be substituted for that natural condition. As the amount of the acquisition would not depend on the amount of effort put forth, expectation would have no natural limit, and the receiving of the gratuitous allotment would be followed by repining at its smallness. The losers in the redistribution would be deprived of what would be the object of an active and intense desire, and would experience great positive unhappiness, which would be intensified to despair by the impossibility of rising again by effort. All the above results would be indefinitely increased if there were a prospect of a periodic repetition of the reallocation. Absolute communism would be followed by the worst results conceivable, and any approach to it would be attended by a corresponding approximation to them.

The results of anthropological study may be applied to so many specific questions of Political Economy that to make the applications would require a review of the science. There are few economic questions which do not stand in a clearer light when preceded by adequate studies into the nature of man and of society. We need to make only one or two applications for the purpose of illustration. A very little light on a fundamental principle is a sufficient reward for attentive consideration. Such a principle is that of demand and supply. Clearness in the apprehension of this law requires a correct conception of effectual demand. Adam Smith has shown that desire for anything unaccompanied by the possession of sufficient

means for its purchase, produces no effect in the market and is not effectual, and his definition of effectual demand is desire accompanied by the possession of sufficient means for the purchase of the object. Every man would, thus, be an effectual demander for a thing if its price did not exceed his entire available means. A laborer with a small accumulation of savings would be an effectual demander for many luxuries which it is certain, in fact, that he never will purchase. The beggar spoken of by Adam Smith, will, probably, never purchase the coach and six, even though his savings be sufficient. Desire accompanied by ability to purchase is an inadequate conception of effectual demand.

It will be convenient for our purpose to state the results of our brief inquiry concerning wants in a tabular form. Ignoring differences between individuals for simplicity, let A, B, C, D, and E represent the different commodities which are the objects of desire of a class of persons. Let the intensity of the respective desires vary in a scale from 5 to 1, that for A being the most intense. Let the cost of each be represented by a single unit of value. The table will be as follows :

A, B, C, D, E, = Different objects of desire.

5, 4, 3, 2, 1, = Relative intensity of the different desires.

Individuals will satisfy their desires in the order of their intensity. The man with one unit of means available for present use will purchase A, one with two units, A and B, one with four, A, B, C, and D. In the case of each there will be a definite point where purchases will cease, and it is certain that the person will not purchase what is above the limit. Momentary caprices cause the relative intensity of different wants to vary and render the purchase-limit a somewhat fluctuating one; but, ignoring these variations, and supposing that the intensity of the desires at the time is represented by the figures indicated, the result is certain. The man with three units of means will not purchase D nor E, though he has abundant means for the purpose. Men only purchase what is the object of the most intense unsatisfied desire; there is always a purchase-limit determined by the nature and intensity of their wants and the available means in their possession, and they are effectual demanders only for what comes within this limit.

If a quantity of goods be offered for sale in the market at such a price that only a portion of the community find them within their purchase-limit, a portion will as certainly refrain from the purchase as if their entire means were inadequate for the purpose; and, if a portion remain unsold, and the necessity for its sale exists, its price must fall until it comes within the purchase-limit of more persons, or until an increased quantity comes within the limit in the case of those who previously purchased. How much the price must fall to accomplish these results is an interesting inquiry on which, it is believed, our discussion of wants will throw light.

The amount of decline in price necessary to secure new customers depends on the nature of the want which the commodity in question satisfies. If it be a want low in the scale it will be general in the community, and a smaller fall will be necessary than if the want be higher in the scale and experienced only by persons of a certain grade of culture. The amount of decline necessary to secure increased consumption by the same customers also depends on the nature of the want, but, here, the higher wants have the advantage. We have seen that they are more expansive and a small reduction in price may bring a much greater quantity within the purchase-limit. The increase in the quantity would have been desired from the first, but would have been kept above the limit by its price. The desire for wheat is not expansive; when a certain quantity is possessed no more is desired for consumption, and it must fall much in price before the same persons will purchase more of it. A small reduction in the price of a luxury may greatly increase its sale. The same causes which necessitate a large decline in price in case of an over-supply, secure a correspondingly large advance in case of an under-supply. A short crop of wheat advances so greatly in price as to be worth more, in the aggregate, than a large one. Intellectual wants are highly expansive, and, in their lower grades, are very general in a civilized community. Low prices of books of amusement, papers, concert and lecture tickets, &c., secure, within certain limits, a more than proportionally increased patronage.

The leading English writers on Political Economy have introduced a distinction between so-called "productive and unpro-

ductive consumption," the former being the consumption of those things, the effect of which is to enable a man to labor, and the latter, the consumption of things which give simple gratification without imparting laboring capacity. This distinction is chiefly of interest from the high authority on which it rests, and from the important questions which it is sought to solve by its use. The economic effects of luxury and of frugality are the real questions at issue in the discussion of what is termed productive and unproductive consumption. Mr. Mill conveys the impression of taking peculiar pleasure in this distinction and of conceiving that light has been thrown on important questions by its use.

The employment of this distinction for the purpose indicated is unnecessary, and involves inaccuracy of thought. Profuse expenditure differs from frugal living, not in producing less wealth, but in destroying more. Consumption is never, in itself, productive, but is more or less destructive. Moreover, the distinction itself will hardly bear analysis, if the nature of man be taken into consideration. It would doubtless be conceded by those who make use of this distinction that it would be impossible to rigidly apply it in actual life. To draw, in practice, a line between that which, in consumption, gives capacity for productive effort, and that which does not, would be impracticable. Comforts, as well as necessities, may increase the ability to work, and necessities, as well as comforts, may give gratification. The food of nearly every man satisfies wants higher in the scale than that of simple nourishment; most articles of food impart a sensuous gratification which is distinct from their nutritive action. The clothing of any one above destitution satisfies higher wants than those of warmth and protection, those, namely, of personal adornment and social consideration. So with the dwelling and the entire surroundings. To consume only productively, one must eat the cheapest food that will adequately nourish, wear the simplest clothing that will completely protect, and live in the rudest dwelling that will satisfactorily shelter. All higher wants, in short, must remain unsatisfied, and the man must become a machine, content with the fuel that keeps him in motion. Such a result would demand an entire change in the nature of the being under consideration.

That such a result can never be realized in fact, is self-evident; that it should ever be conceived of in thought, is an evidence of how little trouble even great writers on Political Economy have given themselves concerning the real nature of the being with whose actions they deal. If the laborer is an engine, his motive power is fuel; but, if he is a man, his motive power is hope. It is psychological rather than physiological forces which keep him in motion. He is to be lured, not pushed, in the way of productive effort. Ambition may have feeble sway in individual cases, but, this side of the gate of Dante's Inferno, it is never entirely extinct.

We have seen what wants on the margin of actual possession are the active incentives to effort. Civilized man struggles no longer for existence, but for progressive comfort and enjoyment. It is progress that makes contentment possible, as distinguished from sullen submission to unavoidable hardship. Progress has limits, and many wants must remain forever unsatisfied, and, by a kindly provision, such wants are generally quiescent. Other wants near to the border line of actual possession must be active with a prospect of satisfaction by effort, if happiness is to be attained. It is the want of things which lie far above the line of necessities and the consumption of which would be classed as unproductive, which is the constant motive power in industrial progress. It is the so-called "unproductive consumption" which is, if soul-forces be recognized, immediately productive of wealth.

Systems of Economy are colored by the sentiments of the land where they originate, and a system like the English could scarcely have originated elsewhere than in a country where the traditional practice, in dealing with the laboring class, is by the method of repression. Only, in such a country could the so-called "stationary state" be held up as an attractive picture of the laborer's future condition. In a country habituated to more of progress the necessity of progress would be more clearly recognized. Such theorising as that which we are criticising may apply to a class of laborers who have already passed the barrier where hope is left behind; it will hardly apply to the laboring class in a free and progressive country.

The ultimate foundations of Political Economy lie deeper than the strata on which existing systems have been reared. The point of divergence between the present science, and the true science lies farther back than ordinary inquiries extend. The Economist of the future must begin at the beginning of all knowledge and, with Socrates, pass through the portal from which diverge the various paths of scientific inquiry, and over which the master has written "Γινῶσι σεαυτόν." Self knowledge is the beginning of every science, but it is, likewise, the middle and the end of a science which treats of the activities of man, and of the social organism of which men are members.

ARTICLE VI.—WHAT CONSTITUTES SUCCESSFUL
TEACHING IN COLLEGES?

TO INSTRUCT under all conditions involves substantially the imparting powers in the teacher and receptive capacities of the scholar. But the age and progress of young men at the period of their pupilage in the college separates them from the rigid discipline of the schoolmaster, and the entire freedom enjoyed in professional study. Moreover, students are at this age in their transition stage, and the education they receive, more than any other, shapes their destiny. For these reasons instruction and government suited to this period have a distinct individuality, which it is now proposed to consider. Undoubtedly the most efficient method of influencing others is by enlisting their sympathy. So long as access to their real nature is denied, it is scarcely possible to direct them for good or evil; for there must be communication between man and man before they can unite in any common work. Unless this is effected, their energies will be directed to different ends, though they be compelled to act together. This is the case eminently between teacher and pupil; since the idea of education is that one person shall be able to direct not merely the action, but the thoughts of another. It is plain that this cannot be done unless each comprehends the motives of the other, and there be that confidence in the superior wisdom of the instructor which will justify his acceptance as a safe guide. While the feeling of confidence should be mutual, the guiding teacher exercises it consciously, and must put himself *en rapport* with the nature to be taught; but the latter unconsciously receives the influence. No man is fit by nature to be a professor unless he loves young people, and takes pleasure in the constant display of that brightest flower the earth has ever known, the bloom of youth. Hence he must never grow old in heart, or forget his own bright days when the sun shone gloriously upon the world, and made it seem full of beauty. And in this memory must be preserved the consciousness that he,

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too, in his day, was just as spirited, thoughtless, and overflowing with mischief, as the animated group which sits before him. Nor is this enough. He must earnestly desire them to be happy, and make it a daily study to render their youth as bright and joyous as this life of toil will allow. Life's high noon will come soon enough, and with it so much of care that youth should be made happy, since it can come but once. The teacher's object must always be, not to repress nor freeze to death these buoyant spirits, but to direct them into the proper channels. For it will not do to destroy any real power; it is too precious and should all be utilized. If he can show a lively sympathy in the welfare of his pupils; that his object, even when it becomes necessary to repress the exuberance of spirits, is not to abridge any innocent pleasure, but to seek their highest good; and can supplement this by culture to insure confidence in his superior wisdom to direct, his task henceforth is easy. For by this beginning his pupils are led to consider him, first of all, in the light of a friend, whose constant aim is their welfare; and when this understanding is secured between them, the way is open to enlighten the understanding and mould the moral character.

Without love for pupils and intense enjoyment in student life, an appetite as keen in the looking on as in personal experience, there can be but little effected by an instructor, however intellectual and accomplished. He may rule by force of will, and his severity be tolerated because of respect for his talents and acquisitions; but unless he communicates with the heart, he can never fully enlist the intellect in his service.

There is no time in the history of young men when they so much need sympathy as when they enter college. This is usually their first distant or protracted removal from the home of their childhood. Hitherto the youth has been considered merely a boy in the household; now, at once, he is treated as a man; he is alone in a strange place; with no new ties formed and all the old ones broken and bleeding. At such a time words of sympathy make a lasting impression, and inspire the soul with new courage. There are more young men broken in spirit, and thereby precluded from obtaining the culture of college, during the first month of their separ-

tion from home, than the four years which remain. It may be said sneeringly, that it is only weaklings who need such coddling; and that home-sickness is a disease which is unmanly. With such a view we have no patience. Every young person having a good home should feel deeply the separation from it; and if he does not there is something lacking in his nature. He may be stern and too proud to give way to what he terms weakness. But sternness and pride are not all the qualities necessary to form a perfect character. Sensibility and gentleness can effect much more happiness, both for him who exercises them and those who are their objects, than indifference and harshness. Besides, the possession of these gentler qualities is not inconsistent with the greatest firmness of purpose and steadfastness of character. On the contrary, they are always found in the highest types of human nature. "The perfect gentleman is he who unites the tenderness of a woman with the courage of a man." While we can be children but once in age; while we can never, when once dissevered from the home circle, reënter and incorporate fully with it; still the more of childhood's frankness we retain through after life, and the more of that precious savor of home we bear with us everywhere, the more "sweetness and light" will we diffuse in our pathway. Hence, if at the time when students meet as strangers, there can be a gentle word said, or a sympathetic glance bestowed by the instructor, many a sad heart will be relieved by the assurance that all true friends have not been left behind. If some are independent enough not to need this sympathy, still it will gain access to their confidence sooner than coldness or harshness. For all classes of men are more easily led than driven.

It seems a truism to say that no man can govern others who cannot control himself. Yet the lack of this ability is the origin of more failures in professional instruction than all other deficiencies combined. To teach requires a calm, collected mind, undisturbed by passion, not disconcerted by opposition, not disquieted by confusion. To perform the purely intellectual part of his duty, he must be self-contained, so as to rise superior to all efforts made to throw him off his balance. But his work is, also, to cultivate the heart; and

hence he must not be offended in anywise by the treatment received from his charge. If they needed neither government nor instruction his occupation would be gone; and to the degree that the pupil is captious or uncivil, to the same degree should his guide be able to oppose an example of quiet, gentle, dignity. The faithful discharge of duty with uniform courtesy of manner, allowing the looks to speak rather than the lips, are a powerful means of culture. If there be any place where, more than all others, the reliance upon "Words, words, words," is fatal, it is in the professor's chair. Yet this is the universal resort with all men when they lose their self-possession; and the teacher is often tempted to try their efficacy. For, in every company of young men there are some who are ugly tempered and uncivil by nature—though these are the exceptions. Others are puffed up with conceit, and do not readily brook control. No matter how rigid the spirit of discipline be in any institution, there are a thousand ways in which the professor's rights, and the proprieties of the place, may be encroached upon with the purpose to annoy. Two methods of dealing are possible, provided self-control be complete. One is by force of character shown in severity, and thereby to crush out all opposition by summary punishment. In this case fear is all that controls. Of course this is far better than not to rule at all. For if anarchy in the State is worse than any uniform species of government, however tyrannical, much more is this so when the object of rule is to give opportunity for instruction, since this is wholly dependent on systematic good order. Some natures can govern by no other method than force; but for those who are not shut up to this there is a more excellent way. The greatest firmness is entirely consistent with the most affectionate kindness. And when we consider that the task is not merely to enlighten the intellect, but to make the heart better; and through this combined culture to form the character for life's work, it is of far more consequence that the instructor be loved than feared. Undoubtedly a combination of the two is desirable, in consequence of the diverse natures of the pupils which call for the exercise of both qualities. It is seldom, however, that a man effects any good result by the exhibition of anger. If there be brute natures which can be

awed into submission in no other way, then, perhaps, it is allowable; but even in such cases the passion displayed in perfect self-control under strong provocation, is most efficient. Besides, brute natures on exhibition have no place inside of college walls where all should be refinement and culture; and surely should not be manufactured there by the example of the instructor. It is self-evident that no man can secure the respect of others who does not have it for himself. Hence when he so far forgets the requirements of his position as to lose his self-control and act like a madman, certainly, after reason has regained her seat, he must be heartily ashamed and mortified. Such conduct calls for apologies; but these from teacher to pupil are fatal to the discipline of college.

By this calmness, which is inseparable from self-control, the confidence of those who have force of character is secured; and such elements add greatly to the strength or regimen in any body of thinking men. One person who remains unmoved amid all commotions will be able to subdue the rest to calmness. For every other temper is fickle, and what is constantly changing can itself effect no permanent result. The disposition which is unmoved, however, is ready as a rallying point, and all others will in time gravitate to it.

The mastery of a subject is necessarily limited by the conditions of human knowledge, and also, practically, by the location where the instruction is given. But the lowest degree of mastery that is admissible, must be at least an amount of knowledge quite beyond the attainments which the most inquiring pupil may be expected to make while receiving instruction. Otherwise the teacher is manifestly unequal to his position. But beyond this, much more is necessary, and is expressed best by the word *growth*. For though the instructor have the elements of his subject by rote, though he possess a verbal accuracy and critical mastery of its outlines, embracing all that he can impart within the time allotted for pupilage, this will not suffice. Instruction derived from no more intellectual capital than this will quickly grow lean. The teacher will become monotonous, and the pupil grow wearied through the necessary repetition. Though a new class succeed, somehow the ideas which are repeated in one continual round will

lose their faculty of arresting and fastening the attention, and hence cease to instruct. Doubtless the chief reason is the condition of that mind which is content to stand still while all around it is in motion. For it insensibly imparts its own dullness through the medium of truths which are in themselves momentous, even though they are not repeated except to successive classes of hearers. There must be sympathy, not merely between the hearts of teacher and pupil, but also between their intellectual processes. The youthful mind is a vigorous plant. It is prickly all over with interrogation points, expressed or implied. It is eminently progressive and expansive. It advances with the spirit of the age; and by this progress alone will leave behind it that teacher who is content with his acquirements, though they be accurate and extensive, if they be not growing. Hence every successful teacher must never cease to be a close student himself. As he must not lose that freshness of feeling which makes him take pleasure in the buoyancy of youth, so he must not be out of harmony with the growth about him. He must, in fact, stir up the fresh soil with the share of his own intellect; he must sow the seed of his own ripe experience; he must irrigate by the sweat of his own brow; he must pluck up the rank weeds of idleness in his new field by careful culture of his own fallow. The teacher must be a student, not simply for the purpose of obtaining the information to impart, but for the influence on his own habits of thought. It is not enough to show the way clearly by accurate description; he must have the exhilaration of new prospects, which can be obtained successfully only when fresh fields of inquiry are surveyed. If knowledge be power, then his progress in original research will measure his ability for effective work. First principles must be the foundation of all investigation; but these continually receive new illustration by application to fresh truths, because they rehabilitate familiar ideas with new life and interest. The increased range of investigation in any subject causes the most trite principles to start up like old friends, whose faces are none the less dear because they have prospered since we last met them. Knowledge, while it grows, never becomes old or dull; because by its accretions it remoulds itself into new forms. Thus it effects

the same pleasure in each successive effort to instruct, as it did at its first acquisition. In this way the mind of the teacher shares with the pupil in the sympathy of a common intellectual effort. To insure this result, however, the studies of the teacher must be of two sorts. One has been indicated above in the constant progress made by further investigation in his specialty. The other is by a fresh revision of the particular lesson taught. However elementary the subject of instruction, or familiar its first principles be, they should be revised; not in a general way, but in precisely the mode they are to be taught. If a text book be employed, then the manual must be carefully studied anew, just as often as a new class of pupils is to be instructed. This might seem to be useless in the case of one who had repeatedly taught the same subject, and according to the same text book. Yet it is necessary in conveying information that the ideas be clear and definite, and that the language employed be precise. This combined result can be obtained only by a careful selection of the words best adapted to convey the meaning. Of course the mere learning a lesson by rote is not advocated, save where the task is the mastery of forms; but the consecution of ideas must be maintained, and they clothed in phraseology on a level with the scholar's progress. If the latter depends upon a text book this must be the basis of the teacher's preparation, because he must be able to go through substantially the same process himself, as that through which knowledge is conveyed. Besides, he must be familiar with the language of the text book by a fresh perusal, in order to meet the difficulties which arise in the learner's mind, and require an explanation, not according to the general principles of science, but on the basis of that amount of knowledge which can be obtained from the authors studied.

Though acquisitions exclusively in the line of the subject taught may insure highly respectable teaching, yet it will be narrow in its influence upon character. The mind does not expand in one direction alone, neither is its food but of one sort. Man is, physiologically, an omniverous animal; and will not attain his best type if fed on one viand, however excellent. He requires variety, though there be one staple ingredient present in all his dishes. Still more is this so with the mind. Its

range is limited only by the objects of the external world, and the powers of the mind within. All subjects of knowledge, as Cicero* so well said, are connected together by an indissoluble tie, and are to a degree mutually dependent. Hence there is absolutely no limit to the amount of illustration they furnish each other; and the more roots by which an idea fastens itself upon the mind, the firmer will it remain, and the more surely will it grow with rapidity. While the obvious illustrations, homogeneous with the subject, are necessary to its comprehension, they do not enlarge the range of vision, nor liberalize the mind so much, as those that are drawn from more remote sciences. One great danger of the young is that they will be puffed up by their conceit of wisdom; and hence a most important point to be gained is the enforced revelation of their own ignorance. This cannot be done so effectually by a narrow line of illustration as by one of extreme range. For thus will the mind of the learner discover how illimitable is the domain of knowledge, and how confined our narrow grasp. But when the firm foundation of acknowledged ignorance is laid, it is safe to awaken the enthusiasm of the ingenious by showing, that while we can know but in part and understand but in part, we can know nothing accurately unless we have some conception of that great universe of knowledge with which our acquisitions are inseparably connected, and form an indispensable element. Hence is verified the Greek proverb: He who does not know everything knows nothing.† Thus every idea mastered is treasured up the more securely because it is connected, by most interesting relations, with all that is knowable. The remoter bearings of a subject in this way have a tendency to liberalize the mind; they awaken new pleasure at every step; they make men of one profession or line of culture respect those engaged in another pursuit, by the consciousness that they are all mastering coördinate parts of one infinite system of truth.

There is an opposite danger to be carefully avoided, which consists in frittering away the energies through a desultory

* Pro. Archius, 1 fin.

† Attributed to Goethe, but not original with him.

rambling over too wide a field. This is more to be dreaded in the case of the pupil, before habits of consecutive thought and patient application are formed, than by the teacher, in his studies. The scholar must usually confine his labors within comparatively narrow bounds as to his main pursuits; and when he goes beyond them it must be for the purpose of relief, as journeys of recreation, or vacations for bodily health. But the master should not be so confined, because he is bound, not simply to convey the particular information by which the learner can make progress, but he must expound and liberalize his modes of thought as a necessary part of education. For no idea can be taught perfectly, but in its relations. Even in the most abstract sciences, as Pure Mathematics or Formal Logic, the terms can produce no significant results unless they connote definite objects. Hence an exclusive study of these sciences, apart from any practical application, instead of enlarging the understanding and developing its faculties, dwarfs them; and renders their devotee averse to attempt, as well as unable, to grapple with any questions of real life, involving, as all such subjects do, complicated relations. Accordingly, it is clear that the wider the field be from which illustrations be drawn, the greater will be the culture imparted. This accounts for the fact that men of extraordinary talents in a particular direction, and who are specialists in their studies, are almost invariably unsuccessful as teachers.

That man whose thoughts are concentrated upon himself exclusively is so disgusting that he is barely tolerated among his fellows; and this only because other men are not equally selfish. Such a person is manifestly unfit as an example by which the character of the young is to be moulded. But more than this. Such a state of feeling incapacitates the mind for clear action, because it is preoccupied with one idea so thoroughly that all others exert but a passing influence. Accordingly, if the teacher would be in the proper condition for efficient work, he must lose sight of himself in the interest he professes in the subject of instruction. While this principle holds good in every kind of mental activity; while the public speaker, the actor, or even the writer, must sink all thoughts of self and be absorbed in his subject if he would interest, this

is, if possible, more necessary in the class room. The teacher is not here for his own sake; he comes not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and consecrate his life to the good of his scholars. There is yet another reason. He is diligently watched by multitudes of sharp eyes, which become dangerously critical if they see any exposed place for the shafts of ridicule to enter. In this effort, they will not fail to be highly successful, if he places himself so much on a par with them as to regard any thing said or done as personal to himself. Each man has his own weaknesses and idiosyncracies; and these always grow by being humored, and become more conspicuous in proportion to the sensitiveness which their possessor exhibits. Hence any feeling of offended dignity, and especially any complaint that there is lack of respect, is fatal to the successful work and personal comfort of the teacher. The obvious truth is, that if an instructor has plenty of dignity, it will take care of itself without his thought; if he has but little, he had best give his whole attention to its preservation, and betake himself to some place where it is not likely to be wounded by rude shocks. An attempted insult from a pupil should not be noticed, however gross, unless it be of such a character as to interfere with the professor's work; and then is to be checked exclusively on that ground. For it is perfectly clear that no man can be insulted unless he choose to accept the affront. If he is in the line of duty, the pupil who is so abandoned as to wantonly attempt to hurt his feelings, is sure to be summarily condemned by the better spirit of the class. This is the strongest element of government in college, and if the professor can fully enlist it, he may well disregard all unreasoning petulance from the baser elements. If an occasion for insult be really given, then, as the affront is deserved, it must needs be pocketed in silence; for vain will be the attempt to take refuge behind the dignity of the professional chair.

It may always be taken for granted by men in any position, that if they are on the lookout for affront and disrespect their search will be rewarded with abundant success. Much more is this the case where the same persons meet from day to day, and he who should occupy a commanding elevation acknowledged to be above insult, leaves his vantage ground, and by

placing himself on a level with his inferiors in age and position, offers himself as a mark for every missile which the fertility of youthful mischief can contrive. If any teacher thinks he can be a match for a lecture-room full of bright young men, after they have, through his overbearing demeanor or childish punctiliousness about respect, been made to feel that their first duty is to give him all the annoyance they can, he greatly overrates his own powers or undervalues theirs. He may check their mirth in his presence; he may tread out their mischief for a time; yet if he do this successfully, it will be not by resenting this as a personal matter, but because it is subversive of good order. The fight will be long and bitter, if ever successful, when waged against any personal annoyance as such. Both teacher and pupil will be emphatically in hot water; and meanwhile there will be no good work done in educating the intellect: while the hearts of all involved will grow in bitterness, rather than in that love which always accompanies true culture. But he who, with entire forgetfulness of self, lives in his subject and for his pupils, will be remembered by them. They will take care of his reputation, if it need any care. While he will not any sooner expect to be insulted by them than a parent does by his child, they will repay his faithfulness by a world of love; and their respect will crown his venerated head with the sweetest laurels that cultured men can wear. With devoted affection do we look back to those true and faithful men at whose feet we sat and learned. Some have finished their course, full of peace and honor; while others still are unconsciously drawing young hearts to their own by bands which neither the passing of years nor the buffetings of life can pluck asunder.

Since it is the nature of young people to relish sport, mischief must be assumed as an element of character to be considered by every one who is brought in contact with them. Greek culture produced the most perfect development of mind and body ever gained apart from the higher spiritual relations; and doubtless was preparatory in furnishing the noblest type of human nature for the Gospel to consecrate to God. In this most perfect tongue of earth, the name of a young person is *παῖς* the player, from *παίξω* to play or sport. Playfulness is

the bent of every healthy, proper child; and if there be no disposition for fun and frolic, this is undoubted evidence that something is wrong mentally or physically. Hence, if any person thinks that this instinct should be eradicated, or that its exuberant flow can be dried up, he has no conception of that nature which is to be educated; and therefore has no business with a task quite beyond his comprehension. For if he could have his will in crushing out all fun and mischief, there would be left only an emasculated and prematurely aged mannikin: not a vigorous, sympathetic youth, alive to all noble thoughts, and ready for any worthy task. This *thing*—no longer a *person*—will be able, perhaps, to go over by rote, and with mechanical precision turn out the tale of bricks assigned. The hand organ grinds out its unvarying number of tunes, but has no harmony nor originality. The question then is, how to direct this exuberance of life without destroying its fountain or checking its innocent flow? It is a fact verified by all experience, that the teacher who is on the look out for mischief will find it. The pupil is quite too liberal to permit him to return empty handed from his “still hunt.” It is equally true that espionage develops latent powers for evil, which otherwise would slumber. Such is human nature, that a prohibition stirs up desire for transgression. The sight of forbidden fruit increases the hunger of Tantalus, and causes redoubled efforts to grasp it. It follows, therefore, that clear judgment should be exercised in determining how much be forbidden in advance, and how much noticed after the offence has been committed. Sharp, discriminating sight and hearing are invaluable, not so much to see all that is done as to enable the teacher to weigh exactly the guilt in a case deserving reprehension, and to fasten it without mistake on the proper offender. These two duties are among the most difficult that fall to his lot, and measure his skill by an unerring standard. The real object of government is to secure obedience for its own sake, without reference to law. For duty is easy if it be performed voluntarily, and the fetter of restraint is galling only when it confines a restive member. Hence the multiplication of regulations in the class room is to be avoided; and threats of punishment for anticipated offences should be resorted to with extreme caution. Espe-

cially should threats be avoided in *flagrante delicto*. This is not the time for threats, but the enforcement of law. When any act is to be denounced with no farther punishment, a time should be selected when no offence is under consideration; so that both parties may weigh it apart from personal feeling as far as this may be possible. Threats are ruinous to discipline if not executed; and hence, the fewer made, the less danger the teacher has of seeing them a dead letter, and feeling himself contemptible in his own eyes, as well as of those whom he has vainly tried to frighten. Offences must needs come under all discipline. But the majority that arise among students are of that sort in which more harm is done through the uneasiness and excitement occasioned by their punishment, than by over-looking them entirely. It is not meant that they should be unnoticed, for the teacher should see everything; but that they are generally too trivial for him to be justified in quitting his more important work to give them any attention. It may be said that such a course as this invites impunity, and opens the flood-gates of disorder. But in practice no such result follows. That the summary execution of Draconian laws increases the number of offences, is a matter of history, and must be admitted by every thoughtful publicist. When capital punishment was freely inflicted in England for highway robbery and burglary, these crimes were far more frequent and daring than after the penalty was mitigated. The constant execution of criminals cheapens the estimate of life, and familiarizes reckless men with deeds of violence. And the general tendency of all punishments is by frequent repetition to rob them of their power to intimidate. The great object of law is to rule so that offences be few; and when the execution of justice becomes necessary it will be preventive of crime by striking wholesome terror. But, as all discipline contemplates punishment for disobedience, cases will arise when the offence must not be passed over. Here the punishment must be prompt, firm, impartial; and not to be rescinded. It should be inflicted with as little publicity as possible, and never accompanied with explanations or apologies to those not involved. College censures or penalties should be so clearly just that they commend themselves; and then the character of the professor will be a guarantee of their propriety

when the reasons are not known to the other students. And the mysterious leaving of a bad student is the most efficient check ever brought to bear upon the disorderly ones who still remain. Every offence that deserves a penalty should be tried at once, because the censure, when viewed in connection with the misdeed, commends itself more to the guilty parties, as well as the looker on, than after delay. For while the offence will grow less distinct, and excite less disapprobation as time passes, the punishment, however late, will be new when it comes; and hence seem aggravated. The assertion that decisions to punish should not be rescinded, implies that such determination be arrived at with great caution, and not at all without positive evidence. But when once announced they must be carried out without fear or favor. For the great power of prevention which resides in punishment, arises from the absolute certainty of its infliction.

While the instructor must possess ample knowledge of his subject in order to be fitted to teach, he should never claim infallibility. The more completely he is cultured, the less will he be disposed to arrogate this in word or action. He should, therefore, never be offended if his opinions are questioned, provided this be done in the temper of genuine truth seeking. The spirit of free inquiry should be encouraged; and while respect for his authority must be maintained, yet this will provide for itself if he possess such attainments as deserve respect. Besides, however dogmatic he be, this will not secure respect for his authority on a disputed point unless his opinion rests upon a true basis. He that knows but little can ill bear to have his opinion questioned; he that is thoroughly master of himself and his work, can well afford to acknowledge a mistake. For no one on earth is infallible, save His Holiness; and he only in his own opinion and that of his sycophants. Many points in the best established sciences are still open questions; and it is perfectly natural that among many curious and vigorous young inquirers, some one might anticipate the teacher in the discovery of the truth; and when such is the case, a true man will always raise himself in the estimation of all whose good opinions are worth having, by frank and distinct acknowledgment. The relations between teacher and pupil are

admirably expressed in the name by which those professors who formerly lectured in Latin addressed their scholars: "Commilitones," Fellow-soldiers. The teacher leads the way, the pupils help him fight the battle; and the spoils of victory are to be divided between them. If, on the other hand, every pupil is to be a Pythagorean, and accept each word because *αὐτός ἔφη*. He said, free inquiry will be stifled if not destroyed. The great object of education being to make men fit to direct themselves when pupilage ceases, as cease it soon must; to make them independent investigators, able to take up the work where the teacher drops it, and in their turn be pioneers to hold up the torch for their successors; it is of the utmost consequence that every degree of freedom, consistent with the true modesty of knowledge, should be fostered. And hence, that teacher who has magnanimity enough to give full credit to his scholars, when by independent research they elucidate a point which was hitherto obscure to himself, takes the surest method to secure their entire confidence; and at the same time educates minds which will prove by their work that his influence has effected the most coveted results of instruction.

ARTICLE VII.—JOHN STUART MILL*

III.

IF there is no restraint which can withhold speculation from nihilism neither is there any which can withhold action from realism. Nothing can withhold speculation from nihilism, for in its final form, to which it inevitably tends, speculation is the endeavor to combine the inadequate and dissevered abstracts of human intelligence into a representation of universal being, and until the unity and integrity of the whole consent to appear in the representation, the abstracts will go on contradicting and effacing one another forever. It is safe to say that this is the doom of philosophy; at any rate it has so far been the doom of all the philosophies. From the most circumspect to the most pretentious of them, from the humility of subjective idealism in Mr. Mill to the confident omniscience of absolute idealism in Hegel, all alike are feats of constructive speculation which turn into criticism (for the most ruinous criticism is a ruined theory) and expire at last in nihilism. Nor is there any restraint which can withhold action from realism, for the determination to act and the terminus of the action are outside the actor, and this outside which we call the universe, while refusing to be represented, insists on being affirmed. It is unreasonable and overbearing on the part of the universe if you will, but it is so. Why then has philosophy failed to accept intelligently the rôle defined for it by the limits of intelligence, and fulfilled in spite of itself at every stage of its evolution? Why persisted in masking the disintegration of its conflicting artifices with the splendid haze of ideal reconstruction? Why not explicitly avowed itself everywhere, what it is, the detection and exposure of rational abstracts? Because criticism itself is as much an action as any other. Involving the whole apparatus of intelligence, it implies the critic and an object of criticism, affirms the universe in the

* Continued from the *New Englander* for July, 1877.

very denial of itself, and landing philosophy at nihilism unloads along with it all the surprises of realism. So what we have said of recent speculation is more or less applicable to all speculation whatever. Expelled from realism by one urgency only to be repelled from nihilism by another, it has pitched its ragrant tents upon the no-man's land between the two. The needed discrimination will come some day, no doubt, and beginning with the frank divorce of speculation from action, of philosophy from life, will end in the fulfillment and extinction of the weaker of the two. But it has not come yet, and pending its arrival there is no more impressive spectacle than high intelligence perplexed between an infinite aspiration and a bounded power; goaded by the honorable illusions that the world cannot be used until it is comprehended, and that it can be comprehended by anything at once other and less than itself.

We have put the names of Hegel and Mill together here for the reason that in the daring of the one and the diffidence of the other are the opposite poles of philosophy, and the same moral in both. They are extreme types of speculation collapsing into criticism; that is, disclosing in the endeavor to represent the universe the inadequacy of all representation. It is the merit of Hegel to have entirely understood and accepted the conditions of the task, to have seen that a thing cannot be *represented* by another thing or in it, or changes in one by changes in another; therefore, that no intelligence detached from and planted outside the universe will ever contrive a system in which the universe is expressed. The whole doctrine of representation, whatever form it wears in philosophy, is proved to be illusion, not only by the absence of any criterion to assure the validity of a given representation, but by the *a priori* certainty that all representation is impossible. A theory of things is not to be had. There are numerous collections of concepts which pass for theories, but none of them agree together simply because they are extraneous to one another, and none agree to the reality because they are extraneous to the reality. But one expression of the universe is possible and that the expression into which the universe passes. And my system, says Hegel, is that expression. All Being is

a Becoming. What men in their disjointed way talk of as the co-existences and successions of things and break up into abstracts of noumenon and phenomenon, force and motion, cause and effect, mind and matter, subject and object, creator and created, are the graduated phases of the infinite and eternal Absolute, which however it fall to pieces in your thinking about it, in itself knows nothing of schisms in space or time. There is one Being, namely, the Absolute Idea; and three phases of the One, namely, Logic the pure abstract of the Idea, passing into Nature the higher concrete, and both into Spirit the highest concrete of all; whose true expression is the system of me, George Frederick William Hegel. This is not insolence or bombast, at least on one side of it—the negative side, but, as we have said, a proclamation of a fact we take to be indubitable, that until you get the reality *into* the expression you will never get any expression; a most righteous judgment therefore, upon any thinker who sets up the collected abstracts of his own isolated thinking for the system of the great whole; as if the Whole would reflect its form in the looking glass or pour its tides into the pool of any limited intelligence outside itself. The absurd comes in, if at all, with Hegel's pretence that he is inside and not outside the processus; that the Universal Ego has found room for itself in his Ego, the Absolute Idea in his idea, that evolving Being has *involved* itself at last in his system as its highest concrete and so its sufficient expression. And here the great Hegelian Apostle to the Gentiles turns upon an unregenerate world with the heroic authority of inspiration. You ask me how the Idea, which is one, can yet exist in phases as three, and how we know that the System is the true expression of the Triune Absolute. But I must first ask *you* with what intent you put the question. Is it because you deny that the system is the real system of the universe? Then you yourself, apparently, know what the real system is. If you don't know you can't deny that this is it. If you do know—produce it! Or do you ask because you do not understand and want us to explain? Then I am sorry to say we can do little to help you. For the explanation of the system is the system itself and so long as you are outside of it you can never understand it. Until evolving Being has involved itself

in you as a partaker in the Absolute Idea you will never know nor can we explain. When that consummation comes you will know, and know Hegelianism to be true.* What reply is there to this? We are outside the system and have none of our own; the universe having never paid us the compliment it paid Hegel, we can neither accept nor reject Hegelianism. We have but one reply and here it is. You say with perfect reason that the system is inexplicable to him who has it not, that in his outer darkness he can neither affirm it nor deny it nor receive it. Then why, O Hegelian, all this travail and prodigality of explanation? You are not to be revealed—and Sinai and Patmos are ablaze with the cloudy splendors of your apocalypse. The SYSTEM itself is the one expression of the universe, beside it there is no other—and our shelves groan under the burden of your expression of the expression! This is contradiction and the contradiction suicide. That the ocean of Infinite Being should lie hushed in the trance of the Absolute Idea may very well be for what we know: but that it should vent itself in the gush—however pellucid—of your discourse, that cannot be at all. We could not gainsay the divinity while the oracle was dumb. But you have spoken, and speaking, are trapped in the dilemma you set for us. Either, putting it plainly, the system of Hegel is in the twenty odd octavos of Hegel, or it is not. If it is it is not the system of the universe, for the universe can't be bound in octavo. If it is not then, good heavens, why the twenty octavos?

For Mr. Mill the prodigious abstractions of German philosophy are the emptiest of phantoms, but Mr. Mill too, in his more conciliatory manner, insists on the Hegelian dilemma. His complaint of the critics is that they miss the mark because they do not understand him, and that they do not understand because they do not "put themselves at the standpoint" of his theory. Any man who has a system of his own, or none at all, is *ipso facto* outside Mr. Mill's and can reach the center of it in no way short of adopting it. What are we to do about it? The true expression of the universe, says Hegel, is in my experience of it. Mr. Mill, without any of the affectations of

* Vera. Introduction to the translation of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.

omniscience, does yet equally say that the true expression of the universe is in his experience of it. And each of a hundred other philosophers says it is in *his*. *Quot homines tot sententiæ*. There is one Kosmos but a thousand cosmologies. Life is too short to adopt them all in turn ; criticism from without is invalid. We can only say to one philosopher what we say to all. However true it may be that the universe has expressed itself in your experience we cannot at any rate find it in your expression of the expression. The very essence and plenitude of it for aught we know may have passed into you, but it certainly has not passed into your discourse, and you who know so much ought to have known perfectly well beforehand that it would not. Dropping apostrophe and generalizing the statement, we say that any system of philosophy is beyond the reach of criticism in so far as it criticizes the systems which it sets aside, but that it goes down at once before the *tu quoque* argument or in the recoil of its own guns, because the discrete conceptions which it extricates from concrete experience to embody in propositions and compile into treatises as a doctrine of the universe belong of necessity to that very class of dissevered and contradictory abstracts which it derides. So there is no withstanding Hegel when he opens fire on the Substance of Spinoza, the Occasional Causes of Malebranche, the Pre-established Harmonies of Leibnitz, the Ego of Fichte, or the Non-ego of Schelling ; but in turn the Absolute Idea and its three phases, Logic, Nature, and Spirit, instantly identify themselves, in the very pomp of the exposition, as members of the same family, and we know without waiting for the event that some Schopenhauer will come to thrust aside the Absolute Idea for the Absolute Will, and some Hartmann to bury both under the Philosophy of the Unconscious. In a word, philosophy is explicit or virtual criticism of the abstractions by which we represent the universe to ourselves, and alike in its polemic and its constructions leads to nihilism. Its reproach—and its interest—is, that in fulfilling its task it seeks to avert its doom ; that it permits the speculative urgency of the intellect to be interrupted by the practical urgencies of life, and attempts an impossible negotiation between the two. In the study of any given system we

have only to ask at what particular point along the line the halt is called, and what particular reasons are given for stopping *there*; why, first, the criticism good so far is not good to the very end: why, second, the realities admitted in spite of criticism do not bring in all the others along with them.

Mr. Mill, as we said, does not trouble himself with the exhalations afloat over the swamps of German idealism. For the matter of that he has the British lack of the historic sense, and approaches the problem of the universe with scant respect for any but the empirical traditions of philosophy. What concern him are those abstractions which occupy the common consciousness of men; not, unfortunately, in their native form, but as modified to suit the emergencies of the Scotch appeal to "common-sense." Beginning with the conception of substance, as that fundamental reality to which we refer the integrity and permanence of any group of phenomena, Mr. Mill concludes that inexorable laws of thought require its suppression. The same process applies to the conception of force, or cause, as that other reality to which we refer the determination of changes among phenomena.* The conceptions of space and time as the realities in which coëxisting and consecutive phenomena are contained follow those of substance and cause. The bottom having thus fallen out of matter and all its specific differences as a separate entity, the constitutive element or principle and the comprehending forms which gave it independent being apart from other modes of being, it is impossible to save the phenomena themselves. In all this it cannot be said that Mr. Mill has added anything original to the critical procedure already in use. The complex conception of an objective universe, as men ordinarily entertain it or as philosophy deals with it, is discarded on the familiar ground that any such universe is *ex vi termini*, outside the consciousness which affirms it; therefore (1) that it cannot be known: (2) that it cannot be conceived: and (3) that as unknowable and incon-

* The sophistication of the common sense to which they appeal by the Scotch philosophers here reaches its extreme. Causation according to Hamilton is the identity of the effect with its causes; a doctrine which has since developed into the Identical Philosophy of Mr. Lewes, as certain other doctrines of Hamilton survive in the shape of Mr. Spencer's Synthetical Philosophy.

ceivable it cannot be affirmed without contradiction. But the criticism is suspended on reading the complex conception which every man has of a past experience of his own. Why? On the ground that the criticism is inapplicable? Not at all; nor on the ground that it is impotent. Mr. Mill is perfectly aware that the series of past sensations, or "experience," affirmed in memory are as much out of consciousness as the objective universe affirmed in perception; are indeed so absolutely out of it that they are now out of being. Wherefore, according to the accepted canon, (1) they are not known at all; they are *inferred* from certain states of mind which are known, and *believed* on the strength of the inference, precisely as substance, cause, and phenomena are believed upon the strength of inferences from certain other known states. (2) They are not intelligible. Mental states which are yet states of nothing, modes which are modifications of nothing, changes not determined to change, existing no where but in a space which is their own order of coexistence and never but in a time their own order of succession, flashing into being out of nothing and back into nothing out of being; these are things which may have been or may be, but which cannot be conceived as they are. Finally (3) they cannot be affirmed without contradiction. For to say that past states of mind have in any way authorized the affirmation—whether as an intuition or an inference—of themselves by present states of mind, or that the present states are in any way authorized to affirm the past states, is in either case to add a function which denies the characters of mental states as already described. A sensation which is also the capability of being remembered by what is not itself, or a sensation which is also the capacity of remembering what is not itself, (equally with a sensation which is also a perception of what is not itself) is not the sensation of the theory. The transcendental antinomies with which the Kantist paralyzes reason, or the antithesis of subject and object, fade away before this feud between successive sensations and this disruption of a single sensation which purports to be a memory or a thing remembered. The truth evidently is that the criticism is cumulative from the beginning; that the waters let loose above cannot be stopped below, because their volume

and crushing power are doubled with every obstacle carried away. If we give up the conceptions of substance and cause *à fortiori* we cannot maintain the conception of phenomena; and if we give up the conception of an external reality perceived *à longè fortiori* we cannot keep the conception of an external reality remembered. It is the clear and full recognition of this dilemma which makes Mr. Mill's escape from it instructive. He does in fact, and in the most explicit manner, abandon the intuitions of memory to the torrent which has swept off the intuitions of perception as natural beliefs in an exterior reality for which no rational justification can be found. He recovers them afterward to make of them the basis and material of his entire theory of things on the plea that between the intuitions of memory and the intuitions of perception there is this capital difference, that if you grant the former the latter can be explained, but that if you deny the former nothing can be explained at all. We are permitted to believe in a past experience as memory affirms it, not because the belief is beyond criticism but because it is necessary to the explanation of any fact of consciousness: we are forbidden to believe in an objective universe as perception affirms it, not because the belief is specially exposed to criticism but because it is not necessary to an explanation. The experience remembered and the universe perceived are alike, in the same manner and on the same grounds, unknowable, inconceivable, contradictory; but the former is indispensable while the latter is superfluous. Or, quoting Mr. Mill, "Our belief in the veracity of Memory is evidently ultimate: no reason can be given for it which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well grounded," for the giving a reason is itself an act of memory. "I am asked to explain where the distinction lies between acts of memory and other alleged intuitions which I do not admit as such. The distinction is, that as all the explanations of mental phenomena presuppose Memory, Memory itself cannot admit of being explained. Whenever this is shown to be true of any other part of our knowledge, I shall admit that part to be intuitive."* Everything, then, in consciousness which admits

* An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. 4th edition, London, p. 209.

of explanation is an acquisition or product of consciousness and must be abandoned to criticism: that only is intuitive and exempt which refuses to be explained. But what is philosophy? Explanation of the facts of consciousness. What is explanation? Exposure and degradation of facts of consciousness ("parts of our knowledge") which seem to be intuitions but are not. What is left? The inexplicable. And the Empirical Philosophy with its long search into the Origin of Ideas, from Locke to Bain and Berkeley to Mill, ends with the amazing anti-climax that knowledge is the discovery of the unknowable—the explanation of the universe a pause before the inexplicable. In other words what we can explain we don't know: what we know we can't explain.

Now it would be idle to object here that this is an extraordinary use of the words intuition and knowledge, for Mr. Mill claims the right to use words in any sense he pleases provided due notice is served on everybody concerned and the same sense always adhered to. We submit to the inconvenience since we must, although a good deal might be said about it as the source of half the confusion of recent speculation. But Mr. Mill, certainly without intending to do so, has introduced a graver distraction by likewise using the words in their ordinary meaning, and to make matters worse has exchanged the meanings exactly where it was in his own interest to do so. An intuition is that which (as presupposed in all the explanations of the phenomena of consciousness) does not admit of explanation itself—when Mr. Mill is addressing the intuitionist. But when addressing the sceptic an intuition is simply the immediate certitude that a thing is so. "You (the sceptic) say to me, perhaps, that there is no such thing as certitude, that we do not in fact know anything at all. To which I will not give the ordinary reply that if you do not know anything I do. I will simply ask you whether at the moment of feeling you do not know that you feel? Such assurance or conviction is what other people mean by knowledge. By whatever name it is called, it is the test to which we bring all our other convictions. You may say that it is not certain, but such as it may be it is our model of certainty. We consider all our other assurances or convictions as more or less certain according as

they approach the standard of this.*" Our knowledge, then, that we have a feeling, that our states of consciousness at any given instant are what they are, is an intuition; but not because it is presupposed in all explanations of mental phenomena and so does not admit of explanation itself. It was open to Mr. Mill to say this and no doubt to the rationalist he would have said it. But the sceptic would have taken it as an unconditional surrender to himself and upon him, therefore, an intuition is urged as the direct knowledge that a thing is so; so far beyond the need or possibility of a criterion to distinguish it from spurious intuitions that it is itself "the test to which we bring all our other convictions," "a model or standard for measuring the certainty of all our other assurances." We can only suppose that if the task had been laid upon Mr. Mill of saving reason from the craft and violence of scepticism he would have gone on to vindicate our assurance of the reality of past experience by bringing it up for comparison with our assurance of the reality of present experience; would have said to the sceptic, when you feel you certainly know that your feeling exists; when you remember do you not certainly know that the feeling remembered existed? Or if you don't know it with absolute certitude at any rate with a certitude which comes near enough for all practical purposes to the standard? Having got so far nothing could have prevented him from bringing up our assurance of an objective reality for similar comparison with the like result. So for the sceptic Mr. Mill is a rationalist armed with the rational criterion of certitude, capable of building up a universe after the true Cartesian model with his "you feel, therefore you are, therefore you were, therefore other things are," and so on to the end: while for the rationalist he is a sceptic armed with the maxim that all "ideas" whose "origin" is found are explained, and discredited in the explanation. Now it is not permitted, even to the metaphysician, to blow hot and cold, to eat his cake and have it too. The straits of rationalism do not justify the distressed rationalist in resorting to scepticism, nor do the straits of scepticism justify a resort to rationalism. A man must elect between the two and abide by his election; which,

* *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 157.

of course means that Mr. Mill must be held to the consequences of the scepticism which on the whole determines the character of his thinking. We shall see farther on what is involved in the doctrine that an inexplicable idea is a good intuition. Here we have to ask whether it warrants Mr. Mill in exempting the intuitions of memory from the criticism which has discredited the intuitions of perception.

I. As all the explanations of mental phenomena, then, presuppose memory, memory itself cannot admit of being explained; therefore the reality of our past experience must be admitted as memory affirms it. To this is to be added, what is obviously implied, that as all the explanations of mental phenomena do not presuppose perception, perception itself admits of being explained, and explained, of course, by memory which it presupposes; therefore the reality of the objective universe as perception affirms it must be excluded. The apparent perception has not originated in realities without, but in experience within. Or, as experience is nothing but memory,* perception is transformed memory.

1. In the first place, what is meant by "presupposition"? I perceive a paper weight lying upon the table at which I write, and I set myself to explain the perception. Immediately it turns out that I cannot explain it without remembering it. Accordingly I seek an explanation of the memory, when it turns out again that I cannot explain the memory without remembering the memory; and so *ad infinitum*. This is all so manifest that it would be delirium to doubt it. But what does it amount to? Simply this, that what we call explanation is a specific act of what we call memory. There is a great deal of remembering which is not explanation but all explanation is comparison of our recollections disclosing their likenesses and differences, the law or order of their coexistences and successions: that is, explanation is attentive, methodical memory, and to say that memory is presupposed in all explanations of mental phenomena is to say no more than that memory presupposes memory; which is a truism, or falsism, of the idlest

* How could anyone make Experience the source of all our knowledge without postulating the belief in Memory as the fundamental fact? What is Experience but Memory? p. 209, note.

kind. We are all trying to explain the perception of the paper weight, what it is, where it came from, how it came; in other words we are seeking the "origin" of the "idea." To tell us that memory presupposes memory, explanation explanation, is not to help the search even when the identical proposition is put into the synthetical form by saying that all explanation presupposes memory. What if I say that mental action is presupposed in all explanations of material phenomena? Is any light thrown upon the origin of material phenomena? All explanation is mental action. Nothing can be more indubitable or irrelevant; and if I go on to conclude that mental action itself admits of no explanation, and from that to conclude that material phenomena are explained as products of mental action, nothing can be more grievous; it is backing up a *petitio principii* with an identical proposition.

So far, evidently, Mr. Mill's reason for exempting memory from the criticism which discredits perception, and for assigning memory, or experience, as the origin of the intuitions of perception, puts the cart before the horse. Speaking with scientific precision, it is not true that memory is presupposed in all explanations of the phenomena of perception, since a thing does not presuppose but *is* itself. On the contrary, the exact truth is that the phenomena of perception are presupposed in every explanation of memory, and presupposed in the only intelligible and pertinent sense of the word, that is, as the source of the act or origin of the idea. Certainly there would have been no attempt at explanation if there had been no perception to explain, and in explaining no memory, had there been no perception to remember. Throughout the series *ad infinitum*, memory is either an empty abstract without a reality agreeing to it, a name without a thing, and explanation purely verbal, or it is the specific remembrance of a concrete something. The memory, which, says Mr. Mill, is presupposed in all explanations of mental phenomena, is nothing at all, or is the memory of the phenomena. This is how it comes to be "explanation." It could not explain if it were the memory of something else; much more, if memory in the abstract, i. e. memory of nothing.

This again is all so obvious that, as stated, no one ever seri-

ously questioned it. What has been questioned is the fact to which we now ask attention, that we are shut up to this relation between perception as the origin of all memory and all memory as the derivative of perception, by the constitution of consciousness itself; not, of course, in our interpretation of it, which does not count, but in the empirical interpretation. Inconsistencies excepted, the empirical psychology is embodied in its capital maxim that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses. Its *raison d'être* is exclusively and entirely in its refutation of the doctrine of the intuitionist philosophy that there are ideas, or if not ideas, faculties, in the intellect which are underived and original; and its demonstration that ideas and faculties are products of sensation. Whether in the hands of Condillac and the French empiricists, or of Hartley and the English empiricists, this has been the uniform issue of its search into the origin of ideas: Intellect is Transformed Sensation. But, on the one hand, all intellect (again in the empirical meaning of the word), like explanation, is memory, for there is no intellection which is more than comparison of our remembrances; and all memory is intellect for there is no remembering into which comparison does not enter. On the other, all perception is sensation and all sensation perception; or if not all at any rate all that is distinct enough to be remembered. Therefore there is nothing in memory which was not previously in perception. The two propositions are convertible, expressing an identical fact; and when Mr. Mill offers us perception as transformed memory we have simply to invite him to relinquish the historical doctrine of empiricism which offers us intellect as transformed sensation.

But beyond disclosing the real beneath the apparent historical relations of Mr. Mill's theory, this inconsistency does not signify, since it is permitted to any man to strike his flag in order to save his ship. The significant thing is that this virtual renunciation of empiricism is not escape from its consequences, for Mr. Mill's elaborate investigation of the phenomena of memory only serves to bring out more clearly than ever that there is nothing in memory, as it stands and has always stood in the known experience of men, which was not put into it by previous perception. The laws under which memory

has been organized (the Laws of the Association of Ideas) are these three. (1) The ideas (memories) of similar phenomena tend to present themselves in consciousness together: (2) When phenomena have been experienced, or conceived, simultaneously in intimate contiguity their ideas tend to present themselves in consciousness together: (3) When phenomena have been experienced, or conceived, in intimate contiguity one after another their ideas tend to present themselves in consciousness together. These tendencies once ascertained we instinctively count upon their persistence, the effect of the combined memory and expectation being that we are furnished with an idea of permanent possibilities of sensation distinct from our actual sensations; which idea is ultimately differentiated into our ideas of substances manifesting properties and causes determining changes, in space and time. Our comment is that in thus tracing back our complex conception of an objective universe to its origin in certain subjective phenomena it is not enough for the purposes of the explanation to ascertain that the phenomena, as "experienced or conceived," have definite relations of resemblance, coëxistence and succession; it is absolutely necessary that they be purified of all complicity with that perception of an objective universe which they are to explain. Are the original phenomena, as we experience or conceive them, which resemble, accompany, and succeed one another, already phenomena of perception, or not? If they are then we have let bodily into the first factors the whole essential content of the final product; have found, not the origin, but at best the original form of the idea. We say that this is what Mr. Mill has actually done; we add that this is what upon his own showing he could not but do. He has failed to produce from the entire range of experience (including conception) a single sensation which is not also the impression of an external reality; and he has verified the certainty that no such sensation is producible. For in Mr. Mill's, as in any other empirical classification, all sensations, whatever specific forms they wear, belong to one of two genera. Either they are sensations originating in the bodily organism, or sensations originating in surrounding bodies; in Mr. Mill's dialect, sensations originating in the group of permanent possi-

bilities known as the body, or in other remoter groups. In either case a given sensation, however obscure and confused it may be, is always and necessarily an impression of an objective reality. We may traverse the entire range of human consciousness, in all forms of its manifestation, normal and abnormal, in all stages of its development from the embryo to the man, we shall never find a formation so primitive, a constituent element so simple, that it is not already a specific affection of our own body, directly or indirectly determined by surrounding bodies. In defending Locke's demand for the origin of our ideas against Cousin who says that we must take consciousness as it stands, Mr. Mill has expressed the opinion that childhood is the age to be studied, when nothing is fixed and final but all things are in formation. But the child which is father of the man is already possessor of a body; so far as it has any consciousness at all has a physical consciousness, or if it has only the unorganized elements of a future one, has them in the shape of physical sensations. Neither psychology nor physiology reveals any earlier or simpler condition of things than that. Probably if Mr. Mill had lived longer or later he would have followed Prof. Bain into a reluctant adoption of the theory of evolution for the sake of the wider range of animal psychology and physiology. But the same barrier would have blocked the way at last, for biology, which takes us back to organisms so obscure that no man can say whether they are plant or animal, has yet to find an element of consciousness so doubtful that we cannot identify it as a bodily affection. We can't say whether the thing is sensation or motion, but we can always say that whether one or the other it is an affection of matter. Contractility, neurility, or sensibility, the material universe is given after a fashion in the writings of the lowest infusoria, and if the creature is conscious that is what he is conscious of.

To this it may be and is replied that to talk of these aboriginal feelings as perceptions of an objective universe or non-ego is to read into the confused elements of an unorganized consciousness the artificial products of organization. It is absurd to suppose that infusorial or foetal sensations rise at once into a recognition of external realities. The first feelings

of pressure, warmth, and muscular action which gather in the sensorium of the unborn child, the first feelings of color, light, touch, and sound which are added to them after birth, are all purely subjective, which means that they are merely themselves and not a knowledge or notion of something else; they cannot even give so much as an intuition of the self, much more an intuition of the not-self. These intuitions come with the organization of consciousness. But why do they not come at once? And why do they come afterwards? Because the reality is not already in position awaiting recognition? There lies the whole issue between realism and idealism, and our argument is that Mr. Mill surrenders the case, since upon his own showing the organization of the body precedes and produces the organization of consciousness; that is, the possibilities of sensation which constitute the bodily organism (and not the association of ideas) determine the subsequent perceptions. There is no sensation, ante- or post-natal, of pressure, warmth, color, sound, pleasure, pain, or any other, which is not already definitely localized as an affection of some part of the bodily organism, and to say that the sensation is subjective is only saying that the child does not know yet, what is the fact and what it will know in good time, that it has a body. The sensation is from the start and as certainly as it ever will be, in the place and in the relations assigned to it by the previous organization of matter (of the permanent possibilities of sensation); and will ultimately be discovered to be there in the development of consciousness, not as an illusory product of development, but for the extremely simple and sufficient reason that it *is* there. In other words, the conditions which ensure our ultimate perception of external realities are anterior and exterior to the laws of memory, or association of ideas, by which the perception is explained.

But we cannot stop here. Absurd as it seems to the idealist, startling as it may seem to anybody, there is really no alternative but to declare that the bodily organization not only provides the conditions of ultimate perception, but excludes from the very beginning any sensations which are not already perceptions themselves. A sensation must be given as it is and not as it is not; that is, specifically differentiated from other

sensations and definitely localized somewhere in the body; that is, invested with the recognized characters of objectivity. So given it is nothing other than a perception of an external reality. Let us take as a capital instance the sensation of color. According to Prof. Bain from whom Mr. Mill borrows much of his chapter on the primary qualities of matter,* this in itself is exclusively a subjective feeling. Distinguishable only as differing from other feelings and from varieties of itself it cannot give unaided any knowledge of an external world or be thought of as belonging to an object. Its reference to an object and its consequent revelations of an external world are all products of a totally different set of sensations with which it has been associated, namely, the muscular sensations, first of the eye, and, indirectly through those of the rest of the body. The apparent perceptions of space relations originating in the muscular apparatus of motion and locomotion are appropriated by the sensibility to color, which is the "distinct impressibility" of the eye. In this or any similar analysis what is meant by saying that the sensation of color is subjective and that it is invested with objectivity by the muscular sensations? "Objective," here evidently, is of color as belonging to the colored object seen: "subjective" of color as belonging to the organ of sight. The colors in the flower, or the autumnal forest, or the sunset sky, are in fact not properties of any of these, but affections of the eye. But the eye is as much an object as the flower or the cloud, and were the needed correction made by withdrawing the colors from the objects where they do not belong and locating them in the eye where they do, we should be no nearer to a "subjective" feeling than before. If the first sensation of color received by the new-born child is felt as an affection of the eye it is as much an objective sensation as it ever will be when organic associations have perverted it and its kind into the vast panorama of the earth and the heavens. So in the last resort we refer the sensation to molecular disturbance of the brain or to some other reaction of the nervous centres. This is an inner region quite beyond the reach of psychology and barely within the reach of physiology, for there is no evidence to show that color, or anything

* Ch. 13.

else for that matter, was ever felt as an affection of the nervous centre and abundant evidence to the contrary; but supposing this to have been its primitive form and that the subsequent transfer to the eye and finally to the external object has been the product of advancing organization, are we better off than before? Any nearer to the indispensable element of idealistic construction, a subjective feeling? We have got a feeling indefinitely more confused and obscure, no doubt, than any to be found within the range of present experience, but still a feeling which is an affection of matter, already in the place and in the relations assigned to it by the structure of the body; consequently an objective feeling. And we say that this feeling which must be identified as the impression, must equally be identified as the perception, of an external reality. We repeat it with all the emphasis at our command: to have a sensation, to feel a feeling, is to feel it as it is and not as it is not. Granted that it is only distinguishable from other feelings and from varieties of itself. To distinguish is to perceive, and to distinguish one feeling from another is to perceive the individual and specific differences which make it distinguishable; every one of which has already been invested with the characters of objectivity. The sharpest acid of psychological analysis is turned by this indissoluble atom which refuses to enter into higher multiples of feeling save as a fully equipped perception; ill-defined and indeterminable beyond all comparison with any feelings now known to us, but actually existent with individuality of its own, and actually distinguishable as it exists; existing indeed, out of hypothesis, only so far as it is distinguishable.

What the analysis of that form of consciousness known as perception has discovered is, then, not the origin, but as we said the original form, of the form; the earliest simple perception which continuing association of ideas has amplified and differentiated into our present complex perception of the sensible universe. First, it has reduced the apparent properties of bodies, primary or secondary, in space and in time, to functions of the several senses; correcting the illusory projection which vitiates all intelligence, it identifies the spacious and enduring universe as coëxistent and successive affections of the

bodily organism. Second, it rearranges these various affections around some primitive, central one which determines the character of all the others. According to Condillac, who although no idealist owed much to Berkeley, this determining sensation is touch. According to Prof. Bain, who has confiscated the whole wealth of physiology to the development of Berkeley's theory of vision, it is the sensation of muscular action, which when continuous gives the notion of time; unimpeded the notion of empty space; impeded the notion of resistance, space occupied, or body; continued with regular interruptions, as in locomotion, the notion, or improved notion, of distance; in all these ways a complex notion of objective existence which is handed over to the senses of hearing, vision and others, whose combined action produces the vast and varied apparition which we call the material universe. In this long process of construction to which we owe the entire fabric of consciousness as it stands, what is the exact function of the association of ideas? Unknown, says Mr. Mill, or misunderstood, or wickedly ignored by the rationalists with their clumsy *Deus est machinè* of the intuition, it is none the less the creative and providential power whose activities explain all the mysteries of psychology. We do not complain of this apostrophe and apotheosis. Believing in memory and its laws as much as anybody we are anxious not to ignore or misunderstand or degrade it; but having been put on our guard by the whole empirical philosophy against the mischievous "realization of abstractions" we ask that the doings of this omnipotent agent be exactly determined and clearly defined. Lifting our eyes from the paper as we write, an assemblage of vivid sensations of color rises in consciousness, which are transformed by association of ideas into a perception of vast spaces and magnificent perspectives. In the realistic language of common life, the sun setting behind the Jura flushes the sky overhead with varied splendors reflected below in purple from the slopes of the Savoy Alps and in crimson from the level of Lake Geneva. The apparent space relations do not belong to the sensations of color but are put into them by the association of ideas. How comes association to be able to do that? Has it created the perception which it bestows? No; it has borrowed

it from the sensations of muscular action. These again, we will suppose, have received the perception from an earlier association, and so on till we come to some positively first sensation which owes nothing to association. But go where we will we find that association creates nothing, produces nothing, originates nothing; it is not the author, not even the architect, but so to say the hodman and bricklayer, of the edifice it erects; a kind of common carrier which hands over to one set of sensations what it got from another. Whatever there may be in any perception which is received from previous association of ideas, there is no idea which is not the image of some previous perception and no association of ideas not determined by some previous association of perceptions.

2. To this vicious circle we are shut up by the constitution of consciousness itself. To break the circle we must escape from and go back of consciousness, not only as it stands to-day with its organized rhythm, its systole and diastole of perception—memory, memory—perception, but as it stands in the earliest beginnings revealed to us whether by psychology or physiology. What is required by the theory is the interior origin of our perceptions of exterior realities; to find the origin in sensations which are already perceptions or are sure to become such without any help from association of ideas, is to restore the vicious circle. *Sensations*, that is, particular affections of specific sense-organs already differentiated and localized, no matter how obscurely, will not answer the purpose. The indispensable postulate is a set of feelings which have not yet become sensations, out of and earlier than the bodily organism but ready for embodiment. These and these alone are “subjective feelings” in the only admissible meaning of the phrase. What we have to remark here is, that this postulate, indispensable to the idealistic theory, is impossible upon any, and good for nothing in all.

In the first place, where and when are these bodiless feelings to be looked for? What is their era and their habitat? their relations to other modes of being in space and in time, upon any construction, real or ideal, of space, time, and being? It will not do to leave them afloat in the inane like the ghosts of the dead or the souls of the unborn; a *pou sto* or *locus standi*

must be found for them somehow, room among coëxisting phenomena, a date among consecutive phenomena; for they belong potentially to the bodily organism that is to be. Now thanks to the empirical philosophy, which has recently given a startling range to the search after the origin of things, we have the whole parentage and history of the body from the first bioplasm to Man and from the first man to the Mother; a pedigree which must be broken somewhere to let in these subjective elements of future organization. But the empirical philosophy with its inexorable doctrine of the persistence of force maintains the continuity of the pedigree. It admits readily enough the appearance of feelings at some undetermined epoch in the process, but admits them only as new transformations of force determined by higher organization of matter; that is, as sensations which are already impressions of an external reality and sure to become perceptions when their character is found out. Feelings of any kind other than this, in particular the subjective feelings required by the theory, are peremptorily excluded from the series where only they can be of any avail.

In the second place, what are these feelings in themselves? Supposing their relations to have been satisfactorily determined, a place found for them in the successive stages of organic evolution, in what character do they enter the series? We know what they are not, namely, not yet physical sensations; but we do not yet know what they are. What is a feeling which is not a feeling of muscular action; or touch; or heat; or light; or color; or savor; or odor; or sound; or motion; or hunger; or thirst; or pleasure; or pain; or any other of which we are or can be conscious? We must refuse it seriatim every quality which distinguishes the sensations within experience from one another; we must find for it some distinctive quality of its own as an actually existing feeling. The conclusion is plain enough. A purely subjective feeling is a pure abstraction; required by the theory as an element of construction; forbidden to the theory by the characteristic vices of such abstractions; and useless to the theory were it not forbidden. An empty generalization from the sensations we are conscious of, its existence apart from them cannot be

known, or conceived, or affirmed without contradiction; and cannot contain the needful elements or find the needful conditions of any particular concrete feeling. The universe with all its transformations of force does not provide an energy equal to the conversion of this subjective feeling x into a sensation of light or heat or any other known to us.

There is thus no possible escape from the fatal circle which closes round us. We must accept as absolutely the earliest and simplest materials of organization a set of complex sensations whose differentiation and distribution have been determined by the anterior organization of the body; needing no association of ideas but the bare disclosure of themselves as they already are, in the relations they already hold, to become the perception of external realities.

3. Finally, if every thing which has been contested here be made over to the idealist, Association remains unequal to the task which is laid upon it; it cannot bring up out of past experience, near or remote, any idea or set of ideas powerful enough to pervert a new sensation into the perception we have at any waking moment of the world about us. A perception, of whatever feeble sort, is and must forever be something other and more than a memory or idea suggested by a sensation; or a sensation perverted by a memory or idea.

Let us suppose, to the contrary of all that has been said hitherto, that those primitive sensations which must be accepted as the materials of future organization are the subjective feelings required by the theory, each distinguishable only as differing from other feelings and from varieties of itself; that they fall into classes according as they resemble one another, and into groups according as they recur together or recur one after another; lastly that these relations persist until the ideas of the classed and grouped feelings tend to present themselves in consciousness together, and so ultimately suggest a permanent possibility of sensation apart from all actual sensations: then, what notion of externality or objectivity, if any at all, can in any case attach itself to this permanent possibility? Evidently, as it seems to us, only this, that these tendencies of ideas are tendencies over which we have no control, that the resemblances of feelings belonging to the same class and the

co-herencies of simultaneous or successive feelings belonging to the same group, have been determined before they enter consciousness and are probably maintained after they leave it; in short that there is some influence or agency at work upon us from without other than our own at work within. A particular sensation of figure, say of a surface two inches square, rises in consciousness and instantly the ideas of particular sensations of hardness, heaviness, resonance, and others which have repeatedly been grouped with it heretofore, present themselves. Concede the action of the laws of association in all departments of consciousness for any length of time whatever, and the consequent development of a perfect interior intelligence, still what possible character of objectivity can invest the so-called paper weight other than this, that the origin of the sensations and the persistence of the relations between them are not due to me, are therefore probably due to something that is not me? So of the possibility suggested by any other group; so of that permanent possibility in general which we have learned to call Matter. How the composition and recombination of subjective feelings, carried on in any way, kept up for any length of time, could induce or compel a reference to the outside other than this doubtful inference and obscure conjecture, we are totally at a loss to conceive. Accordingly on turning to Mr. Mill we find that this is exactly the conception of the material universe whose origin he undertakes to find, and exactly the conception which he turns out as a product of association. That is he has discharged from the phenomena in question all the specific differences which call for explanation, has minimized the concrete perception into an abstract *conception* and ground out the conception, along with a good deal of similar meal, from the hopper of association. If my perception of the world outside is itself an idea then no doubt association with other ideas may very well have suggested the reference to the hypothetical outside.

“The conception to be accounted for, says Mr. Mill, is this; that there is concerned in our perceptions something which exists when we are not thinking of it; which existed before we had ever thought of it, and would exist were we annihilated; and farther that there exist things which we have never perceived

at all and which have never been perceived by man. This *idea* of something which is distinguished from our fleeting impressions by what in Kantian language, is called Perdurability; something which is fixed and the same while our impressions vary; something which exists whether we are aware of it or not . . . constitutes altogether our *idea* of external substance.

Whoever can assign an origin to this complex *conception* has accounted for what we mean by the belief in matter. Now all this, according to the Psychological Theory, is but the form impressed upon the conception or notion, obtained by experience, of Contingent Sensations; by which are meant, sensations that are not in our present consciousness, and individually never were in our consciousness at all, but which in virtue of the laws to which we have learned by experience that our sensations are subject, we know that we should have felt under given supposable circumstances, and under the same circumstances might still feel."*

We have put the italics into this passage for the sake of emphasizing the obvious fact that this is not a description of our perception of the external world, but of our conception of it, and our conception refined into a pure abstraction; not so much as the idea or notion of the world which the practical man has when he sits down to think about it, but that quintessential extract of the idea distilled by the metaphysician in the depths of his cave. As he has concocted the artifice himself, naturally enough he finds no difficulty in explaining it. The objection is that it is not at all the thing which we want explained. We were promised the subjective origin of our perceptions; we are asked to accept the subjective origin of an idea which is not even our own but invented for us by the person who undertakes to explain. The passage is of import far beyond the purposes of our small polemic for it discloses with a *naïveté* quite peculiar to the metaphysician that *ignoratio elenchi* which is the pervading vice because, as we have often said, it is the inevitable misfortune of all philosophy. Mr. Mill finds himself incessantly surprised by revelations of an outer world which with all their seeming candor and positiveness are full of the most suspicious announcements. To clear

* Exam. of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Phil., p. 227.

up the equivocal character of the revelation he determines upon the discovery of its origin; if not in the realities without whence it seems to shine, then as the illusory splendor emitted by consciousness within. Preferring the "psychological method" of inquiry to the "introspective" and other methods in use among philosophers he begins by completely shutting out of his mind (and consequently out of his explanation) the entire apocalypse as it stands. To explain the world he retires into the cave. It is not the fault of Mr. Mill's method that he does this, or of Mr. Mill, but the common infirmity of philosophers. For this seeming outer world is of that overbearing kind that the impressions it makes drive out the other occupants of consciousness before them like chaff before the wind, and so capricious that the impressions will not stop long enough to be laid hold of and reasoned about, but rush in and out again like the gusts after the chaff. The overpowering and evasive perception excludes the possibility of collected thinking, and all the hapless thinker can do is to take as its equivalent or representative the "faint copy" which it leaves behind. So Mr. Mill, like any thinker, not because he would but because he must, substitutes for the present perceptions he might have, a comprehensive memory, or complex idea, or large abstract generalization, of all the perceptions he ever had, and proceeds upon the assumption that the "origin of the idea" is identical with the origin of the perceptions. It is, we repeat, the assumption of all philosophizing. In its most humble or its most magnificent forms, with Plato and Hegel as with Mr. Mill, Philosophy is only methodical memory, the exclusion of the universe and our perceptions of it, the laborious redistribution of empty eidola within the Cave. It may be the unimaginable Processus of the Absolute Idea throughout eternity, or the humble Association of Ideas in a single consciousness; it is in any case ideal and therefore illusory. Until Philosophy can learn the art of thinking out of doors, can put the perception into the idea and both into the expression (until it can get the *reality* into the expression), it will be what it has always been, the leaving out of the count the thing to be accounted for.

I darken my windows and close my eyes; as well as one

can I shut to every sense and suspend all sensation. By finer artifices I calm the interior turbulence which survives the excluded uproar of the world outside until its last reverberations die away, and pause, attentive, while consciousness fills with the dim scenery and voiceless hosts of memory. Even so the spaces are too vast and populous, the bustle and glare too disquieting for the delicate functions of pure reason. So I turn down the lights yet lower and pause again until the jarring world of memory has retired after the ruder world of sensation, leaving behind it the bare relations of its innumerable phenomena, the pure abstracts of its most general forms. This, at last, is the hush and the twilight of the cave. These are the purged and rarified *Eidola* which have risen into the transcendental creations, or collapsed in the transcendental catastrophes of all philosophy. I can build what world I will by letting in the intellectual raptures of the Greek or the brooding reverie of the German; and work what havoc I will with the "esprit" of the Gaul or the "common sense" of the Briton. If I am an inventive person I can build a world and wreck a world of my own. But I throw open the windows again to that other world outside which surrounds, or which seems to surround, the life of every man, and as the pageantry within breaks up and disperses before the in-rush of sensation, I cannot resist the conviction that all the realities to be explained have been forgotten in the explanation. The faint chiaroscuro of remembered sensation, whether dimmed by the haze or accented by the intensities of abstract thought, is one thing: the immense perspectives which converge upon the open senses are another, and Philosophy cannot account for them simply because it cannot contain them.

Our conclusion is, not at all that the apparent intuitions of perception are trustworthy but, that their origin has not been found. We make them all over to the idealist as thoroughly discredited by his criticism; only, we ask him to take the intuitions of memory along with them. The distinction set up between the two and the discrimination in favor of the latter will not stand. Criticism must take its course unimpeded to the end. Having turned substance and cause, space, and time out of phenomena, and phenomena out of perception,

we have no choice left but to turn experience out of memory. Realism has merged in Phenomenalism, Phenomenalism in Idealism. The last step cannot be avoided if the others cannot. Idealism must merge in Nihilism and Philosophy must expire. *Finis coronat opus.*

II. So, beyond disclosing at some new point and in another light the strength and the direction of the hidden forces which urge it forward, it is a matter of no great moment where philosophy pauses in its movement toward Nihilism. It may be with Mr. Spencer at Transfigured Realism; with Mr. Lewes at Reasoned Realism; with Mr. Mill at Idealism; or anywhere with anybody. In any case the halt is a needless dismay; the inevitable catastrophe (as if the world would not go on were philosophy to take the final plunge—a dreadful realization of a harmless abstraction) and an attempt of the appalled philosopher to withstand the speculative urgency of the intellect at any cost of intellectual consistency. What we have now to observe is that to escape in this way is to be taken captive by the practical urgencies of life, whose inevitable ending is Realism; in other words that the realities exempted from criticism, on whatever pretext, bring in all the others along with them.

"For myself," says Mr. Mill, enumerating at the end of much controversy the data of his philosophy, "I admit other sources of knowledge than sensation and the memory of sensation, though not than consciousness and the memory of consciousness. I have distinctly declared that the elementary *relations* of our sensations to one another, viz: their resemblances, and their successions and coexistences, are subjects of direct apprehension."* A continuous consciousness, in Mr. Mill's meaning of the word, is therefore exempted from criticism on the grounds that we have a memory of the related sensations which constituted past consciousness and a direct apprehension of the related sensations which constitute present consciousness. Are these two one and the same ground? We know what Mr. Mill means by admitting memory as a source of knowledge; he means that memory being presupposed in all explanations of mental phenomena does not admit of being explained itself. It is an ultimate fact and as such

* Ex. Sir Wm. Hamilton's Phil., p. 209, note.

entitled to rank as a trustworthy intuition. But direct apprehension in the obvious and only intelligible meaning of the words is no intuition of that kind; it is one of the rational kind which we have seen Mr. Mill resorting to when pressed by the skeptic. However, the phenomena of present consciousness which he distinctly declares to be the subjects of direct apprehension he in almost the same breath declares to be the subjects of an intuition of *his* kind, like that of memory. The editor of the *Dublin Review*, a metaphysician of considerable humor, once called Mr. Mill's attention to the paradox of saying that there is just one good intuition and no more. It is conceivable that there should be a good many or none at all, but nothing could be odder than that we should happen to have exactly one. But why, says Mr. Mill, is it more improbable that there should be one *besides present consciousness*, making two in all, than three or four or any other number? It is a mere question of evidence. So it is. Twenty intuitions are no doubt as queer as two. What cannot be permitted is that one of the two should have two contradictory characters to suit Mr. Mill's successive emergencies. We are concerned here with the original elements of an entire system of philosophy; it will not do to have any ambiguity in the intuitions which ascertain them. The intuition of present consciousness cannot be direct apprehension (the immediate certitude that things are so) unless the intuition of past consciousness is. If the latter holds its title and rank by virtue of being an inexplicable, ultimate fact so must the former. We do not dwell upon this for the sake of excluding Mr. Mill from any source of knowledge (for the more he admits to begin with the less we shall have to ask him to admit afterward) but to show the distress he is in to get any source of knowledge at all.*

* The fact is that Mr. Mill in his search for the origin of ideas left the foundations of his entire thinking unsettled by complete uncertainty as to what knowledge, the act of knowing, is. Sometimes it figures as the bare consciousness of sensations identical with the sensations themselves; sometimes as the direct apprehension of simultaneous sensations or the indirect apprehension of successive sensations by one another; sometimes as the unavoidable acknowledgment of real existence which we are not conscious of or do not apprehend at all: all these cognitions, or knowings, being divided into parts of knowledge which are not intuitive (and therefore not knowledge at all,) and parts which are good intui-

The source is consciousness and the memory of consciousness as distinguished from sensation and the memory of sensation. This distinction is without a difference. A sensation is an affection of some sense-organ (arises in a particular group of permanent possibilities of sensation) and as such necessarily carries with it into our apprehension and memory all those relations to other sensations which have been assigned to it in advance by the organization of the body. A sensation of color has its quality already determined as similar to others of the same class, and its position already determined in groups of coëxistent and consecutive sensations of other classes. The memory of sensations is thus the memory of past consciousness; the direct apprehension of them the apprehension of present consciousness. To avoid tautology Mr. Mill should have said that he admits other sources of knowledge than the apprehension and memory of *subjective feelings*. Unfortunately, these having no relations of resemblance, coëxistence and succession which can be apprehended or remembered, are not sources of knowledge; so that what Mr. Mill "admits" is in fact what he could not get along without. That is what we admit too—what we cannot do without. The most exacting rationalist does not ask for more than consciousness and the memory of consciousness. Realities of which he has had no "experience," as he understands the word, are no concern of his. It is a curious indication of the fog which has invaded all speculation that the dynastic titles of the two contending powers define nothing at all of the questions in dispute between them. The empiric is rational in his meaning of reason, the rationalist empiric in his meaning of experience. The question is always a question of the meaning of words. In admitting consciousness and the memory of consciousness what is the extent of the admission?

1. One of the two portions into which consciousness is divisible, by far the larger and more striking of the two, is made

tions, the intuition being good sometimes as immediate certitude, sometimes as an ultimate fact of consciousness. It is this inevitable confusion, as disturbing in Locke as in Mr. Mill, which forbids the search for the origin of ideas as the first business of philosophy. How are we going to know anything if we mean a dozen different things by knowledge.

up of that stream of strong, or vivid, sensations flowing forward from the dawn of consciousness until now, which seem to be our impressions of the world about us. What we know by intuition of these sensations is that each of them appears and disappears in three elementary relations. The resemblance to others of the same class may be greater or smaller; the union with others of the same group more or less intimate; the preceding or following others of the same series more or less regular: but in any case, whatever the quantitative variations, the relation, as to quality, is exclusively and entirely of resemblance, coëxistence or succession, with other sensations. There are more which might be enumerated, but none known intuitively, or otherwise than as an artificial product of these three. Such are the relations which the sensation discloses as the impression of certain external phenomena which are the properties of some substance or the effects of some cause in space and time. Testimony of this sort must be excluded because the witness is not competent to give it. It can declare its own existence; its associates may each declare theirs; all together, the relations they hold to one another: but no one of them nor all together can do more.

Now for the most part this admissible testimony is not given directly by the strong sensations themselves but through those composing the other portion of consciousness, that stream of weak, or faint, sensations which seem to be memories of past experiences. Mr. Mill is inconsistent in saying that the elementary relations are subjects of direct apprehension. A limited number of sensations may be, but on his own showing the apprehension of the relations between them requires time. We are absolutely dependent upon the intermediation of memory for all that we know of the organization of consciousness, and this is the reason why we accept its intuitions as trustworthy after excluding the intuitions of perception as false. And now the question is, what are the relations of any given faint sensation, accepted in this way as a memory, to other sensations.

To begin with, they are evidently the three elementary relations which the faint sensation has already helped to disclose among the strong sensations. Thus, it resembles the strong

sensation of which it is the memory, and more or less closely all the other members of the same class. It falls also into the same group and the same series. It could not be a memory if the relations it holds did not re-produce, re-present, the relations held by that which is remembered. They are certainly indispensable to it, as a sensation in general, and as an act of memory in particular. But no less certainly they are not adequate to account for it. For, if the relations of resemblance, coexistence and succession determine this sensation to be a memory they must equally determine any other which holds them to be a memory as well. Every individual impression, or perception which we seem to have must be a vivid memory if the having these three elementary relations is what constitutes a memory. Yet we refuse to permit it to testify to the existence of any concrete thing, sensation, phenomenon or noumenon, beyond itself—that is not itself. If we permit the faint sensation to deliver this testimony it must be in virtue of something other than either or all of the three elementary relations held by all sensations alike. What then is this *desideratum*, this additional something between the present sensation which is a memory and the past one which was the thing now remembered?

“The truth is, says Mr. Mill, that we are here face to face with the final inexplicability, at which, as Sir Wm. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts. . . The real stumbling-block is perhaps not in any theory of the fact but in the fact itself. The true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something which has ceased can still be in a manner present: that a series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past, can be gathered up into a single present consciousness, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think by far the wisest thing we can do, is to accept the inexplicable fact without any theory of how it takes place.”* This is, no

* Exam. Sir Wm. Hamilton's Phil., p. 248. The reader will remark that what Mr. Mill here laments as a stumbling-block which we would surely get out of the way if we could, is exactly that ultimate incomprehensibility which is the mark of an intuition. We do not want to be hypercritical but it is strange that Mr. Mill should not have felt the awkwardness of building all knowledge and philosophy on a “stumbling-block,” it being the sole business of philosophy to remove stumbling-blocks. To found philosophy on an inexplicable intuition is to provoke

doubt, by far the wisest thing to do provided only that we can do it. But to admit the inexplicable facts, the memory and the thing remembered, is to admit those specific differences which distinguish them as inexplicable from all the other facts of consciousness which we explain. So to admit them is to admit a new, peculiar connection between them; and to admit this new tie is to establish a theory. Let us see what must necessarily be said of this intermediate something necessarily postulated, between the sensation which is a memory and the sensation remembered. (1.) As we have seen, it is not a mere resemblance, coëxistence, or succession. None of the elementary relations disclosed *by* memory can be the constitutive element of the memory itself: consequently none of the apparent relations which are the products of these. If a relation at all it must be unlike any known to us, and if affirmed can only be affirmed as relation in general, or abstract relation; which is not worth affirming. It is therefore more than a relation, that is, it is a real thing. (2.) This real cannot be a sensation. If it is, it is either a sensation of the strong kind—itself a thing to be remembered: or of the weak kind—itself a thing which remembers. In either case to interpolate a sensation is to introduce new facts of the inexplicable kind under consideration. We may fill up the gap between the thing remembered and the memory by sensations multiplied *ad infinitum*, we shall never get any nearer to the real intermediate *x* required; we shall only get a new necessity of postulating it. (3.) But consciousness is made up sensations and their relations. Therefore the *x* required, being neither of these, is a real something distinct from consciousness and exterior to it. (4.) This extra-conscious reality required by the “inexplicable” facts is required for no other purpose than to explain them. If the facts were explicable without it it would not be required. It is as much pre-supposed in all explanations of memory as

all future philosophers to find an explanation, i. e., to undermine philosophy since to explain an intuition is to discredit it. So when Mr. Spencer explains memory as a faint sensation (a faint affection of a sense organ), or Mr. Lewes as the retrospective “aspect” of a feeling, Mr. Mill’s ground gives way under him. Nay, Mr. Mill himself, as we shall see immediately, brings in an Ego for no other than the suicidal purpose of accounting for the inexplicable facts of memory, having just ruined (by accounting for them) the intuitions of perception.

memory in all explanations of the facts of consciousness. It exists therefore not only as a real thing but as an extra-conscious factor in certain products of consciousness; as a living power or active agent, with specific functions as that which in some way enables the past sensation to be remembered and the present sensation to remember. (5.) Here we come to a fact of so startling a character that after a preliminary sentence or two we shall leave to Mr. Mill the responsibility of "admitting" it. We have ascertained, by a good intuition, the existence of an active power between a given sensation and its memory. What is required by one such pair is equally required by all the innumerable pairs found in consciousness. Is there an x for each pair—that is, are there innumerable agents x ? Then what is it that fuses them all into one and gathers all of their activities together into a whole as *my* memory and not some one's else, of *my* past experience? The fact of fusion and gathering together is indubitable whether the I is an illusion or a reality. Each memory of a past sensation is out of communication with all other memories, and consciousness, in spite of its elementary relations of resemblance, coexistence and succession, crumbles into a dust heap of incoherent elements, or else the agent x which enables or authorizes one memory to affirm the past existence of a sensation is the very agent which enables all other memories to do the like. No integration is possible, or this is the thing which integrates sensations and memories into consciousness. Exactly here is the real stumbling-block, the ultimate incomprehensibility signalized by Mr. Mill; not that a single present faint sensation can be the memory of a single past strong one, but that "a series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past and out of existence, can still be in a manner present, gathered up into a single present consciousness, accompanied by a belief of reality." Mr. Mill's conclusion is that "we are forced to apprehend every part of the series as linked with the other parts by something in common, which is not the feelings themselves, any more than the succession of the feelings is the feelings themselves; and as that which is the same in the first as in the second, in the second as in the third, and so on, must be the same in the first and the fiftieth, this com-

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mon element is a permanent element,"* that is it participates, or is implicated, in all phenomena of consciousness alike. (6.) In the midst of the fluctuations of sensations and of the possibilities of sensation—of the universe—what is the limit of this permanence in the common element of consciousness? Mr. Mill believes in a possible immortality, not as an article of religious faith, but as a legitimate concession of philosophical criticism. Mortality for him is nothing more formidable than the cessation of that group of possibilities called the body, whose analogues are the cessations hourly taking place in other, remoter groups or bodies. Such are the consumption of the coal in the grate, the falling of the leaves in Autumn, the melting of the snows in Spring, the submersion of a continent, the extinction of a star; such too is the dissolution of the body, a more considerable event for the owner of it but after all of the same kind. Consciousness has survived multitudes like the first; why not the last as well? Mr. Mill is rather inclined to think, on the whole, that his theory having reduced matter to an abstraction has taken the sting out of death. But now what is it that will connect the series of sensations after death with the series before death, into a continuous consciousness? It is not the sensations themselves; or the relations between them; or the bare memories of them; or the conditions of sensation; or the groups of permanent possibilities of sensation. All these, however similar to, are individually distinct from, their equivalents in the series *ante-mortem*; however permanent they all in time come to an end. It can only be one thing, viz., the agent *x*, which is the common and permanent element of consciousness in this life. *That* is the real thing which is immortal and that alone.

To recapitulate: we have got, by no invention of our own but by simple exegesis of Mr. Mill; not as a conjecture, or inference, or suggestion, or theory, or "good working-hypothesis," or any kind of "ideal construction," but as the "subject" of an accredited intuition; a concrete reality which is not sensation, out of consciousness yet giving integrity and permanence to consciousness, implicated in every one of its phenomena

* *Ex. etc.*, p. 281.

yet immutable among their mutations. The plain truth is that this immortal *inconcussum quid* discovered by Mr. Mill is nothing other than Mr. Mill himself; the "personality," or "subject," or "ego," or "self," discovered in good time by every body, and long before metaphysics ever formed an abstract of it or gave a name to it; the enduring inscrutable soul whose manifestations are the transitory phenomena of consciousness.

2. We know nothing in philosophical literature more curious than Mr. Mill's bewilderment among these intrinsic difficulties, as he calls them, of the psychological theory. But when he escapes into the region of the strong sensations which seem to be perceptions of the external world, his lucidity and confidence return. Mind, he explains, as revealed somehow through memory is a hopeless puzzle, but matter as affirmed by perception has no difficulties at all; the inexplicable facts which confounded us before being now replaced by facts which are perfectly explicable. What then are the facts of the new order which Mr. Mill believes himself to have explained? The strong sensations themselves? No, but only the perceptions which they seem to be, and the seeming objects of the perceptions. The material universe taken for granted in practical life, explored by science, puzzled over by philosophy, he has identified as the illusory projection in space and time of our perceptions, which in turn he identifies as perversions of our strong sensations: but the strong sensations which have lent themselves to the travesty are no more explained than the faint sensations, or memory, by which it has been effected. The *mise en scene* and the masquerade are accounted for, but not the actors behind the masks. On the ground that they are directly known, or are presupposed in any explanation of what we do know, that we have had experience of them or can't account for experience without them, all these innumerable sensations in continuous succession, each with its innumerable relations to the others, are passed into consciousness and into philosophy unchallenged, without a question as to where they came from or how they happen to be what they are. Here, as before, Mr. Mill invoking the highest human wisdom available admits the inexplicable facts without any theory as to how they take place: and here, as before, so to admit them is to admit other facts along with them which establish a theory.

Excluding the artificial and illusory forms which they wear as impressions or perceptions of external realities, the sensations of the new order are distinguishable as follows: (1) Negatively, no one of them affirms more than the fact of its own existence. A sensation which is a memory "involves the suggestion and belief that another of which it is a copy or representation actually existed in the past" (p. 247). But a sensation of the kind we are now considering makes no such suggestion, involves no such belief: it does not present itself as the copy, or representation, or affirmation of anything else. This being so we cannot account for it as a product, or effect, or derivative of any other sensation, or of the ego which we admitted to account for a memory. Consciousness, whether a bare series of associated sensations, or the integrated phenomena of a spiritual substance, is not the author or source of it. It is, therefore, self-produced, which is great nonsense, or just *is* without being produced at all. (2.) Positively, this isolated, non-suggesting sensation is distinguished as a strong or vivid sensation. It presents itself in consciousness with an overpowering vigor and violence, putting down and thrusting out for the moment the memories and ideas of things, which with all their suggestiveness have the infirmity of being "faint." Of this superior force we must say what was said of the sensation itself, that consciousness is not the source of it. (3.) Nevertheless this overbearing alien and intruder makes itself at home on arrival in the most surprising manner. Not originating anywhere or anyhow, born out of nothing to vanish into nothing, it discloses during its momentary being every one of the highly differentiated characters required to fit it as an element of consciousness. It identifies itself as a sensation in general, say of the genus color, of the species white, of the individual paper-weight; and in doing so enters into innumerable relations of difference, resemblance, coexistence, and succession with all other contents of consciousness. As of its existence and its strength, so of these traits and aptitudes; they do not originate in the consciousness which they qualify it to enter; they simply *are*. Such are the sensations which make up, at any moment and throughout its history, by far the larger portion of consciousness. They are the inexplicable facts which Mr. Mill accepts without any theory

as to how they take place. The question is whether anything else must be accepted along with them.

No, Mr. Mill says, beside the facts themselves we need accept nothing whatever save the bare possibility attested by them of other similar facts. Beneath our memories we did postulate a real concrete existence of some kind, which turned out in the end to be nothing other than Mind. But beyond our strong sensations we postulate nothing more concrete or real than the Possibility of Sensations. A smaller or safer concession than this could not well be made; perhaps no more innocent abstraction ever entered philosophy. As before, however, let us see what must necessarily be said of the new postulate. (1.) A sensation I have had or have is one thing; the possibility which it attests of a sensation I might have had or am likely to have is another: and this possibility, again, of a contingent sensation is not identical with the sensation in which the possibility is realized. Perhaps a given sensation never appears in my experience at all, but there is always the possibility that it may appear. So of any other given sensation; so of all my sensations together, or my consciousness as a whole. Their existence or non-existence has nothing to do with the possibility of their existence; the former is not identical with, or inclusive of, the latter. The possibility of sensation is distinct from, exterior to, and independent of, the actual sensations which make up consciousness. (2.) The actual sensations themselves are short-lived and transitory: they enter consciousness abruptly, occupy it for a moment, and quit it as they came. But the possibility existed before their coming and will endure after they are gone. Through all the changes of consciousness, beyond and independent of them, there is the Permanent Possibility of Sensation. (3.) This possibility, in fact, is an incalculable multitude of possibilities. The actual sensations are quite beyond number, and each represents innumerable possibilities. (4.) This throng is not a rabble but an organized array. The individual possibilities fall into classes and into groups of associated possibilities. (a) Thus beyond all my sensations of color is the permanent possibility which I call the sense of vision; beyond those of sound, odor, savor, etc., the possibilities called the senses of hearing, smell, taste, muscular action, and the rest. (b) This

symmetrical distribution into classes of similar sensations is crossed by another of differing sensations into groups which reveal other possibilities. Thus, beyond the association of all my sensations of color with particular sensations of muscular action lies the permanent possibility called the organ of vision ; beyond the association of all sensations whatever that comprehensive group of possibilities called the bodily organism. (c) This distribution revealing what we call the body is crossed by yet others revealing other bodies. Beyond the union of particular sensations of color, resonance, and resistance is that remoter group of possibilities named the paper-weight, behind which lie innumerable other groups still farther away, all of which together we call the material universe. (5.) These extra-conscious possibilities, thus differentiated and organized, are the conditions *sine quâ non* of our sensations themselves. So far as appears hitherto we might accept them as a mere enumeration or transcript of the facts of experience, an abstract statement of the observed order of sensations widened so as to take in what might have been experienced in the past and what probably will be or haply may be experienced in the future. But we have now reached the point where, as before in explaining memory, it is necessary to ascribe to these inert abstractions certain specific functions, the exercise of which is indispensable to, and therefore presupposed in the explanation of, any sensations whatever. For the previous conditions of one of my sensations is not in the other, accompanying or antecedent sensations. It is an individual thing which never was in my consciousness before and never will be in it again ; and so is every other member of the series. No one such individual can possibly have anything to do with the appearance of the others. If each member of the series depends upon previous conditions, in any meaning of dependence and condition, if there are invariable antecedents without which it never presents itself, then such antecedent conditions are exterior to the series, and as outside the series there is nothing but the possibilities, they are in the possibilities. Kant somewhere made the observation that the phenomena of consciousness as they stand can only be accounted for by the existence of feelings and thoughts which we are not conscious of ; " we must, he said, have unconscious ideas."

This remark has been developed by Hamilton into a well-known theory of Unconscious Mental Modifications; and within ten years past by Hartmann into a doctrine of the universe under the title of the Philosophy of the Unconscious, which, mad as it looks, is the sanest product of German speculation. But Mr. Mill will not hear of unconscious mental modifications. A feeling which is not felt is for him a simple contradiction of terms. He admits such modifications in the only shape in which he can attach any distinct meaning to them, "namely, as unconscious modifications of the nerves," (p. 357), that is of the permanent possibilities of sensation which we call the nervous system. If the interposition of the nervous system is admitted anywhere it must be admitted everywhere; there is no change in consciousness (no new sensation) not preceded by unconscious changes of the most extensive and complex kind in the peripheral organs, the afferent nerves, and the nervous centers. That is, extra-conscious modifications of the group of permanent possibilities which constitutes the bodily organism are the invariable antecedents of all consciousness, the previous conditions in the absence of which no sensation and no relation between sensations will present themselves. This is what we remarked before; the anterior organization of the body determines the character of every constituent of consciousness, assigns to it every one of its relations of resemblance, coëxistence, and succession, and consequently controls the whole association of ideas by which consciousness is explained. (6.) As the conditions of every change in consciousness are previous changes in the bodily organism, so the conditions of bodily changes are previous changes in surrounding bodies. Far beyond the farthest reach of any sensation, the coëxisting groups of possibilities perpetually act and react upon one another, possibility encountering possibility, resisting, controlling, perhaps suppressing it. "There is surely no more difficulty," says Mr. Mill, in conceiving the annihilation or alteration of the possibilities while absent, than of the sensations themselves when present." (p. 256). The activities of the world about us which scientific realism describes as the communications of motion or the transformations of force are the reciprocal modifications of permanent possibilities. (7.) The body is descended from parent bodies in

a pedigree stretching back to the primordial forms which were the ancestors of all: besides the previous conditions of each change in it there are the previous conditions of its being and organization, a series of groups of possibilities connected by what biology calls the law of heredity and acted on by what the Darwinians call Natural Selection, or Survival of the Fittest. "Asexual" possibilities are delivered of new ones, or possibility coupled with possibility begets a third, the consequence of the manoeuvre, if we may be permitted to say so, being the flourishing races of animated possibilities in being to-day. Moreover, each of all the inanimate bodies which make up the rest of Nature has its pedigree as well, a vaster succession which takes in the other. The sequence of events variously described in science and philosophy as the concourse of atoms in a vacuum or in an aether, the differentiations of the plenum, the modifications of the substance, the harmonies of monads, the processus of the absolute, and in many another magnificent phrases, is in fact the series of changes in Permanent Possibilities of Sensation. Mr. Mill, although extremely shy of these cosmological retrospects, finds that the whole variety of the facts of Nature as we know it is given in the mere existence of our sensations and in the order of their occurrence (p. 257). In the same sense Professor Bain accepts the theory of universal evolution, and Professor Fraser, in his *Life of Berkeley*, says tranquilly that there is room and to spare in the Berkeleian theory of matter for all the generalizations of science. (8.) It would appear then, that Mr. Mill is simply giving new names to old things, describing the realities of being in a dialect of his own according to the dearest privilege of every philosopher. The possibility of sensation is credited with every essential attribute and function ever ascribed to matter by anyone: it is distinct from consciousness, exterior to it, independent upon it, not conscious itself yet in remote perspectives of the past, the present, and the future, providing the conditions *sine quâ non* of consciousness. Is it not then what everybody means by matter? No, says Mr. Mill, for "the condition of a phenomena needs not be anything positive or objective; it may be anything positive or negative, actuality or possibility, without which the phenomenon would not have occurred, and which may therefore be

justly inferred from its occurrence" (p. 258). So the succession of possibilities flowing forth through all time and space is nothing more real in itself than time and space are real: but happening to be unarrested at what we call the surface of our planet it develops into the immediate antecedents of the only reals there are, the sensations which make up a consciousness, including presumably the ego which is their common and permanent element. Without stopping to ask how possibilities can yield actualities, or negative factors a positive product, whether the last phases of the process can be real if the earlier ones are unreal, let us see if Mr. Mill himself ascribes to any of these unreal negatives, reality in his own positive meaning of the word. "I am aware," he says, "by experience, of a group of permanent possibilities which I call my body, and which my experience shows to be an universal condition of every part of my thread of consciousness. I am also aware of a great number of other groups, resembling the one which I call my body, but which have no connection, such as that has, with the remainder of my thread of consciousness. This disposes me to draw an inductive inference that those other groups are connected with other threads of consciousness, as mine is with my own" (p. 259). The inference is confirmed by subsequent experience. "I find that my subsequent consciousness presents those very sensations of speech heard, etc., which being the effects or consequences of actual feelings in my own case I should expect to follow upon those other hypothetical feelings if they really exist." The result of this happy induction is, we need hardly say, the discovery of—Mrs. Mill, Mr. James Mill, the other relatives, the friends, enemies, and acquaintances of our Mr. Mill, and more remotely of men generally, or mankind. We are sorry to have to add that the critics have pronounced every one of these "inferences" a flagrant *non-sequitur*, and it does seem that the induction halts in a fashion hardly to be expected from the author of *Logic*. But it is not our purpose here to oppose the entrance of any reality Mr. Mill consents to admit. Having emptied the universe by the great Hamiltonian Law of Parsimony we are glad to see him repeople it, if by nothing better than an inductive inference. Only we have to observe that every consciousness ascertained by the induction is a cause

or source or previous condition or indispensable antecedent of the sensations in Mr. Mill from which the induction departs and by which it is confirmed.* This being so it is a permanent possibility of sensation for Mr. Mill, and the question is what are the specific differences and limits which distinguish it from possibilities of the unconscious kind. The popular distinctions between conscious and unconscious, living and not living, are left far behind by the ultimate, widest generalizations of philosophy. By Spinoza thought and extension (mind and matter) are identified as two essences of the same Universal Substance; the material Monad of Leibnitz is a sensitive, intelligent being, receiving impressions and replying to them; with Hegel, Nature is a phase of the Absolute Idea, with Schopenhauer of the Absolute Will, and with Hartmann it is the Unconscious Idea; for Mr. Lewes' sensation and motion are two sides of the same differentiation of the Plenum; and Dr. Tyndall is surprised to find the potency of Mind in Matter. Nor have the distinctions lost by philosophy been found by science. Its highest molecules—are they organic or inorganic? its lowest organisms—plant or animal? The three kingdoms, mineral, vegetal, animal, meet in a bit of protoplasm. Which will it be? All these groups of possibilities, with their unstable boundaries and vanishing differentia, are represented in Mr. Mill's consciousness by groups of sensations certainly not more distinguishable. What criterion enables

* The series established by the induction is:—(1) The Ego of A which is the common element of (2) A's consciousness whose universal condition is the group of possibilities constituting (3) A's body, modified by (4) sensations whose source is (5) B's body united to (6) the thread of B's consciousness integrated by (7) B's Ego. Now the extremes of the series, the Ego of A and the Ego of B affect one another across or through all the intermediate terms 2-6, that is, are possibilities of sensation for one another. Add that the series may be indefinitely extended by interpolating between Nos. 4 and 5 which stand for the direct action of B's body on A's, all those intermediate possibilities by which absent bodies act on each other, e. g., the Pyramids, the Iliad, the Telegraph, any monument of art, any work of literature, any change whatever wrought by men in the Permanent Possibility called Matter. Mr. Mill turned, not very adroitly, the objection of one of his critics that his theory made no provision for the intercourse of bodies. What he ought to have been asked for was an explanation of the intercourse of consciousness or Egos, the only concrete reals he admitted. A concrete real B produces real changes in the concrete real A: if this is done indirectly the intermediates must be as real as the extremes A, B: the Pyramid as the Pyramid Builder.

him to say, this group of sensations represents a conscious, that one an unconscious, group of possibilities? Resemblance to his own body? But all bodies in their essential properties (all groups of possibilities in their elementary relations) resemble his; all in their contingent modifications differ from his. Non-connexion with his thread of consciousness? No body but his own is connected with it. The production of the criteria, the classification of Mr. Mill's sensations, would have been a revolution in human intelligence. The lack of the criteria exposes Mr. Mill's idealism to the invasion of universal realism. The induction which warrants the inference of a consciousness like Mr. Mill's at one point, warrants the inference of some kind of a consciousness at any point. However suppose the criteria found and the frontiers erected. Then a particular group of sensations warrants the inference, or putting it upon stronger ground, requires the postulate, of an objective ego in explanation of the origin and grouping of the sensations. Another group, say the group called the paper-weight, requires no such postulate, authorizes no such inference; an objective ego is not the source or antecedent of the sensations composing it. But indisputably, as much as the others, they authorize the inference or require the postulate of some kind of an objective reality, if not conscious then unconscious, as the source or previous condition of them. For equally with the others, they intrude themselves upon consciousness in spite of it, in relations maintained in spite of it, and in relations of the same elementary kind. If room can be found for the conscious reals imported by Mr. Mill to account for one class of his sensations, room must be found for reals of some kind behind the other class which equally requires accounting for. The possibility called the paper-weight, or the solar system, or the stellar universe, is quite as remarkable in its way as the possibility called Mr. James Mill; or at any rate is as real as he.

Without pursuing the discussion any farther let us sum up by saying, that to accept with the inexplicable facts of Memory a common element of consciousness is to re-instate Mind; to accept with the inexplicable facts of Sensation a permanent possibility of sensation is to re-instate Matter. We concluded before that if any of the realities which are taken for granted

in practical life are abandoned to criticism, all must be abandoned: we conclude now that if any are admitted against criticism all must be admitted.

A philosophy is never refuted. It simply gives up the ghost and is gathered to its fathers. Criticism never stunted its growth or hastened its decay, for it is the highest satisfaction possible in its place and time of the not yet exhausted impulse of the intellect to speculation. But on the other hand no curative or tonic or stimulant will keep it alive when its hour comes, and its hour comes when the abstractions, coherent enough to resist the strains of criticism, break up beneath the overwhelming pressures of reality. The fabric stands intact within the shelter of its cell; and goes to pieces when taken abroad and put to practical use. It survives *there* so long as it is fit to survive, and the fittest survives the longest; but the delicate adjustments of secluded speculation are no match for the violences of Natural Selection, and it goes down in its turn in the universal Struggle for Life. We have not dwelt on Mr. Mill in the hope of confuting him but principally because there was that in the blended earnestness, candor and carelessness of his thinking which exposed him more directly than most philosophers to the supreme confutation which awaits all alike. For there was no trace of the *dilettante* and *virtuoso* in Mr. Mill. His doctrine of the universe was not worked out at all as a contribution to the cabinet of ancient and modern curiosities in speculation, but as a rule and way of right living. It was an interpretation of human Experience by one of the sincerest of men, for the highest of all ends, that human experience in the future might be better and happier than in the past. What Mr. Mill taught he was the first to practice. Probably no thinker, certainly no English thinker, since Berkeley came so near to the realization of his own abstractions; permitted so much of the temper of secluded thinking to pass into his character and life. He carried with him the close air, the stained lights, the delicate precautions and the shelter of his cloister wherever he went; fought his own calamities and the rough realism of English Society under the

perpetual reserves of idealism. So it came about that the confutation we spoke of as awaiting all philosophies found Mr. Mill out in his own time and is on record in his own words. We have only to turn from the strange induction by which he satisfied himself of the existence of other consciousnesses like his own to the passage in the Autobiography where the son speaks of the father and the husband of the wife, or from the notion of Possibilities of Sensation with which he abolishes the Matter of Sir William Hamilton to the Essays on Nature and Theism, to see that the artifices of the metaphysician had nothing to do with the convictions of the man. All the delicate devices of methodical afterthought, the patient rehearsals of disciplined abstracts within the brain, go down at once before the inrush of human feeling with its interrupted transports and its inevitable agony; while Nature rises beyond, formidable and menacing, with her intractable material, her malignant forces, and her discomfited God. *Naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurrit!* The *argumentum baculinum* in the hand of Dr. Johnson was a poor affair; but if it is the retort of the universe? Let us say it with the affection and honor due to a good and a great man, and to everything he loved and honored: the refutation of Mr. Mill's philosophy is in nobody's criticism but in the grave of Mrs. Mill.

And what philosophy is there that can sustain this ordeal of life and death? The hostilities of rival systems it sustains and is no whit the worse for them, coming out of the conflict like one of Milton's angels with much effusion of ichor but sound and whole as ever. Yet it disappears and is heard of no more. The Cartesians were filing out of the arena when Locke rode into it. Transcendentalism was dying already, like the Templar in his saddle, when touched by the lance of Positivism. Who killed Transfigured Realism? Not the critics, for Mr. Spencer is equal to the whole throng of them. Or Reasoned Realism? The critics have hardly troubled Mr. Lewes. The truth is that the mob of human passions is perpetually breaking into the ring of the philosophers, or, to give a worthier expression to a great fact, the practical realities of human life are forever busy making away with the frail abstracts which express them. It is the Cosmos which insists on being affirmed and refuses to be represented that overpowers the Cosmologies.

ARTICLE VIII.—SOME NEW YORK CUSTOM-HOUSE:
INVESTIGATIONS.

WHEN President Hayes said in his letter to Secretary Sherman that he wished the collection of the revenue to be free from partisan control, it is said there was no little jest and merriment among Custom-house officials over the idea that that powerful institution should ever lose its political character. They had heard talk of reform all their official lives, and yet the Custom-house has continued to be a tremendous political engine, which, as they suppose, could hardly be worked on any other system than that of the spoils. More than thirty years ago a man who had seen more of the Custom-house than was good for him, declared it was the most powerful piece of political machinery for neutralizing opinion and controlling elections that he had ever seen or heard of in any country. Even as far back as 1826, Mr. Benton, who, with others, were appointed a Committee of the Senate to inquire into the patronage of the New York Custom-house, exclaimed, in view of its officers, at that time less than two hundred: "A formidable list indeed! Formidable in numbers, and still more so from the vast amount of money in their hands, the action of such a body of men, supposing them to be animated by one spirit, must be tremendous in elections, and that they will be so animated is a proposition too plain to need demonstration." This was said more or less in prophecy, but in prophecy which could not be expected to anticipate altogether that the connection of politics with the New York Custom-house would be the fruitful source of that fraud and corruption which in a generation or so have called for half a dozen investigations at the hands of Congress.

Now, from 1789, when the revenue business of the country began to take shape, down to 1830, though there were more or less mismanagement and looseness among Custom-house officers, this was not especially the fault of politics, and on the whole collectors and their subordinates in those days were such as they naturally would be when the affairs of the country were

in the hands of those great civilians who succeeded each other from Washington to Jackson. But what with the law of 1820, making collectors of the customs together with public officers in general to be appointed for the term of four years, and removable at pleasure, we begin to see signs of that political pressure, when, as Benton said, the President can and will extend, or deny to the formidable list of Custom-house officers a valuable public as well as private patronage, according to the part which they shall act in State as well as Federal elections. No such pressure was to be exercised indeed by John Quincy Adams, but the case was very different with Andrew Jackson. From the hour of his election, Jackson was bent on reform, and reform with him meant the removal of his political enemies to be succeeded by his friends. Among these removals was Jonathan Thompson, collector of the port of New York. Thompson had been collector since 1825, and was in all respects a worthy and efficient officer, but he had to be removed on the score of political justice, and it is said that the New York politicians were thrown into spasms because he was retained a few days longer after Jackson's election.

When it comes to his successor, the place was given to Samuel Swartwout, a man who, in the language of the Committee appointed to inquire into his subsequent defalcations, was "wholly irresponsible in pecuniary reputation, notoriously prone to hazardous speculations, deeply embarrassed from them, and always in want of funds." From the first he was a firm believer in the doctrine of the spoils, carrying his faith into practice, and holding fully, to use his language, that "no d—— rascal who made use of his office or its profits for the purpose of keeping Mr. Adams in, and General Jackson out of, power, is entitled to the least lenity or mercy, save that of hanging." Accordingly, Swartwout was just the man to carry out General Jackson's ideas of reform. Having disposed of the Adams men, it was always a question of politics as to those who wished to be his subordinates. If a man wants to be inspector of customs, he must come with the endorsement that he is "a warm political friend, and a strenuous advocate of the present administration." If one would have the position of auditor or book-keeper, it settles the matter that "his politics are of the

right kind," that "he is a Democrat of our stamp," that "he breasted the storm of Whiggery in 1834." Whoever aspires to be weigher or guager must come with the recommendation that "he is an old and active politician," "one of the most effective electioneers in our ward," etc. In this way Swartwout, under Jackson, converted the New York Custom-house into a nest of busy, buzzing, and often most unscrupulous politicians.

We shall now see how Swartwout carried out his doctrine of the spoils. He had said before his appointment that "in the general scramble for plunder he rather *guessed* he should get something, though it might be nothing but the Bergen lighthouse," and he had too much regard for his reputation to have his prophecy fail of fulfillment. Consequently, having got a collectorship he had such an eye to the perquisites that within a year after his appointment he began to feather his nest. To what extent does not appear, because the Committee could not get at the true relations of collectors, receivers, and disbursers of public money so as to distinguish debtors from defaulters. The accounts were so mixed that the naval officer and auditor who are designed to act as a check on the collector could not keep track of him. Then, again, there was no sub-treasury in those days, and Swartwout saw fit to discontinue the use of banks as depositories of the public money, and allowed it to accumulate on his hands. The collector was permitted to execute the law as he understood it, we are told, and he understood it to mean, doubtless, that a collector is to get all he can, if he is not to keep all he gets. Of this at least we are certain, that after serving four years he had \$201,000 in his possession which was not charged on the books, but which, however, he was allowed to retain for several months on the ground that certain merchants had claims against him which he was entitled to pay with this money.

Thus matters stood in 1834. Reform had made such progress under collector Swartwout that even Martin Van Buren objected to his reappointment. But General Jackson wishing to reform it altogether had him appointed a second time, while the collector seems to have felt more than ever the value of his services to the country, and was certainly a more wily if not a wiser

man. According to the report of the Committee, the auditor and naval officer were kept in total ignorance as to the true state of the accounts; the cashier and his assistant frequently made no entry of money abstracted by Swartwout for his private expenses; for three years after his second appointment he was allowed to carry on his operations without any security except that based on his own responsibility; whereas, but for a combination of unprincipled men to plunder the treasury, his frauds could not have been concealed for a day, and certainly not for a week. But, like collector, like subordinates, and the auditor would not tell, and the assistant cashier would not tell. The auditor had known for a long time how things were going even before Swartwout's second appointment, but when asked why he did not inform the Committee of the Senate that the collector had not paid over to the cashier \$30,000 in his possession, he replied: "Because we clerks of the Custom-house consider ourselves as in the service of the collector, and not in the service of the United States." In like manner, the assistant cashier would not open his lips "in conformity with Custom-house practice." These answers, say the Committee, afford a valuable instance of Custom-house morality. The conclusion of the whole matter is that the collector embezzled \$1,225,705.69; or as the Committee say impressively in addition to the figures, one million, two hundred and twenty-five thousand, seven hundred and five dollars, and sixty-nine cents. Of course, under the circumstances, and after eight years of laborious service, the collector naturally thought it would benefit his health to travel in foreign parts, and he accordingly took passage for Europe.

Come we now to a second investigation in view of the doings of Swartwout's successor, Jesse Hoyt; and in this case it is a personal friend of Martin Van Buren, as Swartwout was a personal friend of Andrew Jackson. In fact, in early life Hoyt turned up as a lawyer in Van Buren's office, and says he is mainly indebted to him for his political education. When made collector in 1839 he was bankrupt in credit, but being a shrewd and reckless political manager, the Custom-house afforded a fine field for the exercise of his accomplishments. Hoyt, too, was for hanging every rascal who had made use of his office for keeping Mr. Adams in, and Gen. Jackson out of

power; and what we know is that three years after this virtuous collector received his appointment, another dignified committee is sent up from Washington "to inquire and report upon all cases of bribery, abstraction of goods from the public stores, misapplication of public property, fraud, partiality, misconduct or irregularity in the Custom-house service or among the public officers or agents engaged therein." It seems absurd that one investigation should so soon follow on the heels of another, but collectors in those days had short memories. At any rate, it appears from the Report that Hoyt ruled his subordinates with a high hand; that he was even more averse to careful book-keeping than his predecessor, that he kept large sums of money in his personal sub-treasury with which to meet contingencies, and that there were "evidences of official delinquency, if not downright corruption, which have but seldom, if ever, occurred in any civilized country on the face of the earth." It was hard to get at all the facts of the case because Hoyt objected, while his subordinates if they told all they knew, did not tell more than they knew. For instance, after the Commissioners began their work Hoyt gave peremptory orders to have the official papers and correspondence sent to his house, not choosing to remember that by a law of 1789 all the public or official books, papers, and accounts of a collector resigning or deceased shall be delivered over to his successors as the property of the United States. Accordingly, he was greatly disgusted to learn that one of the Commissioners had taken possession of the books and carried them off to Washington. It is certain, at least, that books or no books, all sorts of irregularities were practiced; that there were false entries, undervaluations, and artful devices calculated to elude detection; that there was partiality in the appraisement of goods, while different importers had been subjected to the payment of different rates of duty; that suits were instituted and then settled by a system of "compromises" because they could not be sustained; that all the supplies for the Custom-house were furnished at second-hand through individuals selected by Hoyt, and that the difference between the market prices and the prices actually paid constituted an enormous profit which went into his pockets; that in three years \$35,000 might have been

saved to the government in the matter of stationery; that he rented five stores from which he accumulated \$30,000 at an expense to the Government of \$90,000; and that the amount of his indebtedness to the Government when driven from office must have been \$300,000. Then, again, he had his tools, notoriously Wasson and Cairnes, one of whom began as a poor collector and ended with setting up an establishment for his wife and children, while the other remarked on one occasion that "if Mr. Van Buren was re-elected, he should be able to retain office four years longer, after which he would not want to hold office under any administration, as he should be able to retire."

All this time everybody was as sound as a nut on the political question. "The inspectors when absent from duty were generally engaged in electioneering or in procuring the naturalization of foreigners in the interest of their party, while a Custom-house tax was regularly levied and paid in advance of elections for City officers, Governors, and Representatives in the State Legislature, for Members of Congress, and for President and Vice-President of the United States. This tax was graduated on a scale corresponding to the salary received by each officer, and the importance of the pending election; and the refusal to pay it was invariably followed by a removal from office." "A system of favoritism was uniformly extended to the most violent political partisans who earned their favor by their devotion to the hand from which they received it." Meanwhile, it is not surprising to learn that while the cost of collecting the revenue was less than one and one half per cent. under Thompson it was more than two and a half under Swartwout, and nearly five and a quarter under Hoyt.

This then was the way matters stood in 1842. Within a few years the Custom-house had been harnessed to a system which was shameful and degrading, and which to this day has not been shaken off. In the appointment of Swartwout and Hoyt, Jackson and Van Buren are largely responsible for converting the Custom-house into an intolerable engine of corruption and oppression. The spoils system had at last taken root, and we see the fruits of it. Politicians and speculators are installed in office only to make it a means of plunder, and to corrupt the

entire service by their bad example. Merit gives place to partisanship, and honesty and independence to an obsequious spirit in which auditors and cashiers are in the service of the collector, while the collector is in the service of his party, the party meanwhile, being in the service of the politicians.

But let us pass on to the investigation of 1866 which concerned the operations of Collector H. A. Smythe. This was under Republican rule, and in the days of Andrew Johnson. That Smythe had an eye to business appears from a remark of his uttered the first day of his official life, that "the North river general order business is the big plum of the collector." Here it may be proper to say that an Act of 1846 inaugurated what is called the warehouse system, which, in 1854, the Government extended to private warehouses. Now, all unclaimed goods are sent to the general order store, which is so called in virtue of a general order issued by the collector to receive them. It is this general order business which Smythe had set his eye on as the collector's big plum, and which being in the unpurchased possession of Messrs. Humphrey & Co., they naturally wished to retain. Smythe remarked, however, that parties in Washington of large influence and big expectations must be taken care of, in which case Van Bergen & Co. must have three shares of the general order business, while Humphrey & Co. could have but one share. They could not have a larger proportion because he had got to pay \$20,000 out of it, \$5,000 being set down "political." A day or two after, Smythe sold out the whole general order business to Miller, Conger & Co. for \$40,000, offering a gratuity of \$3,000 to Humphrey & Co., which was indignantly rejected. In this case \$10,000 was to be set apart as a political fund of which Smythe was sole almoner, notwithstanding his oft repeated assertion that he was not to have a dollar of it. Here a new operator intervenes, E. C. Johnson, who testified that he had spent two or three thousand dollars in the November elections and among the bar rooms, and who now offered \$50,000 for the general order business, remarking that "this would knock the other arrangement into a cocked hat." Finally, the general order business of the whole city was in December, 1866, turned over to Myers and Smyth, in which case it was half proved to

have been boasted that this time no d—— Congressional investigating Committee could get hold of the arrangement." "To allow the inaugurator of such picaroon proposals and proceedings," say the committee, "to continue sitting at the receipt of custom must inevitably degrade manhood generally and essentially, if not entirely disorganize all the subordinate branches of the public service."

What use Smythe made of his power appears in the fact that of the nine hundred and three officers employed during his three years term of service, he effected eight hundred and thirty removals. "By his numerous changes, removals, appointments and re-appointments he has greatly disorganized, demoralized, and impaired the capacity and working force of the revenue service of the New York Custom-house. Faithful, experienced, capable men have, for no known cause, but the collector's capriciousness been made to give place not infrequently to incapacity, ignorance, vice, and, in one instance, to a convicted thief." In the mean time, a vast amount of money was delayed by a system of seizures and compromises; several officers were enriched over \$100,000 each above their salaries: with decreasing business the expenses of the Custom-house increased, it was said, \$100,000 annually; so that "in the opinion of the committee there was abundantly sufficient cause to warrant, require, and insure Smythe's removal from the New York Custom-house."

Let us now glance at the investigation of the alleged frauds in the New York Custom-house in 1872. This was under Collector Murphy, and in "the gross and shameless days" of B. G. Jayne, when that worthy, acting the part of special agent of the Government, was harrassing New York merchants by making oppressive seizures of their books and papers. According to Jayne's testimony he made thirty-four seizures between June, 1869, and January, 1871, which resulted, of course, in all manner of suits and compromises, while the amount paid into the treasury was \$617,683.76, one half of which was retained by the Government, while the other half was divided between the collector, the naval officer, and surveyor of the port of New York, whose salaries and emoluments were double or more than double that of the President of the United States. This time the "big

plum" of the collector was sold to Leet and Stocking, who, though spoken of with consideration in the Majority Report managed to keep from both committees all inspection of their books and papers, or any authentic statement of their receipts and profits even for a single week. What politics had to do with the Custom-house in those days we may gather from the fact that Murphy made three hundred and thirty-eight removals in eighteen months, while his predecessor, Mr. Grinnell, made five hundred and ten in sixteen months. One witness testified that in 1866 the subordinates of the Custom-house voluntarily contributed many thousands to the expenses of the campaign; another, that when he was appraiser a large collection was made for the Republican party in Connecticut; while Murphy instanced that when a collection was taken up for the campaign in 1870, but \$25,000 were received, whereas a contribution of two per cent. on the salaries would have yielded \$36,000. It is true, the Committee on the Majority Report "saw no reason why those who draw salaries may not as properly be invited to contribute as those who do not," but they certainly might have seen it if they had taken any pains to investigate the history and workings of the New York Custom-house. More to the point is the Report of the Minority, at least so far as they say that "the frauds, the misdemeanors, defalcations, and abuses to which we have referred in these pages have their well-spring in the necessary corruptions from the prostitution of appointments in the civil service to party ends." It is true, the Republicans learned this lesson from the Democrats, but they were apt learners, and what they practiced in 1872 was as bad, as far as it went, as what their teachers practiced in 1839, and in 1842. "Murphy's idea of the New York Custom-house," say the committee, "seems to have been that it was a political machine to be run exclusively and constantly in the interests of the party with which they happened to be acting at the time." Well, this was Swartwout's idea, and Hoyt's idea, and Smythe's idea, and it has been more or less the idea of nearly every collector for the last thirty-five years. This is but saying it is the idea of the system which was thrust upon the Custom-house in the days of Jackson and Van Buren, and to which it has been under bondage ever since. The committee

go on to say: "We might multiply instances to show that Murphy treated the official patronage in the New York Custom-house as so much merchandise to be bestowed and sold in what he might choose to regard as the interest of his political party." But Murphy could say in reply that he took the institution as he found it, and was only carrying out an ancient, if not honorable custom. It may have been his business to reform it, but usage is everything in this world, and usage doubtless taught him to believe that to separate the Custom-house from politics is contrary to nature.

If now we turn to the investigation under collector Arthur, we find most certainly some improvement on the old order of things, but much which is a continuation of it, and which, if not reformed altogether, may easily become as bad. Here we read the old story of political assessments; that one man for the last twelve years has paid sums amounting to \$100, \$200, and \$300, that he contributed \$800 to the Connecticut political fund; that under the present system the officers who are appointed through political influence are expected to make their offices contribute to the support of the party; and that most of the officials thus assessed accede to the demand, some of them repairing their diminished salaries by exacting or accepting from the merchants unlawful gratuities. Here we read of clerks receiving three or four hundred dollars in fees besides their salaries; of weighers who are never seen on the docks, while their assistants come late, leave early, and read the papers; of men who are deficient in a proper attention to business, as well as in business qualifications and character; while other men are more or less employed in private business to the possible detriment, in some cases, of the interests in the service. As one result of the investigation the Committee thought there should be a reduction of the Custom-house force twenty per cent, causing an annual saving to the Government of \$319,000.

Here, then, putting all these investigations together, is an astonishing state of things. Periodically the New York Custom-house is gone through with as though this operation were required by an article of the Constitution. Committees, more or less partizan, of course, are appointed by Congress, the unwilling

witnesses of the Custom-house are called on to testify, a vast amount of evidence is taken, majority and minority reports are made, of which two or three thousand copies are ordered to be printed, a great deal of excellent advice is given, while, perhaps, a collector and a few subordinates lose their places or hold them by being put upon their good behavior. Here, for instance, in less than twelve years have been three investigations into a vicious condition of things which the Republican party ought to have extirpated as far as possible from the moment they came into power. And yet in the face of these investigations, and what with the precedent of more than eighteen hundred removals since 1866, what is to hinder the Democrats, should they succeed at the next election, from clearing out the whole Custom-house force, and returning to the disgraceful days of Swartwout, Hoyt, and Jayne.

Are we forced to conclude, then, that neither party has really wished to reform the abuses of the Custom-house ; that though each wanted the officials of the other to attend strictly to the business of the government, they yet expected their own officials to use the Custom-house in the interests of the party to which they belonged. This is the real secret of a powerful opposition in the Republican party to the present efforts at reform, and from the first it has been so far evident that the Custom-house authorities are half-hearted in the matter, that, as the final result of the Jay Commission, it is pretty much decided to have them removed, and institute reform in head and members. At any rate, no administration could undertake a worthier task than to break up, so far as a single administration can break up, that unnatural alliance of forty years standing which at times has well nigh embraced the whole Custom-house force, and corrupted the entire institution. Of course they will say you cannot separate the Custom-house from politics ; as if the United States must hand over an institution for collecting the revenues of the country to be managed by the politicians, and everlastingly go through this farce of investigations ; as if, in fact, a condition of things which would be thrice ruinous to any private concern must be endured forever by a great human government.

There is good reason to believe, however, that the administration is not going to succumb so easily. Thus far there may have been something more of promise than performance, and they only can understand a difficulty like this who have tried to remove it. Certainly, there is a high degree of expectation that President Hayes will leave this Custom-house business a great deal better than he found it, and that he is preparing the way for a reform as "thorough, radical, and complete" as in this degenerate world we can well hope for. So far, at least, as he tries to equal his pledges he can rest assured of the sympathy and coöperation of the people, which are, in fact, the guarantee of ultimate success.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES.*—This volume contains the lectures originally delivered before the International Free Trade Alliance of New York by Prof. Sumner of Yale College in the spring of 1876. The author seeks to show by the history of the protective legislation of the United States, which he claims to have been framed in ignorance of its effects, and to have been frequently changed without any conception of the public interest, that such legislation tends to diminish national production.

In the first lecture he argues that as trade is absolutely free between the States of the Union with the best possible results, the same good results would follow were trade free between the United States and other countries. This, he says, is the true American system. Texas was won from Mexico, and when admitted into the Union was open to trade to the other States of the Union, while Mexico, of which it had been a part, remained under the former restrictions. A citizen of Vermont can trade freely with New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, "but if he wants to trade northward to Canada, it is regarded as fatal to him and to his country that he should do so freely."

In the second lecture he discusses the theory that the legislature of a State can direct and regulate the business of the citizens better than they can do it themselves, claiming it to be an American principle that no man shall obtain by law any advantage from traditional or fictitious privileges. He denies that taxation can ever be a productive force. This denial he enforces with great acumen and power, and illustrates in various ways. The arguments in these introductory chapters are not new, but are urged with much strength and ability.

The remainder of the volume is devoted to the history of tariff legislation in the United States. Beginning with the statement that "the war of American Independence was a revolt against unjust taxation, he speaks somewhat cursorily of the attempts

* *Lectures on the History of Protection in the United States*, delivered before the International Free-Trade Alliance. By W. G. SUMNER, Professor in Yale College. Reprinted from "The New Century." Published for the International Free Trade Alliance by G. P. Putnam's Sons, 182 Fifth Avenue, New York. 1877.

during the period of the Revolution to make treaties of commerce with other nations, and then more at length of the discussions in the constitutional conventions. He speaks of the legislation at that time as illustrating all subsequent tariff legislation in this country, and as "a grand grab struggle between interests and sections." He criticizes at some length the report on manufactures made in December, 1791, by Alexander Hamilton, to whose good faith and philosophical spirit he pays tribute.

He traces the establishment of protection in this country during the early part of this century, and sketches the commercial legislation during the Napoleonic wars and down to the close of the war with Great Britain, and gives the history of the tariff of 1816, remarking that down to 1832 tariff laws were passed in every presidential year except one. The tariff bill of 1824 comes in for a thorough examination, as does the bill of 1828. Following the history down to the present time, he concludes with several deductions.

1st. This notion that there is some means to increase, by an adjustment of taxes, the wealth of a country, has had a very full trial amongst us. It was inherited from older countries; it was hostile to all the beliefs and habits of thought of the American people and totally incongruous with our social and political system. The Americans adopted the notion, that they could get certain industries started, which would then go alone and become independent sources of wealth. "But instead of strong, independent industries, we have to-day only a hungry and clamorous crowd of infants."

2d. This continual law making about industry has been prolific of industrial and political mischief. It has tainted our political life with log-rolling, presidential wire-pulling, lobbying, and custom-house politics.

The book well sustains its author's reputation, but must be read to be appreciated. No sketch like that we have attempted can do it justice.

ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY.*—The interest newly awakened in the questions of Political Economy has led Mr. David A. Wells to publish some selected essays from the writings of F. Bastiat,

* *Essays on Political Economy.* By FREDERICK BASTIAT. English Translation, revised, with notes. By David A. Wells. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 182 Fifth avenue. 1877.

one of the leaders in opinion on this subject in France, who lived in the first half of this century. Some of these essays have been published in Germany, Italy, England, Belgium, and the United States, and in all these countries have passed through several editions. Their sprightliness of tone and fullness of illustration make them singularly attractive and interesting to all readers.

The first essay on "capital and interest" is largely devoted to showing that capital is entitled to remuneration, in other words, that interest is a legitimate result of the use of capital; a question which has hardly been brought into discussion in this country, but which has been much discussed in France; Mr. Proudhon and other Socialists claiming that "the productiveness of capital, which is condemned by Christianity under the name of usury, is the true cause of misery, the true origin of destitution, the eternal obstacle to the establishment of a true Republic." These ideas are beginning to obtain foothold in the United States, and the reproduction of this essay is very timely. Other essays, on "What is Government?" "The Law," and "What is Money?" exhibit the author's characteristics, and are interesting discussions of topics which will attract much attention, if they have not already done so.

The essay, however, which we think the ablest, the most interesting and the most suggestive, is entitled "That which is seen and that which is not seen," the object of which is to show that the effect of an economic law is not limited to its immediate visible influence, but is to be traced in ulterior consequences. In this essay occurs the famous illustration of "the broken window;" but the author does not confine himself to one illustration, but enlivens the discussion with such a variety of anecdote, explanation, and elucidation, that the reader is carried along with all the interest of a romance. Yet one feels inclined to ask, as of a romance, is it true? Does it express the whole truth? M. Bastiat states some things which "are not seen," that is, some remote consequences, does he state all? Take the "broken window" illustration as an example. A shopkeeper has a pane of glass broken, and a glazier is employed to replace it, and receives for his labor one dollar. This, says M. Bastiat, is what is seen. What is not seen is, that as the shopkeeper has spent a dollar upon this, he has it not to spend for anything else. If he had not spent it to replace his broken window he would have had it to replace his old shoes, or to add a book to his

library. "In short, he would have employed his dollar in some way which this accident has prevented." And "therefore," he argues, "neither industry in general nor the sum total of national labor is affected whether windows are broken are not."

The anecdote is first used to show that there is no profit in the destruction of property, either direct or remote. The author applies the same illustration and the same mode of reasoning to various forms of restriction. To the levy of taxes and the tariff laws he applies his theory, also to the employment of men by the government on public works, the use of machinery, and various other activities; and it is very interesting to see how in each instance he brings to the front some remote consequence which seems to have escaped the notice of the advocates of the opposing theory.

As in his illustration of the broken window, he says "if the shopkeeper had not spent his dollar to replace his broken window, he would have employed it in some way which this accident has prevented;" so he subsequently puts his theory into a more general statement. "If there is in the world a workman with unemployed arms, there is also in the world an unemployed dollar. These two elements meet and combine." But is there not something which is still unseen, at least by M. Bastiat and the political economists of his school. It is not true that the capitalist, although his money is unemployed, will always use it. He may think it safer and more profitable to allow it to remain unused for a time, waiting for new and more advantageous investments, than to expose it to risk by employing it at present, when the promise of remuneration is small and the danger of loss great. This is the meaning of the large amount of capital at the present moment unemployed in all the nations of the world, while there are thousands upon thousands of unemployed or poorly employed hands.

M. Bastiat says, "if you will go to the root of all the arguments, which are adduced in its [restriction] favor, all you will find will be the paraphrase of this vulgar saying: What would become of the glazier if nobody broke windows?" But this is the question of questions to-day: What shall be done with the workmen when capital does not furnish employment? It is useless to say to a starving workman with a starving family that supply and demand are equal and expect him to be satisfied with this aphorism. The immediate necessity is upon him, and he will

reply to the question which M. Bastiat quotes, "What would become of the glazier if nobody broke windows?" If nobody else breaks them, I will, for I must have work; and this answer has been given in substance all along our railroads and in our burning cities during the past summer.

It is the question of the hour, and those who wish to learn how one class of writers treat the subject, and who wish to be interested and instructed by a vigorous and animated discussion of related topics, cannot do better than to read the essay "that which is seen and that which is not seen."

CUNNINGHAM'S DISSERTATION ON THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS.*—This little volume considers (1) the Manuscripts, Editions, and Text, of the Epistle which bears the name of Barnabas; (2) its Plan and Character; (3) its Authorship; (4) the testimony of Antiquity respecting it; (5) the Epistle and Contemporary Influences; (6) the Theology of the Epistle. Then follows the Greek Text, Latin Version, Commentary, and English Translation. The work is the product of careful study, and well deserves the attention of all students who are interested in the early patristic literature.

BISHOP KIP ON THE CHURCH OF THE APOSTLES.†—Bishop Kip presents us in this volume with four Essays, on the following subjects: Creeds, Fellowship, Eucharist, Liturgies,—which are followed by a brief Conclusion. They are written in a reverential spirit. Their materials are drawn from Eusebius and his Continuator, and from Stanley's Lectures on the Eastern Church. Much valuable information is incorporated in them. The strong predilection of the author for the Anglican polity and worship is quite manifest in his judgments respecting the institutions of the primitive Church.

MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, VOL. XII.‡—Pages 289-536

* *A Dissertation on the Epistle of S. Barnabas*, including a Discussion of its date and authorship. By the Rev. WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM. Together with the Greek Text, the Latin Version, and a new English Translation and Commentary. London: Macmillan & Co. 1877.

† *The Church of the Apostles*. By the Right Rev. WM. INGRAHAM KIP, D.D., LL.D., Bishop of California. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1877.

‡ *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*. Comprising portions of his Diary from 1795 to 1848. Edited by CHARLES FRANÇOIS ADAMS. Vol. XII. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1877.

of this volume, the concluding volume of the series, are devoted to the Index, which, considering the extent and character of the work, is none too long. The volume embraces an account of the last days of Mr. Adams, up to the time when he fell at his post, in the House of Representatives, where he had maintained, with so much fearlessness, the cause of freedom against the encroachments and the violence of the representatives of the Slave Power. Partly owing to the strenuous political struggles in which he was so long engaged, and partly from the warmth of his temper, this extended Diary of Mr. Adams contains a great quantity of vituperative writing. If we cannot accept, in many cases at least, the verdicts and estimates which he records with reference to his contemporaries, they are seldom destitute of a racy quality which makes them interesting, and they have all the spirit which might be expected in contemporary sketches, taken from the life, by a vigorous hand. Of Mr. Adams's uprightness and patriotism, and of his great public services, there can be but one opinion, whatever regret may be felt at the infirmities of temper which are so fully exhibited on the pages of this Memoir.

LIGHTFOOT'S *S. CLEMENT OF ROME*, AN APPENDIX.*—The recent discovery of the concluding portion of the Epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians, both in the Greek and in a Syriac translation, has led Dr. Lightfoot to prepare the present volume, by way of supplement to his formerly published edition of Clement's Epistle. The newly discovered matter is, from various points of view, of much interest; and the comments and discussions of the editor are marked by the learning and judgment which distinguish all of his productions.

SELECTIONS FROM *EPICETUS*.†—We can hardly call this tiny book a collection of gems; for what did Epictetus write that is not a gem? It is a selection of characteristic utterances of the Stoic Sage, which may serve to acquaint the reader who goes no farther, with the peculiar flavor of his noble teachings. Whoever reads this volume appreciatively is pretty likely to be enticed to the perusal of all the writings of the most striking of the Stoic teachers.

* *S. Clement of Rome*. An Appendix containing the Newly Recovered Portions. With Introductions, Notes, and Translations. By J. B. LIGHTFOOT, D.D., Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. London: Macmillan & Co. 1877.

† *Selections from Epictetus*. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1877.

ROMANISM AS IT IS.—The Rev. Samuel W. Barnum, who is known as a painstaking and accurate scholar, published in 1871 a book with the above title, which was commended at the time in the *New Englander* as a valuable collection of facts and documents in exposition of the Roman Catholic System, which had hitherto not been easily accessible to the general reader in this country. Mr. Barnum has recently published a new edition of the book, to which has been added an Appendix of nearly a hundred pages. In this is given an account of the more important events of the last six years, which show what the working of the new system has been, since the decrees of the Vatican Council. An account is given of the Gladstone controversy, the Falk Laws, the Guibord case, and the state of Romanism in the various nations of Europe, as well as in this country. The book will be found to be a very convenient book of reference.

SPIRITE.*—This entertaining little story deals, as the title may indicate, largely in the supernatural. Spirite is a beautiful girl who is in love with the hero, but by a perverse and malicious fate is prevented from being seen by him, although they are repeatedly brought near one another. At length, in despair, she takes the veil, and soon dies. But she appears to the object of her love, succeeds in weaning him from every other attachment, until finally he dies, and enters into a blissful union with herself. The story is genuinely French, and sufficiently interesting to repay a perusal. The management of the celestial machinery is carried forward with the aid of a Swedish nobleman, a disciple of Swedenborg.

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* *Spirite*. By THEOPHILE GAUTIER. (Library of Foreign Tales.) Appleton & Co. 1877.

Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York City.

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